

The
Interaction
between
Democracy
and
Development

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Preface

Contrasts, sometimes extreme, are a characteristic feature of the beginning of the twenty-first century — contrasts between the level of development of States, which can range from apparently boundless affluence to the most absolute destitution, and contrasts between regimes marked by the rule of law, respect for human rights and the participation of citizens — in short, democracy — and ones where lawlessness, arbitrariness and tyranny prevail or, indeed, where prolonged conflict has led to the very breakdown of the State.

This situation cannot but demand the attention of an Organization which Jawaharlal Nehru once described as “the conscience of the United Nations system”, and whose mission is to work to achieve, through education, science and culture, “the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind”. The preamble to its Constitution explicitly recognizes the link between “the great and terrible war” and “the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men”.

Down through the years, UNESCO has therefore conducted research, organized debates, stimulated discussions, produced many publications and initiated concrete projects devoted to democracy and development. In particular, it has organized international conferences on democratic culture, on education for democracy and on democratic governance, as well as international conferences, symposia and meetings of experts on social development, the fight against poverty, exclusion and illiteracy, and science in the service of development.

UNESCO also participated very actively in the major United Nations conferences of the 1990s on various aspects of development — the environment, population, social development, human settlements — and on human rights and democracy. UNESCO’s many publications devoted to one or other of those topics attest to the importance that the Organization gives to them and have contributed significantly to this world-wide debate.

One issue, however, has not been addressed as such, namely, the relationship between democracy and development. Following the realization that development is not just a matter of economics and that, even in the “old democracies”, the dysfunctions of political institutions were hav-

ing a negative impact on living conditions, the question of the relationship between democracy and development could not but be taken up by UNESCO.

In order to improve our knowledge and understanding of these complex phenomena, it was necessary to contribute to the formulation of strategies capable of ensuring that equitable development and the “common welfare of mankind” are sustainable, and to help societies characterized by social harmony, the rule of law, respect for human rights and genuine democracy to thrive.

To look more deeply into the issue, a think-tank was set up in March 1998, the “International Panel on Democracy and Development (IPDD)”, chaired by Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali and made up of 20 leading international figures. I am most gratified that UNESCO has been able to benefit from the wisdom and experience of such eminent personalities and from the commitment of their Chairperson.

The think-tank began by discussing the conceptual framework and defining the broad lines of the main issues to be addressed. How does one define a democratic society today? What are the challenges facing democracy, in a world characterized both by “globalization” and by the self-imposed isolation of many communities? Why has development aid had mixed results? And, lastly, what is the true link between democracy and development? The Panel recognized that the sustainability of equitable development is closely bound up with democracy. It was of the opinion that true democracy, characterized by the rule of law, respect for human rights and recognition of the intrinsic dignity of all human beings, cannot be maintained unless people enjoy a minimum standard of living, which in turn requires a minimum level of development. In this light, Panel members sought to identify the kinds of action within UNESCO’s extensive fields of competence that could contribute to the emergence or consolidation of a democratic culture, at the same time as equitable economic and social development.

The recommendations that are the outcome of those discussions will be studied carefully, as befits the reflections of a Panel whose Chairperson and members are held in such high esteem, and will form a valuable guide for UNESCO’s action in these complex but absolutely essential areas.

I should like to thank Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Panel’s Chairperson, and all its members for enabling UNESCO, in so open and forthright a way, to benefit from their insights, competence and wisdom.



Koichiro Matsuura
Director-General of UNESCO

Introduction

For a long time, democracy and development remained concepts that were foreign to each other in the eyes of analysts. And in the 1960s and 1970s, few specialists attempted to establish a link between the two. During that same period, many developing countries achieved a significant growth rate despite being governed by authoritarian regimes. From the 1970s on, a number of questions began to be asked, particularly after people had started to become aware that development was a more complex phenomenon than had been thought, and one that would probably take longer to bring about than had been forecast. It was then realized that the concept of development could not be reduced solely to its economic and financial dimension, to which it had hitherto been confined, and that its social, cultural, political and environmental dimensions were just as crucial. The crisis of the 1980s, “development’s lost decade” in many regions of the world, prompted renewed questioning on the issue that seemed all the more urgent because authoritarian States were manifestly incapable of coming up with a solution to their difficulties. With the end of the bipolarization of the world, the decline of centralized State systems, the demise of most authoritarian governments and the emergence of new organizations spawned by civil society, the democracy/development dialectic finally became a central subject of contemporary debate.

Everyone now agrees that there is a close relationship between democracy and development. But what is the nature of those links? How do they hang together? Should some of them be reinforced, and if so which? How can the emergence of a democratic form of development, without which democracy would remain meaningless, be encouraged?

UNESCO, the only organization in the United Nations system whose Constitution refers to democratic principles, decided on 26 March 1998, to contribute to this vast issue by setting up a think tank.

This was the “International Panel on Democracy and Development” (IPDD), which was made up of 20 leading figures from every region of the world and from a wide range of disciplines, namely:

Robert Badinter (France), Former President of the French Constitutional Council, Senator; Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco), Former Director-General

of the Arab World Institute, Judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; H.R.H. Princess Basma Bint Talal (Jordan), Chairperson of the Board of Trustees, The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development; Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo (Spain)*; Former Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Professor of International Public Law and International Relations, University of Seville; Mohamed Charfi (Tunisia), Member of the Arab Institute for Human Rights; Pierre Cornillon (France), Honorary Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union; Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira (Brazil), President of the Brazilian Government's National Council for Women's Rights; Peter Glotz (Germany)*, Former Rector of the University of Erfurt, Director of the Institute for Media and Communications Management; Nadine Gordimer (South Africa)*, Nobel Prize for Literature (1991); Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom), Warden of St Antony's College, Oxford University; Rosario Green (Mexico)*, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Guo Jiading (People's Republic of China), Former official of the Permanent Mission of China, to the United Nations, New York, Executive Vice-Chairman of the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation; Han Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea), Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, Special Representative of the United Nations' Secretary-General in Cyprus; Abid Hussain (India), Former Vice-President and member of the Advisory Council of the, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, Special United Nations Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression; Attiya Inayatullah (Pakistan), Former Chairperson and member of the Executive Board of UNESCO, President of the Association for Family Planning of Pakistan; Kéba Mbaye (Senegal), Former Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, First Vice-President of the International Olympics Committee; Hisashi Owada (Japan), President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Professor; Waseda University, Former Permanent Representative of Japan, to the United Nations, New York; Bruce Russett (United States of America), Director of United Nations Studies, Yale University; Nicolas Valticos (Greece), Former Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, President of the Academy of International Law; Alexei Vassiliev (Russian Federation), Director of the Institute for African and Arab Studies

The Panel met on three occasions at UNESCO's headquarters, on 4-5 May 1998, 8-9 February 1999, and 3-4 April 2000, with myself acting as Chairperson. Its task was "to advise the Director-General with a view to car-

*Unable to participate in the meetings of the Panel.

rying out UNESCO's programmes relating to the building of democracy", and to submit to the Director-General its conclusions and its recommendations, with a view to shaping UNESCO's future action in the field of support for democracy.

Those responsible for the secretariat of the Panel were:

Francine Fournier, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences; Janusz Symonides, Director, Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace, Sector of Social and Human Sciences; Timothée Ngakoutou, Chief, Democracy Unit, Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace, Sector of Social and Human Sciences

Those three meetings gave rise to fruitful exchanges of views, though some divergences emerged in the course of them that were related to the participants' diversity of disciplines, cultures, sensibilities and experiences. The Panel tried to evolve a programme of action it could propose to UNESCO, it being understood that its priorities should naturally include the cultural dimension of development and the need to encourage the emergence of a democratic culture at world level.

Without claiming to be exhaustive, this work reproduces, first, a full account of the discussions, to which only nominal changes have been made in strict accordance with the speakers' remarks and views. It concludes with a series of recommendations which were adopted after a lengthy debate which is not reproduced in this work. In the interests of greater clarity, I took the liberty of slightly rearranging those recommendations, and I assume complete responsibility for that, as I do for this *Introduction*, which also aims to be a brief summary of our discussions.

The relationship between democracy and development

In order to analyse this relationship, it is important first to specify what is meant by the democratic imperative, then to define the concept of development, and finally to analyse the interaction between democracy and development.

The democratic imperative

Democracy is a system whereby the whole of society can participate, at every level, in the decision-making process and keep control of it. Its foundation is the full observance of human rights, as defined by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Pacts and Declara-

tion of 1993. And the promotion of those rights and the respect of differences and of freedom of speech and thought are indispensable preconditions for democracy. There can be no democracy without an independent judicial system and without institutions that guarantee freedom of expression and the existence of free media. The power to legislate must be exercised by representatives of the people who have been elected by the people. Laws must be implemented by legally responsible individuals, and the administrative apparatus must be accountable to the elected representatives. That is why a parliament that is truly representative of the people in all its diversity is indispensable for the democratic process. In this respect, the holding of free and fair elections by universal suffrage is a necessary, though not in itself sufficient, precondition for the existence of a democratic regime.

In short, democracy can be defined as a political system that is capable of correcting its own dysfunctions. But a true democracy cannot be restricted to this institutional framework alone. It also needs to be embodied in a culture, a state of mind that fosters tolerance and respect for other people, as well as pluralism, equilibrium and dialogue between the forces that make up a society. Unlike traditional conceptions, which are exclusively restricted to the domain of the State, the concept of democratic culture requires all social, financial, governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as the relationship which links or separates them, to be taken into account. The concept of democratic culture faced with the computer revolution is therefore both new and complex. It deserves to be examined more closely so that public opinion everywhere can understand the challenge it represents.

These basic democratic principles constitute a fundamental source of common values that can be described as the common heritage of humankind. Without those values there can be neither democracy nor sustainable development. But the recognition of universal values does not mean that a veil should be drawn over the specific historical, religious and cultural characteristics that make up the genius peculiar to each society and each nation State. For the general principles of democracy can be embodied in different ways, depending on the context. Thus, while democracy is the system in which "sovereign power lies with the people", the methods with which it can be exercised can vary depending on the social system and economic development peculiar to each country. Those methods also tend to change depending on political, demographic, economic and social change.

Democracy cannot be conceived of without freedom, but it also

entails the rule of law and the voluntary restrictions that result from it, in other words the existence of a common rule issued by those who have been chosen by the people to define its content.

More concretely, Panel members agreed that justice is a precondition of democracy. They also agreed that justice guarantees the exercise of democracy as it serves to enforce the principle of equality before the law, the right of all individuals to express their opinion within the society to which they belong, and the right to be heard and to put their case. Democracy is therefore viable only if it has a reliable and independent judicial system.

The free participation of citizens is a second precondition, since it allows them to exercise their right to freedom of thought and to be different. It also enables civil society to express itself not only within each nation, but also on the international scene — something which is becoming a necessity in an increasingly interdependent world.

As regards human rights, the dialectic relative to the universality of those rights and, by contrast with the distinctive features of social systems, the universality of the historical and cultural traditions and the economic contexts in which they are embodied, was the subject of lengthy debate. At the end of the debate, Panel members nevertheless reaffirmed their espousal of the terms of the 1993 Vienna Declaration, namely that “while the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms”.¹

The concept of development

There was a broad consensus on the analysis of development. Panel members were unanimous in asserting that development should be understood to mean the whole range of economic, social and cultural progress to which peoples aspire. That is the meaning of “sustainable human development” in the sense that the United Nations has given it.

Sustainable development is, then, multidimensional. It is no longer restrictively understood to be narrowly economic or financial. In order to be complete, it also needs to be cultural and social, and more broadly to

1. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Part I, paragraph 5.

take into account all the factors that help individuals to fulfil themselves. The environment, social justice, democracy, education and the sharing of knowledge are closely connected with development. That is why the right to development has a natural place among human rights.

This broadening of the concept of development has many implications. For example, it changes, by making it more complex, the view people long had of the problem of poverty. While the economic dimension is still preponderant, it is no longer sufficient to enable the problem to be apprehended as a whole. Helping people to escape poverty and creating a dynamic of development presupposes the satisfaction not only of needs directly connected with survival but of a whole series of needs as regards health, housing and education. This also presupposes a reinforcement of the ability of individuals and groups to take part in and influence decisions affecting them. Panel members also stressed that “development” and “justice” are indissociable, as development needs to be able to rely on the existence of clear and fair laws and rules.

The interaction between democracy and development

Democracy and development are complementary, and they reinforce each other. The link between them is all the stronger because it originates in the aspirations of individuals and peoples and in the rights they enjoy. Indeed, history shows that cases where democracy and development have been dissociated have mostly resulted in failure. Conversely, the interlinking of democratization and development helps both of them to take root durably. For if political democracy, in order to consolidate itself, needs to be complemented by economic and social measures that encourage development, similarly any development strategy needs to be ratified and reinforced by democratic participation in order to be implemented.

The interdependence of democracy, development and human rights was spelled out in the 1993 Vienna Declaration. Panel members pointed out that recognition of that interdependence of the right to democracy and the right to development is not something new. The United Nations Charter, international agreements, the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women all mention it. But the implementation of those rights, which have been endorsed by international law, entails both greater solidarity on the part of the international community and the respect by States of their international obligations.

Here again, Panel members saw the rule of law or the primacy of law as the thread that can link the construction and consolidation of democra-

cy to the construction and consolidation of development, as well as the way of consolidating their common bedrock: the respect of human rights. It is a fact that, if human rights are to be guaranteed and if democracy is to work, communities and individuals, both men and women, need not only to have access to justice but also, before that, to be aware of the law and to understand it. Similarly, the lack of justice directly compromises development, first because it encourages mismanagement and corruption, and second because it discourages investment and economic exchanges. There can be no development in a context of arbitrariness or in the absence of the rule of law. In order to construct and to institutionalize, there needs to be a minimum degree of certainty: one needs to know what rule is applicable and how it is applied. It should be pointed out that the notion of the rule of law or the primacy of law has wider implications than the much more concrete notion of rule by the law, which refers to the authorities' daily enforcement of existing laws, whether they be good or bad, just or unjust. The rule of law, on the other hand, which is the contrary of arbitrariness, is based on the reign of the general principles of the law and on the concept of justice in society, hence its importance in relation to a democratic government. That rule of law entails, for power to be exercised, legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Those three elements, which underpin the rule of law, are vital for both the democratic process and the process of development. But for that rule of law, which goes hand in hand with citizenship, to be able to establish itself within a society, a juridical culture needs to have grown up, and that is something which requires short-, medium- and long-term strategies to be prepared. For such a culture requires an apprenticeship, an education and the ability to understand legislation. It implies that everyone knows how justice works. But that knowledge is possible only if access to justice is equal and if it is the same for everyone. Unequal access to justice, depending on the socio-economic group to which people belong, depending on their ethnic group or their sex, for example, is in contradiction with justice and the rule of law.

Finally, democracy and development can together contribute to the consolidation of peace. Most of the time democracies settle their domestic disputes by peaceful means. Moreover, in addition to this preventive role, the democratic framework has often proved effective in settling international conflicts peacefully. Democracy is a factor of peace and therefore encourages development, which itself tends to consolidate the state of domestic peace and, consequently, international peace, since many wars originate from domestic conflicts. Democracy, development and peace form a trilogy, a common purpose.

While the relationship between democracy and development is now proven, it still needs to be clarified and defined, as do the impediments to the emergence of a sustainable democratic development.

The construction of democratic development

The process of constructing democratic development throughout the world needs to be defined in relation to the international context, that is to say in relation to globalization, to international organizations, to the impediments that need to be faced and to the ways they can be overcome.

Democratic development and globalization

Is globalization a challenge, an impediment or an opportunity for the future? Without wishing to jump to conclusions about the nature of the upheavals inherent in globalization, Panel members recognized that this phenomenon, understood to mean increased political, economic and social interdependence between all countries in the world, is both a major challenge that humankind must face at the beginning of the twenty-first century and a fact of life to which the international community must adapt itself. Insofar as it multiplies the possibilities of passing on information, makes it generally available and intensifies trade, globalization can be a genuine asset for democracy and development. But it can also constitute a major impediment because, if globalization is not democratized, it may well change the nature of democracy. That is why globalization should be subject to democratic regulations in economic and social matters. And it should be handled in such a way as to close the gap between poor and rich countries, between the most disadvantaged and the affluent, and also in such a way as to avoid creating a new form of discrimination between the IT-rich and the IT-poor, between those who are plugged into the internet and those who are not or will not be. Finally, it should be handled in such a way as to protect the wealth constituted by the world's cultural diversity.

But although States are subjected to contradictory influences introduced by globalization, whether as a result of the omnipresence of multinationals or as a result of the appearance of normative or jurisdictional international institutions, their role in the construction of democracy and the choice of development policies will remain crucial. More than that, this is a case where there is an obligation on the part of States, which, if they did not meet it, would call their political legitimacy into question. The best ways of encouraging governments to pursue long-term policies in favour of development and democracy at a domestic level therefore need

to be identified. Failing that, it will be difficult for such States to succeed in democratizing globalization.

At the same time, the increasing influence of non-governmental actors is a feature of modern democracies. Domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local associations, local authorities such as those of cities and communes, financial institutions, universities and research centres, as well as private economic agencies, find themselves intervening more and more directly in the affairs of States. Their influence on democratic development is already considerable at both domestic and international level. Major international NGOs have long extended their action beyond national borders and tackled the world dimension of contemporary problems. The increasing — and often necessary — role played by non-State actors at domestic and international level should therefore be taken into account. It is one of the preconditions for the emergence at world level of a more participatory form of democracy. However, the degree to which such actors, who should be accountable, are representative remains to be defined. It is also necessary to ensure the transparency of relations between such non-State actors, nation States and the international community.

In another connection, the democratic handling of the relationship between the majority and minorities constitutes a major challenge. It is a question of establishing what needs to be done to ensure that the many loyalties of individuals and societies are, as is only natural, a source of enrichment and an inspiring model of tolerance, instead of being distorted and turned into real impediments to democracy. There is no getting away from the fact that in a number of countries the introduction of formal democracy has triggered clashes of an ethnic nature. This is the case with countries where the formation of political parties and election campaigns are influenced by ethnic considerations, which results in the return of a form of “tribalism”: the vote, which is supposed to be democratic, is conditioned not by political programmes concerning the population as a whole, but by loyalty to an ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic group.

Another demonstrable fact is that there is obviously a very wide range of different situations: there can be minorities concentrated in one part of a territory or scattered minorities; there can be a strong majority and a multiplicity of minorities, or a numerically strong and well-balanced majority and minority; there can be an economically and politically weak majority and a powerful minority. These different situations require different constitutional and institutional responses. But whatever the particular configuration of a given situation, three principles must be respected.

The first is that domination by the majority is not an adequate criterion for deciding whether or not a democracy exists, since people belonging to minority groups are entitled to be represented in parliament and at the level of central and local authorities. Several solutions are possible, depending on the situation, such as the granting of a certain territorial autonomy or the adoption of exceptional measures such as representation quotas. Such measures need however to be carefully assessed depending on the various contexts. Finally, it is important to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of minorities as regards their culture, their religion, their customs and their traditions, on condition they respect the Constitution and State institutions.

The second principle is that the political representation of minorities is not in itself enough to guarantee the harmonious existence of a multi-ethnic, multiconfessional and multicultural society; and a multiparty system, when introduced without adequate preparation, can accentuate divisions. In addition to the political institutions of democracy, areas of dialogue and cultural exchange need to be created that will gradually remove the boundaries between minorities and the majority, and between minorities themselves.

The third principle is that, while democracy requires cultural diversity and the rights of minorities to be respected, access to power should not be conditioned by considerations of an ethnic, cultural or religious nature.

Democracy is a constantly evolving process, and no country in the world can pride itself on totally applying its principles. Even the most advanced democratic regimes themselves need to try to adapt further in order to reach that goal. Equality of the sexes constitutes, in this respect, one of the challenges that no democracy has yet succeeded in meeting comprehensively. And yet that equality is a vital precondition without which democracy cannot be properly achieved. It is also a priority as regards development, given the major role played by women at every stage of the process of democratic development.

Democratic development and international organizations

Panel members felt that the role of international organizations, when faced with globalization, is one of the challenges that the international community is duty bound to meet at the beginning of the twenty-first century. They discussed the role that such organizations can play in the promotion of democracy, in social relationships within States and in inter-State relationships. They also took an interest in the internal workings of such insti-

tutions, while taking into account the broad principles of democracy to which they naturally claim to adhere.

International organizations are a cornerstone of the mechanism of cooperation for development. What is more, multilateral aid can effectively contribute to the promotion of democracy. So it is important to encourage development aid in new or restored democracies. Some Panel members wondered, however, whether it was legitimate to encourage democracy through external actors, as it is arguable that such action contradicts the United Nations Charter, which requires the sovereignty of States to be respected in accordance with the principle of non-interference. While all participants recognized that international relations should be based on mutual understanding, equality and non-interference, some of them also insisted on the fact that the increasing interdependence of States necessarily entails a certain erosion of national sovereignty. They stressed that the introduction of international procedures to protect human rights, as well as the adoption of the principle of good governance by development-oriented international organizations, reflect a less and less rigorous interpretation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States as laid down by the Charter.

It also has to be admitted that an increasing number of problems can no longer be resolved at nation-State level. They include problems connected with finance, the environment and drug trafficking. Indeed, the ever-mounting need to define and deal with problems at global level shaped the action of the United Nations during the 1990s, which was marked by a series of major international conferences on the Environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), Population (Cairo, 1994), Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), Women (Beijing, 1995) and Habitat (Istanbul, 1996).

Similarly, Panel members asked themselves whether it was advisable to make the provision of development aid by the United Nations conditional on a State's democratization efforts. For it needs to be established whether such conditionality clauses do not encourage the emergence of sham democracies. It is also debatable whether it is reasonable to insist on the same requirements being met by countries whose economy has been destroyed and whose institutions are weak or non-existent as by countries which refuse the democratization process.

In any case, it is reasonable to assume that international aid would be much more effective if it were no longer accompanied by a form of sanction resulting from demands imposed from outside. It would be preferable for such aid to hinge on positive cooperation between donor

and recipient, and to be rooted in the framework of comprehensive development, which would itself be based on three elements: the reinforcement of human capacities, the consolidation of institutions, and good governance. Moreover, in order to be sustainable, development must be supported by the political will of society as a whole, hence the need to establish a relationship of partnership and cooperation rather than one of confrontation. In this way, the whole of society will have the feeling of owning its own development. It is however important to ensure that in the long term aid does not create a relationship of dependence. This approach, by the way, is closely akin to the principle of respecting the sovereignty of States and is based on principles of equality and mutual advantages. Conditions imposed from outside, without any veritable partnership being established or without the actual participation of the governments and peoples concerned, are counterproductive. But that does not mean that international aid should be totally unconditional.

We need to be able to ensure, in other words, that aid is not diverted by corruption, that it does not have the effect of increasing imbalances, and above all that it does not serve to reinforce the authoritarian power of undemocratic governments. Cooperation must therefore be based on the need for accountability and transparency on the part of both donors and recipients. In this sense, support for concrete projects, in specific areas such as education, scientific and technological development, health and even the development of human resources as regards governance, will encourage the emergence of internal conditions favourable to democratization.

At the end of their debate, Panel members agreed that the promotion of democracy and human rights should be a component of cooperation programmes within the United Nations system. For, through such programmes, international organizations can exert a real influence on democratic development strategies. They already play an appreciable role, not only in favour of a peaceful solution to conflicts, but in favour of respect for transparency, tolerance and cultural diversity.

As regards economic sanctions, on the other hand, a rigorous assessment of their consequences is imperative. First, it needs to be remembered that the purpose of such sanctions, as provided for by the United Nations Charter, is not to be punitive, but to bring illegal behaviour to an end and ensure that the rules of international law are respected once again. But there is no getting away from the fact that sanctions rarely achieve their aim, and that they chiefly affect the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population. They then take on the nature of repres-

sive sanctions. They slow down development and, what is more, particularly when they continue for a long time, they result in a decline in the living conditions of the people, as well as in their cultural environment, which can take on disastrous dimensions. Sanctions then constitute violations of human rights carried out in the name of human rights. Another perverse effect of sanctions can be an increase in crime, in particular smuggling, often to the benefit of the country's leaders. And above all sanctions have no effect in undemocratic societies because, in those societies, the population at large has no influence over its leaders. Sanctions tend to reinforce their power by creating, as a reaction, a feeling of collective solidarity.

Thus, sanctions may weaken democracy and make it more difficult to bolster political opposition to authoritarian regimes. The international community therefore has a responsibility here, which it must shoulder. First, it should analyse the actual impact of sanctions more accurately and define the application criteria of such sanctions more clearly; then it should devise other kinds of measures, such as "targeted sanctions", chiefly financial sanctions aimed at the bank accounts of the leaders of the countries concerned, which seem to be more effective than trade or economic sanctions, which affect the most disadvantaged sections of the population. Above all, the possibility of an international court of justice that would make it possible to prosecute those truly responsible for a grave violation of international law should be explored, it being understood that it is up to the Security Council, by virtue of its discretionary powers, to determine what violations constitute threats to international peace and security.

Moreover, the Panel pointed out that not only does the United Nations have the task of ensuring that the purposes and principles of the Charter are respected, but it is also one of the main bodies responsible for elaborating international juridical standards and, as such, should guarantee respect for the rule of law at world level. For the time being, however, it has to be admitted that international relations suffer from a democratic inadequacy and that they are above all conditioned by the relative power of the countries concerned. It seems difficult today to talk about international democracy, when the influence that a State can exert on joint decision-making depends strictly on its economic and military might, and, consequently, on its political will. What is more, the possibility of censure which is a fundamental element of democracy — a dissatisfied people can censure its representatives and its rulers — does not apply to international organizations.

The democratization of international relations remains nonetheless a priority in the age of globalization, since the lack of democracy at an international level is an impediment to the development of democracy at a domestic level and can even fuel various forms of extremism. Yet it is not a case of utopianism, as can be seen from the example of the European Parliament, which confirms that peoples can be represented beyond their national borders. The regionalization of international relations may — in the view of some participants — speed up the process of democratization, insofar as regional organizations are often able to act as a counterbalance to globalization. Checks and balances are indispensable for a proper working of democracy.

It may however be asked whether the United Nations has the required legitimacy to intervene in matters regarding democracy, when the Organization itself clearly suffers from a lack of democracy. The Security Council, the only body with the power to use military force and impose sanctions, is not a truly democratic organ in that only some States are represented on it and others have the right of veto. The General Assembly, which is the most democratic organ in the United Nations system insofar as its decisions are taken by a majority vote, is also the one that has the least powers and the least possibility of ensuring that its decisions are implemented. According to some Panel members, the General Assembly itself is not truly democratic, as its members represent States and not peoples. There is of course talk of reforms, but several speakers emphasized that those envisaged by the Security Council would not have the effect of making it more democratic. At the current stage of planning, the reforms would simply aim to bring its composition up to date by increasing the number of its members to include new economic and political powers. That might just ensure a better balance between developed countries and developing countries.

The United Nations' specialized institutions, on the other hand, have a more democratic composition. Furthermore, the democratic features of the system are to be found not in the framework of its coercive powers, but in other characteristic functions of democratic processes, such as the adoption of standards, mediation between Member States, the dissemination of information encouraging transparency and facilitating the settling of disputes, and an opening up to the participation of civil society. In any case, the role of the United Nations needs to be reinforced and the authority of the Security Council preserved. Despite major changes that have occurred on the international scene, the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter remain valid and should be firmly supported.

The blockages and counter-blockages of democratic development

As has already been noted, these impediments exist at both national and world level. In this respect, while there are a host of international impediments, as we have seen, States for their part should adopt a self-critical attitude, as there exist many internal causes of inadequacies as regards democratic development. Those who defend human rights and democracy, who are the first to combat this democratic inadequacy, are entitled, in that capacity, to security and immunity. Their protection should be a subject of concern for the international community insofar as they are frequently persecuted by their governments.

One of the major impediments to the achievement of democratic development resides in the serious inequalities that exist in the way revenues and wealth are shared out. That is why the implementation of political freedoms will not be enough to ensure the durability of democracy in the developing countries unless it is accompanied at the same time by strategies aimed at promoting economic and social rights. Similarly, in the developed countries, the existence of pockets of extreme poverty and the exclusion caused by it produce distortions in the exercise of democratic rights, by restricting and sometimes even preventing the victims of poverty from actually participating in political, social and cultural life. Social and economic inequalities not only undermine social harmony and political stability, but they are also contrary to the very spirit of democracy. Moreover, they encourage corruption and nepotism, both of which act as a brake to development. While economic globalization, when unrestrained, accentuates inequalities, poverty and exclusion, its proper management can be seen to be a necessary precondition for the promotion of individuals' economic and social rights.

In addition to economic and social impediments, democracy also has to face a series of other obstacles, such as religious fanaticism, racism and xenophobia. One of the effects of globalization has been to create cases of identitarian closure, which often find expression in mounting ethnic, national or religious extremism that is fuelled by political and economic frustrations experienced both individually and collectively. Seeking to find one's identitarian bearings is not in itself negative, but the impression of "colonization" that is felt when a "world culture" tries to impose itself, sometimes clashing with local cultures, can prompt exacerbated patterns of withdrawal behaviour which can even result in a total rejection of all other cultures and other ways of life. Identitarian closure of this kind finds justification in the cultural breeding ground in which its specificity is rooted. Fundamentalist movements, which believe that they are the sole

repositories of the truth, and that their truth overrides all other forms of truth, reject and condemn, sometimes violently, all differences whether they be religious, political or ethnic.

Education itself — which can and should play an important role in the apprenticeship of tolerance and respect for other people — sometimes encourages identitarian closure, or even extremist behaviour. It is therefore vital to ensure that education does not encourage rejection of other people or identitarian closure, but that on the contrary it encourages knowledge and respect for other cultures, other religions and other ways of being and living. A lack of general culture and premature specialization result in attitudes that are receptive to extremist ideologies. Hence the importance not only of a high-quality general education at every level, but also of the educational role of the media.

As regards the major impediment to democracy and development — the very widespread and often considerable inequality between men and women — the Panel stressed how urgent it was to implement the recommendations of the Beijing Conference. While women's rights are dependent on the universality of human rights, their implementation requires the specific discrimination that women suffer in various contexts to be identified and recognized. This calls for constant vigilance and, of course, the political will to get rid of such discrimination.

In trying to identify impediments to the achievement of democratic development, the Panel gave further thought to the issue of justice, given that democracy can be defined as the rule of law, of a law that issues from the will of the people. Disappointment with democracy, which is noticeable in some countries, often originates in the inability of the justice system to fight corruption and organized crime. Similarly, the lack of legal and jurisdictional guarantees covering investment and economic and trading exchanges can hinder development. Both the slowness with which court rulings are made — a slowness that is not found exclusively in the developing countries — and the shortage of honest and competent magistrates act as impediments to the implementation of democratic development.

Finally, an excessive concentration of power was also identified as an impediment to democracy. The solution could be decentralization, but it is no panacea and may, in some circumstances, have a negative impact on democratic development. It can, for example, encourage local feudalities or ethnocracies. What is more, it requires the responsibilities of the various authorities to be clearly defined, adequate budgetary resources to be made available at local level, and local authorities to be effective.

What we should try to do is bring decision-making closer to those

who are affected by decisions. There is, then, good reason to define solutions that are suited to the various degrees of development, to the size of a country and to the composition of the population — in order to encourage the devolution of powers and enable the local authorities to operate with their ears closer to the ground. Nor should we ignore the emerging phenomenon of inter-State regionalization, under which agreements have been concluded between the towns, cities or regions of various countries, thus giving birth to new regions and helping to devolve power in various States.

After completing this review of the issues, Panel members examined methods that would make it possible to take up the various challenges and overcome impediments to the emergence of a veritable dialectic between development and democracy.

They ranked education as the most important of those methods. Once again freedom of expression, too, was seen as an essential precondition for the introduction of democracy and as a factor that guarantees its durability. It was pointed out that freedom of communication and, in particular, written and audiovisual communication, plays a key educational role, as political decisions are largely determined by access to information sources and by the independence and reliability of those sources. Free, independent and accountable communication is, then, indispensable to democracy.

Again in the political field, the existence of representative parliaments which are democratically elected and genuinely reflect the diversity of the population, is the precondition for the elaboration of accepted and acceptable legislation, which is vitally necessary for social harmony.

Once again, too, the existence of a fair and independent justice system was regarded as a major precondition for the reinforcement of the rule of law, as the lack of such a system makes the operation of democratic institutions impossible and blocks the development process. That is why the separation of powers is one of the characteristics of democracy, insofar as it can guarantee the freedom and independence of the justice system. As we have seen, everything contributes to make the justice system one of the central pillars of democracy. The legitimacy of elections, for example, also depends on the existence of an effective justice system which is independent of the executive, and which, combined with the vigilance of the citizenry, can in addition reduce the need for the assistance, or even supervision, that international organizations offer when elections are held.

Transparency at every level of government services is also a pre-

condition for the proper working of democracy and for an effective fight against corruption.

In addition to the protection of individual rights, the recognition of collective rights is an element that can reinforce democracy. The guarantee of economic and social rights envisaged by the United Nations Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995 is an important element for democratic development, insofar as a social approach to development at global level is capable of reducing the inequalities that result from globalization.

In short, it is international solidarity which seems more necessary than ever if democratic development at national level is to be encouraged and consolidated.

After reading this work once again, and in particular this introduction, which is chiefly intended as a summary of our debates, I would like to conclude by formulating some self-criticism in three parts.

The first remark I would like to make is that the working hypothesis we adopted saw the relationship between democracy and development solely in a context of peace, given that there can be no democracy or development in a conflict situation. It so happens that domestic and international conflicts have never been so numerous as they have been in the past few decades. What is their influence on neighbouring States and on all those who are not involved in hostilities? The key element is not so much the conflict situation as the political context that led up to it or ensued from it, as well as its impact on democratic development. While that development is at threat during the period leading up to the conflict and completely paralysed during the conflict, it will require some special measures during the period of “convalescence” that ensues from the conflict.

My second remark concerns the North-South confrontation, which we dealt with only in passing. The problems of democratic development are very different depending on whether one is talking about developed — or overdeveloped — States, or developing States. We did not examine closely enough how democratic development differs in those various categories of States. While the broad principles of democratic development are universal, the fact remains that their application varies considerably, depending on whether one is talking about a State that has practised democracy for years or a State that has just gained independence.

My third remark is that we did not discuss the “people’s economy”, the economy of untaxed micro-companies which in the developing countries meet the real needs of poor people and constitute a driving force of democratization. It is obvious that this economy also includes the black market, and that it is sometimes hard to distinguish it from the criminal

economy, which needs to be curbed. The Western world often finds it difficult to understand the role played by that economy in the democratic development of a developing State. Instead of condemning or ignoring that economy on the grounds that it is only semi-legal and escapes the labour laws, would it not, on the contrary, be a better idea to encourage it? The micro-loans invented by Mohamed Yunus in Bangladesh are an example that deserves our attention.

Having said that, the people's economy in the developing countries and ways of assisting it cannot be discussed without stressing the role of women. The way roles are divided up between men and women can be observed throughout the world, and the Panel discussed the discrimination from which women suffer. But they play an especially important role in the development of the developing countries.

These remarks in no way detract from the value of the ideas that were exchanged during many hours of discussion by eminent experts from every continent. That only goes to show that the subject is far from exhausted, and that it deserves to have many other meetings devoted to it, particularly because one of UNESCO's *raison d'être* is to promote the culture of democracy, development and peace.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

*Chairperson of the International Panel
on Democracy and Development*

Debates

First meeting

UNESCO Headquarters, Paris

4-5 May 1998

Agenda

1. Links between democracy and development

Is democracy a precondition for development? What kind of political organization is most conducive to development?

- ◇ The relationship between economic and political reforms;
- ◇ Factors that encourage democracy and development;
- ◇ Role of the United Nations system in the development of democracy;
- ◇ Role of non-governmental actors and civil society.

2. Globalization and the international community

How does globalization affect democratic States? How can development be facilitated in a global context?

- ◇ The impact of globalization on democracy and development;
- ◇ Transnational actors and democracy;
- ◇ Democracy and development;
- ◇ Democracy at international level: the democratization of international and transnational relations.

List of questions*Democracy and development*

- ◇ Why has interest in the relationship between democracy and development emerged at this particular time?
- ◇ Why was it earlier thought that the developing countries were not ready for democracy, and that they would have to make considerable progress on the economic front before democracy could work?
- ◇ Why are authoritarian regimes now being urged to change, whereas they were tolerated in the past?
- ◇ Is there a relationship of cause and effect between democracy and development?
- ◇ Does the market economy stimulate political activity and encourage democracy?
- ◇ Is democracy not only desirable but also necessary for the market economy and, conversely, can it act as an impediment to economic growth?
- ◇ Is democracy essentially a by-product of development?
- ◇ Which is more important in a post-conflict situation - democracy or development?
- ◇ Which is more important in a post-authoritarian situation — democracy or development?
- ◇ What impact does gender discrimination have on democracy and on development?

N.B. This list of questions is not exhaustive. Its sole aim is to provide the Panel with elements for discussion.

- ◇ If a poor farmer or unemployed worker were asked to choose between democracy and development, what would his answer be?

Democracy, development and international relations

- ◇ Does globalization signal the end of domestic democracy?
- ◇ What is the future of democracy now that some of the most powerful socio-political political forces in the world extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-State?
- ◇ How can global problems such as the environment and international crime be solved within the framework of democracy?
- ◇ Why has the increase in the number of democratic States not caused a corresponding increase in inter-State democracy?
- ◇ How can the reluctance of democracies to extend their model of governance to inter-State relations be explained?
- ◇ Why has political theory regarded democracy as a model of governance that can be applied only within State boundaries?
- ◇ If all States became democracies, would international relations be founded on democratic principles?
- ◇ Can a State be fully democratic in a world that is not democratic?
- ◇ Do democracies have more peaceful relations among themselves than with autocratic regimes?
- ◇ If all States were democracies, would there be no more wars?
- ◇ Does international peace depend on the gradual increase in the number of democratic States and the democratization of the international community?
- ◇ What impact does the presence of undemocratic States in the international system have on democratic States?
- ◇ Does the globalization of domestic issues encourage authoritarian rather than democratic solutions?

I would like first of all to say how happy I am that you have been able to find time to take part in this meeting.

I shall be very brief. The aim of today's meeting is to discuss quite a specific topic, namely: "What are the links between democracy and development?" So it is not a question of talking just about democracy or just about development. Our topic of discussion is both of them, and the links that exist between democracy and development.

As I told you by letter, I thought of dividing up our discussions into two parts, concerning respectively: development and democracy at national level; and development and democracy at global level.

Several comments were addressed to me. One of them was the question: "Why do you not mention the relationship between democracy and human rights?" It was also suggested to me that the debate should be extended to cover the links between democracy, development and peace, since they are closely related issues.

In order to facilitate our discussions, I asked myself a series of questions, which included the following:

1. Why are we concerned today to establish a link between democracy and development, and why are we discussing it today, whereas we did not do so a few years ago?
2. A few years ago, it used to be said that democracy could come into being and develop only once a certain degree of development had been achieved. The idea was that democracy was a kind of extra which came on top of development. It used to be thought that democracy was a luxury restricted to a limited number of countries, and that the developing countries could experience democracy only once they had attained a certain economic development. Today's thinking is that, on the contrary, you first need a democracy in order to be able to achieve economic development.
3. Why, when authoritarian governments used to be respected and accepted, suddenly insist on demanding that they opt for democracy?
4. Is it true that sustainable development can exist only in a democratic context?
5. Is democracy a by-product of development? In a post-

Francine
Fournier

conflictual situation, when a conflict is over, should priority be given to development or to democracy?

6. Can some States switch simultaneously from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, and from a planned economy to a market economy? If a choice has to be made between democracy and development, what should that choice be?

I would like to say a few words on behalf of the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr Federico Mayor, who has asked me to represent him here, and I have great pleasure in welcoming you on his behalf.

The fostering of democratic principles has always played an essential role in the Organization. It lies at the very heart of UNESCO's Constitution, which, as you know, is the only one of the founding texts of the United Nations system that specifically refers to democratic principles. In the Preamble of the Constitution, we may read that: "the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men". UNESCO's aim, then, beyond the institutional level, is to foster the birth of a genuine democratic culture which we very much hope will turn out to guarantee a truly sustainable form of development.

In the world of today, democracy has gained momentum, and, to quote the Chairperson's *Agenda for Democratization*, the basic idea of democracy is today being more and more widely espoused at a cultural, social and economic level. For some time now, many States have initiated a process of democratization, in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia, where totalitarian regimes have collapsed and been replaced by democratically elected governments — which does not mean that problems do not still remain. In Africa, in Latin America and several Asian countries it is in some cases the first time that a democratic process has been launched, while in other cases the process has been one of restoring democracy. This wave of democratization has raised hopes for a better and safer world where development is based on the respect of human rights and democratic principles.

But why is this recent shift towards democratization taking place in all parts of the world? The reason for the recent

process of democratization has often been ascribed to various factors: the end of the Cold War, local pressure in favour of democracy and an increasingly widespread awareness of the fact that democratic principles are indispensable for the development of humankind. The latter dimension may be linked to what is called globalization, which does indeed suggest the notion that all peoples and all countries face similar challenges. But globalization is more than that. It is a comprehensive process whereby the State and its citizens are becoming more and more keenly aware of external pressures. Thus, the key questions centre on establishing how this multidimensional trend towards globalization affects States in their quest for democracy and development.

So that UNESCO will be in the forefront of this new global context, the Director-General decided to set up this International Panel on Democracy and Development to identify challenges and recommend guidelines for future action. Nobody could have been better suited to guide us than the Chairperson, who has shown us the way in his *Agenda for Democratization*. On behalf of the Director-General, I would therefore like to thank Mr Boutros-Ghali for having agreed to chair the Panel, and to thank you members for having agreed to be members of it and to take part in its proceedings. In this way, you are helping the Organization to prepare for the twenty-first century.

The principal task of this Panel is to provide the Director-General with ideas that can inspire UNESCO programmes concerning democracy, as part of an overall strategy for “the construction of a culture of peace in a multicultural world”. In addition, the Panel will be able “to encourage initiatives and mobilize partners” or suggest strategies for mobilizing such partners, as well as the various actors in the democratization process, with a view to making joint efforts to implement those programmes. UNESCO is faced with many important issues. They particularly concern the theme of education and democracy, namely how should democratic principles be disseminated through the education system so that all citizens are fully prepared to play an active role in society. Other major issues that UNESCO deals with include the creation of development capacities, everyday democratic practices, assistance in the consolidation of democratic processes, parliamentary democracy, the role of local authori-

ties, democratic governance and the role of the media in encouraging it, so as to enable citizens to define their interests and their needs within a common framework.

Some 200 years ago the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, studied the relationship between democracy and peace, a theme which now constitutes the core of UNESCO's activity. Even if democracy and development are increasingly perceived as fundamental preconditions for a lasting peace, a more thorough study of that relationship needs to be made. I therefore believe that development is closely linked with the democratization process and that only a comprehensive holistic approach based on political, economic, cultural, social and environmental criteria can encourage development at a domestic and international level for the benefit of all human beings.

Democracy is not a model that can be imported. It can work only if it takes root. Within the tradition of democratic institutions, each country needs to adapt democracy to its traditions and its socio-economic situation. Democracy cannot therefore be reduced to a legal framework involving only civil and political rights. The aim of democracy is also to enable each citizen to obtain a better standard of living through the full exercise of economic, social and cultural rights.

The international community has a duty to foster democracy and development. But how can UNESCO more specifically encourage democratic initiatives and human development? What is its role at the level of international democratization? All these challenges are essential and deserve to be debated thoroughly: that is the challenge facing this Panel. The aim is not only to broaden and increase our understanding of these crucial issues, but to formulate proposals for action that will shape UNESCO's programmes involving the construction and consolidation of democracy. We shall naturally make available to you the findings of work already under way at UNESCO and, it goes without saying, the Agenda for Democratization. By way of conclusion, I would say that democracy is the challenge that faces us, and, as is indicated in the Director-General's Note (Annex I), it is our task to present an interim report during the second half of 1999, so that these recommendations can inspire UNESCO's next programme.

I am delighted that UNESCO has been able to make pos-

Han
Sung-Joo

sible this meeting of such eminent figures, under the chairmanship of Mr Boutros-Ghali. I am convinced that, with the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights being celebrated this year, the results of your work will have a lasting effect on UNESCO's activities and prove to be an inspiration for future generations. On behalf of the Director-General and myself, may I thank you for having agreed to take up this challenge.

I feel rather presumptuous to be the first person to speak on a fundamental issue. There are two reasons for my doing so. I am an academic, and academics tend to be presumptuous (I hope Professor Russett will forgive me for saying that). The second reason is that, unfortunately, I will not be able to be here tomorrow, so I would like to participate as much as possible today. First, I would like to congratulate Mr Boutros-Ghali and UNESCO for setting up this Panel, and to thank them for this very interesting meeting.

I think that the issue of democracy and development can be divided into two closely related elements, one of them concerning the impact of the economy or of economic development on democracy, and the other concerning the role of democracy in economic development. This distinction seems to me to be useful, otherwise our discussion may be a little confused.

As regards politics and development, I think it is wrong to make sweeping statements of the kind one sometimes hears, such as: "Neither development nor growth is possible without democracy", or its opposite: "An authoritarian government is indispensable for economic development". And these assertions have been made with reference to economic development in Asia.

As for the relationship between democracy and economic development, I am in a position, on the basis of my own research (my first book was on democracy in Asia), to put forward the following hypothesis: one can talk of five broad stages of development, at both a political and an economic level.

First there is the pre-industrial stage. In Asia, countries such as the Philippines and India succeeded in becoming democratic before they started industrialization in earnest. In the context of Asia and in many States there, the second stage was that a relatively authoritarian government was able to implement an economic development plan — and that is in fact what happened

in Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea¹ and Indonesia. Then, thanks to economic growth and development, the authoritarian government tended to be reinforced, because people saw that there was an advantage in having authoritarian rule and were thus induced to accept a continuation of that rule.

But subsequently, as the economy grew, society became more diversified and more open to the outside world. Consequently, economic development turned out to be the undoing of authoritarian rule, thus contributing to democratization: that is what happened in Asia, particularly during the 1980s. The process of democratization got started. At the next stage, the question was: is democracy capable or not of sustaining, or even of encouraging, continued economic growth?

To take the example of South Korea and Taiwan — despite the economic difficulties South Korea is facing — I think the answer would be that, yes, democracy and economic development can coexist. Consequently, the question is not whether democracy has to be present for there to be economic development, but rather whether they can coexist. The answer is in the affirmative.

My final remark is on the issue of so-called “Asian values”. Some people tout the idea that Asian values contributed to economic development in Asia, and conversely, now that many Asian countries have run into financial problems, that those same Asian values are contributing to those difficulties.

I think that two elements need to be taken into consideration. The first is the question of what degree of economic development needs to be reached by a country for Asian values or, if you like, authoritarian rule to be at least acceptable or, failing that, beneficial to economic growth and development. The second element is the international context in which the economy evolves. There has been a rapid process of globalization, in the sense that goods, services and finance no longer have any borders. In that kind of context, where there is no democracy, no accountability and no transparency, it would be difficult to maintain a high degree of economic development.

¹ Throughout these debates “South Korea” refers to the Republic of Korea.

Therefore my conclusion would be that we cannot really make any sweeping and categorical statements. These issues need to be dealt with both within the context of a country's domestic development as well as with reference to the international context.

Nicolas
Valticos

I believe that at the stage we have reached we need to proceed somewhat cautiously. We must also steer clear of both noble sentiments and basic verities. But we shall not be able to avoid them entirely, as we attempt to study the question more closely. And first of all, to return to a question you have asked us, why exactly is there a link between democracy and development? It has sometimes been claimed, on the contrary, that one of them slows down or obstructs the other. But surely one of the basic ideas which explains that link is the fact that when we talk about development we are not just talking about a country's economic development. Development also involves the construction of a country and the structure of a country. And regarding that type of general development, some form of democratic consultation appears to be necessary in order for one to be certain that that type of development squares with the conceptions and needs of the country, and that it is not merely a policy implemented by a megalomaniac or biased government. Democracy therefore serves as a test and an incentive for a balanced development which corresponds to popular feeling in the broad sense of the word. There have been cases of undemocratic countries where megalomaniac or biased leaders have steered development in a disastrous direction. And even then, if there is to be democratic control of a country, the questions need to be formulated properly, in other words the people who formulate the questions need themselves to be steeped in democratic ideas. But then we come to the question of what kind of democracy we are talking about. There are several types of democracy. And a minimum of democracy is necessary — and I do not say that solely out of respect for UNESCO, where we are meeting. There can be no veritable and sustainable democracy without a continuous effort to improve general education. If development requires an electoral consultation, in other words a democratic control, those who vote need to possess a minimum degree not so much of culture as of education, in order to be able to choose between what is

being offered them and not reflect tendencies that do not correspond to the true needs of the country and of its future.

The democratic process therefore needs to be assisted. A true democracy should strive to provide a general education and a balanced education. The problem in all this is that, while democracy is necessary, demagoguery is one of the dangers that threaten it. And we do not need to look very far: we have seen this happen in European countries, in countries whose population was thought to have been well educated for centuries, but was very easily caught up in a momentum of mass megalomania which, so it was thought, would be a credit to the country, but which eventually led to disaster.

I would like to address a remark to the previous speaker. I am delighted that Mr Han talked about the problem of Asian values. It is a question I have worked on. As regards social issues, for a long time there were problems with the Asian countries, and particularly the Southeast Asian countries, which invoked Asian values, or what they understood to be Asian values, in order to oppose a certain form of social progress which they regarded as contrary to some of their own values. That is now beginning to change. It is unfortunate that this change should be taking place at a time when there are difficulties, but it still marks a beginning, compared with the widespread earlier mistrust of social progress measures. I say this in passing, to make it clear that I greatly appreciated what Mr Han has just said.

By way of conclusion, then, I think we should analyse both what we call democracy and what we call development, as well as the links between the two.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

May I first of all congratulate UNESCO on having taken the initiative of setting up this Panel and say how delighted I am that UNESCO has put you in charge of it, Mr Chairperson, in view of everything you stand for not only in Africa, but throughout the world.

We have been asked to undertake a task which involves more than an academic discussion of various issues, in that it will result in a report: first an interim report, in the first half of 1999, then probably a final report that will help UNESCO to elaborate its programme. We must first at least agree on what we mean by democracy. In the past, people used to talk of several kinds of

democracy, or at least two. Nowadays, they say “democracy”. But I believe that, in the light of our experience in the developing countries, we should define a minimum number of elements that need to be present whenever we talk of democracy.

The first thing I would say in this connection is that democracy is not simply the right to vote; it is not just the organization of free elections. Something more is needed. And it may be here that democracy and development converge, because I believe that democracy needs to be rounded out by economic measures as well as by social measures. I believe the same is true of development: we also need to know what we are going to talk about.

The second observation I wanted to make is that since 1988 there has been a kind of common “umbrella” as regards democracy and development: development has become one of the human rights.

It was in 1972 that a number of us gave some thought to development as well as to what subsequently came to be known as the third generation of human rights, after civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. And our efforts were eventually crowned with success, when the Declaration on the Right to Development came into force on 4 December 1986. It would, I feel, be a good idea for us to have that document here, as it is an extremely useful instrument for the kind of task we have been set. Development, then, is now one of the human rights. But since 1988 the same has been true of democracy. Before that, democracy used to be talked about in rather general terms, but since the Vienna Conference on Human Rights democracy has been established as a right to which peoples are entitled.

If democracy and development qualify as human rights, it is of course because there is a natural link between the two. But that has naturally had a number of consequences. The first of these is that we have got past the stage when we wondered if it was advisable to start with democracy in order to achieve development, or, on the contrary, to start with development in order to achieve democracy. Now that both of them have become human rights, peoples’ rights, there is no longer any reason to choose between them: democracy and development have to go hand in hand. True, there have been examples in the past of

democracy being neglected in an attempt to achieve development. A British writer I like a great deal, the late-lamented Paul Sigard, rightly said that people justify their decision to flout democracy in order to ensure development by contending that “you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs”. He added: “Unfortunately, it very often happens that people break eggs but do not make an omelette”. I believe that to be true. Today, we can no longer choose between democracy and development. They must go hand in hand.

Another consequence of the fact that democracy and development have become human rights is that they are now obligations to be borne by States. States have to guarantee development and democracy. At a meeting organized in Dakar in 1978 by the International Commission of Jurists, the problem of law and development was discussed. One of the conclusions of the African jurists was that the guarantee of development was in fact one of the foundations of the legitimacy of governments. That notion is extremely important. In other words, a government which did not guarantee development would cease to be legitimate.

Lastly, and by way of conclusion, once development and democracy are ranked as human rights, justice has a major role to play. And I have a complaint to make as a magistrate, because in the document we were sent I could see no reference to the role that justice plays in democracy and development. I am talking about constitutional justice of course, that goes without saying. But also justice generally, and even the justice handed down by small courts, which should to my mind contribute effectively to the introduction of democracy and champion development. In Africa, we have a charter, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted in 1981, and which to my knowledge is the only such charter that refers to third-generation rights, including the right to development. For that charter set up a Commission with the specific task of defending the right to development. Within a few weeks, I hope, we shall have an African Court of Human Rights, which will also have the task of defending the right to development as well as the right to democracy. These are the initial ideas I wanted to put up for debate, Mr Chairperson.

I believe that during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s a lot was said and a lot was written in political literature about the complementarity or antinomy of democracy and development. For a long time, it was abundantly and forcefully argued that a minimum of authoritarianism was necessary to foster development. Democracy was regarded as a luxury that the poor countries could not afford; and so the idea that an antinomy existed was sometimes vigorously set forth. I believe that experience showed, from the 1950s to the 1980s, that development could be achieved side by side with democracy. Take the example of India, one of the largest States in the world, which has never known a one-party system and never been subjected to an authoritarian system. Even if democracy in that country is not perfect at local level, there has always been freedom of the press, there have always been regular, fairly regular or almost regular and always periodical elections. Power has always changed hands from one party to another, and at the same time India has made economic progress, as can be seen if the standard of living and per capita income of 40 years ago are compared with what they are today. And throughout that period India has always been a democracy.

It is true that there have also been a number of counter-examples. Spain, for instance, made economic progress under Franco. So it is fair to say that there is no antinomy, that there can be democracy and development at the same time, as well as development without democracy. But while India's experience has fortunately continued, the Francoist experience, just as fortunately, came to a halt. This proves not only that democracy and development can coexist perfectly well, but that development without democracy tends to be a doomed system. In other words, there can be development without democracy for a time, but in the long term both are necessary. I would even say that in the long term, development cannot continue without democracy. Thus, democracy is perhaps not necessarily a precondition for development to get going, but rather a precondition for it to keep going.

Unfortunately it is only human for there to be nepotism and corruption in a government which faces no challenge, and which does not have to reckon with an opposition. They are the inevitable outcome of authoritarian regimes. Corruption exists even in democracies, but it can be held in check by a free press,

which does not exist in authoritarian regimes. Corruption and nepotism act as a brake on development. The rule of law has now become a prerequisite for investment.

What exactly is meant by the rule of law? As Mr Mbaye has just said, the rule of law means among other things an independent judiciary. The rule of law, democracy and human rights are different but closely connected notions. An independent judiciary means well-paid magistrates, magistrates whose careers do not depend on the executive, in other words irremovable magistrates who cannot be sacked on the grounds that they have not ruled in accordance with the wishes of the executive. Without the guarantee of independent magistrates, investors will not invest. And today, with globalization upon us, all the poor countries and developing countries need inward investment. Direct inward investment is investment that does not go through the State. And that investment can take place only if investors trust the legal system and know their rights will be guaranteed and that they will not get their fingers burnt. In the absence of an independent judiciary, investors will be very hesitant about investing, or else will invest on terms that will guarantee they recover their capital within two or three years. In other words, it will not be a long-term investment. I profoundly believe that, for sustainable development to be possible today, democracy is absolutely necessary, with its indispensable constituent elements of law and an independent judiciary.

I would like to add, Mr Chairperson, that this whole debate about antinomy and complementarity which dominated the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is now beginning, fortunately, to seem somewhat outdated. Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the debate was fuelled by a counter-example. But that counter-example has now failed in most countries. There still exist one or two exceptions, but I believe they are in the process of changing. The arguments of those who opt for a lack of democracy are becoming thin on the ground. We are now getting to a stage where democracy is becoming what I would call "the dominant ideology". And so much the better.

What does "dominant ideology" mean? It is the ideology which is truly supported and implemented in good faith by a large proportion of the population and of world States, and which is not contested by the rest. The "dominant ideology" is

one that people dare not challenge. And that is an important step forward. To make myself clear, let me give you an example: one of the most serious breaches of human rights is torture. A few centuries ago, torture was something that was taken for granted. Courts in perfectly respectable countries, with magistrates, would order suspects who had not confessed to their crimes or named their accomplices, to be interrogated. And the interrogation was carried out in a room next to the courtroom. In other words, respectable magistrates had no compunction in ordering this totally inhuman practice. And the magistrates would retire and spend an hour or two waiting for the results of the torture session. Then, an hour or two later, the accused would be brought back, limping and injured, and start confessing so as not to have to endure further ill-treatment. Today, it cannot be said that torture has disappeared — far from it, unfortunately. But no one assumes responsibility for it any more. There is no longer a single State that admits to the practice of torture.

There are people who oppose certain aspects of human rights. It remains a serious problem, which we may discuss. But everyone subscribes to democracy as a system. The most authoritarian regimes now organize elections from time to time and do not admit that human rights are violated in their prisons or in the course of their interrogations: they claim that the judiciary is free; and while there still exist one or two examples of *de jure* one-party systems, all that we find in the countries of the South, where democracy is lacking or still weak, are *de facto* one-party systems, with a few satellites that pass themselves off as opposition parties. I therefore believe that the problem to which we should be giving priority is the difference between real and apparent democracy, because, by virtue of the fact that democracy has become the dominant ideology, there now exists more actual authoritarianism than apparent authoritarianism. There lies the real problem. Having said that, I feel that the real opposition to democracy today is to be found less in the policies of States than in certain ideologies which are antidemocratic, and which tend to be popular ideologies rather than State ideologies — I am thinking in particular of religious extremism. In any case, that is where opposition to democracy takes on its most serious form.

Pierre
Cornillon

First of all I should like to congratulate UNESCO on the initiative it has taken. The democratization phenomenon which is taking place should be supported; it must be sustained and that is the duty of international organizations such as UNESCO. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), of which I am Secretary General, has made its contribution by adopting a Universal Declaration on Democracy accompanied by a study. We must continue to work at both parliamentary and governmental level. I should also like to say, Mr Chairperson, how delighted I am to be working under your guidance and in such distinguished company.

Although the main principles and general procedures relating to democracy are the subject of a fairly broad consensus, we can see that their application is not without some problems and that applies not only in the difficult context of developing countries but also in developed countries. Thus we can see that in countries with a long democratic tradition, economic crises give rise to what one might term demons or the perverse effects of democracy, the very ones which, a few decades ago, allowed Hitler to come to power democratically.

You have asked us about the link between democracy and development. The fundamental link, I believe, is that democracy and development have in common the fact of being centred on human beings; they are the expression of their aspirations and their rights. Human beings are at one and the same time the authors, the actors and the beneficiaries of both democracy and development which respond to their needs regarding dignity and well-being. But we need to come to an agreement regarding the term 'development'.

I think we should stay with the meaning given by the United Nations to the term 'sustainable development'. Studies devoted to development by The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) take into account not only economic development but also many other aspects without which development would be an empty shell and could not last. We really must retain the qualifying 'sustainable'. We are meeting here in order to think long-term — and development certainly cannot be established long-term without democracy. Just as man walks on two legs, humanity can only get ahead by leaning at the same time on democracy as well as on development. Of course, man puts one leg forward first, but he has to stand on both in

order to walk properly. The same goes for development and democracy.

This is precisely what several of the previous speakers have stressed — democracy is not limited to the holding of free and honest elections. Democracy is also a legal system, justice, which makes it possible to rectify errors and abuses in all areas, including in the economic and social field and which, as it were, equip it with a self-correcting device. Democracy is the only political system capable of correcting its own malfunctions.

That is why, Mr Chairperson, I am convinced that in the long term, democracy and development can only go hand in hand.

**Marrack
Goulding**

Mr Chairperson, it is a great pleasure to be sitting again under your authority. I may be going to defy that authority because I want to make some observations about our work. We have been asked by the Director-General to “advise him on how to carry out UNESCO’s programmes relating to the building of democracy”. I agree therefore with those who have said that it is necessary to analyse what we mean by democracy, what it is that we are trying to build. But I would go further than that and I would say that this Panel needs to analyse the conditions which have to be fulfilled if democracy is going to be built. And only when we have done that analysis are we going to be in a position to make recommendations to the Director-General about how the programmes of UNESCO could be adjusted so that they contribute more effectively to the building of democracy.

And in that context, this morning’s debate is very interesting, but I venture to suggest, Mr Chairperson, that we ought perhaps rather soon to address more directly those questions about conditions which have to be fulfilled if democracy is going to be built in countries which do not yet have a democratic system or have an imperfect democratic system. And that is going to lead us into some quite difficult areas of debate.

First of all, there is the point that Mr Mbaye made, which is that democracy is not just the right to vote. And I note in the Director-General’s Note to us, it states “that it is for each society, taking into account its own cultural and historical specificities, to find its path towards democracy on the basis of universally recognized principles”. So we have that difficult question to

Bruce
Russett

tackle, which is, how does one take account of cultural diversity in working out guidance advice to the Director-General of UNESCO, about what form UNESCO's programmes should take?

Secondly, we are going to face a very difficult area, which is that for an international organization, an intergovernmental organization, to involve itself in programmes to help build democracy in a country, is for that international organization to assume a very intrusive role, which is difficult to take on. It means that the international organization is going to be talking to governments about justice, about better governance, about these conditions which — I suspect we would agree — do need to be fulfilled if democracy is going to take root and flourish.

And that brings us, again, into very broad questions about the extent to which it is now legitimate for international organizations to take the initiative in proposing to sovereign governments, steps which those governments ought to be taking to change or improve their political systems.

I think this morning's comments have been very useful, and let me just expand on a couple of them.

First of all, for the sake of clarity, I will implicitly be using the following concept of democracy. Again, one might add certain elements to this concept. They will not be found in perfect degrees anywhere. It is also a matter of more or less, but presumably more, democracy. Democracy certainly includes free elections. Without free elections we do not have democracy. Competitive elections. A wide franchise, presumably including all adults. The executive responsible for carrying out decisions must be subject to the election direct or indirect through a parliament and, finally, there must be a wide range of civil liberties and the ability to organize and give free expression. So that will be my implicit definition of democracy, others might argue with it, but it will be necessary for my further comments.

Secondly, when I refer to economic development, I will be referring both to the achievement of a relatively high level of income and wealth ("relatively" of course meaning with reference to a country's own experience rather than some international standard of development), and to an ability to maintain a reasonably sustained growth in economic activities.

All right. With those cleared, I think it follows from many

of the comments that have been made, starting with Mr Han, that it is useful to unlock this relationship between democracy and development, particularly to look at two mediating influences: inequality of income and wealth, and political instability. It is becoming increasingly clear that economic development is difficult to achieve and to sustain under conditions when income is divided very unequally. Furthermore — according to articles that have appeared in *The World Bank Economic Review*, and a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) — income inequality in itself promotes political instability. Economic development is hindered by inequality both because of its relationship with political instability and with the fact that when income is distributed very unequally, poor people are unlikely to achieve sufficient education, so that the workforce is relatively uneducated and unskilled. So that if economic development is to be sustained, it requires a wide level of literacy and skills in the workforce.

Hence this is where democracy comes in because democracy is the best check we have — not perfect, but the best check we have — on inequality of income. It is the best protection against “cleptocracy”. Furthermore, democracies tend to be less politically unstable and, indeed, the combination of development and democracy tends to be very sustainable. Work by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues, for example, has found that when a country is democratic and has achieved a level of income roughly the level of Argentina, once that level of income is achieved under a democratic government, or the level of income is achieved and the country becomes democratic, there is no example of a country that has subsequently lost democracy.

Democracy, then, is sustained by development, just as it can help, particularly through the mitigation of inequality and instability, to achieve development.

Finally, I would add that one other result coming from these comparative studies is that, interestingly, democracies show less variation in rates of economic development than do authoritarian systems. That is, there are a few authoritarian systems that have been able, particularly for relatively short periods, to achieve very high levels of economic growth. There are also quite a few authoritarian systems that have achieved nothing in the way of economic development and growth for their

Hisashi
Owada

people. So, there is a wide range of results among authoritarian systems depending on type, place, experience; but less variation among democracies. They tend not to be the spectacular performers, they tend not to be the terrible under-achievers, but rather to do generally quite well.

It is my turn to say how happy I am to be here and to congratulate you on organizing this meeting. I think it serves a very useful purpose, as it at least tells us something about the basic issues involved in a problem that tends to be discussed on a more technical, day-to-day level. I think it is very important for us to think about the most fundamental aspects of the problems involved.

I assume that this is more or less a brainstorming session today, and in that spirit I would like to express myself in a somewhat radical and perhaps even deceptive manner.

In a sense, I agree with the points raised by my friend Marrack Goulding, when he talked about the basic problems to be addressed. As for the relationship between democracy and development, I think we have to be very clear about what we are talking about, namely: are we putting ourselves in a historical context, by expressing ourselves in descriptive terms, or are we adopting a prescriptive approach to what it is up to us to do to bring about this programme of democratization, in the context of the development issue?

If we look at the issues in a historical perspective and in purely descriptive terms, the question of which problem comes first, which problem is a precondition of the other, is perhaps irrelevant, because there are very different models and examples. In other words, I think it is wrong to say that the process from development to democracy and from democracy to development is a linear progression. Mr Han was right in describing the experience of East Asia over the last 20 years. I am convinced that the same point could be demonstrated by the experience of a country like Japan, or even some countries in Western Europe which developed in the nineteenth century. The two processes are interlinked in a very complex manner and, consequently, from a strictly descriptive point of view, comparing one with the other may not be the right approach to the issue. Setting aside the question of a value judgement, which involves the prescrip-

tive aspect of the problem, I think the basic problem can be summed up as follows: who is going to do what in terms of development?

Of course, if you look at the classics like Plato, it is clear that in some cases, someone who is really capable of leading the process in an extremely effective way could perhaps start a better beginning for the process of interaction between development and democracy than to try to have a democratic system at the beginning, so that it may produce certain positive results in development. Having said that, once a certain development process has been obtained, through whatever means, that process will itself generate the emergence of a middle class and much better educated masses. This creates a new environment in which the problem of participation becomes a very important factor. And therefore the question of the mobilization of resources, and in particular the mobilization of human resources, will become a fundamental factor of development, especially if the concept of development is understood in a broader sense than just economic development. And I think that, in that context, the relevance of democracy becomes a very important factor.

That is why I think Mr Charfi was right to stress the element of continuity. For if one looks at the process as a whole, however it began, there comes a stage where sustainable development becomes possible only within the framework of a participatory democracy, where the mobilization of human resources can be greatest. To that extent, of course, even in a historical perspective, a stage is reached where development becomes, in a democratic regime, a precondition for sustained further development. But, in purely descriptive terms, that does not mean that this should be so from the beginning.

To come to the prescriptive aspect of the problem, however, I think we have got to a stage in the world where globalization — not just of the economic system, but rather in the popular imagination — makes it essential that there should be a simultaneity between the development process and democratization. Failing that, one cannot really attain the goals one has set oneself. In that sense, the question of democracy and development may not be a question of priority. We should explore both avenues at the same time.

Attiya
Inayatullah

One further point I wish to make in connection with the impact of globalization in another context: the question of the aspirations of States which embark on the development process as latecomers. This was the case with the Soviet Union at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, or China after World War II. I have no intention of formulating any value judgement on this point. All I want to say is that in such cases the aspirations of the peoples and governments involved necessarily make the development process seem like a process of catching up. That is a negative aspect of globalization — if one adopts a prescriptive approach to the issue. It is inevitable, if one gives priority to that process of catching up, that one ends up preferring one, i.e. development, to the other, i.e. democracy. Again, I must make it quite clear that I am not making any value judgement. But this is an element we have to take into account when thinking about this problem in prescriptive terms.

Like my predecessors, I would like to congratulate UNESCO on this initiative. I think it is very timely, and I look forward to working under your chairmanship. I assume that this morning's session is no doubt going to be devoted to a free discussion and a brainstorming, and that, as Mr Goulding said, we should then focus on specific issues.

First of all, I would like to refer to the Note which defines the mission of our Panel and to stress the usefulness of the work that has already been done or is still under way. The *Agenda for Peace* and the *Agenda for Development* are examples of this, as are such UNESCO programmes as the interdisciplinary project entitled: "Towards a culture of peace and communication in the service of democracy".

I would first like to refer to the first part of our programme, which links democracy and development within countries. I would like to move away somewhat from economic development and focus directly on the United Nations' vision of the concept of the universality of human development when it was founded. That vision has now become a reality.

We have seen that economic factors are an important element of the causal process, but there can be no doubt that the *Quality of Life Index* is an essential forecasting instrument. What we have been able to achieve in the second half of this century

is quite remarkable, as regards both life expectancy, infant mortality and adult education. I repeat that what was a hope of the United Nations at its beginnings has now become a reality.

I would also like to mention the example of the Kerala phenomenon,² of which we are all aware, and where the quality of life and of development has been one of the reasons for the vigour of democracy. One of the most important indicators in this respect, as has been repeatedly pointed out, is universal education. I think that this will be an important element for us in our deliberations.

I would now like to move on to another point: how can we act on a coercive policy and on democracy within a country? For even if human development is advisable and desirable, we are faced with poverty, very real poverty, in many parts of the world. And we cannot have any effect on poverty unless we deal with problems of discrimination, such as unemployment or the destitution of the landless. To be able to do that, how can we bring about the necessary political change that will enable that development consensus, which seems to have become a reality, to materialize? How can we do that when we have to work through a political community that refuses to give up its vested interests and through political leaders who regard the privileges they enjoy as the recognized norm? And yet what we expect of them is that they will change.

For example, since the end of the Cold War there has continued to be a certain resistance to change in the military-industrial field, even though there has been talk of the dividend for peace for quite some time. Because of poverty, landless peasants continue to face big landowners, and there are still problems that pit men against women. So I quite agree that democracy is not just a ballot paper, as it involves taking into account these basic issues.

That is why I would like to put the following question on the table: how does one establish the time-frame of indispensa-

2. The Kerala phenomenon refers to the model of sustainable development of the southern Indian state of Kerala which has low per capita consumption of natural resources combined with zero population growth and women and girls have equal access to health and education facilities.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

ble measures in a country that is acquiring the attributes of democracy? To my mind, it is a major challenge for its leaders to do it within a time-frame which is suitable and which results in changes in the political system. Political leaders are reluctant to pursue long-term policies, which have no effect during their term of office. They are practical issues, and yet, if they are not dealt with, there will never be any true democracy. At present it is indeed very important that we go to the polls. But beyond that there is the question of the place of civil society in democracy.

I am alluding to the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) sector, because a lot of the problems in promoting and sustaining democracy are unfortunately created by governments and result from their policies. That is why I would like our Panel to focus on the issue of “democracy and civil society” (with particular attention to the tertiary sector). To my mind, this issue is relevant at both a domestic and an international level.

Finally, I would like you to examine the whole post-Cold War set of problems: the place and the role of ethnic and religious strife within States and within regions. It is a new problem, and it is important to address it in terms of conflict resolution. The remarks made about Asia and the progress that has been made there were of great interest to me. I also believe that democracy has indeed gained ground in many African and East European States. It is true that with the end of a bipolar world an international system came into being which tended to encourage human rights and multiparty systems. I have a reservation to make, however: there are countries such as Haiti and some Central Asian republics, which are poor and have weak regimes that have little legitimacy. Efficacy in terms of economic development needs to be reinforced there, so they can keep their political system in good order. So a very fine balance needs to be struck before anything else, and it is up to each country to do so. It is not a question of an either/or decision.

I would like to say how happy I am to be here and to take part in this work under your chairmanship. In this debate on democracy and development, quite apart from a series of comments which particularly interested me, I would like to make a point which, I believe, has not yet been sufficiently developed.

I have some difficulty in talking of development and

democracy as two separate concepts. It seems to me that if one talks about development in the broadest sense one necessarily talks about democracy. In other words, I do not believe it is possible to conceive a project for the international community, or a development project for everyone, without the very notion of democracy being included in it. And if I use the word project, it is because I imagine that an international community, if it likes to think of itself as such, cannot be conceived of without a certain number of common denominators. Thus, the notion of human rights, for example, which has been nurtured and established on a universal plane above all since the last Conference in Vienna in 1993, would in my opinion be one of those common denominators. Now it seems to me that this is also the case with democracy because, when it comes down to it, the aspirations of peoples centre not only on economic development, but also on certain values such as the expression of wishes and the formulation of group-specific projects that can be realized only in the context of democracy. So I am tempted to suggest that we take democracy into account as an element of development.

The question which remains, in my view, and which, I admit, poses a tricky problem is the question raised by Sir Marrack Goulding, when he asked: but how does one achieve democracy? What are the processes that lead to democracy? It seems to me that Judge Mbaye made an essential point when he raised the problem of justice. Living as I now do in my country, Brazil, which is precisely a place where people are working to build a democracy after years of authoritarian rule, I can testify to that. We are basically faced with two stumbling blocks: the first concerns justice, that is to say the general practice of justice for everyone, or true justice, if you like; the second, as Sir Marrack Goulding has already pointed out, concerns education. I believe that for all of us here the question that needs to be considered is the problem of choices that insufficiently educated peoples have to make — that is to say the problem of “wrong choices” based on misunderstandings. I believe that UNESCO’s vocation is to support education and culture worldwide. So it has a crucial role to play as regards a direct and intensive form of investment aimed at raising the level of education in the world. That investment in the field of education is an investment in democracy. Similarly, investing in democracy means investing in development.

Mohamed
Bennouna

Finally, I would like to add, as far as press freedom is concerned, that we should not forget the role of communication in the modern world. I think we are all agreed on that. In any case, it is obvious to such an intense degree that it cannot be ignored. To my mind, freedom of the press is undoubtedly a factor that can educate people. This means that it is through the freedom of peoples that political choices and, therefore, the construction of democracy are possible and accessible to very many different sections of the population. It is, then, on these three foundations — education, justice and freedom of the press — that we should work first to construct democracy and secondly on its upshot, development.

I would like to say that I am very very happy to have been given a chance to participate very modestly, under your guidance, in the work of this Panel and to participate in the debate initiated by UNESCO, which is to my mind of the greatest importance.

I believe that if we are to make real progress we need to look beyond a number of ideas which one comes across increasingly often here and there, and of which people are beginning to weary. Those ideas are in fact to be found all too often in what is said and discussed in the press — if I may say so without wishing to sound disparaging — on the issue of democracy and development. They consequently remain rather far removed from practical concerns.

I think that it may be said — and here I agree with the preceding speaker, Ms Darcy de Oliveira — that democracy is an element of human development, since development is no longer gross national product (GNP). People now talk of human development. Now if they talk of development in the sense of the quality of life of human beings, of a better quality of life, they are not referring to national wealth in the comprehensive sense of the word. So democracy is indeed an element of development, and I think that this is an important point that needs to be stressed.

My second point, and here I agree with Ambassador Owada, is that we need to specify whether we are talking in “prescriptive” terms, or, to a certain extent, normative terms, by thinking of what ought to be. In that case, we come close to the notion of “obligation”, which is an approach very dear to jurists. From that perspective, democracy is an obligation, and develop-

ment is an obligation. But if they were obligations, what would that add? Nothing, to my knowledge. The fact of having made an obligation of development or of democratization has not resulted in more development or more democracy for the populations concerned. So perhaps what we should be talking about is not so much an obligation of behaviour — to use a jurist's distinction — as an obligation to produce a result, given that what we are talking about are not things that can be prescribed at a given time, but historical processes. And here again I agree with Ambassador Owada when I say that we can talk only in terms of history and that if we neglect the dimension of history we will end up talking in abstract, prescriptive or normative terms that will not get us anywhere. Just as democracy cannot be imported or decreed, so development cannot be decreed.

So we cannot say: this is what democracy should be. That is meaningless. If we talk in terms of history, we are perhaps on a sounder basis, and we indeed need to be very modest and accept the relativity of things. As Ms Darcy de Oliveira has just said, there is of course an international community with universal values, but those universal values necessarily come from the diversity of societies that make it up, and not from values imposed from outside. They are values that reach out towards the universal.

In any case I am personally very attached to diversity, and I cannot conceive of a uniform world. I can conceive of a world in which there is a community of values, and a common lot, but also a respect for great diversity. Otherwise, it would not be at all fun, would it? A world of multinationals, with the same airports, television soaps, etc.? No thank you. If that is development, then I say no. It does not interest me at all. I prefer to fall back on things which may be poorer, but have more savour. But here, incidentally, I am indulging in "culturalism", and I do apologize. I simply want to say that we should remember that there is a very great diversity in the world, that the Western historical process has achieved certain things, but that there are other forms of historical evolution. In other words, that societies move forward at a different historical pace and have a different historical capital — which is patently obvious, and which carries risks, as well as inevitably creating problems of identity, legitimacy and, in the end, social harmony.

What I want to say is that in my opinion the two terms “democracy” and “development” need to be complemented by a third: I personally believe that there cannot be democracy or development without social harmony. I believe this to be the main problem. Without social harmony you sink into anarchy, and there have unfortunately been many examples of that in recent years. Because they wanted to move too fast, or tried to import elements from outside, societies have lapsed into civil war.

Social harmony is not possible without the State. I believe that to be a fact. So today, when we discuss democracy and development, we run into the problem of the State. And if there is an area where international organizations can do a great deal, it is to my mind at the level of the State. The World Bank produced — last year I think — an excellent report on the State. Surprising though it may seem — and there is a connection with what Mr Han said earlier — the World Bank was clear-sighted (I almost said: clear-sighted for the first time). It was prophetic in that it forecast the Asian crisis, the crisis of the Asian economies. Indonesia and other countries went through a crisis, that is to say there was a kind of model, but it was a model based on States which were not modern, which indeed are still not modern, and which induced crises. In other words, the economy was artificially inflated in States that had remained very archaic. That was true of Indonesia, in particular, and the crisis was serious, a State crisis. In the World Bank report, which is of fundamental importance to my mind, here was an international organization which had previously advocated out-and-out neoliberalism suddenly issuing a warning: look out, it said, the developing countries need to be strong States because, unless these strong and efficient States are endowed with modern, high-calibre, uncorrupt, active, well-organized etc. bureaucracies on the ground, which carry out the functions of State, in other words maintain peace, security and justice as well as regulating economic activity, nothing is possible. Or in any case there cannot be sustainable development.

That argument was to my mind very welcome, at a time when the West, because of the failure of the Soviet bloc, was advocating an unbridled free-market economy. Economies like, for example, the European economy are now necessarily tending towards less State intervention, since the State is being eroded

from below, via decentralization, and from above, by organizations of economic integration. I believe that in other countries — and it is here that there is a situation that is historically out of phase — we need more State intervention. In any case, that is my theory, Mr Chairperson, but with a distinction between political decision-makers and economic actors. That is to say that today, unfortunately, political decision-makers are at the same time the principal economic actors; they are both judge and judged. In other words, it is they who both lay down the rules and who are the actors. This is true of many countries of the South, and of course utterly perverse effects are created as a result. As for democracy and development, they are things which go hand in hand.

This is what I wanted to add: social harmony and the State. I completely agree about the role of justice and education. I would simply like to say that in my view, if an opinion poll were organized today in many countries of the South — I am referring to my own country, Morocco, but I am convinced it would hold for many others as well — and people were asked what they wanted, they would not say: “More freedom”. They would say: “More economic and social rights”. Let us look again, for example, at the proposition, the reminder, formulated by Judge Mbaye earlier. There is a first generation of rights, then a second and a third, that is to say work, education, water and a number of essential facilities such as roads, without which there can be no freedom. They are the instruments of freedom. In the classical Western process, on the other hand, people began by introducing formal freedoms before moving on to economic and social rights, despite the Marxist critique of those freedoms, which to my mind remains valid today. Marxism as a scientific approach is not dead; it is the perversion of Marxism that is dead. The Marxist critique of formal freedoms remains valid to my mind.

Alexei
Vassiliev

I feel that during our discussions we have raised more questions than we have come up with answers, which is only normal. I think that it is precisely why we are here, to understand the problems and reach a consensus under the chairmanship of a person who knows the Third World as well as he knows the First, while the Second has ceased to exist!

In any case, the questions raised here are also known in

Russia. There is an old Russian saying, which consists of the following question: "What do you want? A constitution, or some sturgeon with horseradish sauce?" Which, in an Arab or Asian context, is a bit like asking: "What do you want? Democratic freedoms or a plate of couscous?" That is to say, economic progress and a rise in the standard of living. In my view, there is no general answer to that question. The overwhelming majority of people would certainly prefer the second option, namely an enlightened authoritarian regime that guaranteed social and economic development. Let us assume that "an enlightened authoritarian regime" may be understood to mean a regime which restricts democracy to a certain degree but observes the basic human rights. But where is the dividing line between that kind of authoritarian regime and an oligarchy of corrupt parasites, whose very existence precludes any development? In other words, many of the questions being raised here are very important. In what kind of society is development better and quicker?

In the early twentieth century, Russia was the fifth-largest power in the world in terms of GDP. Now, after 70 years of efforts, it does not even rank among the 12 most thriving economies. And yet there was a time when Stalin's brutal totalitarianism produced results that were the envy of much of the world. But the consequences of that are well known. We witnessed China's process of self-destruction during the Cultural Revolution. Yet after bringing in a few changes the same regime was capable of achieving one of the fastest development rates in the world. So which is preferable? I do not have an answer.

It is clear that democracy can be no more than a framework for the existence of a civil society. It is obviously very difficult to arrive at a consensus on what we mean by "civil society". In any case there needs to be an enlightened middle class. There was nothing of the kind in Russia before the reforms. A certain political culture and a respect for the law are necessary. But even in the nineteenth century, travellers noticed that, while laws were burdensome, the population never abided by them and was happy.

Of course some sort of freedom of the press is necessary. But when the press is owned by the State or oligarchic interests, what kind of press or mass-media freedom can there be? That is perhaps why, after ten years of efforts, GNP has halved in Rus-

sia. Worse results are to be found only in some of the former Soviet republics, such as Georgia or Armenia.

A further question: "What kind of democracy can we expect to establish in countries that are not part of Western civilization?" Can we expect the great Islamic civilization to accept all the values of Western democracy? My answer is no. But again, what values are likely to be accepted?

Another issue has been raised, and with good reason: globalization. And it has been argued that globalization goes hand in hand with greater democracy, transparency and all that. I would say yes and no. Why? When a democratically elected government loses control of its economy, who benefits? Multinational corporations, big banks or simply some broker in the City whose decisions can sometimes affect the development of a whole country. Does that mean greater or less democracy? I do not have an answer.

And as for information channels, who controls them at global level? And what kind of information is being disseminated throughout the world? And then there is the fact that globalization is regarded as implying the free movement of capital, among other things. What about the free movement of labour, of individuals? Is the Western world prepared to grant freedom of movement to Africans or Latin Americans? Or are we talking about a kind of global system reserved for the privileged classes? And then, if globalization eventually takes place, who will control it? I do not know the answer, but we could see a trend towards totalitarianism at a global level, and not towards democracy. I myself would be happy if that were not the case. But can you answer that question?

A further point is worth debating: the criminal economy at a global level. In Europe alone, the criminal economy is equivalent in volume to the GNP of a country like Spain. And there exists an international criminal economy at a global level, which ranges from what are known as boot economies, as in Zaire, to criminal economies based on drugs, as in Afghanistan, or on kidnappings, as in Chechnya, or on criminal activities, as in some Russian cities. These, too, are questions that need answering.

I have just raised a number of questions, without claiming to have got to the bottom of the problems or providing all the answers. Last but not least, there remains the issue of equality.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

What should we understand by development? Let us suppose that a great State, like China, adopted the same production methods and attained the same standard of living as the United States. What ecological impact would that have at global level? It would be death. So what kind of development do we want for the world? All this implies that a form of self-censorship should be imposed on societies and groups. But who would take responsibility for the restrictions that would thus become necessary? It is an unfortunate fact that nations are naturally selfish, as are groups. So, one way or another, restrictions would have to be imposed by a higher authority. By whom? I do not have the answer. Perhaps this highly estimable gathering of people, under the enlightened chairmanship of Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, will be able to provide some answers to these very important questions.

I think that more questions have been asked than answers proposed. At this point I shall try to summarize the main ideas that have been formulated during this first working session.

I think we are all agreed that democracy and development are closely connected. Some have even argued quite rightly — as I did myself in *Agenda for Development* — that democracy is a fundamental element of development, that there are various stages regarding the links between democracy and development, and that those links will be modified depending on the stage of democratic development reached and on changes peculiar to each State. Hence the idea put forward by Professor Russett, who argued that when a certain level of development is reached democracy is no longer under threat and there can no longer be any accident, break in the democratic process or return to an undemocratic system.

Another idea which has been raised several times is the role of justice or of fairness. One may answer that fairness is bound up with democracy, since democracy tries to maintain a balance between various tendencies and strives, through that balance, to achieve a certain degree of fairness. We have also been talking about the role of education. Lastly, returning to the Director-General's Note, which asked us to make recommendations, Sir Marrack Goulding asked a number of questions. Can democracy be encouraged from outside? Would any such encour-

agement not contradict the sovereignty of States as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter? No one has yet spoken of new conditions imposed by some financial institutions on some States which ask for their help to overcome a crisis or indeed to enable them to develop. Should the report we are going to present mention these types of conditionality?

This is a brief summary of the discussion this morning. I have not in fact provided any answers, but simply confined myself to asking the same questions as most members of our Panel.

First of all, Mr Chairperson, I would like to thank you for inviting me to join this Panel. I consider it a privilege and, even more, a challenge. I worked at the United Nations throughout the 1970s. Almost 20 years have passed since I left the organization, and I have had little to do with it since. My last job was in Macao, where I worked on the “one country/two systems” project. I am currently executive vice-president of the China National Committee of the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council. Taking part in this International Panel on Democracy and Development is something quite new for me. I feel a little bit stressed, and I will do my best to answer the questions, rather like a schoolboy trying to pass an exam! I will naturally be unable to avoid referring to the experience of my own country.

What is democracy? I think that democracy is essentially a system where the people is its own master, and where the power of the State belongs to the people. The people is sovereign. The government therefore needs to act not in the interest of the minority, but in the interest of the people as a whole. Democracy implies that all individuals are entitled to express their opinion and pursue their personal interest. Moreover, the criterion for judging the various forms of democracy is whether it can really guarantee the fundamental rights and interests of the people. It is up to each country to define its own form of democracy, depending on its circumstances, namely its level of social, economic and cultural development and its historical background. There is no such thing as a universally applicable, immutable or absolute model of democracy.

As regards China, in the light of our specific conditions, the system that has been adopted comprises the National Peo-

ple's Congress, combined with a Political Consultative Conference for Multi-Party Cooperation, which is responsible for promoting, through dialogue and consultation, the prosperity of the various ethnic groups concerned, thus contributing to the overall, coordinated and harmonious development of society. That, in a word, is what I have to say about democracy.

Now what do we understand by development? In my view, development is progress achieved comprehensively in the social, political, economic and cultural domain. The right to development is the inalienable right of every individual and the people of every country to participate in, promote and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development. A special right to which nations and individuals are entitled is that of equal opportunities to benefit from development. What we are talking about is the right to subsistence and the right to development. We regard them as the basic components of human rights.

As for the relationship between democracy and development, I regard them as inseparable, closely linked and interdependent. The same is true of economic reform and political reform. For us Chinese, as well as for people in the developing countries, development is our prime need. It is only when the economy develops that States can satisfy the population's most pressing needs, namely food and clothing. We have considerable experience in this respect. Economic development is a reflection of democracy, which guarantees the promotion of human rights; failure to develop the economy goes against the will of the people and is therefore undemocratic. Failure to develop the economy prevents the people from gaining the right to subsistence and therefore violates human rights.

So economic development and democracy cannot be separated or treated as two unconnected subjects. In my country, we regard development as an absolute priority, as the key that will enable us to solve all China's problems. Over the last century, the Chinese people has experienced three historic changes on its way forward. The first stage was marked by the 1911 revolution, which overthrew the autocratic monarchy that had ruled China for thousands of years. The second stage came with the foundation of the People's Republic of China, and the third with reform, an opening up and a bid to achieve socialist modernization. The 20 years that have elapsed since China embarked on its policy of

economic reform and of opening up to the outside world have been a period of ever-faster economic development and an improvement in the population's standard of living.

To enhance the economic reforms, it is also necessary to pursue and intensify political reforms. We are extending the scope of democracy, improving the legal system, governing the country in accordance with the law and turning it into a country governed by the rule of law. Right now and for some time to come, the main aim of political reform is to develop democracy, reinforce the legal system, separate government functions from company management, streamline State organs, improve the democratic monitoring system and maintain stability and unity.

As regards the factors conducive to democracy and development, it is important to make one's position clear at two levels, the domestic and the international. We shall be talking about the international level later on. Briefly, at the international level, the predominant trend towards peace and development, and the evolution of the world towards multipolarity or pluralism or greater diversity, have created favourable factors for democracy and development. Domestically, political stability, reforms tailored to the domestic situation, and an emphasis on science and education are essential for democracy and development.

Pierre
Cornillon

I shall simply try to answer the questions you have just asked, that is to say: can democracy receive outside support? How can that be compatible with non-interference? Can there be a conditionality?

At the beginning of the meeting, you were asking why authoritarian governments were respected when we are now imposing requirements with regard to democracy. It seems to me that it is not so much governments as their sovereignty which was respected since we were not demanding anything regarding their conduct within their own frontiers.

There is a historical reason for that. In the past, developing countries and Africa in particular, were the focus of competition between two blocs. We helped certain authoritarian governments and we respected their sovereignty in the competition between these blocs. Unfortunately, with the end of East-West tensions, developed countries are far less inclined to help and they now pose requirements. I have heard some very cynical comments about this.

The problem faced by some developing countries is that they received more aid when they were under authoritarian rule than they do now that they are engaged in the democratic process. As a result, the citizens of these countries are inclined to think that democracy does not bring them anything. Democracy carries a price: it is expensive to run a parliament, having officials and competent judges who are paid properly also has a price and that money is difficult to find in a country which has to face up to its development requirements. To that we can add the fact that in these countries which have opened up to a multi-party system, freedom of the press has become widespread if not complete, with the notable publication of scandal sheets. Some citizens are saying: "Before, we used to have a very respectable government because every day the newspaper told us about the President's good qualities; now I only read of baseless news and there's even less food on my plate". In order to help democracy, development aid is therefore needed more than ever. In stressing the link between development and democracy we have shown that it is through aid to development that one helps democracy.

Here we come to the question you raised of conditionality. We can, of course, consider that development aid given to a country that is already well on the way to democratization will be well used and will produce good results. But we often have doubts on the good use to which that aid is put. We can then ask ourselves if conditions could be imposed on the countries receiving economic aid, particularly tying the assistance grant to progress on the road to democratization. Just as it has been argued that there exists a certain right to interfere on humanitarian grounds, to what extent can it be argued that there exists a right to interfere on democratic grounds to ensure that development aid — particularly when previous development aid had no noticeable effect — produces better results? I have to admit that at this stage I have no clear answer to this awkward question and so I shall be most interested in hearing the views of my colleagues around the table.

Marrack
Goulding

I would like to return to the question that you posed about conditionality and the conditionality which the international financial institutions have begun to insist on. I think the point I was

really making was not so much that we should propose conditionality in any recommendations that we may put to the Director-General of UNESCO, but rather that we have to be conscious of how sensitive it is for governments, for outsiders to say to them, if you want to build democracy, you have to make your police force less brutal, you have to improve education, you have to stop discriminating against your ethnic minorities, and so on.

And the reality of the world we live in is that Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter has been very considerably eroded in practice. And erosion began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The erosion has accelerated during the last decade, certainly in the field that I am familiar with, which is peace and international security, because it has become almost the norm for the United Nations to play a part in the prevention, management and resolution of internal conflicts. If you ever — as you know very well, Secretary-General — if you were ever to try and get a resolution through the General Assembly saying that that was the norm, you would never succeed, but what we have been seeing in New York is good old Anglo-Saxon case law and precedent. Precedents are being established for the United Nations to involve itself in the countries' internal affairs.

Another major erosion in my view was the adoption by various of the multilateral development agencies of good governance as a legitimate objective of development policy, because that immediately meant that those agencies — and their governing bodies approved this — were saying: we can take the lead in proposing development activities whose objective is to improve the governance of the country concerned, and that is very much involvement in the country's domestic affairs. But, conditionality is going another step forward.

And the final point I wanted to make is that of course, when you come to discuss globalization, you find that there is a reason for governments to accept greater derogations in their sovereignties, because, as Professor Vassiliev was saying, there are all sorts of forces out there, non-governmental forces, which governments are finding more and more difficult to deal with individually. Given that the sovereign State is here to stay, governments are therefore obliged to collaborate and work together in order to deal with these major external non-governmental forces like pollution, like crime, like drugs, like AIDS. So, again,

Nicolas
Valticos

we are seeing a process which has never been legitimized as such and never been legislated as such, but is a process by which Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is becoming somewhat less relevant.

But that does not exonerate us from the responsibility of being very careful and sensitive if we are going to propose to the Director-General of UNESCO adjustments of UNESCO's programmes which will involve more, as it were, interference by UNESCO, or by other multilateral agencies, in the internal affairs of governments.

We fully realize — but do not say as much — that national sovereignty is a term which is being discreetly written out of history and the development of nations. But we must not say so!

What has the United Nations done since it was set up? One of the two outstanding things it has achieved, Mr Chairperson, is the promotion of human rights. And the promotion of human rights necessarily involves addressing observations to governments, notably through bodies set up by the United Nations. And what is being done by the United Nations and the specialized institutions, which have adopted many specialized conventions regarding human rights? They have set up a monitoring system so they can tell governments which do not accept those obligations that they are not respecting them. It is a task that involves acting discreetly and continuously nagging at them, and it has its ups and downs. One has to act diplomatically, but those are the rules of the game. There is such a thing as an international life. States are not islands, and some islands which are States are no longer even islands.

In the circumstances, I believe that as far as we are concerned it would not be wise — and I do not think it is in your mind either, or in mine — to put our foot down and say in our report: “This is what needs to be done to compel States”. What we should try to do in the report is define the link that exists between development and democracy. We shall end up with certain methods of action, perhaps some general suggestions as to how those two elements can work together and, at a pinch, proposals regarding the aid which governments might require and which people or organizations capable of doing so could provide them with as required. That would make it possible to avoid the

pitfall (although in fact it is a false pitfall). But we must observe the diplomatic niceties.

Our discussion of the connection between democracy and development has been very interesting and productive. One of the conclusions that seems to have emerged from it is that, when democracy and economic growth reach a certain level, a positive connection is inevitably established between democracy and development.

The drift of what Professor Russett said was that democracy sustains development and development sustains democracy in return. We need to encourage both, not only because they are both desirable in their own right, but also for the very pragmatic and very practical reason that they reinforce each other. What can we do along those lines? What can we do? There is a sentence in the first paragraph of the 1996 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Organization's activities which strikes me as relevant in this context: "It is not for the United Nations to offer a model of democratization or democracy or to promote democracy in a specific case". Does that mean there is nothing else to be done? I do not think so. To my mind, that sentence is highly relevant because we do not yet know, it seems to me, what is the most effective way of encouraging democracy in certain countries or in certain cases. Sometimes it can be counter-productive. Sometimes the adverse effect can be greater than the desired consequences.

In my view, one thing is certain, and that is what is stressed in both the 1996 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Organization's activities and the Memorandum of the Director-General of UNESCO. That is to say, two elements need to be stressed — political culture on the one hand, and institutions on the other. Of course, political culture entails a greater awareness on the part of the peoples of the world, which itself affects knowledge of how democracy operates, of the way it impinges on other aspects of life and the values related to democracy and the emotional attachment that can be generated in people.

I think this will be a very important role for this Panel, probably more important for democracy than the establishment of democratic institutions. And one thing we should stress is the promotion of a culture, a political culture or just culture, of

Mohamed
Charfi

democracy. The second question is how to create institutions, which is something that naturally concerns both intergovernmental international organizations (IGOs), such as UNESCO, and NGOs. But the aim of my intervention is mainly to emphasize that our essential function concerns the culture of democracy.

The question facing us, from a purely theoretical point of view, is the right to interfere in favour of democracy, which is incompatible with the principle of State sovereignty. From a purely legal point of view, the great innovation of the half century now ending has been the fact that States are bound by international human rights conventions. They have pledged to respect, within the framework of their sovereignty, a number of rights, particularly those listed in the Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

What is the point of an international convention if it does not create an obligation? I fully understand that nothing authorizes a military intervention to force a State to respect this or that right. Even so, there is no international convention which does not create an obligation, for otherwise it would not deserve its name. When there is a convention, there is therefore an obligation. And it is to my mind perfectly legitimate to remind a co-signatory that it has not respected an obligation.

In order to be consistent with itself, the United Nations Organization, at the same time that it promoted human rights through its conventions, set up certain bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights. Because of the composition of the Commission, States sitting on it express their views in extremely diplomatic terms that are acceptable to other States. Even so, whenever an opinion is expressed, it amounts to interference. I believe that the principle of peaceful interference, in diplomatic terms, can no longer be called into question today. In any case, it should no longer be called into question from a purely legal point of view. And States are today going further down that road. My country, Tunisia, joined and was, I think, the first Mediterranean State to have signed with the European Union a convention to join a free trade zone. The European Union is being enlarged not only as a result of admitting new member States, notably in Central Europe, but through the joining of the free trade zone by certain southern States. And the membership Con-

vention between the European economic entity and the Mediterranean countries still contains Article 2, which specifies that the free trade zone is based on a community of thought and a community of system which is the democratic community. States which join the free trade zone make a commitment to their partners, in return for economic and financial advantages. Within the framework of their internal sovereignty, they pledge to respect a number of rights and they foster the democratic system.

So in my view, as Judge Valticos said a moment ago, the sovereignty of States is being eroded; it is giving way to a right to peaceful interference, which although expressed diplomatically is nevertheless very real and well founded.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

Excuse my intervening here. I would simply like to ask a few questions: Who is going to exercise that right to interfere? Is it itself democratic? More importantly, that right to interfere is exercised in some cases, but not in others. Why do we apply double standards?

**Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira**

It is worth remembering that over a number of years the United Nations has set itself a very wide-ranging programme that goes from Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Vienna in 1993 to Cairo in 1994, Copenhagen in 1995 and Beijing in 1995. The programme covered a whole series of issues, including the environment, human rights, world population, poverty and women's rights. The programme clearly involved problems that could not be dealt with by States individually. That is why they made up this wide-ranging programme, within which conventions were concluded and commitments made by States.

When I look at that programme, it seems to me obvious that it would be difficult to deal with all these issues outside the framework of democracy. I cannot really see how the objectives defined in it could be achieved outside a democratic framework. This brings us to the issue of the right to interfere. I would prefer, particularly after Mr Chairperson's intervention — which I find rather disturbing, though it asks relevant questions and brings us back to a certain reality — I would prefer to talk not so much of the right to interfere as of the duty to influence. In my opinion, that is the method that the United Nations has already been using, discreetly, for some time.

I believe that it was the United Nations' influence that caused such issues as the preservation of the environment and, certainly, women's rights to be raised decisively in some countries. I think that if we were able to exercise our influence to protect the environment and to demonstrate the absurdity of the denial of women's rights, why should we not similarly be able to exercise our influence as regards democracy? In actual fact, it is clear that financial bodies are already doing that: the question of human rights is a conditionality, as is the protection of the environment without any doubt. The World Bank imposes very clear conditions as regards the environment on the development projects it is asked to fund. And I can assure you that the organizations which defend women's rights are actively urging the World Bank to impose conditions as regards those rights too. So a whole process is getting under way, which involves appealing to the United Nations so that conditions are imposed which are likely to result in the introduction of more democratic processes within States.

So I propose that we strive all the more energetically to impose this duty to influence, since the right to interfere obviously poses problems.

**Hisashi
Owada**

The problem posed by Mr Goulding is a very concrete and real one. There is a major discrepancy between the ideological reality of sovereign States in their strong attachment to sovereignty and the social reality of interdependence which gradually erodes the absolute value of sovereignty in the full sense of the term. I feel that, whether we like it or not, sovereign States are very jealous of their sovereignty. That has always been the case.

The examples given by Mr Goulding are true, but we have to be very careful about how we approach this problem. I would like to make two suggestions in this connection. Of course, when we talk about sovereignty, we generally mean the sovereignty of States, which corresponds to the classical definition of the term. But basically the problem is not so much about the sovereignty of States, in the abstract sense of the term, as about sovereignty as perceived by the people. And intervention, even if it is peaceful, seems to me to pose a problem if it is a question of imposing the will of outsiders on a people against its will, however the situation is assessed. On the other hand, the sovereignty of the State,

in the classical sense of the term, often tallies with what the government advocates, which may not reflect the will of the people — and I believe this is one of the problems we need to address.

The second point is that in this respect it is very important to ask oneself who is qualified to carry through the process of development. Conditionality of course implies a take-it-or-leave-it offer. That seems to me to be neither conceptually right nor operationally wise, because I do not think it can work. What is implied in the notion of conditionality, of course, is that people will think about the problem with a view to achieving a success of the operation. With this in mind, certain things are offered on certain conditions. But the same result can be achieved in a more effective way, namely by trying to exert influence, as Ms Darcy de Oliveira said, or, to use my own expression which I prefer, by using the power of persuasion, through a process of cooperation and partnership aimed at entrusting the control of the operation to the people themselves. If that element is taken into account as part of the process, I think the same result can be achieved without introducing take-it-or-leave-it conditions. And it may be preferable, in that context, to take into account the aptitude of human beings for creating institutions, which might be possible if less insistence were placed on conditionality in the crudest sense of the term. That could help influence or convince the population, rather than the abstract entity known as the State, which is usually represented by the government, a body that may well not be truly representative of the people.

Kéba
Mbaye

I very broadly agree with what our colleagues, Judge Valticos and Mr Charfi, have said, in other words that, while a kind of *actio popularis* does not exist today, the “right to interfere” is something which, in one way or another, has become the practice of States. But in my view the right to interfere covers a whole spectrum of acts and even abstentions, ranging from entering a country with armed forces to the withholding of all aid. At that point, at this lower limit, the question of conditionality comes in, because, in the end, that is what conditionality is all about. Concerning the welfare of populations there is a fundamental principle: if you apply it I will help you; if you do not apply it, I will not help you. Fortunately, UNESCO is not asking us to decide whether it can raise an army to go and tell the Senegalese gov-

ernment to do what it should do. It is simply asking us to say what it can put in its programme, as Ambassador Owada said a moment ago, to help establish democracy.

I think there are a number of things on which we are now agreed: there is indeed a very clear link, as you said, between democracy and development. For my part, I rather agree with Ms Darcy de Oliveira's idea that development includes democracy, just as we have been saying for several years that development includes human rights. So, on that basis, I believe that one can perfectly well recommend, for example, that programmes be elaborated with a view to encouraging the establishment or the development of development, if I can put it that way, given that democracy is regarded as being part of development. By the way, while browsing through my library today, I came across a book which contains the following passage: "Development, far from being a model that should be copied, constitutes an attitude of adaptation that one feels to changes in the world, because development does not boil down merely to economic development, but contains a social, political, cultural and psychological dimension". Do you know who wrote those words? Our Chairperson, Mr Boutros-Ghali. You were addressing a United Nations symposium on development, and taking the case of Africa as an example. You also recommended, during that symposium, that the United Nations should intervene in the field of education to reinforce development and democracy, and therefore peace. So I feel that we are in a good position to advise UNESCO to reinforce all the elements in its programme which can help to develop development, as I said a moment ago, it being understood that development includes democracy.

A number of those elements, of those conditions, might be mentioned, such as the existence of the rule of law. Let me quickly tell you a story. I was asked by 16 African States to head a board that was to implement a development programme in Africa, in other words to encourage investors to come to Africa. We began by carrying out an inquiry, and what the investors told us was not: "If we work in Africa, we don't get paid." They asked us what law was applicable in this or that country. They said: even if we know that such and such a law applies we do not know how it will be applied by the courts. In other words: there was juridical insecurity and judicial insecurity. That is why I was very

insistent, and we set up in those 16 States an organization called the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law (OHBL), with joint legislation so as to try precisely to get round juridical insecurity and judicial insecurity. I believe it is a serious obstacle to development and therefore to democracy, and in my opinion it is undoubtedly one of the first criteria that needs to be taken into account when establishing whether or not one is entitled to benefit from an aid programme within the framework of UNESCO. Then, of course, we come to everything that was mentioned this morning. To recapitulate: for example, the equality of individuals and of peoples, the education of citizens, freedom of expression and its corollary, a plural and independent press, the responsibility of the authorities in the handling of economic, social and cultural rights, etc.

Mohamed
Charfi

I am not quite sure whether the subject I would now like to broach falls under the heading of the democracy of States or of intergovernmental democracy.

There was much talk a moment ago of the right to interfere, which often runs into the problem of the sovereignty of States, because when one talks about human rights violations one accuses a State or States. But human rights violations are not just the work of States. They may also stem from popular groupings. This brings me to a question of culture and not to a question of government methods. So do cultures, the content of cultures and the dialogue of cultures form part of our topic of discussion or not?

I am looking at the Note we received from Mr Federico Mayor, who invited us to take part in this Panel. I read in paragraph 5: "The Panel's main task will be to advise me with a view to carrying out UNESCO's programmes relating to the building of democracy, which form part of a global strategy aimed at establishing a culture of peace in a multicultural world". As far as I can see, and I speak under your supervision, I believe that cultural issues should also concern us, at least to judge from the terms of this invitation. So as far as I can see there is nothing to stop us talking about culture or talking about violations of human rights, in other words of democracy, since human rights are an integral part of democracy. Today there exists in several countries of the world an authoritarianism of government and also an

authoritarianism of cultural groups. I am referring to religious fanaticism or extremism.

I would first like to say that religious extremism can violate human rights and the freedom of human beings, possibly in a more crucial and more serious fashion than governments do. Generally speaking — not in the absolute, but generally speaking — authoritarian governments are interested in the political behaviour of their citizens. An authoritarian government is not interested in the behaviour of ordinary citizens, of ordinary men and women; anyone who does not challenge the conduct of the president, the government or the State, and shopkeepers or workers who have no political opinions, are left in peace. Religious extremists, on the other hand, want to direct people's consciences and the individual's behaviour. That is a very serious violation of human rights. And the suffering of those I would call the offenders — those whose behaviour is different from the behaviour that others are trying to impose on them — is more serious when those violations are carried out by religious groups than when they are the work of governments. However efficient the most authoritarian police in the world may be, it is less efficient than the policing carried out by religious groups, because in the latter case offenders are kept under surveillance not only by the State police, but by their neighbours, parents and friends. The feeling of suffocation is even greater.

So I believe this question is very much part of the subject at issue. There exist several cultures today whose contents, seen from an extremist viewpoint, are hostile to human rights and hostile to peace. May I broach an important topical issue, for example the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The peace process has now reached deadlock. Who are the main groups that are most hostile to peace between Israel and Palestine? On both sides, they are groups of religious fanatics — The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), on the side of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the religious parties, on the side of the faction in the Israeli population that is hostile to peace. So these issues are important for both peace and democracy.

I shall speak solely about what concerns the world to which I belong. I believe it is right that we should all first speak about ourselves, first clean up our own back yard, first criticize ourselves. I am a Muslim and I belong to the Muslim world. I note

that in my culture, if we look at its past and the part of it — unofficial for the time being — that has not evolved officially, we have a number of groups which want to maintain corporal punishment, the non-emancipation of women and capital punishment for apostasy, in other words to keep a number of rules that are contrary to human rights. Those rules have changed, as far as the actual law of States is concerned, and when one examines their legislation one's mind is somewhat set at rest. Today, barely 10 per cent of the 50 Muslim States that belong to the Organization of the Islamic Conference still practise corporal punishment. That means that old religious rules have been abandoned by nine tenths of the States concerned.

In fact I believe that all religions have changed. Vatican II was a cultural revolution for the Christian religion — or at least for the Roman Catholic Church. We have very fortunately come a long way since the Crusades, the Inquisition and so on. In the Jewish religion, for example, polygamy was abandoned centuries ago, even though it formed part of Mosaic Law. So all religions change, and the Muslim religion has changed too, if one looks at the actual law of States.

Religious extremism, on the other hand, wants to see a return to the old religions. I believe that Islam is capable of changing like other religions. One should encourage that change. UNESCO cannot of course intervene in a religion's internal process of change. As in the case of States, there must of course be a principle of non-interference in religions, particularly as Islam is a perfectly respectable religion, and one in which I believe. So it is not for non-Muslims to interfere in it. Even so, that change can be encouraged, in an indirect but to my mind quite acceptable way, through a dialogue between religions. Today, there is a dialogue between cultures in UNESCO and various other bodies, but this is not the case with religions, because there is no international inter-religious organization. And that is a deficiency. The United Nations system has organized cooperation between States, cultures and continents, but not between religions.

Since Vatican II there has been a Secretariat of the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue, and several meetings between representatives of various religions have indeed been organized by that Secretariat. But that remains a dialogue which

Alexei
Vassiliev

was initiated by one religion. There exists no international inter-religious dialogue, and the initiative, the paternity, of such a dialogue belongs to no one. There are many Muslim, Christian and Jewish intellectuals who would like to organize a dialogue between each other. The international organization whose purpose is to promote culture is in the best position to initiate and organize such a dialogue. Jihad is rather like the Crusades, a legacy of history. One day it will become necessary to give it up, to decree its end and to abolish it officially, rather as when Vatican II officially abolished a number of ancient Christian practices. People who carry weight in these various cultures will have to sit down together. They will have to talk to each other, so they realize that understanding, cooperation and acceptance of other people will eventually supersede the ancestral hostility they had inherited for centuries. Such a dialogue will of course be extremely difficult to organize. The practical difficulties will be considerable. But I shall not go into further detail until I know whether the topic appeals to you, Mr Chairperson.

May I first of all say that I agree with Mr Charfi on the importance of dialogue between different religions. But I beg to differ with the notion that this dialogue has not taken place. In this same building, in a room next to this one, just about a year ago, I took part in a dialogue of that kind which UNESCO had organized. The dialogue brought together representatives of European civilizations and of the Islamic civilization, including religious dignitaries from both sides. Many other groups exist in their field. In Birmingham (United Kingdom) there is a sort of Islamic-Christian dialogue. In Russia, we have organized some five conferences on the problems of a Muslim minority faced with a Christian majority, and vice versa. But that does not mean that further efforts along the same lines are not necessary.

Now to answer your question, Mr Chairperson, about democracy and development in the perspective of international relations, it is worth remembering one very important fact: after World War II, and perhaps even after World War I, there were no military conflicts between democracies. There is just one exception, Northern Ireland, and it is the exception that proves the rule. And that is a very important fact, as it defines the framework or conditions for economic development. Regarding the

future, we must realize that in the twenty-first century humankind will live in a world that is no longer bipolar, but multipolar. But it will also be a multicultural world, where each civilization will be able to contribute its own values to the civilization of the whole world, enriching other civilizations through its own achievements. But that remains theoretical, and an ideal to strive for. At the moment, when we talk of some form of extremism — in the Islamic world, that might be fundamentalism or anti-Christianism — I think that that kind of extremism is a symptom that reveals the problem rather than actually being the problem itself. The problem is that, today, in finance, the economy, information technology and even the military field, the Western world dominates the planet. And the reaction to that domination consists of acts that are sometimes logical and sometimes illogical, as in the case of some religious fanaticism. Just as long as the equality of different civilizations, different ethnic groups and their values are not recognized — recognition is possible only in a democracy — there cannot be normal conditions either for development or for a dialogue between nations, ethnic groups and civilizations. Of course the majority of experts reject the notion of a clash of civilizations, for it would seem that that would mean the human race was doomed for ever. But dialogue, coexistence, and cooperation, which are part of democratic culture, are all necessary, even if considerable efforts are required to introduce them into international life, international relations and people's minds. Moreover, all this ties up with the Director-General's idea of a culture of peace, which also comprises the culture of dialogue, understanding and esteem of other people and their right to be different. That is very important.

**Francine
Fournier**

I shall be very brief. I believe that what has been said will be all the easier to implement because we at UNESCO have already done work on this issue of dialogue between religions. The first important event was that meeting in Barcelona. It was attended by leading representatives of the world's major religions, who agreed on a declaration which ruled out violence carried out in the name of religion. So there was that Barcelona Declaration, which stipulated that it was inadmissible to use violence in the name of any religion. Since then, we have had other meetings on that same question of dialogue between religions. But what I find

Nicolas
Valticos

particularly interesting in the present debate is the idea of there being a connection with the issue of democracy. And I think that this is an area that could usefully be explored.

I would like to add something in connection with an important idea, namely that it is not just States that violate rights, liberties and democracy. I would add a very worrying phenomenon, the rise of the far right in Europe, North America and Latin America, and I think that we should discuss that too, as it poses a threat to democracy.

The difficulty with this problem is that there is not extreme evil on one side and absolute good on the other, and that it is often a mistake either to angelicize or to demonize. Democracies themselves involve notions that we have not had time to analyse properly. We should examine the degree of democracy — democracies can be formal, or social, or profound, or peripheral, all to a varying degree, and do not necessarily resemble heaven on earth. I am not talking about the problem of the distribution of wealth, about sociology, but after all they are not synonymous with peace either. There have been bellicose democracies, and it has to be admitted that Ancient Greece was not a particularly peaceful nation and liked to conquer colonies, sometimes even when that involved slitting their inhabitants' throats. But, as Churchill said at a later juncture in history, it was probably the least bad of regimes.

Since the beginning of this century, there have been colonial wars launched by democracies, or colonial occupations. There was the Crimean expedition, which was launched by countries which at another time would have been described as bourgeois. There was Theodore Roosevelt and his “big stick” policy in the United States. That is the difficulty. We should perhaps say a little more clearly what we mean by democracy and by the power of public opinion, the possibility for public opinion to express itself, and above all the fact of enlightening public opinion, of having an enlightened public opinion. All this comes into the notion of democracy, and even educated peoples are sometimes bellicose. People need to be educated in peace just as they need to be educated in democracy. In every country they shout the equivalent of “*nach Berlin*” or “*nach Paris*” at certain times of great excitement. Democracy is a continuous teaching process,

and that is why I was keen from the start to emphasize teaching — the teaching of things, the teaching of ethics, the teaching of human life.

I have perhaps digressed a little, but we do need to analyse the contents of the notion of democracy and of the values that need to be taught. This can sometimes be difficult, because young people are rebellious and sometimes little inclined to listen to what they might regard as a moral lecture. And proof of that is to be found in the fact that the teaching of ethics has been abolished in most countries where it used to exist. So there is still a great deal of work to be done, and we need to analyse both the notion of democracy and the different notion of peace and development.

Pierre
Cornillon

I would like to go back to the issue Mr Charfi raised in connection with religious extremism and with the notion of cultural exception. Religious extremism, as described here, and which occurred in other forms in the past, is to my mind essentially the work of people or groups who are simply trying to seize power. It is not the first time that individuals or groups, bent on seizing political power or economic power, have cloaked themselves in religious robes or other guises in order to reach their goals. Each time it takes a while to become apparent. These groups recruit among simple people who are disappointed with and excluded from modernity. For it is a fact that in many societies modernity brings changes, even serious upheavals. Many people are afraid of these changes and cannot bear the upheavals. Ms Fournier referred to the right wing phenomenon in Europe; when you question the majority of right wing extremists, xenophobes, in our countries, you find that these are people who are afraid. Fear is a very bad counsellor and often results in extremist positions and withdrawal. From what I gather to be true of some countries, religious extremism in Muslim countries feeds on fear of modernity and recruits people from among those who are excluded from or disappointed with modernity.

If we analyse religious extremism as a form of power, I cannot wholly subscribe to some of the views which have been expressed here. Indeed, the constraint imposed on individuals by religious extremism is very burdensome — often what is imposed in the name of God is burdensome. But although some

authoritarian regimes are not interested in individual behaviour and are satisfied when their citizens do not oppose them politically, many other regimes, in principle non religious, are based on an ideology and religion has been replaced by that ideology which is just as constraining for the individual.

With regard to cultural exception, it seems to me that democracy, in its major fundamental principles, is a universal value which transcends religious, cultural or ethnic characteristics. It is universal because it offers freedom of choice, freedom of belief, freedom to lead a different life. We could perhaps think that this or that form of democracy might be subject to cultural exception but I do not see the possibility of the essential aspects of democracy — which appeal to the concept of freedom, doubtless the concept most widely shared by all human beings — being subject to cultural exception. I have had occasion to visit some members of parliament, very simple people, not trained in London or Paris, in their prison cells on the other side of the planet, who only spoke their national language and were a pure product of their national culture. I was able to observe that they had a very acute sense of what freedom is, of what injustice is and the suffering it brings. I cannot see in the name of what cultural or religious exception I could have told them to accept the abuses of which they were victims.

So it seems to me that cultural or religious exception is not a notion that can be applied to democracy and that religious extremism must be considered as a form of oppression identical to that of an authoritarian government.

One last remark. The relationship between democracy and peace has been mentioned here. I should like to come back to that issue later in the debate but at this stage I have to point out that it has certainly not been empirically proved that democracy is a sure guarantee of peace, although this has been stated by many international organizations. I am, of course, convinced that democracy greatly encourages peace but I should like to have the assurance on the one hand, that beyond a certain level of development and of democracy, there is no risk of going back and, on the other hand, that a conflict between two democracies is not possible. Unfortunately I still have doubts about that.

A suggestion, and then a comment or two. A suggestion, just a proposal: would it be helpful for us to make the following distinction between group rights and individual rights? That is, that we might wish to protect the right of an individual or all individuals to express his or her group identity, in terms of religion, ethnicity, language and culture. That is distinct from the right of a group, whether that group be the majority in a political system or a minority, to enforce on a minority within it the necessity of conforming to the group's conception of culture or religion or ethnicity. We must make that distinction between recognizing group rights and protecting individual rights within groups.

Mr Vassiliev made the interesting point about democracies not fighting each other. There is a lot to be said about that and I hope that we will be able to address that issue tomorrow, as it is on our agenda. So I will wait until tomorrow to comment on Mr Vassiliev's remarks, which are essentially a correct empirical statement. We will talk about the reasons for it and some of the qualifications that Mr Valticos suggests.

By the way, just a small clarification: what I said about democracies having achieved democracy at a certain level of development is only an empirical generalization. Yet I am not certain that it will always happen. That is the difference between seeing something in the past and being confident that it will continue. And something of the same can be said about democracies and fighting.

One other comment: Mr Vassiliev also mentioned the rather infamous work on the war of civilizations. We all know that there have been many wars between countries representing different civilizations, not only in historical eras but in this century. However, if one looks very carefully at who fights whom, at least in the past century, I can find no evidence that wars between civilizations are especially common, that is, States are as likely to fight members of their own civilization as they are to fight States in other civilizations. Wars between civilizations do happen. But to imagine that they are common normal events is incorrect and to expect therefore that they will be common and, in the future, that wars between civilizations will be the most common type of war, is something for which there is no historical evidence. However, if enough people believe that the next wars will be between civilizations, I suppose they can make it

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

possible. So I hope that my American colleague's book on wars — *The Clash of Civilizations* — is not taken too seriously here.

I would like to make a few further remarks on the topic of democracy. The first is that I was delighted to note that some people have reminded us that even in countries regarded as the most advanced democracies there are extremely worrying signs and tendencies. So the relationship which has been established, to my mind a trifle hastily, between economic development and democracy seems to have been invalidated by the examples that we have been given, mainly concerning modern Europe and the United States. That is a point which I feel we should nevertheless keep in mind.

I would also say that even in democracies generally regarded as the most advanced there are major shortcomings, challenges to be taken up and quite important problems to be resolved. This prompts me to be so bold as to say, perhaps with a touch of radicalism, that there are no democracies yet in existence. That is something that could be argued, for example, from the standpoint of women's rights. In other words, I do not know of a country today that has achieved genuine equality between men and women, and that is something that could justify one asking some embarrassing questions. I would also like to remind you that it was in Beijing that, to my great surprise, the international community first agreed to declare that women's rights formed part of human rights. I was astonished, I have to say, that this gave rise to such difficult negotiations at the end of the twentieth century. And yet that is the case, and that is why I always say that women became part of visible humankind only in 1995. It was in 1995, in Beijing, that we women became part of the human race for the first time. By that I mean that the issue of democracy is perhaps a little more difficult to deal with than might be imagined. Its relationship with economic development is not the whole story.

The second point I would like to raise, without knowing whether or not I am anticipating a subsequent debate, is the question of the agency that could intervene in a country — the UN as it happens — to defend democracy. In other words, the possibility of interfering and the right to interfere, or the duty to influence. In other words, what possibility does the UN have,

when it intervenes, to talk about the democratic nature of a State? It is a question which I feel deserves to be debated.

I would like to comment on an issue that has come up on several occasions, namely the international impact of democracy and development. I know we are going to talk about international democracy tomorrow, but the impact of democracy on international relations is an interesting subject, which includes the question of whether or not domestic democracy can contribute to international democracy.

Professor Vassiliev quoted from a work, I think by Sam Huntington, in connection with the fact that democracies do not fight among themselves or go to war with each other. What he meant was certainly not that democracies do not fight, but that there are no wars between them. But there is a study which indicates that it all depends on the kind of democracy one is talking about. Thus, fledgling democracies tend to allow themselves to get carried away by nationalism or emotional upheavals. As a result, they can be induced, if not actually to go to war, then at least to display greater aggressiveness in their international relations than older and better established democracies.

This brings us to the role of nationalism and the question of whether democracy should encourage nationalism and ethnocism as well. The fact is that both dictators and democratic leaders exploit nationalist sentiments for their own ends. That is something which I think we should take into account. But it is quite true, in my view, that domestic democratization tends to make international relations more stable, in the sense that regional cooperation or integration would, for example, be very difficult to bring about without democracy. The European Union would be inconceivable without there being democracy in all its member States. People now talk about the birth of the euro. Many years ago, I visited Spain and Portugal just as they were emerging from a murky past. They had just taken part in an election for the European Parliament, and everybody was celebrating the event: I knew at that point that they would not go back to the old days. I believe that when you have democracy at home it encourages international cooperation and integration, just as international cooperation and integration encourage domestic democracy.

I do not think that democracy necessarily makes interna-

Attiya
Inayatullah

tional institutions more democratic in the short term. In the long term, however, I am convinced that domestic democracy contributes to international democracy. Here again, I would quote the European Union as an example. When I was dealing with Cyprus, I could see that Greece's life force was as powerful as that of the United Kingdom or Germany. So if we can regard the European Union as being more democratic than other integrated inter-State organizations, it is because its member States are all democracies.

When I look at autocratic regimes and plutocracies, I certainly feel that in the post-Cold War period democracy is here to stay. I predict that it is going to evolve, and I think the concept of democracy should be looked at in terms of general principles. It seems to me there is a consensus on this around this table. The upshot of what I have heard in the course of our discussions — and I am also of that opinion — is that we should talk about general principles and values that are common to all models, and thus respect pluralism. That is a point which has emerged, and I feel it to be essential. I would also like to reaffirm that respect for pluralism and the need to educate citizens are quite clearly the key to developing democracy, whatever form it takes.

That being the case, in answer to your question, I would say it is possible to encourage democracy from outside, in the case of democracies that set global standards. In my view, that is why the role of the United Nations or any similar body as global guardian is so important. We are due to talk about UN-related issues tomorrow. But I think that what is now going on in Afghanistan is important in this context. We have talked about fundamentalism. To me, the most negative and depressing aspect of Afghanistan is what is happening to women there. As Ms Darcy de Oliveira pointed out, it confirms the fact that it was not until 1995 and the Beijing Conference that women's rights were discussed in terms of human rights. It was a cliché for which Ms Clinton was responsible. I feel that we live in a world which still does not recognize the role, place or status of women, as has been shown by what is happening today in Afghanistan in the name of religion. In my view, yes, democracy can be encouraged from outside, but when we are talking about collective guardians there must be a level playing-field so that they are all

equal. And the present situation cannot continue as it is. But we shall be talking about all this in greater detail tomorrow.

However, as regards the link with development, I do not feel all that much at ease. I feel that linking democracy with development for the first time is a big challenge for this Panel. And what we should above all talk about is our conception of development. We all agree that democracy has common principles and common values. But what about development? For me, development is not the free market economy which people are striving to encourage and promote. I think the repercussions of that can be very serious. What I am looking for, what I regard as development, is the establishment of safety nets. To my mind, the development paradigm adopted by the United Nations under your leadership is true development. It is not necessarily the market-place, it is not solely the market-place, and it is not the market-place as we understand it in our discussions.

To come back to the very relevant questions asked by our Russian colleague this morning, what actually is the situation as regards the free movement of workers? When we talk about globalization — and I am sure it will be on the agenda tomorrow — and the World Trade Organization (WTO), we have to talk about free movement and about people. We need to talk about the economy of organized crime, which seems to me to have reached proportions where it is destroying the youth of the world. And Mr Vassiliev made the very interesting point that if China became industrialized in the same way as the United States our whole environment would be destroyed. That is why I feel we should pay tribute to China for the way it has succeeded in controlling its population, so as not to find itself in a disastrous situation.

Just one more point. At local level and at national level, everyone must take part in the process of democratization and development. UNESCO documents mention government, local government, universities and the worlds of business and industry as being very important. In fact the same is true of the document of 20 December 1996, which you circulated to us. All that is very important from the point of view of accountability. There needs to be accountability to the population. There needs to be transparency, since corruption is another factor that has to be taken into account in the developing countries. We have to be

able to talk openly and honestly about the impediments that are peculiar to each country at an internal level, irrespective of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the conditions it lays down. What we need to know is how to help a country's leaders and its people. And I think corruption is a major problem that needs to be talked about and debated.

I also believe that since we are leaving behind us the era of authoritarianism, which was in some cases the work of military governments, it is important, when considering a country and its leaders, to take into account army officers and the army as well. It too is a social actor. We sometimes tend to forget that important player, which was the most important player only two decades ago. That is why I would like us to discuss the army, with reference to a given country's domestic situation, in the context of democracy and development.

Hisashi
Owada

I agree with everything that has been said by earlier speakers. But I think there is one point we need to be careful about, and it is this: when we talk about democracies, whether at a domestic level or at an international level, it is important to the group in relation to which the problem of democracy is being discussed. At an international level, we usually think about the international community as society consisting of sovereign States, and when we talk about democracy at an international level we tend to think about the application of democratic principles in relation to the sovereign States, thus believing in the democratization of the international community on that basis and the consequences of that in such fields as development. However, the position of some extremist groups within a State, religious groups for example, may be identified as the will of that State within the framework of the State. At least in a hypothetical or conceptual sense, it is conceivable that a State can be represented externally by religious extremists as democracy.

We need to ask ourselves what identifiable group of individuals we are talking about. In many cases, it is a nation, and in most cases it means a people, but it can be smaller than that. And we need to think about the problem of democracy in terms of this concept of society or a community of individuals. And here the most important factor from the point of view of democracy may be the question of pluralism. I think this question may

become even more important if we consider democracy at an international level, because here the question is whether we are really talking about democracy in terms of the sovereign States, or in terms of the peoples.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

May I ask a question of Ambassador Owada? If a group or a political party says openly that the purpose of its political action is to put an end to democracy, then what about that group? Would you let that group use democracy to destroy democracy? After all, we seem to forget that Hitler was elected democratically, and the same was true of Mussolini. So, here, what are the rules?

**Hisashi
Owada**

That is exactly what I was referring to, as it is a classic and basic dilemma intrinsic to democracy. To what extent can one be tolerant towards those who oppose democracy? I believe that in order to express an opinion on this problem one has to take a decision to defend the democratic process as a global phenomenon rather than a domestic problem. I do not know the answer. I guess the conventional answer would be that, if you are thinking about the question of governance at a global level, you need to think about the problem in relation to the interest of the global international community. But that is perhaps more than conventional wisdom. I think it is something more of an ideal than the reality of the present-day world, where there is still a group of sovereign States that make up the global community, as opposed to individuals, who are the true elements of the global community in the literal sense of the term.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

At a certain point in history, in France I believe, the opponents of democracy told the democratic government: "We demand these rights in the name of your principles so as to be able to eliminate you in the name of ours". The problem can by no means be stated in such simple terms. In fact, when Mussolini came to power with his "bogus" march on Rome, if I can put it that way, he did not say he was going to abolish democracy; he said he was a nationalist, which is something very different. And when he came to power, he did abolish it, gradually. When Hitler came to power, he did not tell the elderly Hindenburg that he was going to abolish parliament, but he nevertheless did so, in his own way. That is what complicates the task of democracies,

Mohamed
Charfi

which have to defend themselves. But you have stated the problem precisely. Democracy must not go quietly like a lamb to the slaughter. Democracy must be in place in order to be able to survive, because it has a role to play for the people. For democracy is the power of the people; and it is not the political authorities who are in a position to decide whether they should be so naïve and ingenuous as to give others weapons with which to bring down democracy. So if one asks the question in the absolute, I believe that a democracy should have the means to defend itself. There is a right to defence, to self-defence, a right that democracies should undoubtedly be able to defend against the enemies of freedom. But it is a delicate question, and must not give rise to abuse, otherwise it will result in suicide. Democracies do not have the right to commit suicide, because the purpose of the democratic system is the salvation of its citizens, and not of those who govern them.

I shall not persist in trying to defend my idea. Just let me give you my initial reaction to what has been said.

Very often, all too often, people see a connection between religious extremism and development, and say: "It is the social outcasts who react like that, you have to understand them, etc.". I am not saying that underdevelopment does not foster religious extremism. It certainly does so — poverty, poor housing conditions and even undernourishment all encourage extremism. But it is not — and that is why I have intervened again — it is absolutely not its fundamental cause. In the case of the rise of the far right in Europe, I do however think that it is the fundamental cause. As regards religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world, things are very different. The cause is cultural, mainly cultural.

In this connection, I would like to point out that there are two Islams today. There is a modern Islam, practised in nine tenths of Muslim States, which have abolished the punishment of apostasy and corporal punishment from their legislation. Nine tenths of those in power officially call for equality of the sexes, even if they do not manage to put it into practice or to get rid of polygamy, for example. And then there is a traditional Islam, which is completely different, and which comprises a number of rules that violate human rights and democracy as we understand them today. Now in almost all Muslim countries — and there is

the rub — the Islam taught in schools is traditional Islam. In schools, pupils are told that the only legitimate regime is the caliphate and that Islam implies corporal punishment, with the multiplier effect that is exercised by the school. There is one teacher and one school textbook for 40, 50 or even 80 pupils. And that continues for years and years throughout schooling. You cannot imagine how disastrous it is to disseminate such a culture and to disseminate it with the State's resources, with taxpayers' money. The result, to my mind, is that several countries and several peoples, almost all of them Muslim, are moving backwards in this respect: whereas modernization has made enormous strides over the past century or century and a half, with the spread of education everywhere, we are sliding backwards. For the past two years the Arab Institute for Human Rights has been carrying out a study of human rights and human rights education in the Arab world. Twelve out of the 22 Member States of the Arab League have approved the international instruments concerned with human rights. Only those countries are covered by the study.

What is the situation in almost all those States? At school, pupils are taught traditional Islamic law, which runs against the official culture of the States, against their official legislation. That, to my mind, has been the primary reason — I am not saying the only reason, but the primary reason — for the rise of religious extremism. And that is why fundamentalists today include, it is true, social outcasts and people of bad faith who want to seize power in this way, but also many perfectly honest activists, who are also engineers, doctors, etc., very well-educated people, but who espouse that culture because it is what they were taught at school. There we are, I will say no more.

Pierre
Cornillon

I listened to Mr Charfi with great interest. It is a fact that religions — particularly religions of the Book, which I know best — have basically a “closed” connotation which is not favourable to democracy. Of course, efforts have been made by the churches to become more open-minded — although for some, like the Roman Catholic church, that effort has produced the rise of fundamentalist movements and even though these remain marginal, they are still there. These religions are founded on a revelatory, therefore absolute, truth, and it is very difficult to compromise

with absolute truth. The churches have tried to adapt to the realities of the societies in which they are embedded but they come up against the problem of adaptation of the dogma of their religion. Can one adapt the word of God? That is a difficult question.

If I understood you correctly, you feel that it is the Muslim religion and Muslim States that have made the least effort towards official and generalized *aggiornamento*. This brings us back to what was said earlier on the importance and the value of education for development and for democracy. The *aggiornamento* has not been sufficient because it has only affected the elites; it was not carried out thoroughly enough since religious teaching was not modernized. This issue of religious education can be seen in different terms depending on whether it is a question of opportunist extremists — those who pull the strings in order to seize power — or simply grassroots activists. I totally agree with you that the attitude of the latter would be very different if they had been educated in the context of an open-minded religion.

The difficulty is knowing what attitudes governments should adopt in countries where religious extremism is rife. We have seen that those who govern these countries, and have undergone their own *aggiornamento*, now find themselves subjected to pressure from the mass of the population and they have a tendency to regress so as to avoid being cut off or simply to retain power. They often give way in order to stay in government so as to save the essential, as they put it. Perhaps that is not the right way to go about it, but is the alternative a more authoritarian regime? I am somewhat apprehensive about this matter because all dictatorial regimes have always claimed that their iron hold on society was for its own good, to save it from danger. It is always very awkward to say: "I am abolishing another person's freedom because he wants to abolish mine or his own children's freedom". Mr Valticos put it very well when he said that it is very difficult to know how far democracy can go in order to defend itself. Personally, I think that it should defend itself through its structures, with its own weapons, through its positive action and its educational action rather than defend itself through repression. Everyone knows that the strategy of extremist groups is to trigger excessive repression and thus justify pursuing their action.

Nicolas
Valticos

Just one word. In our free-wheeling discussion of the faults of churches, I would suggest, if you do not mind, that when we get to the point where we formulate our thoughts, which are at the moment varied, we should not tackle the problem of religions, but first tackle the problem of political opinions. While it is true that we have got a lot on our plate, we must not get caught up in a wild-goose chase, and if, on top of that, the geese are dressed up in religious garb, we shall find ourselves in a situation where we try to resolve everything without getting to grips with anything. I think the main thing is for us to focus on the notion of democracy, that is to say freedom of thought and development, something which will indirectly involve what we may or may not think of religious problems. But if we run up against this further impediment, so to speak, we might find we have got too much on our plate for a programme like ours. It is the political issue and the issue of culture that should be our source of inspiration.

Alexei
Vassiliev

The question you have just posed is really a very tricky one. How should a democracy, within its own society, deal with the enemies of democracy? The answer is really a bit like trying to square the circle. The minute you abolish freedom of speech, you are no longer a democrat. If you guarantee that freedom, you put democracy in even greater jeopardy. Frankly speaking, that is why I cannot see an answer to that very difficult question, as there should always be a certain correspondence between the means and the end. Are you prepared to use violence against other groups in order to defend your own values and rights? It really is a very very tricky problem. Are you prepared to point guns at your own parliament in order to defend democracy in your country? Are you prepared to establish a military regime in a country because you believe — setting yourself up as a judge — that other forces, let us say fundamentalist forces, are poised to take over power?

I said earlier that democracies do not fight among themselves. I can assure you that I am very attached to democracy, but I would like to quote the famous remark made by Churchill, who said something along the lines of: “Democracy is a terrible thing, but I don’t know of anything better”. That means that democracies have a lot of faults, and so do international relations. You mentioned the Taliban movement in Afghanistan,

Attiya
Inayatullah

which is very very far removed from the very notion of democracy. What is behind all that? Let us say, to put it mildly, some vested interests in oil pipelines. From Turkmenistan to Pakistan, who are we talking about? I shall say nothing. Democracies should assume their own responsibilities, otherwise vested interests will take over.

As for corruption in the developing countries, it is true that it is a terrible phenomenon. But where does the dirty money, the black money from the developing countries go? To the very democratic world, the very democratic Swiss and American banks. So what can be done? It is up to those democracies to assume their responsibilities. But how? Perhaps one of the rules of democratic behaviour should be not to do to others what you would not like done to yourself. It is simple, but very useful.

What is democracy in international relations? The United Nations Organization grew out of a consensus between totally different regimes, which are still totally different today. Is there a kind of Rousseau-like social contract in international relations? Or, on the contrary, is the will of some imposed on others? I do not know. But of course in international relations we are talking not about elections, but about some sort of compromise, about the adoption of some common rules.

I would like to reply. In fact I think we shall discuss the issue you have raised tomorrow, and I feel that a forum like the United Nations has become even more important as we approach the third millennium. That is why our discussion tomorrow will be extremely important. I do not believe that the United Nations can achieve its purpose in its present form.

I would like to answer the question our Chairperson raised in connection with Mussolini and Hitler. To my mind, anything which militates against the dignity, equality and mutual respect of human beings is intolerable. So one cannot possibly approve of fascism and everything that Hitler did, even if it all began with a democratic election. Democracy is a process and, as Mr Vassiliev pointed out, it is neither black nor white — it will evolve, it will develop. It hardly had a glorious start, but it will change, not necessarily to everyone's liking. But I think — to go back to my country many years ago — that if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan, who won the elections, had been appointed

prime minister, what happened might not have happened and the senseless killings that ensued might not have occurred. Similarly, I believe that if the verdict of the ballot box had been respected and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had come to power in Algeria, they would have been thrown out at the next election if they had not been able to deliver the goods. So I believe that it is important we weigh all that up carefully.

But I would like to take this opportunity to react also to Mr Vassiliev's remarks on Afghanistan. I entirely agree with him. I would like to return to the question of the pipeline, as it is a question of power politics which concerns neither Pakistan nor Turkmenistan. Surrogate wars are being fought, and I believe it is essential for us to look a little more deeply into that pipeline and see where the real power lies. Who is perpetuating the gun-toting Mafia? Who is perpetuating the heroin culture? And I think we need to talk very honestly about this, because the world is no longer divided up between two superpowers and because, as a result, one comes down on this side or the other. At the moment we are witnessing an explosion, as a result of either religious fanaticism or ethnic strife. Mr Cornillon mentioned that some religions are against development. I would like to say — and I hope we are saying the same thing — that extremists, obscurantists and fanatics in certain religions are naturally against development. And here I would like to point out that when you have religious fanaticism women are always targeted.

I feel the time has come where we have got the best possible mandate, thanks to the two intergovernmental conferences in Cairo and Beijing. The identification has been made, and the agenda has been defined and is feasible. All we need to do is integrate women into the process of development and the process of democracy. This should be broadcast loud and clear, for it is possible to take action. Today, women are having to fight against religious fanaticism, which is actively trying to stop them doing so. In the contemporary world, women are concerned whenever there is religious fanaticism. It starts at family level and gradually extends to all the upper levels. As for the economy of organized crime, the situation as regards the international trafficking of women is mind-boggling. In most continents of the world, one finds practices that are discriminatory against women, from female genital mutilation to their fundamental right to maternal

welfare. So I think it is a human problem, and I would like to look at development from a humanist perspective. If one looks at the quality of life and development in the perspective of human rights, the rest tends to look after itself.

Finally, I would like to comment on a major impediment to democracy and development today, namely local ethnic strife. One needs only to look at what has happened in Africa. And I would like to stress that ethnic rivalries do not start at family level, like women's problems. Ethnic strife occurs at the level of the community and of society, and that is where it erupts. And here again I do not think that it is tribes or ethnic groups that clash. Everything comes from that pipeline, which has been rightly mentioned. There is the hidden hand — and sometimes not so hidden hand. So what is to be done about these negative elements, which advocate democracy and freedom and everything that is right and ethical when they apply to the Human Rights Commission, whereas they are in fact solely in the business of politics, base politics?

To my mind, these are the serious problems that our Panel needs to resolve for UNESCO. The nicer or theoretical aspects have been remarkably and abundantly documented, but I hope we will come up with answers to the difficult questions.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

May I just play again the role of devil's advocate? Take the case you mentioned about ethnic strife. Take the case of what happened in Burundi and Rwanda. What happened is directly connected with the democratic process, because there is a minority, the Tutsi, and a majority, the Hutu. If there is an election, and therefore recourse to the democratic process, power will automatically go to the Hutu. And the result is civil war between the Tutsi, the dominant minority, and the Hutu majority. So this is a case where the implementation of democracy immediately triggers a military confrontation unless a way is found of establishing and managing their coexistence.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

You have not played the role of devil's advocate as much as you suggested you might, Mr Chairperson, for the problem you have formulated in the form of a Socratic question is one I had been thinking about during this discussion. What is the essence of the question? The essence is: "What is democracy?" We must make it

perfectly clear in our report that democracy does not simply consist of elections every four or five years, and that even clear-cut elections that bring to power a majority government which can then do what it wants once it has been elected are not democracy either. We must stress that democracy is a constant process, that it is a kind of frame of mind, a respect for other people, progress and, when there are several forces at work in a country, a balance between those forces. Democracy is a reflection of society as it is and as it should continue to be, a society of tolerance and progress. Democracy, then, is a continuous and daily exercise. It is not about taking part once and for all in a poll, which may in fact not be all that honest, and then allowing the government, even if it has been fairly elected, to do what it wants. That is not democracy. Democracy is a state of mind, a constant and daily process. And that is the idea which I believe it is important to emphasize.

Hisashi
Owada

If I provoked a debate that has had a rather destructive effect, I apologize. I had no intention of bringing in some radical ideas, something which could even be destructive. But I think that when such issues and root problems are discussed one needs to be sufficiently categorical, and it was in that context that I raised the issue.

As for the intrinsic dilemma facing democracy, I think one has to realize that we have to assume certain things as our premise. It is a bit like action which can be demonstrated, as opposed to theory. In the case of democracy or the problem of governance, that action would involve determining as your premise whether absolute universal values exist, or whether there are values which you regard as absolute and whose destruction would destroy society. If one adopts a totally relativist attitude in terms of values, I do not think that it is really possible to solve this problem. Perhaps it is a question of philosophical determination rather than scientific proof. But I think it is a basic point that is worth thinking about.

This brings me to the second point you have just raised, Mr Boutros-Ghali, as the devil's advocate. When one thinks about democracy, I believe it is necessary, as Mr Valticos suggested, to be more analytical about what we mean by democracy. Now democracy, to my mind, does not simply consist, as Judge Mbaye

Alexei
Vassiliev

said, of voting and determining who has a majority. The question of pluralism or, if you like, of tolerance is an intrinsic part of the notion, since it is one of the universal values that should be regarded as absolute when we think about the question of governance and politics. And in that context the principle of self-determination, in its broad and radical sense, is going to be a very important factor.

When I talk about self-determination, I do not necessarily mean self-determination as practised in the periods following World War I and World War II. I think of self-determination in terms of the right to exercise basic freedom based on the respect for human dignity, as expressed by a duly identifiable group of individuals, or even by individuals considered individually. That is the central idea we need to keep in mind when we think about this problem.

Just a few brief remarks, Mr Chairperson, concerning the questions you raised about the Tutsi and the Hutu. I share Mr Valticos's view and feel, like him, that the notion of democracy is not just about an election, a majority, a minority and so on. Democracy is a process that sometimes goes on for generations. But it is also an education and a political culture. And it is tolerance. When democracy results in a form of genocide — the fourth in its history — and at the same time a sort of so-called historical revenge involving the killing of men, women and children, it is clear that that has nothing to do with democracy.

But in that case the question that arises is: what is the responsibility of international organizations and the international community, and even the international mass media? Let us suppose that Rwanda had the same sort of oil resources as Kuwait. Do you imagine the international community would not have lifted a finger?

To return to your question, it is obviously not possible to introduce democracy by a decree or a law, or by waving a magic wand. Efforts are needed. The right conditions have to be set up. Society has to be prepared and have suitable structures. Otherwise we know what happens. If the result is a dictatorship, in Africa let us say, it means more State, more corruption, more violence and less development. If there is some semblance of a democracy, it means internal or ethnic strife, group egoism,

increased corruption and violence, and, once again, less development. So it is not easy to find a way out of that vicious circle.

In giving that example, I did not want to suggest that democracy was synonymous with elections. Elections are just the visible part of the iceberg. On the contrary, I wanted to say that we must avoid applying the same rule to all cases in order to establish democracy in different societies. Now this is something we commonly do. We like to think we can take the rules that apply to the old democracies, such as the United Kingdom or France, and apply them wholesale to African countries.

There is another problem, which also requires our attention. We expect a small African country to move, first, from an authoritarian system to a democratic system, then from a one-party system to a multi-party system, and finally from a more or less planned economy to a free market economy. In other words, we are asking for four or five simultaneous changes from a country that is incapable of coping with them all at the same time. This is where the problem of priorities comes in. What should we begin with? Development? Democracy? Education?

The aim is to establish democracy, but in certain cases that is impossible, at least to start with, and you have to postpone democracy. Democracy cannot be the priority. In other cases democracy has been a tool which has encouraged reconciliation. For example, democracy was the last stage of the peace process in Mozambique; it was the last stage of the peace process in El Salvador. But, before that, it was possible to obtain a ceasefire, disarmament, a truce and the integration of the two armed forces. And in the end it was possible to hold a general election, in preparation for which the rebel groups had turned themselves into a political party.

That is why I believe that one of the problems, when we talk about the relationship between the economy, development and democracy, is how to define our priorities. Given that there exists a close relationship between democracy and development, and given also that we are entitled to claim that development means democracy, there cannot be development without democracy. You cannot expect a State in the throes of transition, say an East European State, to carry out four or five changes at the same time. It is all a question of priorities, and I believe that

Pierre
Cornillon

the government concerned is best equipped to define its own priorities.

Mistakes are often made as a result of pressure exerted by the international community or the World Bank, which does not leave the State free to make its own decisions. I shall cite just four examples: in Congo-Kinshasa, there was a revolution; in Togo, destabilization; and in Burundi and Rwanda, civil war and genocide. And that all happened because of pressure to bring in democracy and organize elections immediately. In some societies, it is wiser to wait for other stages to be reached before advocating democratization, which is often the final stage.

We can also consider the opposite hypothesis: that development and democracy do not go hand in hand. It has to be admitted that in some cases democratization is in a sense the final, not the first, stage, and that a country is incapable of going through all the various stages within a matter of months, or even years. South Africa is rather a good example: it is a country that succeeded in making a smooth transition to democracy. But the difference was that it was a rich country with a prosperous minority, which was crucial to continued economic development.

I am sorry, I have gone on for rather too long, particularly as I am supposed to listen, not talk. You can see I used to be a professor!

At the outset I mentioned that it seemed to me very brave to tackle straight away not just a relatively particular topic but a difficult one and I thought that sooner or later we would have to come to an agreement on what democracy is. I should like to mention that the Inter-Parliamentary Union together with UNESCO, in a Commission of this kind, prepared a Declaration on Democracy which was adopted by the representatives of 138 parliaments and it is now being distributed. As a consequence of this Declaration being adopted, we might consider that there is consensus on the fact that democracy is indeed a complex phenomenon which cannot be reduced to any one particular element but which is the sum of a series of elements and, above all, is a state or a condition constantly being improved and constantly perfectible. Thus, for example, even in countries that have long been democracies, democracy can be regarded as being incomplete. Just as there were slaves in the era of Greek democracies

— which would be unthinkable today — in our democracy, society is not yet organized in a totally equal fashion and women have not yet been fully integrated into democracy. It is, then, an incomplete democracy.

You raised the question of action priorities. Here is the old question again: which comes first, the chicken or the egg? What should we begin with? It is a fact that the evolution of a society can begin with development, but democracy and development must go hand in hand early on since, as I mentioned this morning, a society cannot move far on one leg. I would even go so far as to say that two legs are not enough for some countries which certainly need a walking stick and by that I mean help from outside. You asked who is the best judge to set priorities. Who should be left with the task of deciding? I do not have absolute confidence in the leaders who are in power, because they want to hang on to it. Their instinct for survival can lead them to restrict themselves to a small attempt at openness rather than any profound change because leaders know very well that revolution has always devoured its own children and they have no intention of disappearing. And so I am afraid that we cannot always leave them a total choice of priorities.

I have just returned from Namibia. It is a country which had and still has extremely serious problems to overcome. The international community has given it a corset, so to speak, the corset of a democracy that is relatively advanced in its institutions. And it does seem to have been a success. On the other hand, the introduction of democratic institutions or practices in many countries has triggered anti-democratic reactions. The phenomenon is always the same: when a class or ethnic group has power, it takes it rather badly when it loses it. What would have happened in Namibia if there had not been international aid? Or international vigilance? An effort to persuade, a duty or a right to assist — someone here mentioned, to influence? Would the minority — who held power and still enjoyed great privileges as compared with the political majority — have accepted the new situation?

I would be very pleased if this Panel could bring to the fore that democratization will not be able to truly progress in the world unless the international community as a whole promises to help this process. But once we are at this stage we will have to

answer your questions: Who can speak on behalf of the international community? What exactly is it? What is its legitimacy to do so? Perhaps it should reform itself if it is not going to limit itself to saying: don't do as I do, do as I tell you.

I shall continue in English. I was very interested by what Ms Inayatullah just said a moment ago about the events in Algeria. She asked a serious question which is important to us all. An electoral process was taking place. That process was abruptly brought to a halt and the first results were declared void. I personally have deep misgivings when a democracy defends itself by abolishing democracy, and even more so when there is good reason to think that the regime which is defending itself in that way is far from being democratic. We have to realize that the results of that election were the outcome of some thirty years of absence of democracy. On the other hand it would doubtless be rather other-worldly to think that the FIS would have been beaten at the next elections if they had not responded to the citizens' expectations. Like other parties elsewhere and like the one it was going to succeed, the party would have hung on to power and doubtless it would have been a long time before the people removed them.

With regard to priorities, I would opt for beginning with democracy. I am convinced that a genuine democracy can be installed in a country with no democratic tradition. If it permeates the country sufficiently then democracy will be able to defend itself democratically, i.e. through rules, laws and justice without having to resort to undemocratic means.

Nicolas
Valticos

Just one word. You talk about international vigilance. It depends what it is going to cost. Namibia has a population of 1 million, so that does not cost much. But if we are talking about international vigilance involving a population of 100 million, that will cost 100 times more; and that being the case there will not be any international vigilance. So there is an element that should not be underestimated: the cost of that international aid or of that international vigilance to foster democratization. So before talking about international vigilance, not to speak of international aid, we need to know what it is going to cost and ask ourselves whether the international community is prepared to pay for it.

Kéba
Mbaye

May I point out that if States — not the international community but States — which have flooded certain very authoritarian regimes in Africa with money, had flooded fledgling democracies with the same amount of money, those democracies would have been strengthened and would be in a better position today. That is all I regret.

Nicolas
Valticos

International vigilance can be similar to what the thousand-eyed peacock feathers were in ancient mythology, that is to say one can arrange for vigilance in every little village simply to check that everything is all right. One can also arrange for a two-eyed vigilance in the country's capital. So vigilance too is something that can be restricted to essentials or spread out everywhere, as it is during elections. When there are elections, international observers are sent out to every village to make sure the ballot-boxes do not have false bottoms. But vigilance is also needed for the whole thing to work. One needs to adapt. But you are perfectly right, it is first and foremost a question of enormous cost and of feasibility for the international community. And it also needs to be accepted by the country or by some parts of the country. That is one of the many important questions that need examining.

Mohamed
Charfi

I said this morning that to my mind there can be no long-term development without democracy. And I believe there is a consensus here to call for both of them and to regard development and democracy as being closely connected. So the notion of there being two stages, first development, then democracy, is not something I believe in. However, a distinction perhaps needs to be made between the attributes of democracy: democracy is of course the power of the majority; it entails elections and a changeover of political power between parties, which presupposes political pluralism and a denial of a *de jure or de facto* one-party system; it also entails an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the respect of minorities and of human rights in general. So should all this necessarily be embarked upon at the same time, or should there be priorities? Naturally one has to beware of untimely distinctions, which would delay something essential.

May I give you two examples to show that if you take one

element of democracy and apply it on its own it can have disastrous results? Let us take the election in Algeria, six or seven years ago. Even though no preparations had been made, elections were organized and, when the result came as an enormous surprise, the process was broken off. What happened was that the party that was going to win made statements in which it said that these were both the first democratic elections and the last, because democracy was a sin. That was its official statement. In other words, those who were going to win the elections as a result of democracy were going to kill it off immediately afterwards. It is a bad example, if you think the only aspect of democracy worth adopting is its electoral system.

I shall give you a second example, if I may, Mr Chairperson. As I said this morning, an independent magistracy is a fundamental precondition of democracy. What has been happening in Egypt over the past few years? The Egyptian judiciary is one of the most independent in the Arab world, by virtue of traditions that go back more than a century. It is at least one of the most respectable legal systems. It has just handed down a verdict that I think defies description: Nasr Hamed Abouzeid, an enlightened Muslim who dared adopt some liberal ideas, was ruled to be an apostate, and third parties took it upon themselves to ask for him to be separated from his wife on account of the apostasy of which he was alleged to be guilty. The State, the Public Prosecutor's office and the Court opposed that procedure. There was an appeal. The Appeal Court decided, first, that the gentleman in question was an apostate, even though it was not within the competence of the court to say so, as there is no Egyptian law which defines apostasy or draws any consequences from it. Secondly, because he was ruled to be an apostate, he was divorced from his wife, even though his wife was in complete agreement with him. Here you have a couple, then, a man and wife, who were happy together, legally married and wanted to remain married, and it was decided they should be separated. And you have the Court of Appeal, the highest court in that respectable country, in that most independent of legal systems, rejecting the appeal and ruling that the original verdict was correct. That is how, when one focuses solely on the independence of the judiciary, one can end up with a disaster. The Algerian elections and the case of Hamed Abouzeid in Egypt! It may be

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

said that these elements, when considered in isolation, are not a priority for democracy. Democracy is not viable with only one of those elements. And that is why I believe that democratic culture should be the top priority, because if there had been a well-developed democratic culture in Algeria, there would not have been that threat. And as for the judiciary, if the Egyptian magistrates had had a democratic culture, they would not have ruled the way they did.

I was very struck, Mr Chairperson, by the example you gave us in connection with Rwanda, when you said that in that particular case democracy should not have been imposed. I believe that, when we expressed our opinion on democracy, we did not have in mind the extreme cases of peoples who have never experienced elections. But it is indeed clear that democracy does not simply boil down to elections. And yet this does very clearly raise the question of access to a number of advantages which, I believe, can be included in the expression Mr Charfi used: “democratic culture”, that is to say, first of all, an independent legal system that makes it possible to monitor an election without having to resort to observers. Sooner or later, a State must itself be able to ensure the legitimacy of its own elections. That is one thing.

A second thing, which is UNESCO’s fundamental concern, is investment in education and information, education being basically understood to be information. When one looks at people who have never had access to a ballot box, one observes at the same time that their level of information and education is rather low. That is another advantage to which everyone should be granted access. I could continue this list, but in the case of democratic culture I believe that the watershed centres on access to human rights in general, that is to say those which the Declaration of Human Rights says should be accessible to all. The human rights issue has now taken on an importance on the international scene that it probably never had before. I think that this question urgently needs to be asked today, and that there is here an element which is in itself an indication, in other words, even outside the context of an election, the presence or absence of encouragement to attain those advantages indicates either a process of democratization or its absence.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

Before adjourning the meeting, I would like to raise a question. When we talk of “the culture of democracy”, it is something very vague which governments are incapable of defining. Whereas if you say: “The judge must be properly paid.” “There must be freedom of the press.” “People must be taught to read and write”, they are precise and tangible notions. For my part, I have misgivings about an assumption which I come across rather often, which is that we are going to find a solution to the problem of democracy through a culture of democracy. For it is something that is not palpable, not easy to “sell”, not easy to explain to public opinion. That is what I wanted to say by way of conclusion. I am wary of terminology like “the culture of democracy” or “the culture of peace”. They do not mean anything precise to people’s minds. Whereas if, when talking about “the culture of peace”, you mention things like “disarmament”, “a neutral zone”, “a ceasefire agreement” or “a 20-km withdrawal of troops”, they are precise notions for which you will obtain something that is vital nowadays, with our new information methods. You will get the support of public opinion, because you are talking about something tangible and clear. But when you talk about “the culture of peace” or “the culture of democracy”, it all remains very vague.

[beginning of next session]

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

In the hope of better focusing our discussions, I have circulated a list of questions. The first question refers to a theme that has been discussed by many authors, namely: “Can there be such a thing as an international democracy?” In other words, domestic democracy is a reality, but can there be a genuine international democracy? What is the impact of globalizations — for there are many kinds of globalization — on domestic democracy?

And there is this question again: “What can the future of domestic democracy be, when some of the most powerful socio-political forces extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-state?” In other words, the nation-state and domestic democracy have less and less power and are less and less capable of keeping in check those new forces, those new economic and socio-cultural powers.

And lastly, how is it that the increase in the number of democratic States has not gone hand in hand with more democratic relations between States?

How can one explain the reluctance of democracies to extend their model of governance to inter-State relations?

Does democracy encourage peace? Are wars between democracies rare? What are the consequences, for democratic States, of the presence of undemocratic States in the international community? In a different connection, how should a democracy behave towards a party which is not democratic and whose aim is to abolish democracy? What attitude should a democratic State adopt towards undemocratic States?

These questions, which are not exhaustive, simply aim to encourage discussion. May I start the ball rolling by saying that there is a school of thought which holds that there can be democracy only between individuals, and not between States. In the eyes of some authors, then, the whole discussion of inter-State or international democracy is meaningless.

In my view, however, it is important for us to know what impact the new globalizations have on democracy and economic development, and to understand what the new relationship is between democracy and development within the framework of globalization. It is not an entirely new field since, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, the United Nations Special Assembly discussed the democratization of the United Nations, and the majority of heads of State and of government stressed the importance of that democratization. Thus there is a kind of consensus that the United Nations is not democratic and that basic changes will be needed in order to introduce what we may consider to be a minimum of democracy.

This is a new field, the field of international relations, where democratic rules do not automatically apply. The concept itself may turn out to be different and have characteristics that do not exist in domestic democracy.

In short, it is a question of democratizing globalization before globalization changes the nature of democracy.

Nicolas
Valticos

Thank you for formulating, in your introduction, problems which are quite provocative, in the best sense of the term, and which prompt us to examine what we are to discuss today from various viewpoints. We also have the questionnaire, which is itself very interesting. The only criticism I would make of it is that it is perhaps a little too interesting, that is to say that over

the brief period that we have for our meetings we could devote a whole day to each question. Still, we have to begin, and we shall see how it goes. Each of you can choose any question, which will result in a kind of intersecting dialogue.

What I can say straight away, on the basis of your own remarks, and to say a word on each question, is that it is obvious — everyone seems to accept it — that the structure of the UN is now terribly outdated. It is typical of the immediate postwar period, and conditions have changed in half a century. But when one looks at the way it is hoped to change that structure, it becomes clear that it will not be along democratic lines. It is more a question of increasing the number of States in the luxury class. I say that quite clearly. When it comes down to it, it is not directly our problem, but in this context it is something that needs to be raised.

The notion of democracy between States and the notion of democracy between individuals are very different. While the notion of democracy is based on human beings, States are made up of widely differing numbers of human beings. Does that mean that coefficients should be applied to States depending on their population or their resources? These are serious problems which would justify a discussion on the future of the UN like the many that have already taken place. To my mind, the future of the UN cannot involve, as many have argued, an increase in the number of permanent member States on the Security Council, which hold the right of veto. That is the national ambition of the States or the regions considered, but the fact that a slightly larger number of States than before now belong to the club of the powerful has nothing to do with democracy.

An issue I regard as worth mentioning — and I shall say a few words about it if I may, Mr Chairperson — is the notorious issue of globalization. We know what globalization means. I believe it to be a very important issue, especially for the future of poor countries and poor people wherever they may be. Now democracy as we understand it is not just political democracy, it is also social democracy. And of course when it comes to globalization — if I may refer to my distant ancestors once again — it is like the language of Aesop: there is the best and the worst, depending on how you conceive and apply it. But what in fact will the result of globalization be? The result will be that there is

less State, that States are overtaken by international trends, and that the extreme form of free trade it advocates, which is chiefly to the advantage of international trade, above all imposes the laws of the world market and of competition. Now the needs of the developing countries in particular, and more generally the less well-endowed countries, let alone the poorest, require measures to be taken within the framework of the State. Without going as far as a welfare State, it should be a State which is both social and democratic, and which gets substantial aid from the international community. The moment that there is less State and that economic forces rule a world that has virtually no borders, no checks, and no aid for States or individuals, the poor are bound to become even poorer and the rich even richer. I have given a rather caricatural picture, but that is in fact the way things are moving.

A professor wrote recently in a French juridical journal that the idea of a mutually supportive international community will probably be swept away by the notion of globalization, to the benefit of a market economy. That is indeed the way things are going, and it could be dangerous unless mitigating measures are taken. As regards the problem of globalization, I think we should mention the obvious need to preserve those measures, so as to make possible an equitable form of economic development in the world as well as the international social development that was launched at the Copenhagen Summit.

So it is with that proviso that our discussion of the problem of globalization should be continued, allowing for the implementation of mitigating measures for the benefit of countries which will not form part of the movement, and which will be left by the wayside of world economic development. That will have to be put right. What is needed is not less State, but possibly more economic safeguards at international level as well as — but that is another question — within each country. Please forgive me for this rather long introduction, Mr Chairperson, but it is an issue I feel strongly about.

Kéba
Mbaye

Mr Chairperson, at this point in the discussion, I have very little to say, after having thanked you for introducing the subject by drawing our attention to a number of points that strike me as essential. As far as States are concerned, the conception and

achievement of democracy are in the normal order of things. But when it comes to international relations, I wonder if democracy is achievable. I even wonder if it is conceivable. If one looks at what actually exists, I do not believe that it can be said that there is truly any democracy in international relations. What is of prime importance is power, first at an economic level, and then, consequently, at a political level. And that is an observable fact, whether one is talking about the international community or regional organizations. The influence of a State is in direct proportion to its economic, political and military clout. I do not think it is necessary to cite examples in order to reach that conclusion.

In another respect, it does not seem today that sovereign equality, which nobody disputes at a theoretical level, has any true meaning in actual fact. It is a myth more than anything else. The freedom of States is very relative. The weaker a State is economically and militarily, the less weight it carries at an international level and the less influence it has in joint decisions.

It is sad to note that today it cannot even be said that international society encourages democracy. Look at what has happened since the break-up of the Soviet Union: if a State is governed by a despot, the main thing is for the despot to be on good terms with the strong State that controls the region in which the despot's State is located. There are examples of this in Africa. A country is governed by a despot: the despot is protected because he is a friend of the powerful forces that control the region. A country is governed by a semi-despot: he is overthrown in the name of democracy, because he is not on good terms with the State or States that control the region. I am convinced, for my part, that international society as it is today does not encourage democracy. Look, for example, at what happens when an embargo is imposed — and here I shall turn to my friend, Professor Ben-nouna, who knows this problem inside out. Look also, more generally, at what is done in the name of fundamental human rights. One country may be sanctioned to a greater or lesser degree on the grounds that it does not respect human rights, while another country, where there is no respect at all for fundamental human rights, will get favourable treatment. I wonder if all this may not stem from the present structure of the international community.

I have never been a communist or even had communist sympathies, but I believe that there is a principle which is valid both within each State and in international society, and that is that power should be counterbalanced by power. The moment power is invested in a single entity, there will always be excesses and abuses. In the days when there was an Eastern bloc and a Western bloc, the weak were better protected than they are today. Today, everything depends on their friendship and their relationship with those who in fact govern the world. So I would say, for my part, not only that international society is not democratic, but that it does not encourage democracy, in the true sense of the word, because it does not in practice recognize the freedom of States. If you are Senegalese, you cannot do what you want. In present-day society, Senegal cannot run its affairs as it would like. But I do believe, on the other hand, that globalization fosters development, hence the fact that those who advocate sectarian doctrines are mostly against globalization. I am convinced that globalization helps countries to become more developed.

One last remark: we have not yet reached the stage of an “international society”. We are today at the stage of an international community, but at the same time we are witnessing an increasing degree of regionalization. And I wonder whether the world is not tending to go in that direction. I wonder whether, over a very long period, we may not experience a phenomenon of regionalization rather than an evolution towards an international society.

Hisashi
Owada

As the list of questions you circulated to us covers a very wide field, I doubt whether we can debate all the issues mentioned in it. I shall try to concentrate on two issues of major importance, in which I think it will be possible, in one way or another, to incorporate the other issues. One of them is international democracy, and the other the consequences of globalization.

To start with, the first problem is whether democracy is possible at an international level. I would say that in the long term democracy in an international context represents the future and also what the world community aspires to as a community. Having said that, however, the present state of development in the world community is such that even if we call it a “community” it still fundamentally corresponds to what would normally be

described as an “inter-national” community, i.e. a community made up of States rather than people — despite the fact that there are many elements that would justify one describing the society in which we live as a “community”.

The main difference in terms of democracy between the domestic and international sphere is as follows: domestically, when it is affirmed that all human beings are created equal, it is not just a statement of principle; it has become a reality in our social relations. By contrast at international level, unfortunately not all States are created equal. In contrast to the domestic democratic context, sovereign States are different from individuals, not only in the sense that there are differences in their geographic size, their population, their military and economic power and so on, but also because States are abstract entities, which turn into real entities in the conduct of international relations. Unless and until one places oneself at the level of individuals, at the level of people who are directly affected, it is not possible to talk about the practice of democracy in international relations in the genuine sense of the word. Here the key word is perhaps the role of power in the international community. The problem of democracy at the international level is closely connected to the question of the centralization of power in world “governance”. I advisedly did not use the expression “the world government”, since it might lead to some confusion about what I mean to say on organizing the government system at the international level. Setting aside the question of whether a world government can be set up in a similar fashion as the central government of a given country, I think there should at least be a greater concentration of power, not necessarily through appropriation of power from sovereign States, but rather through coordination of power among sovereign States in order to reinforce authority for world governance at the level of the international community.

In this connection, some have mentioned the United Nations Security Council. There is clearly a tendency to increase the legitimacy of the Security Council and its action. One way of dealing with the problem of democratization in the Security Council, it is argued, would of course be to democratize its procedure. But what does one mean by that? When one talks about democratization in an international context, is it a question of introducing greater equality on the basis of the sovereignty of

States? Or is it a question of a democratization process in terms of the global community as a whole? That is the first problem which in my view will have to be addressed when we talk about democracy in the international community.

The second problem relating to the problem of democracy in the international community concerns the way power is exercised in order to attain and promote two of the international community's goals: the maintenance of public order in the international community, so as to guarantee the safety and welfare of the world as a whole. In order to achieve this, effective governance is going to be a very important, perhaps even crucial, factor. Consequently, the democratization process, based on the analogy with domestic democracies, may not be the way to obtain greater effectiveness. This problem of legitimacy and effectiveness and the problem of how to balance those two will be what we will have to face in the immediate future, unless we could get to a new era that could arise from the establishment of a veritable world government.

For the moment at any rate, while I am not claiming that an increased degree of democratization in international relations is impossible, I do feel we need to define more clearly what we mean by democratization in the international process. The question in a nutshell is: are we to approach this issue in the context of sovereign States or in the context of a global community consisting of human beings? By the same token, another question to be asked is: should we aspire to a more effective world public order, or should we pursue "democratization" as an absolute principle that needs to be encouraged, even if that meant the weakening of world public order in a real sense? It is important that we face that problem.

My second comment is about the consequences of globalization. Globalization is a fact of life, and it is going to take place whether one likes it or not. In any case, it reflects the increased interdependence generated by human activities at a societal level, and that means that the process of globalization cannot really be reversed. There is nothing wrong with that. What we have to be careful about is whether we can succeed in creating a situation in which globalization will not result in the marginalization of some parts of the world. These are two distinct and not necessarily connected notions. But to bring the two

Bruce
Russett

together harmoniously, so there can be progress in globalization without marginalization, a certain dose of interventionism is required. For if we adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards the effect of globalization which is widespread in international society, the most likely result will be a world that is closer to society in England in the process of the Industrial Revolution: in that smaller society, industrialization tended to cause the marginalization of certain disadvantaged groups in society. I think this is bound to happen in international society unless an attempt is made to intervene in the process of globalization by implementing some form of social welfare policy at a global level.

One immediate means of doing that and one we should encourage is to promote social development in all the countries and among all the peoples affected. At the same time, I think it may not be enough to leave it to the voluntarism of the regional or local units of the sovereign States involved. An intervention at a global level may be necessary to create a situation where globalization is not going to lead to the marginalization of certain sectors of the international community. Those are the points I wanted to make at this stage of the discussion.

I had thought that I would begin to address the set of questions that you raised about democracy and peace in the sense of "Are democracies more peaceful in their relations with other democracies?" and the implications of all that. And I hope we will come back to that topic, because there are some important things to be said not only about relations between democracies, but about some of the other influences in international economics and international politics that strengthen and enhance the peaceful relations between democracies.

However, I think that Ambassador Owada has plunged us very much into the discussion of democracy at the international level and I would like to respond, and in a large degree support his very careful but very penetrating comments. I may have to paraphrase and even repeat what he said.

The difference between international relations and relations within a country, a democratic country, for example, are obvious. There is in a democratic country a State, which is effective among other things at being able to maintain peace within the State. But, as we have all learned, international relations are

fundamentally in a state of anarchy, which does not mean they are chaotic, but rather, in the good Greek roots of the term, they are without a ruler, without overarching rule. That is the first difference compared with a State.

The second difference is that, partly as a result of that anarchic order, and certainly strengthening it, there are among States immense diversities of military power, influence, wealth and culture. We all know that. I am not saying anything new. But it is worth noting, I think, that these immense diversities between the militarily most powerful and the militarily least effectual, between the most and the least influential, between the richest and the poorest, and certainly between so many different cultures found on the globe, are immensely greater than anything found within countries. And it is these very diversities that increase misunderstanding and which make it particularly unlikely that those who happen to have privileges are going to give them up very readily to those who do not. This is a problem, therefore, of how to manage a system lacking the basis of common culture and lacking the implicit or explicit commitment within a State to at least mitigate the diversities of wealth and power when handling conflicts and relations among groups of different cultures.

Within the context of countries and States, the differences are not so great as at world level. There is more experience and more expectation that these things will be managed. Furthermore, they are managed by common governmental systems and, in democracies, by means of peaceful conflict resolution. Because of the far greater diversity internationally, it is extremely difficult to imagine a degree of democratization in international organizations which would be built upon majority voting.

Why is democracy or the democratization of international relations unlikely to include a very much greater dependence on majority voting? In the first place, of course, States are members of the United Nations, despite the lofty words in the Preamble about peoples, and the States themselves are so unequal, not only in resources and wealth but also in population. In other words, it is difficult to imagine majority voting in the United Nations on many issues that matter, precisely because of the different weights and sizes of States and, to be blunt, because of the demands that might be made by a majority of small States

who by themselves represent only a small fraction of the world population.

The second problem is exemplified by the differences in decision-making procedures in different international organizations, and particularly in different organs of the United Nations. The Security Council, which does have the authority to employ military force or to apply economic sanctions, is the least democratic of all the organs in the United Nations. Whether we like that or not, it is no coincidence that this Organization, which has actual power, is less democratic than others. We all know the rules for voting in the Security Council, a body that reaches its decisions by a weighted majority of votes. In that sense it is democratic, but it is also strikingly limited in its democracy.

The most democratic of the large organs of the United Nations is of course the General Assembly. By contrast, the General Assembly has the least power and the least ability to enforce any of its decisions, and I submit that that is no coincidence. Therefore, if it is the case that one is hoping for a more effective United Nations, able to reach decisions on important matters, to do so expeditiously, effectively, to reach decisions and carry out those decisions, it strikes me that to think too much about majority voting as a key to democracy is to raise false hopes.

Now, it was said very clearly yesterday — and I think all of us agreed — that democracy within countries is not only about voting. Democracy is about other things as well. It is about commitment to institutions able to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution. It is a commitment to transparency and openness, it requires commitment to nurturing civil society, to independent non-State organizations that is. It is a commitment to tolerance and pluralism at a cultural level and a preservation of cultural autonomy by groups of people. It seems to me that these elements of democracy — transparency, peaceful conflict resolution, civil society and the promotion, not just tolerance, of cultural diversity — can indeed be talked about as a not totally futuristic Utopia, but not as a currently existing basis for democratization of the international system. Just to be provocative!

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

I share the doubts of my colleagues who have spoken about the great ambiguity of the term democracy at international level. It is true that it has been used — particularly in the sense of a

democratization of international relations — in the context of North-South relations. Like others, I have taken part in that movement, which has been called the right to development, the new international economic order. Alas, all that took place a long time ago. It was the post-decolonization period, with an ever-widening gulf between poor and rich; between rich and poor, between the haves and the have-nots; between the dominant countries, which had colonized and subjugated the world, and the rest, the damned of the earth; between those who had gone along the road of industrial revolution and the rest. I think this is all a little outdated today, of course as a situation, that is.

We now find ourselves caught up in another revolution, the post-industrial revolution. Information and communications technologies have taken us into the era of globalization, and I quite agree with what Mr Owada said a moment ago. Globalization is not a normative affair which you either accept or do not accept. That is not the problem. There are those who will once again go along the road of this third revolution, and there are those who will not. That is all. So we need to know whether we can organize ourselves to be ready to go down that road, or whether we want to be left behind. That is the question today. It is not a question of determining whether it is good or bad, it is not a question of ethics. Globalization is already here, for various reasons which there is no point in repeating.

I think that the developing countries (I no longer dare to use that term: let us say the disadvantaged countries), some of which are in danger of being marginalized — this is the case with Africa in particular, which has suffered the most — should indeed find out what advantages there are to be derived from globalization. There is no doubt that today the ease of communication throughout the world, notably through systems like the Internet, etc., may enable certain disadvantaged countries to cut corners and thus make exceptional progress. I am now one of those who tend to regard this as a positive step. The world is now divided between those who go along with globalization and those who resist it — globalization has created a kind of backlash, which is withdrawal into oneself and resistance by groups on the grounds of their culture, identity or religion. Because they run the risk of being marginalized, these groups do not resist, as they would have in the era of Marxism, by falling back on the

class struggle. They fall back on cultural, ethnic and other identities. I personally believe it to be very dangerous. I am rather in favour of openness, which squares with the democratization of international relations. That is my first point.

My second point, which was pertinently underlined a moment ago by Judge Mbaye and other speakers after him, is the problem of knowing what we mean by democratization. One of the aspects worth remembering in connection with democratization at international level is the notion of checks and balances. It is a fact — as Montesquieu already stressed — that only power will stop power. The separation of powers is an element of democracy. When all power is concentrated in the same hands, the person who has power automatically tends to abuse it. It is part of human nature. And so there need to be checks and balances, both in domestic societies and in international society. That is where the link is. I believe that the ability to challenge established authority, as well as trade-unionism, parties, organized structures, etc., are extremely positive things for democracy. The year 1990 saw the collapse of Communism, which to my mind occurred too abruptly. I would have liked to see a soft landing for Mr Gorbachev, and not that sudden collapse which left us in the South, at least, shaken. That abruptness, that collapse gave rise to a system which is not today pluralistic at international level. It is a system which is, very temporarily I think, hegemonic. That hegemonic system of course lacks democracy. That is clear at international level. There are no checks and balances, or at least there have not been during the decade which is just coming to an end. There is no need to go on at length about this. We know very well that all that dialogue and concertation and so on has been whittled down to relations between five, then three, then two protagonists. And then there was only one. It reminds one of the famous quip: “Fifteen noes, one aye: the ayes have it”. “The ayes have it” is rather the situation we face today.

Some say we need checks and balances — and I think that we countries of the South are among them. The main thing is not to be satisfied with pious hopes, as Mr Mbaye said a moment ago. The only possible checks and balances today are to be found in regionalization. I think we must not delude ourselves either on this issue. The Europeans have embarked on that long march, they are moving more and more in the direction of regionaliza-

tion. Other peoples have undoubtedly embarked on it, in Asia too. Africa is lagging behind in this respect. I believe that without regionalization — there is no getting away from it — democratization will remain very remote, with small and very weak entities that do not amount to much.

The second point that needs to be stressed at international level is the problem of the representation of peoples. I do not at all share Professor Russett's view — it is perhaps not the view of a jurist — as regards the anarchic nature of international relations. I think he goes a little too far. It is true that it looks rather like a tribal system, though there have since been some changes. And I believe that today's normative international system is more developed than a system of anarchy. But there are indeed peoples who have no say. If one understands democracy to mean a system based on the principle of "one State, one vote", that is of course meaningless. It is decorative as regards the General Assembly, but it will become increasingly meaningless, with the proliferation of micro-States. If, on the other hand, one understands democracy to be the taking into account of peoples at an international level, it has more meaning. That is what the Europeans did when they set up the European Parliament. So we are seeing today the beginnings of the representation of certain human rights associations at international level, alongside the Human Rights Commission and the NGOs which enjoy a certain status with the Economic and Social Council. There are some beginnings of "democracy", where peoples, the votes of peoples are emerging. Unfortunately, this is still not true in a rather alarmingly large number of cases. But when one says that the votes of peoples should be heard, there is still the problem of how those people are represented at world level. And that is where the connection between democracy at a domestic level and at an international level appears. Will States continue to appoint the representatives of peoples, or will there be a separate representation, and if so how? There is an international organization, which Mr Valticos knows well, which brings the trade unions into play: it is the International Labour Organization (ILO). From its beginnings, the ILO has had a triple representation — governments, employers, trade unions — which has been extremely useful and has, I believe, produced some good results. That is one of the shortcomings that can be noted.

Lastly, Mr Chairperson, there remains, I think, one final point to be made as part of my modest contribution to our deliberations: the problem of the individual at international level. It is agreed that the point of departure of what is known as democracy was a certain affirmation of the rights of individuals, who are born free and equal — as in the celebrated French Declaration of Human Rights which eventually produced the Universal Declaration, among other things. Individuals are born equal, and they remain equal... Obviously that affirmation immediately proved to be quite wrong, because, first of all, they are not born equal — that much is certain — and then they do not remain equal. So I do in fact concur with what you said a moment ago, namely that depending on whether you hold a Moroccan passport or a Senegalese passport or a French passport or a Japanese passport or an American passport, you are treated differently. We are all lumbered with our State and its ability to protect us, its credibility, its legitimacy, etc. Of course we are not equal! That ideology, that myth — for it is a myth — has, then, been positive. But it permitted what has been called the Athenian syndrome, that is to say slavery, that is to say Athenian democracy, where there were free men and slaves. It was in fact a democracy of free men. People forget that. So we have reproduced the Athenian syndrome. Later, there were the colonized peoples and the colonizers. The colonized peoples were the world's new slaves. It is a permanent struggle, which comprises an important element that has been developed over the past few years by all human rights activists: the affirmation and recognition of those rights worldwide. I believe this to be an extremely important element of democracy. I do not think that those who enjoy their rights are sufficiently aware of that. But those who do not have those rights, those on the other side, in the countries of the South, know that it is very useful to invoke international agreements and international obligations when it comes to human rights. That means that people become the direct beneficiaries of the rule of law and that they can invoke it directly before international authorities. There are authorities which constitute an opening, once again a small and very narrow opening, but nonetheless a way out. There was talk yesterday of the African Human Rights Charter. The Europeans are very advanced in this respect, indeed they are the most advanced. Other peoples and

other regions are lagging far behind. I believe that, as far as democratization at international level is concerned, recognition that the individual is subject to international law would constitute a huge step forward along the road to democracy.

To pick up Mr Bennouna's idea, I shall take as my point of departure the conclusion of what I had intended to start with, namely that, even if there is no consensus on the question of whether democracy is or is not, in theory, applicable to international relations, we can all accept that they are not relations between equals. When we talk about democratization or equality in international relations, we need to consider three stages. For the most immediate future, democratization is not feasible because several generations at least are needed to achieve the same level of development, always supposing that it can ever be achieved. And in any case it has to be admitted that in one way or another it is the most powerful States which, directly, indirectly or implicitly, impose an international order on others.

I do not think that this is necessarily a bad thing. If, for the time being and in the near future, our prime task consisted of imposing on the world community at least the rules and statutes laid down by the United Nations, there would be nothing wrong with that. Max Weber defined the State as a relationship of dominance based on legitimate violence. The same may be true of international relations. But that dominance presupposes obedience to a certain order, that is to say international law in this case. At the same time, it presupposes a mutual expectation: those who give orders expect their commands to be executed; and those who execute them expect to be given orders that are just and legitimate, at least in their eyes. Max Weber, then, described that sort of interdependence as a legal type of dominance. I think that as far as international relations are concerned we could talk about this form of legal dominance, which also implies that the most powerful should behave in a moderate and restrained way. This is by way of an answer to one of the many questions put by our Chairperson.

I naturally accept that each of the questions deserves to be discussed. I shall therefore focus on two of them. It is obvious that if all the States in the world were democratic the likelihood of a war between them would be greatly reduced. That is

not currently the case, but another question is involved here: what is war? You must be familiar with the old saying: war is political behaviour that requires recourse to various violent means, to supposedly violent actions.

Nowadays, however, certain forms of economic sanctions or embargoes can turn out to be more brutal and to cause more victims than a war in the classical sense of the term. Are the most powerful democracies therefore entitled to resort to them? This is of course a very important question. And how does it affect international relations? Let us just suppose that all States were genuine democracies. Democracy also implies that certain people or ethnic groups are entitled to self-determination. Do we know of a single democratic State today that would be prepared to give up part of its territory easily? Even if it freely submitted to the will of the population in that territory? It is of course a very tricky question, and there are plenty of examples of rejection by the most democratic States.

In the context of international relations, then, the question is: "Are States prepared to give up part of their sovereignty to international organizations?" That immediately prompts a further question: "What organizations are we talking about? And on what principles would these bodies function?" The best example of such an organization is of course the United Nations. But can one imagine States that are not comparable acting on an equal basis within international organizations? Take the United States and Papua New Guinea, for example. With all due respect to the population of Papua New Guinea, it is clearly absurd to compare them. So this brings us back to the same question: on what basis might it be possible to establish democratic international relations, given the problems of consensus and votes?

I would also like to put a very important question to you: the globalization of information is being particularly talked about. I do not subscribe to Mr Bennouna's view on this, as I do not think that the use of the Internet is capable of helping the less developed countries to make rapid progress. I fear the reverse may be true. The most developed States will only increase their dominance thanks to their control of information channels and new technologies. To put it theoretically, if there are 5 billion computer users, on an equal basis, that makes five billion individuals. Every human being has about 20 billion brain

cells. So what does 5 billion multiplied by 20 billion make? I do not know, and it may be supposed that nobody knows. Would there be a kind of self-destruction, or just a great leap forward? Would there be a kind of totalitarian control by one centre over another, or a sort of network of activities grouping together various centres? There are a lot of questions, and we do not yet have the answers. But I would still like to stress the importance of the various questions raised here.

Pierre
Cornillon

Democracy is first and foremost an ideal, an ideal to be striven for, but it is also a system of government. The state of democracy is an imperfect state, always perfectible and which we constantly hope to perfect. Earlier speakers have very rightly drawn attention to the differences which emerge in the application of the term 'democracy' at national or international level.

There is, of course, an enormous disparity between States, nations and countries whereas citizens of one same State are born free and equal before the law. But as has just been mentioned, this equality is inscribed in the constitutions and legal texts but it is very relative: it is better to be born the son of a banker in some major capital than the son of an unemployed person on the outskirts of that same capital. The essential difference between the national and international levels is that we have been working long and hard to advance the ideal of democracy for the benefit of individuals whereas it has only been quite recently, and very little, that we have been advancing the democratic ideal with regard to peoples and States. At national level and in the name of this ideal, we have established systems of government which allow for the arbitration of differences of opinion and interest between individuals and we have made good progress. However, a similar step was taken at international level. It began at the end of the nineteenth century with the movement to arbitrate conflicts which gave rise, in 1889, to the Inter-Parliamentary Union then, at the beginning of the twentieth century to the League of Nations and finally to the United Nations Organization. It is an extremely slow progression but may I remind you that most federal States, formed from totally independent entities, were not born in a day either. I am not advocating world government but one day we will perhaps arrive at a sort of world confederation.

I think that for the time being the best thing to do is strengthen the United Nations system which should certainly be perfected but it is worth it, because it is world democracy in embryo. Not only its efficiency but also its legitimacy should certainly be improved. A number of measures could be envisaged, including a change in the Security Council and its powers. When I say 'efficiency' I do not mean in the bureaucratic sense, but in the sense of decisions taken in such a way that they become acceptable. One can of course do things in a very efficient way but if citizens do not want to apply the decisions taken, then that efficiency is only superficial. Architects know this perfectly well. They often do not mark out pathways to buildings straight away but wait a little to see exactly where people walk and only then do they mark out the paths. A designer could have marked out a path in a couple of minutes and then with a bulldozer quickly dug it out. Short term, that is a very efficient way of doing things but far less efficient in the long term as people would have walked elsewhere.

In that sense, efficiency is closely linked to legitimacy. Strengthening the legitimacy of the United Nations happens through strengthening its representativity and I thank Mr Ben-nouna for having mentioned peoples. We talk a great deal about States but there are also peoples. Within States, the government is not the only actor; alongside is the parliament which is also a State institution. States' representation at the United Nations is flawed because that other branch of the State — which constitutes the legitimate and comprehensive representation of the people — parliament, is missing. It is legitimate because the assemblies are elected by all the citizens; and it is comprehensive because the parliament represents the interests and the aspirations not of certain sectors of society but of society as a whole. Within the United Nations it is often said that more attention should be paid to the civil society through the NGOs. The intention is good since the NGOs, which are the result of responsible citizenship, provide a very rich intellectual contribution to thinking and international action, but it is very difficult to organize a global representation of civil society through NGOs which, moreover, would lose some of their identity through institutionalization.

And yet that representation of civil society within international organizations can happen, and will happen sooner or

later, through the representation of parliaments. You pointed out, Mr Bennouna, that when a group of democratic countries is formed, it is out of the question for this new regional institution not to have what we call a parliamentary wing. In Europe, almost all these institutions do in fact have a parliamentary wing. And yet the establishment of a parliamentary assembly seems to pose many problems within global organizations like the United Nations which thinks it already has its parliament in the form of the General Assembly. Moreover, it is amusing to point out that the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly adopts the style of that of the League of Nations which was itself modelled on that of the French Parliament. So General Assemblies of great world organizations are organized along the same lines as parliaments and yet the latter are absent.

The issue of a democratization of international life through a more direct representation of peoples within global institutions could be achieved with bipartite representation at the General Assembly along the lines of the tripartite representation. This works very well at ILO. In any case, the issue has been raised and is currently under study.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

I would like to try and summarize the discussion at this stage in our work. I think that the Panel is agreed that there is no international democracy, but that, on the contrary, there is anarchy and hegemony. The terminology may vary depending on the speaker, but the question we need to address is this: "What is the impact, on democracy at a domestic level, of an international authoritarian regime or of the hegemony of a superpower?". That is our subject of discussion. Does the fact that this anarchy, which is increased by globalization, diminishes the role of the State and therefore of domestic democracy have any impact, and if so, what impact? Is a domestic democracy restricted, is it impaired, and does it lose its value as a result of this lack of international democracy? How can one explain this basic contradiction between an authoritarian regime at the top, a lack of democracy at the top, and democracy at the base? Can this coexistence produce results? Will democracy, already weakened by transnational movements, not be further weakened by the presence of an undemocratic system, hegemonic to some, authoritarian to others, anarchic to yet others, but undemocratic to all?

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I would like to react to the questions you have raised, some of which seem to me already to contain answers in themselves. Oddly enough, it struck me that when we use the word “democracy” what we often actually mean is a “State”. I shall take, for example, the first question you asked, namely: does globalization mean the end of domestic democracy? It seems to me that what we are talking about is a new phenomenon which is, or threatens to be, the end of States. And when I say “threatens to be” I am not making a value judgement, I am simply describing the phenomenon. I think that States are indeed heading towards a decline, at least a decline in their powers, as is underscored by your remark on the socio-political forces that extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. What we have here is a kind of anonymity of economic power, which is an extremely destabilizing phenomenon, at least for economies which are trying to reconstruct themselves and achieve a certain stability. I believe that these national economies are currently being put to the test, precisely by the anonymity of economic power. So what we are seeing here is something that in a way is not governed by the logic of States, or by the logic of State reasoning. And just as that happens in the State itself, it also affects non-governmental actors.

Nowadays the largest NGOs act not necessarily in response to national issues, but in response to global issues. I am thinking, for example, of Amnesty International and Greenpeace, institutions that do not belong to a State — though they of course have their headquarters somewhere. To whom do they belong? They belong to the international community, that is to say they are involved in every kind of problem. They make their presence felt on the international scene when some structures — domestic structures like trade unions, for example — encounter mounting difficulties as regards their negotiating power, chiefly because of new production structures, as is the case when relocation takes place. So I believe that there are certain new factors which mean that we shall have to shift the emphasis of our discussion of the notion of the State — of the State as a focus of concern, of domestic democracies as a focus of concern — to another question, which is: in view of all these new factors which seem in a way to point to the way the world will look in the twenty-first century, how should we conceive of democracy at

international level? This involves a great number of question marks, and I realize I am not giving an answer to your question. But I would like to articulate these elements more clearly, as it seems to me they will become increasingly crucial in any negotiation aimed at setting up a democracy. They are, I repeat: the powers of States, the anonymity of economic power, the increasing presence of non-governmental actors with an international vocation, the weakening of the mechanisms of domestic negotiation. I think we should take all these elements into account in order better to define the debate on international democracy.

Nicolas
Valticos

I would like to raise a fundamental question concerning the bivalent, and in fact varying, use of the term democracy, depending on whether it applies to people in a country with a democratic regime, where there are elections, where the people have power, intervene and are represented, or to international democracy, which involves the representation of States, etc. They are not the same thing, as we all know. So we should not misuse the term by employing it in the same way in both cases. Man is one and indivisible. The French Republic can be, too, but it is something different. And countries have often split without danger, which is not true of men and women. So when we talk about international democracy between States, it is an image of an equality of rights, which resembles the equality of people within a given country; but the comparison cannot be taken to its conclusion. Moreover, the international or world community is now made up of 180-200 States, whereas for many years it comprised fewer than 100 States. The inhabitants of a State, on the other hand, can be counted and they are always the same, unless there is a population increase. This should discourage us from using the term in the same way in both cases. Within States, true democracy transcends the mere institutional framework. For States, it is more a question of equal representation and of equal rights when voting, it being accepted that some States are more equal than others. I do not say that with reference solely to their power, but also to the fact that they represent more individuals and that their priorities are consequently different.

Mohamed
Bennouna

Let us assume that there is no democracy at international level, with all the connotations and interpretations that various people

see in the meaning of the term. You told us to work on that assumption, and you said to us in fact that the main thing for this Panel was to detect the impact of all that on domestic democracy. It is a very important question.

I would simply like to remind you, Mr Chairperson, of what you once wrote as Secretary-General of the United Nations, which struck me as extremely important given that we were earlier talking about embargoes, that is to say what are known as economic sanctions, which have become increasingly common, as everyone knows, since the end of the Cold War. There have been ten or even a few more cases. It was, I think, in the supplement to *Agenda for Peace* — to my mind a very courageous work — that you wrote, quite rightly, that in the end, when we impose an embargo, we realize that it has perverse effects. In fact the aim was to put pressure on governments that had violated international law and to persuade them to respect it. In other words, to put pressure on States. Well, we realized that governments do not suffer at all from such embargoes, which is true. Worse, in undemocratic States, there is not even any pressure from public opinion, from those who suffer, i.e. the population, on the government, as there is no democratic process. As a result, the perverse effect works in both ways, in other words an embargo does not in fact encourage democracy at a domestic level, but, on the contrary, encourages authoritarianism. That, if I may say so, was more or less how I interpreted your text.

I greatly appreciated the supplement to *Agenda for Peace*, which contributed more audacious and more innovative ideas than the *Agenda for Peace* itself.

The second question, the second effect that comes to mind is what are called, at international level, “double standards”. Much has been said about them. Some people said a moment ago that the UN’s problem — I think it was Ambassador Owada — was the legitimacy of the Security Council not only in its composition, but in its decisions. Double standards are indeed something that can destroy legitimacy. But what impact does that have on domestic democracy? (I am trying not to lose sight of the question you asked us.) Speaking for myself, I see the following effect: let us take the case of the Middle East, for example. If, in one case where international law or international order is not respected, there is no sanction or reaction, whereas

in another case there is a sanction, the effect is to encourage extremism. It is a serious situation. In relation to this last hypothesis, I shall take the example of a bombardment of Iraq following the inspection of certain sites — thank God it stopped, because the UN very fortunately played an extremely positive role in this respect. Everyone then said that if what had happened fell into the category of what the Arab world would feel to be an injustice or an application of double standards, fundamentalist or extremist movements would be encouraged. That is one of the effects which I feel, Mr Chairperson, we should ponder. It is perhaps a negative effect, in relation to domestic democracy, of what is called the lack of democracy at international level.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

Earlier on, when I touched very briefly on the question that has just been raised, I said that in my view the international community as it is today encourages economic development but not democracy. Professor Bennouna explained better what I had in mind. The moment there is an international society — which is itself undemocratic — dominated by 15 States, as Professor Bennouna said, sometimes by seven States, and sometimes again by only one State, the aim for a weak State is not so much to be democratic as to be close to and appreciated by the States (or State) that do the deciding. In the weak countries, that is to say those with no say in the matter, that is how the present phase in the evolution of the international community is perceived.

As a result, there is no real attempt to create and push through a genuine democracy. Despotism and authoritarianism are given a semblance of democracy in order to conceal their true nature. And attempts are made to please the decision-makers. Naturally, this phenomenon of double standards does not at all, to my mind, encourage the triumph of democracy or, to take my argument even further, the respect of human rights in general. There are countries which are accused of every crime in the book, on which other countries are ready to crack down with force or to impose an embargo, which is something that may hit them even harder. There are other countries, on the other hand, which infringe democratic principles and the respect of basic human rights, and which run no risk. So to my mind international society as it is today does not encourage the birth of a true

**Marrack
Goulding**

democracy — and let someone try to prove the contrary. That is what I had in mind when I said that democracy is not just about voting, not even only about voting freely, but about what happens afterwards. It is perfectly easy to organize a free vote and then resort to methods that will prevent a genuine democracy from being established. But such regimes still get a pat on the back from the countries which today impose their will on the rest of the world.

I would like to address two points, and in addressing them I would like to bear in mind the task that the Director-General of UNESCO has given us. The first point is your question which you posed at the end of the last session. The first question on this sheet : “Does globalization signal the end of domestic democracy?” The second question I would like to address is: “What is the relevance of democracy at the international level to the problems posed by globalization?” I would like to conclude with one or two remarks arising from what Dr Valticos just said and from Professor Russett’s intervention.

I would argue the contrary, I think. The sovereign State is with us, it is going to stay. The power of the governments of sovereign States is, we all agree, being weakened by a variety of non-governmental forces, most of them due to technology. But I would argue that the fact that governments are threatened by those developments strengthens the case for having effective democratic systems, and in some cases can actually assist the evolution of democratic systems. It is no longer possible for a dictatorship, for an autocracy, to conceal from its people what is going on in the rest of the world. And that is an enormously important factor in encouraging democratization. And I hope that Ambassador Guo will forgive me for saying that what has been going on in the People’s Republic of China has shown how difficult it has become, because of satellite television, for a regime which wants to control information reaching its people.

As for the second point — which makes the mandate that we have been given by Mr Federico Mayor very relevant — on the question of the relationship between globalization and democracy at the international level, I am not at all sure that that is relevant to our mandate of providing the Director-General of UNESCO

with ideas about how UNESCO can adjust its programme to contribute to more democratization. Clearly that mandate was passed in the context of democratization within States, and not democratization at the international level. But I still believe that democratization at the international level is important in the context of the ability of a world of nation-states to cope with the problems created by globalization. A number of my colleagues have referred to the importance of the credibility or legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations. And that credibility or legitimacy depends to an important extent on whether they are perceived as being democratic.

Now I think that we have a real problem with the Security Council, because the Security Council is not perceived as being democratic and, again, speaking with the frankness that is permitted to an academic, as I now am, the behaviour of one Member State on the Security Council contributes to the perception that it is not a democratic institution.

I myself had a great deal of trouble with double standards. You have in the Middle East two States which occupy, or have recently occupied, territory of their neighbours. You have in the Middle East two States which have weapons of mass destruction, and an enormous effort is made by the Security Council and the United Nations to deal with the problem created by one of those States, but the United Nations is blocked from doing anything about the problems created by the other of those States. And it seems to me a fundamental undermining of the credibility of the Security Council.

Now if we are talking about the problems created by globalization, the Security Council becomes much less important, because the problems created by globalization are mostly in social and economic fields. They relate to environmental pollution, disease and the spread of international crime. These subjects fall within the domain not of the Security Council, but of United Nations institutions which are more democratic than the Security Council. And it is there, Secretary-General, that I believe your question about the globalization of democratization is very relevant. The more democratic we can make the United Nations and indeed other intergovernmental institutions, the greater credibility they will have with the governments and people of the whole world, and the greater prospects they will have of becoming

ing the fora in which governments can collaborate effectively for intergovernmental action and together deal with the problems created by globalization.

Now my third point relates to what Professor Russett said, and I must say, my reaction dates from just before he said he was being provocative! But I think that your analysis, Bruce, was rather on the lines of comparing democracy between individuals within a State and democracy between States within intergovernmental organizations. And I agree with Dr Valticos that this is not a valid comparison. I have, in the past, thought of democracy within the United Nations as being rather like the relationship that exists between legislators and a parliament. Now, in the case of the United Nations, the legislators, the representatives of governments, have not all been elected in a common system. Most of them have not been elected at all. But nevertheless they are all there, and they are politically equal in the General Assembly. And to continue the comparison, it is not the case that there are massive diversities — I think you said immense diversities — in their power, influence, wealth and culture. And as in parliaments, the power and influence of individual legislators may depend not on their wealth or the importance of the constituency that elected them, but very much on the personality of the individual. And I do not think that Jesse Helms comes from a particularly wealthy or powerful part of the United States, but as a parliamentarian, he is very powerful.

Now you have the same with States. Take the non-aligned movement — and you have often said this, Secretary-General, so I am really pinching your point. There are a lot of States and peoples in that movement whose power and influence were out of all proportion to their wealth or their military strength. Countries like Cuba or Viet Nam had a very powerful influence in the non-aligned movement.

And the other similarity is that in parliaments a majority of deputies are willing to be led by other deputies. If you take members of the House of Representatives in the United States or of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, only a minority of them are big players. And the others like to be led, or are willing to be led. And it is the same in the General Assembly: you have blocs, regional groupings, the Group of 77, the non-aligned and so on. Their policies are formulated by a few States, and the

rest follow, most of them not having to refer to their capitals for instructions.

So I think you do have a kind of parallel: the General Assembly is also an international legislature, and people underestimate the extent to which it can legislate. It can legislate, and it does legislate on budgetary matters, even if its decisions are not universally respected. It legislates on many other administrative matters. So I do think there is a valid parallel between the General Assembly and other intergovernmental bodies on the one hand, and parliaments on the other.

Attiya
Inayatullah

To go back to the basic question you asked about the whole issue of elevating democracy at international level, I believe that the legitimacy of the United Nations and other international institutions will obviously be called into question unless we succeed in establishing a form of international democracy. And I fully agree with Mr Bennouna and with you, Mr Chairperson, on the need to ask ourselves what the priority should be in a young country that is moving from an authoritarian regime to democracy and development. Your question is indeed relevant. Ordinary peasants will want development to come first. And because there is no example of democracy at an international level there will be no incentive for their country to establish democracy at a domestic level.

At this point I would like to address the question of globalization. Everything that is happening in the field of communication seems to me to be both disconcerting and highly challenging. But what I want to talk about is globalization in the field of economics. The existing system of industrialized democracy is worldwide, but it is not universal. It is a Western alliance that is growing into a broader system of agreements as a result of the extension of the capitalist economy. An example of this is Mexico, which now forms part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The reconstitution of economies, moving from a system of centralized planning — which we have discussed — to that of the free market has of course been initiated by multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. And, as everyone knows, these organizations in turn tap transnational organizations and banks. I accept that this shift to the market economy was necessary. It was necessary to generate

economic growth, but I would add that it was also necessary in order to create a society that was at once just, civilized and sustainable. I believe that we should take all this into account. Unfortunately, not enough attention has been paid to this dimension or to the creation of justice, civilized societies and in fact sustainable human societies.

And it was unfortunately not taken into account in relation to globalization in the field of economics. I would like, without further ado, to stress the need to implement the agenda of the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen. I remember that Ambassador Somavia said at the time: "I am expecting very little outcome from the Summit other than the fact that we have a prescription, a global prescription, and that in itself is worth a lot, because it will be a starting point for moving in the right direction". What direction are we in fact talking about? We live in a world where the richest fifth of humankind has 85 per cent of GNP, and the poorest a mere 1.4 per cent. And what is the result of that? The result is that today there is a gulf between the developed States and the developing States. This in turn has resulted in decision-making processes which cause serious inequalities in the field of international trade, capital and technology throughout the world. Everything is in the hands of the main developed countries of the North, which means that they dominate the scene. And the predominant feeling in the South is that it has a less and less favourable position in the world and in the new world economic system.

We all agree that globalization is here to stay. But I am convinced it has to be linked with democracy. The concept of globalization must be tied up with democracy, and so we need a stable and fair international economic system. It has to be recognized that transnational entities are involved which belong to both the business and financial worlds. There should be links between that world economic system and the United Nations system, for the simple reason — as has already been stressed — that the United Nations system creates checks and balances.

I feel the United Nations system should be more directly involved in the process of development. I think that we fortunately have a new development model, which emerged from the intergovernmental conferences held over the past decade and from the resolutions they adopted, starting with the Rio confer-

ence and possibly ending with the Habitat conference in Istanbul. There is a development plan which converts the findings of all those conferences into plans of viable action. There has been a resurgence of United Nations humanitarian missions — I refer to peace-building and peace-keeping. And there is the new *Agenda for Development*, which deals with both peace-keeping and peace-building.

I do believe it is imperative that we change the present structure of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. We have to allow for the fact that the United Nations is currently an organization of States. I feel that in order to be more efficient in future it is crucial for non-State entities to take part in proceedings. And I am not just talking of NGOs in this context. The United Nations could be much more efficient if it also relied on the world of business and finance and on the corporate sector, possibly along the lines of the ILO. We have just heard, and rightly so, that the trade union concept is a mould, which may not be all that relevant, but which could certainly become so if we are talking about involving the corporate sector in a new United Nations system and involving NGOs in that new structure. It is important for democracy and development that the United Nations' Agenda for Development is implemented, and to do that will require a fair amount of creative thinking and a genuine political will. That is the crux of the problem: does that political will, that determination to move forward, exist?

Human ingenuity is such that any system can be changed. It is a question of time, and this is an exceptional opportunity to reform the United Nations system.

Pierre
Cornillon

I listened with great interest to what has just been said and I too feel encouraged. I share the view of Ms Darcy de Oliveira. Globalization is a phenomenon which, whether one likes it or not, will extend beyond the economic domain. The world is changing. I do not dispute the comments of Judge Valticos and Sir Marrack Goulding that States will remain sovereign for a long time to come. But the notion of 'State' is changing. The State today is no longer what it was in the eighteenth century, sometimes embodied by the monarch — 'the State is me' — and the State tomorrow will doubtless be different again. The State is nothing more than the form which citizens of a nation use to organize and govern

themselves. And human beings, the people, should be taken into account more and more.

I was encouraged by what Sir Marrack Goulding said: that there now exists a kind of international organization which is generated by that aspiration for democracy as an ideal of justice, freedom and peace — the United Nations. Our Panel must support the United Nations system which was conceived to support the ideal of justice, freedom and peace, but it has been somewhat led astray. There is a parallel with the situation in some countries where there is a constitution and institutions built on democratic foundations but where a strong man or a group has, so to speak, eaten into the system and led it astray. One might think that the United Nations is going through a period when there is some disaccord in the way it has been working, and it has been led astray with regard to the democratic ideal that presided over its foundation.

It seems to me, Mr Chairperson, that our Panel should state loud and clear that there is an organization and a system which grew out of generous, democratic ideas and whose operation needs to be reviewed so that it can accomplish its mission. There is, in the world, a desire and a will to undertake such a review and we must fuel that desire by making suggestions as to how the system could be improved. One of these suggestions would be to consider the peoples more, both through parliaments which represent them and through civil society organizations. And I say 'civil society organizations' rather than 'non-governmental organizations' because I think it very bad practice to define someone or something by what it is not. Establishing a place for themselves on the international scene, governments have said: "There are us and the rest". It is that frame of mind which will have to change.

Hisashi
Owada

Just one or two quick comments, notably in connection with what Mr Goulding said. I think he opportunely helped to restore the balance of our discussion. But without wishing to contradict him, I fear that his very effective efforts to restore that balance may have tipped the scales to the other extreme.

As regards globalization, first of all, I very much agree with what he said on the first question of whether globalization signals the end of domestic democracy. I do not think so. I agree

with Mr Goulding, but I believe that, when it comes to democracy and development, the implication of that question is that we should be trying to find out whether or not globalization encourages domestic democracy, and also whether or not it encourages development. And I would answer first of all that it does indeed encourage democracy, but that there is a risk that it may have a negative influence on the development process, which is closely linked to the question of democracy. I feel that in that sense one needs to add a caveat, insofar as globalization will to a very great extent increase transparency on the domestic political front and therefore certainly encourage democracy in the domestic community. But as far as development is concerned, there is a risk of marginalization which could have adverse effects, if a laissez-faire approach is adopted, by ruling out any intervention regarding the art of world governance. So much for my first comment.

My major caveat is on the second point, on the comparison or analogy between parliamentary diplomacy and the operation of the Assembly, in the particular case of international organizations. I do not deny the existence of that element, but it seems to me that Mr Goulding's arguments were so convincing that one got the impression that things happen exactly as he described. I think that this may be the case up to a certain point. Take the case of the United States Senate. It was created as an assembly of sovereign States belonging to an entity called the United States, which was originally a confederation. Two of its members were — and still are — elected as representatives of each of the sovereign States making up the United States. But if the United States is compared with the United Nations, the main difference is that, in a historical perspective, there is a very clear awareness of belonging to a community and of defending, in that capacity, a common cause; in the United Nations, that feeling is largely lacking. I do not claim that it is absent, but the predominant characteristic tends to be rivalry between national interests and the interplay of power politics, which at best hinders efforts to promote a common cause or to try to establish a world public order. I believe this is the fundamental problem with an organization like the United Nations.

I do not wholly disagree with Mr Goulding when he says that to a certain extent parliamentary democracy exists at the United Nations. But I feel that there is a very marked difference

in that with a parliamentary democracy, at an internal level, there exist ideological, political, and philosophical differences, and even regional idiosyncrasies, which give rise to factional policies. The situation at the United Nations is much more than that, because of the system of sovereign States, which is much more constraining and restrictive for parliamentary diplomacy or parliamentary democracy.

That is the point I wanted to make, more by way of a caveat than a rejection of what Mr Goulding said.

**Marrack
Goulding**

I just want to draw the group's attention to the fact that Ambassador Owada, with great skill, used the old trick of changing the question which the other person had been addressing! And secondly, I would like to say, wanting pork-barrel projects in domestic democracies, I think you are quite right that the members of the United States Senate have a clearer perception of a common cause than the 188 members of the General Assembly have. But I think that if I went too far, I think you went a little too far also, in exaggerating the extent to which that common cause governed their behaviour. Because there are pork-barrel politics in the United States, the same is true of all national parliaments which function properly.

**Hisashi
Owada**

By way of conclusion, I would like to add something I forgot to mention, and which really refers to the point that Mr Goulding has just made. I am not really talking about differences or distinctions between the two. What I am trying to say is that it is not possible to change the United Nations' intergovernmental system into an entity more like a world government. Even with the present system, I feel that we can considerably improve things by trying to emphasize the common cause that United Nations members should strive to be aware of. And this brings us back to some earlier comments made about political will. What is crucially important in that connection is a greater awareness of the effective impact of joint efforts made by an international organization called the United Nations.

**Bruce
Russett**

Ambassador Owada has taken so many words out of my mouth, particularly acknowledging the forcefulness and perceptiveness of Mr Goulding's comments. I was provocative, intentionally so;

he has, I think, been intentionally provocative on the other side. So I suggest we begin to think a little bit dialectically at this point and synthesize things just a bit.

Your qualifications about the General Assembly are quite correct, but don't exaggerate them would be my bottom line. The General Assembly is an organization strong on proclaiming norms but weak on an ability to enforce them, at least in the short and medium term. I do not want to denigrate the importance of being able to proclaim norms over and over, but we must not confuse that proclamation with making them effective in the short-term. There are too many examples of General Assembly resolutions on all sorts of matters, from colonialism to the Middle East, to disarmament and on and on, that have been of little effect. So, in the end, the General Assembly lacks the coercive power of the State, and that absence, unfortunately, is necessary at the current stage of the Organization, I would submit.

Now, more of the comparison between the General Assembly and legislators. Legislators can authorize the coercive use of State authority, to enforce norms, especially on matters of redistribution. They can enact affirmative action mandates, they can authorize expenditure on public goods, transfers of various sorts of private goods and benefits to particular segments of the population, and progressive taxation. All these they can enact and most States can enforce them in some substantial degree once they are enacted. That is, I submit, where the General Assembly at the moment is very different from a national legislator. You made the little stinger about the exception constituted by the adoption of the budget! That is true, but the present requirement for a consensus on the budget explicitly gives great control to a very small minority, indeed to a minority of one. The budgetary process is not so democratic and alas, and I truly mean alas, they cannot collect when they do pass it. So I think we must think about democratizing the international system in terms of other functions than coercive authority. As regards other functions of international organizations, there is a much better case to be made for democratization and its effectiveness. Proclaiming norms is important and it makes for great differences over long periods of time, as we are beginning to see on many of the human rights proclamations.

But international organizations do a lot of other things:

they mediate among members, and they provide information, which is again a form of transparency, notably to break down the governmental restrictions on information that you so rightly pointed out. They change perceptions of self-interest in the long run, which is another function of proclaiming norms which I really care about in the long term. It is to do partly with education and partly with changing values. So, it seems to me that what is at the heart of democratic government is not coercion, but those activities, which are entirely consistent with democratic government. As a result we get a whole different look at international organizations and what democratization of the international system means if we think about international organizations in terms of these functions and about a process of decision-making within those organizations that is legitimate. And indeed most IGOs operate on principles of decision-making that are more democratic than the central organs of the UN itself. That is worth bearing in mind.

Alexei
Vassiliev

Just one or two remarks about our discussion. I get the point, expressed here, that nowadays it is impossible to talk of either equality or democracy in international relations. Maybe a change of terminology might make matters easier for us. If we gave up the term that is central to our discussion, namely “democratization”, perhaps the term “humanization” of international relations — or something similar — might be preferable. Anyhow, it seems to me that despite everything, at least since the end of the Cold War, there has been a kind of humanization of international relations, at least ideally speaking. We could not imagine nowadays the kind of attitude expressed at the beginning of the twentieth century by the president of one of the most powerful nations in the world, who said: “This dictator may be a sonofabitch, but he is *our* sonofabitch”. It would be difficult to make a remark like that nowadays, which must mean that a certain trend towards humanization is taking place.

The second point I would like to raise has already been partly raised in response to Mr Goulding’s intervention. The comparison he drew between the General Assembly on the one hand, and the American Congress and Senate on the other, was a sort of provocation intended to produce a constructive discussion. No one believed that he could have been talking about a real

comparison. There are of course many differences, including the fact that members of the General Assembly are appointed and that even in the American Senate they are elected.

However that may be, I would like to return to my idea that some rules of behaviour should be imposed — as indeed they are — by a body which is not currently very democratic, namely the United Nations Security Council. So what should be done? Should it be changed? Half a dozen very powerful and well-respected members of the international community could be added to it, but that would not solve any problems. If what we want is a sort of international democracy, we need to ask the following question: “Should we or should we not have a kind of world government?” Once again, it is a question that is very difficult to answer. Of course, the General Assembly has no power of coercion. That is something only the Security Council has. But even within the framework of the Security Council, it is well known that one of its most important bodies, the Military Staff Committee, was dead from the beginning. It never operated. That only goes to show how difficult it is to resort to coercion in the field of international relations, when there remain so many differences and inequalities between world powers.

Guo
Jiading

I would like to echo Ms Inayatullah’s remarks by dwelling at some length on the economic aspect of the issues we are discussing, namely the impact of globalization on democracy and development. Not being a specialist in this field, I shall talk rather about the concrete reality of the present world. In the course of the postwar period, people of my generation experienced the vicissitudes of world events from World War II, the Korean War and the Cold War period up to the years 1960-90. We are now witnessing increasingly positive developments. We can say that peace and development have become the main tendency of our times, and that the world is now moving happily towards multipolarity. This may be a Chinese expression for all I know. Or perhaps one should say pluralism, a term more frequently used and with ever greater diversity by various countries in areas such as politics, the economy and culture. The considerable expansion of world trade and investment, and rapid progress in science and technology, have created closer economic links between countries and regions. In China, we are now

stressing the importance of science and education. We need to revitalize our country through science and education. Given the pace of economic globalization, this phenomenon has clearly emerged for all to see, with capital flows crossing borders more freely and with the expansion of operational activities by transnational companies. In China, there are now very many such corporations.

As for the developing countries, the foundations of their economy are weak, and they are consequently more vulnerable to the negative effects of external economic development. Thus, globalization offers development possibilities while at the same time constituting a serious challenge to the developing countries. This is an aspect that needs to be kept in mind. I think that in recent years positive changes have emerged in relations between States, as a result of the continuous increase in political consultation and dialogue at various levels, without discrimination and on an equal basis, in a spirit of mutual respect rather than a desire to impose one's will on others. This is mutually beneficial.

A second point: we should stress the rapid development of economic and trade ties that are profitable and beneficial for both parties, as well as scientific and technological cooperation, all of them relations which are more flexible, more diversified and broader in scale.

A third point: more frequent personal contacts through various channels have resulted in greater mutual understanding and the establishment of friendly ties.

And lastly a fourth point: the constant increase in cultural exchanges has encouraged progress in human civilization.

In a word, then, history is moving on, times are changing, the world is developing and humankind is making progress. What are the tasks now incumbent upon us? Those we face today are very different from those I had to tackle during the 1970s, when I worked for the Security Council and attended all its meetings. Times have changed tremendously. In my view, it is now up to us ceaselessly to increase exchanges and cooperation in economic and trade areas. We must step up mutual investment, lower trade barriers, and raise the level of economic and trade cooperation. As for the developing countries, the international community should take fully into account their difficulties and

needs when defining the rules of the game in such fields as trade and investment.

Our second task involves further expanding scientific and technological cooperation. The developed States should place fewer restrictions on the transfer of technologies and provide the developing countries with the advanced technologies they so badly need. That would not only help them to raise their scientific and technological level, but work in the interest of the developed countries themselves.

In third place, international cooperation needs to be stepped up in the financial field, which is of crucial importance. Something of a greenhorn myself when it comes to economics, I have been involved in Pacific economic cooperation. Among the problems we have been studying, the most serious is the financial crisis. The latest crisis in Asia had an impact well beyond the boundaries of that continent. The globalization of international financial markets makes stock market investments highly speculative and volatile, and this in turn affects the stability of financial markets in the developing countries. We in China do not gloat over the misfortunes of others. We say we are all in the same boat. We share their anxieties and intend to draw lessons from the recent financial crisis. It is up to the international community as a whole to take steps to prevent financial risks and maintain the stability of the financial market.

Fourthly, we should step up political dialogue and consultations, and seek to settle disputes satisfactorily in a spirit of mutual respect and by trying to find common ground while at the same time respecting our differences. The world is rich, colourful and diversified. Differences and divergences, far from proving an impediment, should on the contrary give cooperation a fresh impetus. We cannot expect differences to disappear quickly. On the contrary, they exist everywhere. Dialogue and cooperation should replace confrontations and conflicts, and sectors of common interest should be sought out and developed. We are talking about development at international level. In this respect, dialogue and cooperation are extremely useful, unlike the confrontations and clashes that were characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. We should look to the future and create and develop new methods of cooperation. We are on the brink of a new century.

In a nutshell, we are talking about the democratization of international relations. What does that mean? In our view, it simply means building up international relations based on what we call the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and more particularly on mutual respect, on equality and mutual benefit, and on non-interference in each other's internal affairs, which, I believe, lie at the heart of the aims and principles laid down by the United Nations Charter. When I worked for the United Nations, I studied that Charter hundreds of times. In my view, the most significant articles are to be found in the chapter entitled "Purposes and principles", which provides for the equal rights of Nations, large and small, respect of the principle of equal rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the sovereign equality of all member States, and non-interference in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. So we just need to conform with the purposes and principles of the United Nations for democracy and equality to establish themselves in international relations and for the world to become a better and happier place.

Kéba Mbaye

What I have to say is very brief. In the document you have given us, there are four interconnected questions. We are asked: "Can a State be fully democratic in a world which is not?" My answer is yes. "If all States became democracies, would international relations be founded on democratic principles?" My answer is no. The answers are conditioned by those that can be given to two other questions: "Why has political doctrine regarded democracy as a model of government that can be used only within States?" and "How can the reluctance of democracies to extend their model of government to inter-State relations be explained?" The answer to those questions, in my view, is the one given by Judge Valticos: because they are two completely different things. We are not at all in the domain of democracy. And that is why, at the beginning of my statement this morning, I said that in my opinion democracy is not only difficult to achieve but even impossible to conceive of in relations between States. Professor Russett and Ms Inayatullah, as well as Mr Vassiliev, gave the reasons why 'democracy' cannot exist in relations between States. I agree with them. But one of those reasons is in my view fundamental: it is that a true democracy necessarily involves censure mechanisms.

Government is censured by parliament, and parliament is censured by the people. If parliament does not act in accordance with the wishes of the people, the people censure parliament by changing it. That is something that does not exist in relations between States. That is why the comparison in my view does not work, and it does not seem possible to establish a 'democracy' between States. There are two important issues here. One of them, as Mr Guo pointed out, is the application of the principle contained in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the UN Charter: the sovereign equality of States; and the other, just referred to by Mr Vassiliev: the humanization of relations between States. I think it is difficult to go further than that.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

We are now going to turn to a particular aspect of the problem of democracy and the economy, that is to say the role that democracy can play in peace-keeping. I would like to remind you that peace is the supreme goal and *raison d'être* of the whole UN system. Development was only a second goal, also provided for by the Charter, and one that, so to speak, helped peace-keeping. Democracy, on the other hand, has never been one of the UN's goals, even though the preamble begins with the celebrated phrase "We the peoples of the United Nations...".

Democracy was not a goal, because there was never any question of asking States that wanted to belong to the organization to adopt a democratic system. And the UN has admitted States that were far from democratic. It was only after the end of the Cold War that democracy became one of the goals of the UN, and if I remember right it was in 1992 that a section in charge of dealing with electoral assistance was set up in one of the departments of the Secretariat. And it was in 1993 that the UNDP offered to assist in the democratization of States. The result today is that democracy can be seen as forming part of a preventive action, that is to say based on the assumption that States which adopt a democratic system are less likely to go to war than States governed by an undemocratic regime. Moreover, it is conceivable that democracy can be used as a framework for action to settle conflicts peacefully, insofar as democracy can be used to bring a peace process to a successful conclusion. In cases of civil war, whether in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola or El Salvador, the peace process ushered in a democratic process: in other words,

an armed rebellion turned into a political party and took part in elections organized under the aegis of the UN. That is what happened with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and President Cristiani's party in El Salvador, and lastly, to a certain extent but without success, with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and President Dos Santos's party in Angola. So, irrespective of the goal as such, it is possible to imagine that democracy can be used as a preventive action. Given that it has been argued that democratic States are less likely to use force, one can therefore resort to democracy as a means of settling an international conflict and, so to speak, conclude the peace process by holding elections, turning the uprising or the rebels into a political party and getting them to take part in elections guaranteed by the presence of UN observers.

I believe that it is important to show the link between democracy and peace insofar as democracy is not just a regime that will protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and make possible harmonious and lasting development. It can also — more importantly — make a contribution to what is one of the major goals and the very *raison d'être* of the whole UN system, that is to say peace. There can be no development in time of war, and there can be no democracy when a war is going on. That is what I wanted to say by way of an introduction.

Bruce
Russett

And what I will say draws very much on the spirit of what you have written in your three *Agendas* about the connections between not only democracy and peace, but democracy and interdependence, development and peace, international organizations and peace. So it is in that spirit that I am arguing — I come to it from rather different origins, but we come to, I think, very similar conclusions.

From a very detailed and comprehensive information base, there are at this point a few generalizations that one can make about, first of all, the relation between democracy and peace, and secondly, some of these other relationships that you have talked about in your *Agendas* and which are in part reflected in some of the other questions, both before and after asking whether democracies are more peaceful than autocracies.

Here are a few generalizations out of this very extensive information base that my colleagues and I have collected painstakingly over the past six years or so. Over the past century at least there have been no international wars between established democracies. Mr Vassiliev reminded us of that fact yesterday, and I believe he is right. Furthermore, democracies have very rarely fought each other even at low levels of violence or by threatening military violence. There have been some small fights, border incidents, skirmishes and fishing-boat events, but these are pretty rare, and they are at low levels of violence. So that statement that democracies not only have not gone to war with one another in the past century, but have very rarely fought each other even at low levels of violence, is a strong statement. And I would add that at this point there is very wide scholarly agreement on that descriptive statement, on the facts if not the causes. There is not unanimity — scholars never agree with each other on everything. There would be no purpose to our existence if we did. But there is very wide scholarly agreement on this.

Now, this does not mean that democracies are very peaceful in general or imply a negation of colonialism or of certain acts of aggression against undemocratic States. It is simply a question of stating that democracies rarely fight each other, and that there is a large zone of peace in the world, even if it does not encompass the whole globe. And I would add that this seems to be the best explanation for this state of peace because democracies prefer to resolve conflicts democratically and feel that they can do so with other democracies, though not necessarily with autocratic States. And when I talk about resolving conflicts democratically, I am also thinking of international mechanisms for mediation and arbitration, and of court decisions. Democracies in their conflicts with one another are more likely to use these “democratic” mechanisms for resolving their differences.

Now, I qualified my statement about wars applying to the past century. There are some exceptions or near exceptions to the generalizations about war. But they mostly concern the modern international system, largely in the nineteenth century or a few of them quite early in the twentieth century, the most obvious close calls being the Spanish-American War and the Boer War. Now I submit that it is no coincidence that these exceptions hap-

pened a century or more ago. Because this was a period when democracy was far less democratic, principally because of a much-restricted voting franchise: there were sharp property restrictions or racial/ethnic restrictions on the franchise, and obviously women were excluded by not being allowed to vote. So these democracies were thought to be democratic for their time, but would barely qualify as democratic in the 1990s.

The second point: our colleague, Mr Han, referred briefly to work which purports to establish that new democracies are more war prone and perhaps more aggressive than other States and other political systems. That claim, which is found in some literature, is a very controversial and probably incorrect conclusion, which has not been confirmed. It begins to look a bit like the conclusions of the physicists who said they had discovered cold fusion. At the very least it is becoming clear that new democracies, though they may be somewhat more likely to get into fights than old democracies, are not more likely to get into fights than are recent autocratic regimes. The problem would seem in either case to be one of instability during a period of transition. In any case, the finding about new democracies is not persuasive enough or strong enough to provide an excuse for avoiding democratization.

Having said this much about democracy and peace, let me also say that I am not claiming that democracy is all good, or that it is a magic bullet to guarantee peace. I will come back to that. The notion of democracy and peace really is part of a larger set of influences identified by Immanuel Kant 200 years ago. To translate Kant very freely and quickly, his second principle establishes economic interdependence in trade. And here my colleagues and I are now quite confident that economically interdependent States — that is to say States whose mutual trade accounts for a substantial proportion of the GNP of each country — tend quite strongly not to fight each other. Sometimes they do fight each other but it is quite rare. And this is even truer of developed countries, which rarely fight each other, because the interdependence factor is stronger. This suggests therefore that, as regards peace, interdependence may be more important than achieving a high level of development, and that to maintain and achieve a certain level of peace you do not have to be rich, though that helps also.

So, I would shade the discussion on development to give special importance to economic interdependence. My Chinese colleague mentioned something to that effect earlier, and I would second that. Again, this is not saying that interdependence is all good or benign in its consequences. It is not. It is just that it seems to reduce war and violence significantly. Peoples and States acquire an interest in not destroying their common property and commerce by war or threats of war.

Again, to continue with the free translation of Kant, the third part of his observation has to do with the role of international law, or, as we would more likely say in the late twentieth century, the role of international law and international organizations. And it also turns out in this information base that States which share membership in many intergovernmental organizations also rarely fight each other. That is partly a consequence of States joining IGOs with States they get along well with. But there is more to it than that: the IGOs themselves help to avoid conflict. Looked at together, pairs of States that are democratic, very interdependent and very much tied together by IGOs have been less than one-fifth as likely to get into even low-level military conflicts with each other as States which are neither democratic nor interdependent nor members of the same IGOs. Again, this emerges from a very extensive database going back to 1885, the period we have been able to analyse the most extensively. The evidence is even stronger in the post-World War II period, though the same conclusions hold up for the earlier period.

Again, these are generalizations, but there are good examples. Take, for example, the reversal of experience in Europe that many of us have witnessed, but also what has been happening elsewhere in the world. A very interesting example has occurred in the last decade or so in South America, and that is the emergence of a zone of peace also built on those three pillars : democratization, economic interdependence and IGOs. And I would say that a four-fifths reduction in conflict and zero wars look pretty good compared with the generalizations that medical researchers make about what can be done to avoid cancer or heart attacks. If we think of a conflict as a disease, we can begin to talk in the same way about what is probably the cause of the disease of violent conflict.

Going back to your other points and by way of conclu-

Nicolas
Valticos

sion, in relation to the suggestion that democracy alone is not a sufficient guarantee of peace, I would suspect that a world comprised entirely of democracies would have very few wars, but maybe not zero wars. Even in democracies people do not depend entirely on formal democratic procedures to guarantee civil peace. Again, interdependence and certain aspects of civil society are a very important part of it, and supplement the formal democratic institutions in an essential way. If that is so, this suggests some answers to your question: "What happens if not all States are democratic?" It suggests that interdependence and IGOs, or international civil society if you like, can supplement the beneficial effects of democracy and perhaps take up some of the slack when democracy is lacking in one of the two States in question, or in several States in the same system. So the beneficial effects of democracy, which may be insufficient if not all countries are democratic, may in part be supplemented by close linkages of international trade and within the framework of intergovernmental organizations. This could influence the difficult power relationships between States which are not yet ready to be part of a zone of democratic peace.

My statement will be less scholarly and certainly shorter, though one should always be wary of people who begin by saying: "I shall be brief". They are the most dangerous of all! It will be brief, because, in the assertion that a democratic State is less prone to war and less likely to go to war than a dictatorial State, common sense dictates that conclusion: the action of a democratic State goes through internal phases, where an undemocratic State is subject solely to the wishes of its leader. And that is important. It is not always crucial, but it is in most cases. There have been war-mongering democracies and there have been peace-loving dictatorships, but that is not the rule, and most of the time a democratic regime based on social justice will be opposed to hostilities because there is a parliament, there is control, there is freedom of opinion and there is the press. So it is not as easy for such a regime to launch into an adventure as it is when the decision is taken by a dictator or a single party. But whole nations can be caught up in a frenzy of war-mongering. There have been cases where everyone, as I have already said, was keen to march on Berlin, or Paris, or elsewhere. That has

been known to happen, but it is rarer, much rarer. So one can say that as a general rule democratic regimes encourage peace.

I used to belong to an old organization, at least during part of my life — the ILO. Now one of the three justifications for the existence of that Organization was that social justice is a foundation of peace. One always wondered to what extent that was true. Is it scientifically true, or is it, as Albert Thomas said, one of those catch-phrases that adorn the pediments of temples — always supposing that temples are still being built today? He wrote a very interesting article on the subject, published in the *Revue de Paris* in 1921-1922, in which he said that those words should not be taken literally, but for the spirit they implied — i.e. the idea that democracy fosters progress and social justice and that because it does its best in this way to satisfy all its citizens it prevents governments from launching into foreign expeditions in search of gratifications that cannot be found at home. I can assure you that I used that argument when writing books on the ILO. At an international meeting, I think in Latin America, the Argentine winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (who, incidentally, is a writer — but then it is often better to be a writer because one has a broader view of things), expressed his feelings shortly after the unfortunate business of the Falkland or Malvinas Islands. He said that basically the war took place because there happened to be a dictatorship of generals, one of Argentina's many dictatorships of generals, and because they had sought a foreign adventure and gratification by exploiting a cause which was naturally very popular in Argentina. They had not reckoned with Mrs Thatcher, who was responsible in the end for turning the adventure into a misadventure. What I am saying is that quite logically, and apart from the occasional war-mongering democracy, it is indisputable that with its domestic checks and balances and its public opinion, which influences the government and can take part in political life, a democratic regime encourages peace. It is something we must of course mention.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

We have been talking about war. There can occasionally be, as Mr Bennouna mentioned, coercive measures that are more serious than war. When an economic embargo is imposed on a people, it can cause much more suffering than war. When threats are used

— I give you the example of a decision aimed at introducing a “no-fly zone” — they are not as serious as war, but the use of force is threatened. And when coercive measures are taken against a State — I could mention the bombing of Iraq on 5 September 1996 — they consist of violence that is a form of war. Whether or not legitimized by Security Council resolutions, violence was used. So I believe that it is important not to restrict our analysis to too specific a definition of war, that is to say the use of weapons by both sides, and that it is important to include forms of violence and coercive measures that are sometimes more serious than war, whether they take the form of threats, whether or not the threats are carried out, or whether they take the form of economic sanctions.

**Bruce
Russett**

I will be very quick, because I was very long before. I share many of your sentiments and reservations about the use of economic sanctions and embargoes. I agree that these take the form of real violence and they are carried out militarily. So I am not saying that these are necessarily to be preferred to war, not at all. But sometimes war may actually be quicker and less damaging to the civilian population. That is all I can say, in a quick answer to your question, and acknowledging the moral force of it. And I cannot think of a case of an economic embargo being established by a democracy on a democracy.

**Hisashi
Owada**

Just for the sake of argument, I wish to raise a point. It may be true that in general, democracies do not on the whole fight each other. But when we are talking about peace and war, there are cases which are not dissimilar to those we have discussed with reference to sanctions. Going back historically, there was a war between the United States and Spain 100 years ago, which resulted in the colonization of the Philippines. More recently an even more controversial war against Viet Nam came about.

All those wars had justifications in the context of the popular sentiment of society at the time - an ostensible justification that they were waged in the name of justice or aimed at bringing civilization to people who were not yet civilized.

I am not saying that this is bad. I am simply saying that there are cases where even in democracies people wage wars in the name of civilization, justice and all sorts of positive values

that they would like to defend because they are democrats. That is perhaps not an exception to the basic rule that wars are not normally or usually fought between democracies. It is no doubt true that when you regard the other side as a democracy, and not as an evil empire, you do not go to war. But I think we have to be rather cautious when it comes to making generalizations. I do not really challenge the validity of the statement, but it needs to be formulated more carefully. I wish to point out that the question of sanctions also falls in the same category, in that they are normally enforced in a situation that cannot be condoned and should not be condoned.

Kéba
Mbaye

If we refer to the mandate that the Director-General has assigned to us, we find that only problems of democracy and development are mentioned in it. But I think it was a very good idea of yours to draw our attention not to war, but to peace — peace defined not as the absence of war, but as something much more wide-ranging which includes precisely an absence of violence, of the use of force, of threats, etc. You were right to draw our attention to peace, as there can be no democracy without peace, just as there can be no peace, at least domestically, unless there is democracy. We were shown a moment ago, in particular by Professor Russett, that at an international level, too, there can be no peace unless there is democracy, and that if democracy becomes the general rule peace has a better chance of being established.

In another respect, development itself is a factor of peace, of international as well as domestic peace. I think it was the encyclical "*Pacem in terris*" which argued that development was the new name of peace, and that is quite true. And as I have myself repeatedly said, there is such a degree of interdependence between democracy and development that one can say that the two notions are inseparable. There is then a fundamental and integral link between democracy, development and peace. I think we should make that point very clearly and also show that it is a bit like the chicken and the egg: we do not really know which came first. I think that is an extremely important point.

But, Mr Chairperson, I wanted to draw the Panel's attention to a second point, in the form of a question. As Mr Cornillon said this morning, I believe that anything, however commendable, can get out of hand, and I think we should also think a little

Pierre
Cornillon

about how democracy can get out of hand, at least democracy as it is generally perceived by the people, that is to say as something subject to the vote of the majority. Is it not legitimate, when democracy runs the risk of encouraging a whole country to espouse ideologies that are contrary to the universal conscience and the very principles on which the UN is founded — for example, ideologies based on religion or on an ethnic group (I am thinking particularly of tribalism, but also of the excesses of fundamentalism), is it not legitimate, then, to hold back the democratic process? One of the most terrible dictators the world has ever known was democratically elected to the post where he exercised his dictatorship. When I say democratically, I mean by a majority vote. That is why I simply wanted to draw your attention to that aspect of the question, i.e. whether or not it can be legitimate on occasion to oppose a certain form of democracy when it in fact produces a result that is in the end contrary to the universal conscience and the very principles on which the universal Organization was founded.

What sticks above all in my mind from what Professor Russett has told us is that in the end peace is ensured by a range of elements, of which the most important is democracy. I still have some doubts regarding the conclusions drawn from analyses covering a fairly short period of time and one that has been marked by governmental responses influenced by the Cold War situation. You said that the feeling of belonging to a community is a factor that inhibits conflicts. And it is a fact that during the Cold War the democratic world had the impression that it belonged to a community and that it needed to combat a common enemy. It would be interesting to know what would happen in a world where attitudes were not frozen, as they were during the Cold War period, and where the world had a greater number of democracies. For statistics to cover a longer period, we should go back a few years more; but that presents a drawback since the further we go back, the more flawed were the democracies and therefore the less can we draw conclusions.

To return to the question of the importance of democracy in peacekeeping, may I point to what Judge Valticos mentioned: the internal workings against power, of challenges which hold back decisions to go to war. There is also the fact that democra-

cies are becoming softies. Even the United States would now like to defend crucial interests but fears the loss in action of one single person. Among the reasons why democracy encourages peace, and one of the most important, is the fact that democracy is the best way of ensuring a country's internal stability, social peace and civil peace. Internal instability can rapidly degenerate into first domestic, then international conflict. Throughout history, how many international conflicts have been sparked by a country's domestic instability! That is why democracy can eliminate many international conflicts.

Now, Mr Chairperson, assuming that democracies do not on the whole go to war but authoritarian regimes will continue to exist for quite some time alongside democracies, you ask the question: "What is going to happen?" Judge Mbaye also asked us the question: "How do democracies defend themselves?" If it is a matter of internal, domestic unrest, I tend to believe that a genuine democracy will never be threatened to the point of disappearing because a democracy produces the antidotes to the poisons which could harm it.

With regard to international relations, mention has been made of the embargoes imposed on certain regimes in order to impose democracy on them. Personally, I am not in favour of embargoes that inflict terrible suffering on the populations concerned and often enable the survival of those very political regimes against which they are being imposed. Franco remained in power after the last world war largely thanks to the embargo on his country. I know of other regimes, which shall remain nameless, which are managing to survive because of an embargo imposed on them. It seems to me that there are other measures the international community could take in order to achieve its aim. Thus one might think that the confidential decisions taken at certain crucial moments by large industrial and financial groups not to invest in South Africa were more effective than the embargo over a period of years announced publicly by a number of countries but which was not that well applied.

Once again I should like to plead the case for supportive action for new democracies which are certainly far more vulnerable than established democracies when faced with domestic threats or authoritarian regimes.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I have to confess that I greatly appreciated what the devil's advocates had to say. Colonial wars and Nazism grew out of democracies. It was democracies that waged colonial wars, and they always invoked the notion of the superiority of one people over another. So one really needs to query very seriously the claim that democracies are not the starting point of wars but, on the contrary, are a kind of guarantee against wars. That said, democracy could be a possible answer to the question of how to maintain peace. I find that, quite apart from the debate on democracy, what is really at issue is power. That is to say, how is the issue of power handled in the UN? What possibilities does the UN have to intervene in the exercise of power? How is power handled within States? It is then an international question as well as a domestic question. At a domestic level, I am thinking in particular of the Viet Nam War, where a lively democracy enabled public opinion to manifest itself and help stop the war. So we have examples which carry weight on both sides. The central issue to me is the issue of power, whether at an international level or within States. How is power managed? What are the checks and balances that can be set against the regime?

From a domestic point of view, democracy would seem fundamentally to be the exercise of the three powers that control the decisions of the executive. That seems to me to be a central point. My second point: surely the only purpose of this discussion of power must be to meet some of the UN's broader objectives. Lastly, peace is one of the most explicit rights of the United Nations, but within the framework of peace the reference remains human rights. In any situation where power is exercised without regard for human rights, we are faced with a dangerous situation.

Hisashi
Owada

I am not quite sure whether one is setting forth a universal and undisputed rule when one asserts that democracies do not fight each other, or that democracies do not get involved in wars or start wars. It all depends how you define democracy.

It should not be forgotten that during the Cold War the Soviet Union also claimed to belong to a category of democracy, though different from that of the United States or other countries in the free world. That is one aspect of the problem. But, irrespective of that, it might be more accurate to say that democ-

racies do not normally fight each other. That does not however mean they do not start wars, which is a very different thing.

There are perhaps three possible factors to be considered when democracies get involved in a war. To play the role of devil's advocate, I would say that the first of the three relates to the many exceptions which confirm the validity of the rule itself. There are examples of such cases, but they are exceptions rather than the rule and, as both Ms Darcy de Oliveira and Mr Cornillon pointed out, in a democracy there is always some institutional mechanism for examining the validity of the argument that is invoked to start a war. In many cases, it will be a preventive mechanism, but if it does not work as a preventive mechanism it will certainly function as a redressing mechanism after the war has started. The Viet Nam War was an example of that.

The second factor is the case where a democracy representing public opinion, tries to justify war in the name of defending justice. The United Nations Charter is very clear on this point: when a reference is made to the problem of peace in the Charter, the expression used is always either "peace and justice", "international peace and justice", or "peace with justice". Thus, whatever way you define this concept of justice in relation to a concrete situation, I think there are cases where one can start a war, even if it is not a defensive war, by claiming to be defending justice. This is naturally a rather controversial stance, insofar as one needs to ask oneself what is meant by justice. Its definition can be quite subjective, and that is why some people believe it to be a dangerous proposition. For example, does the "justification" used for the war between the United States and Spain in 1898, or for the start of the Viet Nam War fall into this category? This is the second factor to be considered.

The third factor to be considered is the importance of the power of public opinion, as Ms Darcy de Oliveira said. In my view, public opinion is a crucial factor in a democracy. In many cases, it is a guarantee for ensuring that there will be no war, but, sometimes it can be a guarantee for starting a war. Depending on how public opinion judges the situation, it can be a decisive factor which changes the situation.

Alexei
Vassiliev

On one point I would like to argue along the same lines as Ambassador Owada, but I would also like to challenge another point, as Ms Darcy de Oliveira has just done.

When I said — and it is the majority opinion — that democracies very rarely fight each other, that did not mean that they do not fight countries and regimes which are not considered democratic. The problem is: who is entitled to judge? Who will decide? Why is it hard to trigger a war between democracies? Because of public opinion. How can one justify a war against another democracy? It is rather easy to demonize an enemy and assert that its behaviour is or will become a threat to peace, and in doing so to trick and deceive public opinion. There are well-known cases of that kind. Ms Darcy de Oliveira cited the example of the Viet Nam War, which was brought to an end partly by public opinion, though possibly also because of heavy losses. A question mark remains: would the war have been ended if the losses had not been so heavy? But how did the war start in the first place? Because the Government, the Congress and public opinion were misled by reports emanating from a certain Agency about an incident that in fact never took place. The problem is how to control agencies of that kind, even in a democratic country. The mechanism exists: it is the United Nations, which forbids the use of force by a single State. The only body empowered to take such a decision is the Security Council. Whether democratic or not, the use of force is possible only by a decision of the Security Council and on the basis of a consensus within it. Were that not the case, a very dangerous situation would result where any power that decided to use force on its own might disregard the already established international mechanism, which may be good or bad but is the only one in existence. That is the actual situation, and it represents a real danger.

By way of conclusion, may I make one brief remark on the side, so to speak. Ways of understanding the notion of democracy and non-democracy, of determining what constitutes or not a threat to peace, have changed, and of course we cannot refer today to the criteria of the past, of 40 or 50 years ago. Certain ethical principles are being worked out today, and we would be wrong to try to judge the actions of our ancestors, or even our fathers, since the logic, the ethics and the legal system of yesterday were different from what they are today.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

May I just add a footnote? Article 51 of the Charter authorizes a State to use force without going through the Security Council.

Hisashi
Owada

Perhaps I should not prolong this discussion, but I would simply like to give one example which shows how tricky the question of public opinion can be. I agree with what Mr Vassiliev said. Before the start of World War II, by which I mean the war in the Pacific, the situation in that part of the world was very different from the situation in Germany. While I shall not make a precise comparison, as far as Japan is concerned, I know from my personal experience that public opinion was very much in favour of going to war. The prevailing sense in the country was the feeling of being cornered and of having no alternative but to go to war for survival. The only thing that could be done was to fight back. I am not saying that this was justified objectively. I simply want to show how seriously public opinion can be misled. Consequently, I do not believe that the existence of a public opinion in a democracy is in itself enough to stop a war. Of course the question of whether Japan before the war was a democracy or not is highly problematic, and I would not go so far as to say that. What I am saying is that at least public opinion played a decisive role in the situation. The public opinion could have acted as a preventive mechanism, but it did not, for rather the same reason why it did not at the time of the Viet Nam War.

Similarly, while I do not know to what extent we can take Gore Vidal at his word, he describes in his novel *Empire*, how decisive a role newspapers, and particularly the Hearst newspapers, played in starting the American-Spanish War through influencing the public opinion of the day.

There is no question that public opinion is a very important factor, but great care is needed to safeguard the transparency that is necessary for it to function properly. It is an essential element in a democracy, in a genuine democracy where public opinion is not manipulated because there really is total transparency, and because people can decide for themselves whether it is a case of justice or a case of self-defence, and not a case where one is being induced to go in a certain direction.

Bruce
Russell

To take up Ambassador Owada's interesting point, if you look at the contents of newspapers regarding various international dis-

Nicolas
Valticos

puts in countries with a free press that have a serious but not necessarily violent conflict of interests, it is common for the newspapers to pick up opinion from the free press in the other country and use it as an argument for restraint, presenting the other side of the issue and restraining public opinion. If, on the other hand, the other country is not perceived as having a free press, sometimes the press may be quoted, but only as a mouthpiece of some dictator, whatever the case may be. So that even in the matter of public opinion and a free press, the dynamics of inflaming or restraining public opinion are really quite different, depending on access to presumably independent information and opinion in the other country.

Here we are broaching a very delicate and very important issue — that of public opinion in democracies — and you are right to stress it. There is such a thing as a free press, as well as a free press that is leant on. There was a time when the press was, let us say, given financial help from interests which were in favour of war, and which notoriously allowed certain arms dealers to grow rich. Where does the freedom of the press begin, and where does it end? Where does the role of governments begin, and where does it end, when the press goes wild, or just behaves in a nationalistic way — without going so far as to say that it takes its orders from what were called armaments magnates in the 1930s? I believe that when it comes to a free and informed press and public opinion, there is a delicate borderline between the freedom that the press should enjoy and the government's need to quell the overexcitement of ultra-nationalists or other groups.

I think we should also mention in our conclusions the role of public opinion in democracies. In non-democracies there is no problem: the press is not free, and the government more or less tells the press what to do. But in democracies the issue is more complicated because, while there needs to be freedom of the press, there also needs to be a responsible press. And it is difficult for a government to say: "You have written an article we do not like". That would mean that the press was not independent, and it would be contrary to the notion of freedom of the press. However, there is at the same time a risk of public opinion getting whipped up. It is a problem we need to discuss in very prudent but clear-cut terms.

Secretary-General, I am not sure if any of us have really responded to the question you posed in your introductory remarks, about the role of democratic acts in the resolution of conflicts and about the role of democracy as a preventive measure. Perhaps I may address those two questions.

On the first of them you are quite right, there have been a number of cases where actions by the United Nations to help the parties resolve a conflict have involved an election. I think I am right in saying that in every such case it has been an internal conflict, and that we in the United Nations have never proposed to the parties to an inter-State conflict that there should be some kind of electoral act to end the conflict.

I think there has been a tendency at one time in the United Nations to think that holding an election, and monitoring or guaranteeing the respectability of an election, was the end of the matter, and the United Nations could then go off and attend to other conflicts. Well, I was going to start with one example where that was actually justified: Namibia. In that case, an election was held, a constituent assembly was immediately set up, and an agreement on a constitution was reached swiftly and rather easily. All that resulted in independence and the United Nations did withdraw, leaving behind only the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative. And it turned out that that was sufficient to bring that conflict to an end.

But there are other cases, Angola is one, where the conflict was not brought to an end following an election, and the results of the election were not respected. But I think, in a way, a more interesting case for analysis is Cambodia, where, thanks to your decision, the election went ahead even though one of the parties had withdrawn from the process, saying it refused to take part in the election. And it was a rather successful election, there was a huge turn-out, and a somewhat improbable coalition was formed as a result of the election. I think two questions can be asked in this connection: one, was it actually right to go ahead with the election, when it was going to be an incomplete election because one of the parties, perhaps the strongest of the parties, was not going to take part? Or should we at that time — I say this with the wisdom of hindsight — have halted the process and said this election was going to be an imperfect election and held in a manner which did not conform with the peace settlement,

because one of the most powerful parties was not going to participate? Should we have frozen everything and said: "As Secretary-General, I recommend that the Paris Conference be reconvened, and that we get everything back on the rails...?" I now believe, with the benefit of hindsight, that that probably would have been the better decision, as long as the international community, by which I mean the major financial contributors, had been prepared to agree. But I suspect they were not, because the money spent on peacekeeping was \$3 million a day, and we could not agree to suspend operations for six months or a year.

I cite this as an example of how difficult these electoral operations can be, and how incomplete they can be. It was a flawed election and we now know what disasters resulted from it. Now the second point is your reference to a democracy as a *mesure préventive*. This is much more difficult. Because, again, if we are talking mainly about internal conflicts, democracy is clearly desirable, if the cause of the internal conflict is an unjust government and discrimination and all the rest of it. If you can persuade the government of the day to adopt more democratic ways of running the country, then that is a preventive measure, to prevent armed conflict breaking out or breaking out again in the country concerned. This brings us back to what I and others were saying yesterday, about how extraordinarily difficult this can be in a world composed of sovereign States, whose governments are very jealous of their sovereignty. But I remain convinced that democracy has a preventive role to play if you can get over the sovereignty hurdle.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

May I just give an answer on the question of Cambodia? After all, the area occupied by the Khmers Rouges accounted for only 5 per cent of Cambodian territory. And that percentage corresponded to less than 2 per cent of the population. They were powerful, I admit, because they were receiving aid from another country, but they remained very marginal.

**Marrack
Goulding**

May we continue with this discussion? May I reply to what you have said? I think that they were more significant than you suggest, Mr Secretary-General, in terms of their military power, and that they controlled more of the territory. And what we did not foresee was that, yes, you and Akashi were right, that it was pos-

sible to hold the election without them and to form a coalition subsequently. But what then happened, what smashed the coalition in the end, was that the Khmers Rouges collapsed and started defecting. Their troops defected in large numbers, and there ensued a competition between the two prime ministers to get their hands on those battle-hardened troops and their weapons. But I know how easy it is to be wise after the event.

Hisashi
Owada

I do not know whether it is the right moment to go more deeply into the subject, but as I was personally involved in the Cambodian peace process, I have to say I disagree with Mr Goulding. When you talked about hindsight and being wise after the event, I wanted to know what you had based your judgement on. First of all, I am more inclined to feel that the Khmers Rouges did in fact take part in the electoral process at its initial stage, but that at the last moment, as polling day approached, they decided that after all it was not in their interest to pursue it. It was an on-off decision rather than a rejection of the whole process. In that sense, it was more like the case of Angola.

Secondly, as regards the result, I think that what happened subsequently had little, if any, connection with that process. There was a very delicate balance and a very delicate relationship between the two parties. I know that because I was personally involved in the reconciliation process, and I fear I may not agree with you. But perhaps this means going deeper into a very concrete issue than is necessary here for our discussion.

Marrack
Goulding

On your first point, Ambassador Owada, I think that the significant thing was not so much the refusal of the Khmers Rouges to take part in the election as their refusal to go through with the Canton process, and if there was a mistake, as I have conceded several times — with the wisdom of hindsight — it was to go ahead with the election, knowing that there was this large unresolved problem of well-armed Khmers Rouges, strongly supported by the Thai military for commercial reasons, and that even if the election had turned out well, as it did initially, there was this unresolved problem which was going to threaten the stability of the settlement that had been only partially implemented, especially with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Cambodia (UNTAG) being withdrawn very soon after the election.

Kéba
Mbaye

We must avoid straying from the subject at hand. I think that the problem of Cambodia, like that of Angola and of many other countries, simply served to illustrate the statement which you made, and with which the great majority of the members of this Panel agree, I think, namely that democracy can create peace both preventively and curatively.

But what I would like to do, Mr Chairperson — and it may have a connection with what we said yesterday and with what we have again said today — is to raise the problem of public opinion. I do indeed believe that there cannot be democracy without public opinion. It is perhaps because international public opinion is not a powerful enough sanction, and because at the level of international relations the equivalent of democracy at a domestic level remains unknown. When people refer to public opinion they naturally mean the press. And in the document the Director-General sent us there is much discussion of the press, which has an important role to play in a democracy. It has to be pluralistic and free. But what I would like to draw your attention to is an observation that arose from an experiment. In Africa especially, in States where they are experimenting with a certain kind of democracy, the press does not really play the role it should, even though it is free. Let me explain: either it does not tackle the real problems (it is a press that tends to copy the bad side of the press in the old Western democracies, that is to say a gutter press that reports anecdotal facts), or else it is completely irresponsible. Now I think that freedom and responsibility are two things which should always go hand in hand. If one is free it is because one is responsible.

I believe that one cannot be irresponsible and claim to be free. But it happens very often — what I am saying will not of course go down well and if I wrote it in a newspaper I think I would be fiercely attacked. But it happens to be the truth. I think we should nevertheless temper the advice we give by pointing out that while the press needs to be pluralistic and free it must still remember that it has a role to play in societies that are moving towards democracy, and that that role is essentially based on responsibility.

I would like to add, in connection with public opinion, that of course when one says “public opinion” one means “the press”, but not just “the press”. First of all, I would say that one of the characteristics of democracy is that there exists a form of information which amounts to more than the press, which is itself contradictory. In other words it is one of the thermometers that one can use. It offers the possibility of having two interpretations of the same reality. There are points of view and stances which are not unanimous. If they were, I think there would be good reason to ask oneself questions. So let us say “information” rather than “the press”. We live in a world of modernity, a phenomenon which poses problems from the point of view of interpretation: information now goes through circuits that enjoy very great independence. People can circulate any information they wish via the Internet, for example. This also poses ethical problems, which are much debated at the moment. But it does open up a forum devoted to freedom of information that also deserves to be taken into consideration.

One last thing in connection with public opinion. I used the word “press” and the word “information”, but I do not think that they completely cover the components of public opinion. For public opinion is also shaped by the direct experience of the population at large. And I think that this is an element which should not be looked down on. I can give you an example which I find rather eloquent: we have television channels in Brazil which get a 90 per cent audience rating during newscasts, I repeat, 90 per cent during newscasts, but which have never managed to get their candidates elected, the candidates they supported. I find this an interesting statistic in relation to the shaping of public opinion. It means that 90 per cent of the population watch the news on a certain television channel, but do not vote for candidates supported by that channel. So I think that public opinion remains a much larger area than that of the influence of the press. It is an element of democracy that should be taken into consideration, because it manifests itself not just through the ballot box, but by the presence of people in public places. It is certainly a component of democracy.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

I would like to make two remarks. We have mentioned public opinion in connection with war and peace. Now we have to remember two things: first, that public opinion in general, in every country, is not interested in international politics. It is interested only in domestic politics. The moment there is no real interest, it becomes easier to manipulate public opinion.

My second point: the press almost everywhere in the world is extremely nationalistic. There are exceptions: for example, when the communist party was strong, it sometimes adopted a single stance everywhere. But the press all over the world gives a very suggestive interpretation of foreign policy.

A third point: irrespective of the nationalistic dimension, governments influence the press on foreign policy issues insofar as they say that extremely important interests are at stake and that there needs to be a joint position.

There are then three elements which restrict the role of public opinion as regards peace, war and foreign policy. And there are two elements which enable governments to manipulate public opinion to a greater degree. You have seen how easy it is to obtain the support of public opinion when the government and business circles decide that force should be used to carry out a certain operation or achieve certain objectives. I quite agree with you on the importance of public opinion when it comes to the domestic affairs of a State, because it takes an interest as soon as there are plans to build a road or a hospital, or it is a question of electing Mr A rather than Mr B. On the other hand, as far as foreign policy is concerned — though exceptions do exist — it is much more difficult to bank on public opinion. In other words, it is easier in the event to manipulate it.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

While I quite accept your argument, may I offer a counter-example? I believe that the case of Viet Nam, the war between Viet Nam and the United States, is relevant here. Here was a country that made considerable efforts to defend its foreign policy by using every means of communications it could. In that country, which could draw on an impressive number of mass communication instruments, a powerful movement of public opinion nevertheless came into being as a result of direct experience, eyewitness accounts and a whole range of mechanisms that got going at that time. I can remember my own personal

experience: I was then living in the United States. I can tell you that what people were doing for the first time in the streets of the United States was getting to grips with public opinion. Public opinion was there. And I think it weighed heavily in the balance when decisions regarding the war were taken. It is simply a counter-example, but in our century I find it rather eloquent.

**Mohamed
Charfi**

I agree wholeheartedly with what Ms Darcy de Oliveira has said. First, I would like to say that experience has long proved that public opinion can be manipulated. It often has been, by States or by the interests of arms dealers or others.

Secondly, a free press is an enterprise, and a commercial enterprise that needs to appeal to customers in order to function properly. A newspaper needs to be sold, a television set needs to be watched, and good ratings are an essential factor. And so it is often in the interest of the free press, inasmuch as it is a private business, to please its customers and not necessarily to tell the truth or back the right policies, those that favour peace. However, democracy has a great advantage over authoritarian regimes in that it enables activists campaigning for peace or other just causes to take action, makes their voices heard and in the long term influence public opinion. It takes time for that type of action to produce results, and I shall cite the example mentioned by Ms Darcy de Oliveira. It was not in Viet Nam that the United States lost the war against Viet Nam, it was in Washington, in the United States itself. It was public opinion that prompted it to change its policy. A few years earlier, France lost the war against Algeria, not in Algeria, but in France: it was French public opinion which was gradually swayed by French peace activists, thanks to a democratic system. I would not say thanks to the role of the press, but thanks to the press as a means that has enabled peace activists to change public opinion.

**Guo
Jiading**

One thing I would like to make clear from the start is that we are not expected to reach some conclusion. We are here to express our views freely and amicably. We are not required to arrive at some consensus or adopt an agreement or a joint statement. I was involved in finalizing a large number of joint communiqués concerning China following the Korean Armistice Agreement. But here we are not required to do anything like that.

Attiya
Inayatullah

We are talking about democracy, and there seems to me to be a little confusion about the concept of democracy. In my humble opinion, democracy is a system. But here we are talking about democracy as a State, and we are saying that democracies do not fight each other. What are these democracies? I do not know. And how does one define a democracy as a State? We do not talk about democracies as States, because they are kingdoms and empires, or they go under some other name, but they are not democracies. Some of them do in fact call themselves democracies, without being democratic enough. So how does one define a democracy as a State? Who can claim to be a democracy? That is the question I am asking. But I do not expect you to answer it. I am just putting it on the table.

Now for a second question. We ought to judge and gauge things by a single, uniform standard. But it is very difficult to come up with a single standard that is acceptable to all of us. The United Nations Charter is a single standard which provides for equal rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the sovereign equality of all Organization members, and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. Our deeds and our words should be guided by those principles. I think we all agree on that. But there must be a single standard. There should not be a standard which is applied somewhere domestically, and another which is applied elsewhere. That is how I see things. But I would not want to open the floodgates.

I would like to deal with the question you formulated as follows: "If all States became democracies, would international relations be based on the principles of democracy?" Since we are talking about international relations, I would like to give my answer within the context of the United Nations.

First, I believe that the United Nations was founded on democratic principles. My regret is that those principles have not been practised. It is there, in my opinion, that the most important problem resides.

Secondly, I would like to ask a question: "If all States were democratic, do you think that the veto would not have been provided for?" In my opinion, the right of veto is undemocratic. Similarly, I ask myself the following question: "If all States were dem-

ocratic, would the countless resolutions adopted by the United Nations be implemented?" I do not think so. And I would also like to ask: "If all States were democratic, would the Human Rights Commission be effective?" In my opinion, it is currently dysfunctional.

To my mind, when we talk about international relations, we are talking about politics. It is in fact a power game, and I do not believe there exists the slightest altruism when it comes to power politics. I would like to suggest that at its worst, power politics is a kind of war, whether or not one is talking about democratic States. I will give you the example of the embargo, which is a form of war. The big buzzword around town — and when I say town I mean the world — is "human rights for all". As we are talking about democracy and development, I would be happier if we could talk about the universal right to education for all, to food for all, to shelter for all. It is only then that humankind will be capable of demanding the other rights, which I respect just as much. Basically, I feel that the problem of poverty needs to be addressed. The rest will automatically follow on from that. In any case, one has to start somewhere and establish priorities. That is my answer to the question about what would happen if all States were democratic.

I would also like to answer another question that you asked, Mr Chairperson: "Does globalization signal the end of domestic democracy?" I would like to say, no, it does not signal the end of it. But I would say that it can be an impediment to democracy and, just as importantly, an impediment to development. These are the two issues we are basically looking at. We agree that some external factors related to globalization impact on domestic development efforts, because as economies open up they become more porous. And as they become more porous, States become less autonomous and sovereignty, that notion which underlies domestic authority and accountability, may be jeopardized. And this simply follows on from what we were saying this morning.

Consequently, by way of an answer to your question about the possibility of establishing a viable democratic system and effective development simultaneously, can they be achieved in tandem? Or do we need to define priorities? I would say that the two processes can take place in tandem, on condition prior-

ities are defined. And as regards the developing States, which find themselves at the initial stage of the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system, I would say that we need to envisage a minimal form of democracy combined with development efforts. Secondly, I would suggest that the whole nexus of democracy and development needs to be institutionally and incrementally developed. I do not think it can all be done at the same time, and it is obvious that the model of industrialized Western democracies is not what should be applied as a starting point in fledgling democracies in many countries.

The third point I would like to make is that at the initial stage, when States move towards democracy, it will be constructed on the basis of what the population wants. Now what the population wants is not a procedural democracy and not the right to vote, but a bottom-up micro-strategy based on democratization and the development potential of grass-roots and community organizations. In my opinion, this approach is much more suitable at the initial stage than a procedural democracy. It is important to mobilize and fully involve grass-roots and community organizations.

Mr Chairperson, I would like to express a caveat and a warning: as authoritarian regimes give way to free regimes, it is an unfortunate fact that freedom does not always go hand in hand with responsibility. As a result, people talk about freedom and rights, but the notion of responsibility is lost. My caveat concerns the fact that what is frequently expressed is a freedom to hate, whether the subject of that hatred is ethnic, religious or social; and States where democracy is being introduced are unable to control the situation. That is why I believe that on the whole, the way in which UNESCO approaches the culture of peace, by including in it the culture of democracy, respect for pluralism and tolerance, is not without merit. I think the time has come for international relations to involve civil society at a global level. That is what UNESCO has succeeded in doing very well, and I would like to cite the example of its Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Programme, in which an integrated, multidisciplinary programme comprises biosphere human ecology and the social sciences. And it is being carried out with the help of two NGOs, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the International Social Sciences Council (ISSC), both of which play a key

role. They aim well beyond the narrow focus of the nation-state, and they are more interested in the transnational dimension of a very important problem that concerns the future of the world, namely the biosphere, ecology and the social sciences. And I would like to urge the Panel to take an interest in the use of civil society within United Nations agencies, in the same sort of relationship as with UNESCO. It is within UNESCO's field of competence, probably more than that of any other United Nations body.

Finally, may I take the liberty of offering an answer to Mr Guo's question: "What is democracy?" I know we are not looking for a linguistic definition, but I do feel that when we talk about models of democracy we should stress that the West's relationship with the continents of Africa and Asia has been far from democratic in recent history. Thus, for example, autonomy in the physical sense of the term was denied in Africa by the slave trade. Autonomy in the legal sense of the term was abolished by colonialism, both in Asia and in other parts of the world. My feeling is that we are trying to make sense of democracy for the third millennium. As for myself, I would say that democracy combines personal freedom with an active role for the market-place. I can see nothing wrong with that, but the formula must include minimum rights for a decent existence for all. A decent existence... This brings me back to food, shelter and education. That is the minimum for me. And secondly, collective self-determination for a pluralistic society. Once again, that is what we need in the twenty-first century. And thirdly, individual self-determination, which guarantees personal rights and freedoms. That is what I would regard as the minimum definition of democracy.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

Mr President, I would simply like to make one thing clear. Earlier on, Sir Marrack Gouling talked about the attitude of the UN, which organized elections and then went away, leaving some rather deplorable situations behind it. I would like to go back to what I said at the beginning of the session of this Panel: development is all very well, as is democracy, but they are envelopes, envelopes with a content. Of the two, it is easier to determine the content of development. In my view, the main thing is that development should above all be human development. And in order to exist, development must include a total respect for human rights and, more particularly, for civil and political rights (as it is a

question of democracy, starting precisely with the example Sir Marrack Goulding gave in connection with the United Nations, regarding certain conflictual situations that now occur at a domestic level). It very often happens that European or other organizations send observers to an African country when there is an election. These people stay at rather comfortable hotels and then, after the two or three days it needs for the poll to take place, leave with a report of a few pages that says that the elections passed off freely and that the country concerned is now democratic. And it is awarded a certificate. Personally I shall never ever subscribe to that way of looking at democracy.

Democracy is something else. Democracy is a content, and I think that, when our colleagues in the West or in North America talk of democracy, the notion they have of it is not universally shared, because they belong to old democracies that have overcome a number of difficulties and problems. Public opinion exists. If people are no longer happy with Mrs Thatcher, they change and pick someone from the Labour Party instead. It is the same thing in the United States. It is the same thing in France, between the right and the left. In most of our underdeveloped countries — the term “developing countries” tends to be used by people who bury their heads in the sand — that is not the way things are. In most of our underdeveloped countries, elections are just a façade and there is nothing behind them. In my view, we cannot say on this Panel that we are in favour of democracy in every country without specifying what we also think should necessarily and obligatorily accompany democracy.

There is, for example, the rule of law and the fight against inequality. In Africa today, you have countries where there are millionaires while a whole region might be starving at this very moment. And they are countries where it is said that there is democracy and therefore a fight against corruption and a fight against inequality — it is true that social exclusion and inequality also exist in democracies, though not at all on the same scale. And corruption is imported into these alleged new democracies, and on an extraordinary scale. So I agree with everything that has been said about development and democracy, provided we say that in our view democracy is an envelope and that it should contain a number of specific elements. That is how I wanted to conclude my contribution to this first session of our Panel.

**Marrack
Goulding**

I want to say that I agree very much with what Judge Valticos has said, but I would like to take it one stage further. I agree that it is desirable that this Panel, under your chairmanship, Sir, should be in a position to present to the Director-General of UNESCO jointly agreed conclusions. But it is desirable that those conclusions should not be restricted to the definition of concepts. They should also be of a practical nature and indicate how UNESCO can be more effective in supporting democratization. And this does have some implications for the programme of our work.

I would like to say one word in reply to our other Judge, Judge Mbaye, which is basically to say I agree very much with what he has just said. I drew attention yesterday to the phrase in our letter of instructions from the Director-General of UNESCO, which refers to "it being understood that it is each society taking into account its own cultural and historical specificities to find its path towards democracy on the basis of universally recognized principles". I think that does embody the envelope concept which Judge Mbaye referred to.

A final point, on which I agree with Judge Mbaye, about going to a country a day or two before the vote, observing the electoral process, and then writing a report that puts a seal of approval on the election. That is not a good practice and you, Mr Secretary-General, and I have had a number of discussions about this. First of all, the United Nations only sends electoral missions if the government concerned asks it to do so, and secondly, the United Nations has consistently taken the position that such missions are only worth sending if they go to the country concerned in good time, to understand the political and social realities of that country, and to be in a position to assess not just what happens on the day of voting, but what has preceded it in terms of the election campaign, the capacity of those seeking election to present their programmes to the electors, and all the rest of it. So I just want to say, Judge Mbaye, that I completely agree with you.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

At this point, I would like to remind you of our work schedule. The main idea is to have a free discussion and above all to avoid wasting our time trying to define democracy, which is something that has been done for years by hundreds of institutions and organizations. Our intentions are more limited. The idea is to understand the connection between democracy and develop-

ment, given that everyone agrees what democracy is and what development is, insofar as that has been debated for 50 years by every international organization. I believe that the important thing is to offer UNESCO practical suggestions, by answering the following questions: “What should be done to promote democracy?” “What should be done to bring out the link that exists between democracy and development?” And lastly: “What should be done to take into account the fact that nowadays problems of democracy and development are not just national problems, but that they have an international and global dimension?” Consequently, what is the impact of that globalization first on the phenomenon or process that democracy and development represent, and secondly on the relationship between democracy and development?

One last idea which has been put forward, and which I believe to be important: some Panel members have said that the problem of peace should not be discussed here, insofar as we are talking about democracy and development. I believe that the problem of peace underlies democracy and development. And more than that — examples have been given — democracy has been used as a method of resolving certain conflicts. True, they were domestic conflicts, but it is a method that made it possible to integrate a section of the population and even to move from a one-party system to a multi-party system. They are phenomena that deserve our attention and which could feature in the report.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

I had said they were going to be my last words, but, in view of what you have just said, I feel I really must return to the point I was making. I am far from certain that for 50 years now democracy has been defined, or that everyone is agreed on what it is. Indeed, I am not asking the Panel to define democracy, but only to state a number of requirements as regards what should accompany democracy as we conceive it. I believe that the majority of us would like that to be so, and in particular those of us who come from developing countries, and above all African countries, where ballot papers are sometimes put in the ballot box collectively, where village chiefs are asked to come along with the ballot papers of their flock and put them in the ballot box, with other papers which are added. Then someone says: “This is democracy. That’s that”. If that is what democracy is

about, then I personally cannot agree. And yet they say that in this or that country democracy is being applied. That is why, Mr President, I must insist once again. I believe that most Panel members are in favour of our enumerating the requirements that need to be satisfied for us to be able to say that there is democracy.

Debates

Second meeting

UNESCO Headquarters, Paris

8-9 February 1999

Agenda

1. Impediments to democracy and development

The Panel has identified a series of impediments and threats to democracy and development, as well as means which could be used to overcome them. How can UNESCO help to develop those means more effectively?

1. Social and economic inequalities:

- ◇ How can economic and social rights be promoted in the context of globalization?
- ◇ What are the political, economic, social and cultural measures that can encourage both democracy and development?

2. Identitarian closure:

- ◇ How should we combat the social and political exclusion and the discrimination caused by extremism?
- ◇ How should we combat extremism itself?

3. Lack of justice:

- ◇ What measures should be encouraged in order to reinforce the rule of law?

4. Lack of education:

- ◇ How can the lack of access to formal education be remedied?

2. The culture of democracy

The Panel felt that *true democracy goes beyond the purely institutional framework and refers to a state of mind and an attitude of tolerance and respect for other people, which encourages pluralism and a balance of power by stressing the need for participation by citizens. In this connection, the members of the Panel drew attention to the importance of developing a democratic culture:*

1. *What are the elements which define a democratic culture?*
2. *What are the institutional, cultural and other factors which encourage or impede the development of a democratic culture?*
3. *How can a society be encouraged to adopt democratic principles?*

3. How can UNESCO orientate its programmes in order to encourage:

1. *Participation*
2. *Pluralism*
3. *The reinforcement of democratic institutions*
4. *Decentralization*
5. *The development of civil society*

Ladies and gentlemen, I have great pleasure in welcoming you to the second meeting of the International Panel on Democracy and Development. Our last meeting was held on 4-5 May 1998. It gave rise to a highly interesting discussion and helped to clarify a number of concepts and to pass in review the issues currently at stake as regards democracy and development and the relationship between those two concepts. After that meeting, a summary of the transcript of proceedings was sent to participants for them to comment on. We received six replies, three of which were accompanied by comments. Those replies were incorporated into the draft report sent to all members of the Panel. Seven other communications contributed suggestions or corrections to the draft report. Those corrections were made a second time to the text of the final report on the first meeting, which was subsequently sent to you, and which you will find in your folder.

The report on the first meeting gives some idea of the general discussion on democracy and development which the Panel began in May 1998. On the basis of that report, it will be our task over these two days to examine some more specific aspects that are more directly connected with UNESCO's work, so we can formulate recommendations for the Director-General. I think we all agree that democratic principles and the principles of sustainable development should be regarded as closely interconnected and seen as going hand in hand. My intention is to analyse the means through which UNESCO, in its capacity as an international organization, can promote that approach. To that effect, I trust that you will approve the agenda which you will find in your folder.

I would like to make a suggestion before handing over to Ms Francine Fournier, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences at UNESCO. I propose that the Panel send a telegram of condolences to Her Royal Highness Princess Basma Bint Talal for the death of His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. She will not be able to take part in our work during this session.

Once again, I would like to thank you all for being present over these two days, even though you all have a very busy agenda. Your presence constitutes a very important contribution to the work of our Panel. I would now like to hand over to Ms Francine Fournier, so she can explain the point of view of UNESCO, which is kindly acting as our host.

**Francine
Fournier**

Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson. I shall say only a very few words, mainly to welcome you on behalf of the Director-General of UNESCO, who, although not present, is with us in spirit. Mr Chairperson has just explained the aim of this meeting. We held an initial meeting a few months ago, and it was, I believe, extremely productive — as can be seen from the report with which you are all by now familiar. Today, it would be very useful for us, for the Director-General and for UNESCO, to be able, on the basis of the broad outline and general orientation that emerged from those initial discussions, to identify lines of action capable of sustaining UNESCO's programme.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

Thank you very much, Madam. The provisional agenda has three parts. The first concerns impediments to democracy and development — social and economic inequalities, identitarian closure, inadequate justice and shortcomings with regard to education. The second part deals with culture and democracy. The third asks the question: how can UNESCO shape its programmes in order effectively to encourage the implementation of the suggestions you have made. I have only one point to make, although I took part in elaborating this project. When we talk about “impediments to democracy, social and economic inequalities, identitarian closure and shortcomings with regard to education”, we always refer to the nation-state. I think a second dimension should be added — the international community. That dimension is extremely important with respect to globalization, insofar as social inequalities exist between States as well as within States. While identitarian closure may reflect the attitude of a group within a State, it also exists at an international level under another name — isolationism or neo-isolationism on the part of a State or a group of States. Inadequate justice is the same thing as the “double standards” which can be found at an international level, and which weaken the major principles we try to put across to public opinion. Similarly, while educational shortcomings exist at a national level, they also have an international dimension. Lastly, as regards the culture of democracy, the theme I attempted to defend at our first meeting, it highlights not only the need for a national democracy, but also the need for a democracy at international level and a democratization of international relations. And there is no point in defending democracy at national level if

globalization, which will dominate the world over the next century, is not subjected to a minimum degree of democratic control, and if the lack of any such control is the work of an authoritarian regime. If globalization is not democratized, it could well change the nature of democracy for the worse.

To conclude, UNESCO, as an international organization, has an impact on States, on the education systems they adopt, and on national regulations, but it also, and above all, has an influence at the level of the international community. Those are the two points I wanted to make before embarking on the provisional agenda. If you have no other remarks to make, I propose you accept the plan, which has been worked out by UNESCO's Secretariat.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

I have just read this agenda, and I am prepared to adopt it along with the points you have just made on the relationship between the national and the international. Personally, I would add the notion of sovereignty, because I believe that one of the challenges that the world will increasingly face, and which it already faces, is that of the nation-state and the notion of sovereignty. We all know under what circumstances that notion sprang up in Europe. It is currently causing considerable damage throughout the world. The point at issue today is the challenge of transcending sovereignty and how to go about it. In my view, it is connected just as much with democracy as with development. I think we discussed this point the last time round, i.e. the profound changes that nation-states are undergoing today. I believe it would be a good idea to pursue this reflection on sovereignty.

The second point I would like to raise in connection with the agenda concerns the formulation of point 2: "How should we combat the political and social exclusion and the discrimination which are caused by extremisms?" One's first reaction is to wonder: "Where is the cause? Where is the effect?", because extremism can be caused by social injustice, which causes exclusion, which in turn causes extremism. In other words, this way of formulating the question contains an answer in itself. I think it would have been perfectly possible to remove the words "caused by extremisms" and simply write "how should we combat political and social exclusion and discrimination", because extremisms are often the result of something. Of course they fuel some-

Abid Hussain

thing else afterwards, but they tend to be the result, rather than the cause, of that situation.

As regards the first point, which is still called “social and economic inequalities”, I would like to add an element to it and call it “social, economic and technological inequalities”, because that is where the knowledge society and the knowledge market are causing a lot of problems, which we shall have to deal with.

Robert Badinter

In the world we live in, we are witnessing a dual trend. You mentioned the trend which has tended to result in an extension of the activities of international organizations in connection with the question of transfers of powers and of sovereignty. But there is another trend, which it seems to me should be taken into consideration, because it is just as important and, I would say, almost just as universal: I am referring to the opposite trend, within nation-states, towards an increasingly remarkable development of regions or States which, within the framework of a federal State, are more and more aware of their specific identity, and which result on a very wide scale in the creation of interregional solidarity across those borders. The question is: how can this trend towards regional development within democracies be used to foster their expansion? That is something that absolutely needs to be taken into account.

Mohamed Charfi

I just wanted to say a few words to make it clear that I disagree with my friend Mr Bennouna. I think that extremisms should be studied in isolation. Their economic and social causes will already have been discussed under the heading “Social and economic inequalities”. As regards the heading “Identitarian closure”, something else is involved — extremisms of cultural origin, which need to be studied separately. True, social or economic inequalities can contribute to extremism and help it to come into being or intensify, but the cultural aspect should not be neglected.

Nicolas Valticos

The remarks we have just heard are well founded. The danger is that we may waste time discussing the precise terms of the agenda before tackling the very heart of the issue. I think we should regard the agenda as a point of departure whose content

will expand in the course of our discussions, and which each of us will naturally be free to interpret more or less freely. How, then, should economic and social rights be fostered in the context of globalization? It is conceivable that they could be fostered even outside that context. Similarly, as regards measures of a political, economic, social and cultural nature that can foster both democracy and development, some measures foster one more than the other, and I do not think we are restricted by very strict definitions. We are talking about general themes rather than exclusive questions, and I think we could get down to the heart of the debate without worrying too much about defining a more precise agenda.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

You have made the point, Judge Valticos, that I was about to make myself, namely that this plan is no more than a framework for discussion. If we decide on the three headings, which are: "Impediments to democracy", "Culture of democracy" and "Practical suggestions", we can begin the discussion immediately, without necessarily taking into account the present sub-headings, be they "Social and economic inequalities" or "Inadequate justice". But I would like to return to what Judge Bennouna said about sovereignty. I think that insofar as I tried from the start to demonstrate the international dimension of these issues, which are both national and international, the problem of sovereignty is involved to the extent that we are faced with an inter-State society that currently dominates the world and will continue to do so, I think, during the twenty-first century. Having said that, I suggest, if you are agreeable, that we immediately begin by examining what the impediments to democracy and development are.

**Abid
Hussain**

Mr Chairperson, I think that globalization has very many different aspects. But the most important factor that we have got to recognize is that it is being driven by technology. The point I was trying to make was that science and technology are really the riding horse on which the new factors are riding. That is why we shall not be able to tackle globalization unless we understand what happens when the borderline between time and space becomes blurred.

One of the things that has happened with globalization in

terms of economics is that domestic issues have become international issues, that borders have been broken down, and that the speed with which the factors of production are changing is making it very difficult for people to understand how to deal with it.

And here we are again in the peculiar position of trying to understand the speed which is now the feature of communications and information. It was the steam engine which brought about the first revolution, and automation the second. The third has been brought about by this technological revolution of communications and the transfer of information.

This is what we need to make everyone understand, and here UNESCO will have an important role to play because, otherwise, there will be, on one side, a technologically very advanced society capable of taking advantage of all the changes in factors of production, and, on the other, those who are left behind in a backwater.

The second important thing I would like to emphasize is that today the various sectors are tending to merge. The neat division we earlier used to make between economic, social, political and other aspects has now become so blurred that unless a holistic view is taken of the whole matter we shall be at a complete loss.

The third point I would like to make is that, when the world so shrinks that nations and peoples rub shoulders with each other, a unilateral way of deciding things would not work at all. I do not dispute the power and economic strength of certain countries — it is an undeniable fact. But even that power will itself be unable to move ahead unless a multilateral approach is accepted. And that approach cannot evolve in a day.

For instance, under what circumstances did the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) come into being? It was the upshot of a series of discussions and dialogues. Before the end of the Cold War, the problem was how to manage a divided world. The new challenge is how to manage a world which has become one, or is in the process of doing so. It is a serious problem.

After the end of World War II, there were people who were able to visualize how economic institutions should be formed and what structures needed to be built so the United Nations

could come into being. You were associated with that task and you led that particular trend. It is vital today that UNESCO and other organizations, on that basis, sit down and focus on how to move from unilateralism to multilateralism, and on other aspects which go beyond the field of trade.

The fourth point I would like to make is that cross-border culture needs to be understood. While it is true that national sovereignty has weakened, it is not something that you can run away from. That is why people say that, while it is possible to think globally, we shall have to act locally and nationally. But it is only at a national level that we shall have to work on the basis of certain nations among all the nations. A peculiar thing is happening: on the one hand, national boundaries are becoming blurred and we are merging into the global market, or globalization; and on the other, local diversities are asserting themselves and want to be recognized. We shall have to recognize those diversities. It will be part of the culture of the future, for as long as those diversities are not recognized unity will remain flimsy.

The unlovable structures of imperialism and socialism and others that clamped down on diversities are no more. And when one such structure collapses, a process of disintegration takes place that needs to be handled with care. And if identities are not understood, the way is open for fascism and fundamentalism. Someone put it very neatly: in mental homes, patients tend to think they are Napoleon or Alexander the Great because they are not fully aware of their own identity. And that madness needs to be controlled.

My feeling is that, here again, UNESCO can play an extremely important role, because it is not an economic organization or a trade organization. Its mandate is to create awareness and understanding, which are much more important today than working out a blueprint, because there are many countries nowadays which have a democratic form of government without being truly democratic. I have come to the conclusion that an illiberal democracy is no democracy. Human rights are important. The rights of minorities are important. The rights of ethnic groups are important. And yet if we are unable to arrange them together, like a bunch of flowers, we may create a lot of difficulties.

So I come back to that particular point, in order to under-

Mohamed
Bennouna

stand this new change which is taking place: science and technology will have to become UNESCO's prime focus of concern. Secondly, the organization will have to mobilize the minds of those in think-tanks and others so as to see how we can move once and for all from the unilateral to the multilateral.

Thirdly, we must realize that while it is important to protect minorities the State must also be protected from minorities. These are some of the points I wanted to place before you, Mr Chairperson.

We are going to try to enter into a two-way dialogue. I think it is in the interest of this Panel that we should not simply each have our say. That is why we have been brought together. If I understand your approach aright, Mr Hussain, you are telling us that in the last account it is science and technology which make up the core element, and that in the end UNESCO should concentrate and focus its concern on science and technology. And in order to develop that idea, you suggest that this cannot be done unilaterally, that is to say at the level of national entities taken individually, but only within the framework of a multilateralization. You naturally end up by saying that globalization and multilateralism have been achieved today by transnational companies, without UNESCO, and with the help of States but also, sometimes, independently of States. I cannot see how UNESCO can really counterbalance that kind of thing, i.e. the sheer power of transnational companies, given the breathtaking speed at which it is growing before our very eyes. I personally cannot see how it can be done — unless, and here I come back to the question posed by Mr Chairperson at the start, we say that globalization is being carried out in a rather disorganized way by capitalist structures that are neither democratic nor democratically controlled.

This is a well-known problem: we need to create, in parallel, the counterbalance of democratic control. And we need to remember that a multilateral system can be included in the system of international organizations that ensures multilateralism at the level of public sectors, in other words what we call States. These multilateral structures could to some extent compensate for globalization — though multilateral structures include representatives of governments which are not necessarily democratic

governments. And we come up against the problem of the multi-lateralism of international organizations, which is based on governments and the representatives of governments, and not on the representatives of peoples. It is a problem that even Europe is having to face today, even though Europe is at the most advanced stage when it comes to democratization. But the criticism that is made of it is that it is a technostructure which tends to distance itself from national democratic structures. That is indeed one of the problems at issue.

The second problem you mentioned is the problem of diversity and its importance within States. This brings us back to the question Mr Badinter asked at the start: should diversity be provided by a proliferation of States.

That would be a disaster in my view. We are currently witnessing a process of diversification through the proliferation of sovereign State entities. We should not forget that the United Nations now has 188 Member States, and that the process is not over. New States come into being every day. We have seen processes whereby, within our generation, countries have literally exploded before our eyes in the past few years: the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia have resulted, sometimes amidst total anarchy, in the creation of States. But other cracks have appeared within the very entities born in this way. A topical issue is the problem of Kosovo, over which negotiations are under way.

But what strikes me as alarming is the fact that this process of assertion is not going to stop there. And here again we come up against the issue of identitarian closure. That means, as Mr Charfi said earlier on, that people assert certain positions, that social outcasts and the casualties of globalization assert themselves through culture. Culture becomes a way of asserting, of asserting oneself, of staying in the game. Since ideology has proved a failure, culture will be the thing. That is why a moment ago I did not understand the question. It is not extremism which has created political and social exclusion. It is globalization and unbridled neoliberalism which create exclusion, and which generate, through the vehicle of culture, certain extremisms and certain assertions.

As I was saying a moment ago, just as in the 1960s and 1970s we supported the sovereign State — that was true of my

Pierre
Cornillon

generation, and I am speaking from a Moroccan point of view — as a means of liberating ourselves, as an element of liberation, so today we find that it is becoming a prison. That liberation, that perception of the sovereign State as a means of liberation throughout the world, has turned sour. Of course, certain people or certain groups have sometimes taken over or hijacked that process of liberation. But it has not been accompanied by any recognition of diversity, through a system which is what it is.

And I come back to the question Mr Hussain put to us: “What can UNESCO’s role be today in the face of what you call multilateralism?” That multilateralism should be seen not only as something that takes place at the level of governments or of intergovernmental organizations, but also in the sense of a multilateralism of civil societies, which may or should communicate beyond their borders. That is currently the real problem which faces every country in the world. We are not enemies because we are of different nationalities. Perceptions of the history of national interests *stricto sensu* have changed. Everyone wants to establish relations through NGOs, which are the transnational NGOs of civil society and could counterbalance the multinationals of the capitalists. That is one of the possible lines of action that is opening up to us today, and which may be opening up to organizations like UNESCO.

A few remarks by way of reaction to what has just been said. First, I completely agree with Mr Hussain’s analysis and I think he is quite right about the importance we should give to science, technology and the sharing of them. Science and technology are indeed the basis of all power and all wealth. The ability to produce weapons enabled certain States to set up empires. Colonialism grew out of that superior capability in the field of science and technology. Democracy is based on sharing. Not on sharing the product of power or of knowledge but on power and knowledge themselves. The general state of democracy is about sharing science and technology; that, in my view, is an essential point.

Counterbalances have also been mentioned. A temple of neoliberalism like the Davos World Economic Forum is now beginning to realize how important this issue is and has been discussing possible counterbalances to neoliberalism. So it

would be a mistake to turn neoliberalism into a religion or a dogma, as has been the case with other economic theories. I am thinking of Communism, which was a religion, and which had an answer to everything. Besides, some religions had their own counterbalances. The Christian religion takes it for granted that inequalities increase inexorably: the Gospel according to Saint Matthew says: “Unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath”; but the Christian religion has the notion of the jubilee to re-establish equality. One realizes that liberalism does not have at its disposal enough mechanisms to establish or re-establish equality and it is therefore extremely important to have counterbalances of all kinds. And counterbalances not just against the power of the multinational or transnational companies because the economy is still hinged to a great extent on the domestic product, domestic trade and domestic output. So most of the effort needs to be made at domestic level.

One last word about the State and the paradox facing us. The State, by organizing the structures of social life, enables democracy to establish itself, but it often emerges subsequently as an impediment to the blossoming of that same democracy, which it has institutionalized.

**Robert
Badinter**

I would like to say at this point that when we talk of multiculturalism, let us not forget, since we are at UNESCO, the key problem of multiculturalism, which needs to be seen in relation to a particular culture that is extremely dominant today.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

I think we have already got to the nub of the matter — and we already talked about it in the course of our last meeting. I am referring to the problem of globalization, a phenomenon which is like the language of Aesop: some think very highly of globalization, others think or expect the worst of it. The fact is that globalization will indisputably and logically result in the stagnation of the standard of living in countries where production conditions and other conditions will not allow international competition to play its role. So it is essentially an international problem.

What should be done? It is only natural that in order to offset the social and economic inequalities that will result from

that international process, international measures should also be envisaged. Those measures should be coordinated and made compatible at international level, and not taken in isolation as they sometimes are even today. Of course there are international organizations, as you know better than anyone, Mr Chairperson, which deal with international matters as a whole, such as the United Nations, or with certain specific aspects, such as trade, labour, social issues and so on. And there are also meetings designed to ensure coordination between those organizations. And the United Nations has overall responsibility for such meetings, but it acts in a general way, not closely (it is not within its competence to do so). It involves an exchange of positions, since in the last account each organization remains sovereign in its own field, so to speak. That is no longer sufficient. Naturally there is no question of envisaging a form of UN imperialism that would fight the phenomena of globalization. Even so, the allocation of programmes and activities at world level should be reviewed and harmonized, while at the same time respecting the competence of each organization, but above all with a view to achieving greater efficiency and a well-balanced international governing body that takes no account of the feudal practices peculiar to each international organization. For it is only at an international level that there can be an answer to an international problem.

We cannot expect each country to take steps which prompt no response in the others. Nor can we expect the United Nations to be prepared to impose anything. In any case, even if it wanted to — and I do not believe it does — it would not be welcomed by the rest. But I do believe that in the course of its Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) meetings UNESCO would be in a good position, because it is not directly involved (in trade, labour or politics), to advocate a rather better coordinated allocation of responsibilities and measures to be taken so that globalization does not result in the poor being downtrodden. For that is the way we are going. The poor are going to be downtrodden because they have neither the resources nor the products on the international market that would give them prominence, in countries where the government's authority is very often weak and unstable.

So what is needed is an improvement in the coordination

of the responsibilities of the UN system so that truly efficient international action is taken. It requires a lucid and uncompromising appreciation both of the problems that result from social and economic inequalities in various countries, of the present and future consequences of globalization, and of cases where the free play of trade can result in disaster. UNESCO might be able to ring the alarm bells in its domain.

Alexei
Vassiliev

I would like to express several ideas. One of them, I assume, will probably be shared by all those present here, namely that globalization should not result in the standardization of world cultures and civilizations. We are currently able to see for ourselves that, as far as culture is concerned, globalization is understood by many, particularly among the actors of globalization, to be a kind of standardization, or even — I do not baulk at using the word — aggression on the part of a certain culture and a certain civilization, whose values are imposed on others. This situation represents a challenge and is potentially dangerous. To my mind, it cannot be disputed that we need to defend human traditions and the multiplicity of civilizations in all their wealth, diversity and plurality, and that to defend one's own identity, from an ethnic, cultural and civilizational point of view, is one of the necessary responses to globalization, which can sometimes take a brutal form.

As you pointed out, Mr Chairperson, diversity and inequality are of course found not only within various States but at international level. This prompts the question: does globalization help to abolish that kind of inequality? Or, on the contrary, does the kind of globalization that is taking shape today increase the differences between the various components of humankind, of the human race? I am afraid that the answer would unfortunately be “yes”, for in its present form globalization produces not only positive effects but also many negative effects.

So one might ask: in whose interest is globalization? Who benefits from it? The answer is more or less clear. But it directly concerns democracy. Who controls those forces, those structures, those companies and those organizations which benefit from globalization, possibly in their own selfish interests and without regard for the interests of others? So democracy at an

international level is necessary if we are to control a certain globalization. It is necessary for the voices of the so-called stepchildren of this globalization to be heard. And for that to happen, we need dialogue, transparency. It is sometimes necessary to say that. Only State structures are capable of defending the interests of the majority of the population.

So, in the economic field, what we have seen over the past year and a half, the crises that have hit countries which belong to what used to be called the Third World, all that has been seen as a by-product of globalization. And many questions are now being asked. I think that the representatives of Brazil or South Korea would be in a better position than me to talk effectively about their own problems. As for Russia, however, it has to be said that globalization is a good thing. But when a country, a society and some of its structures are totally unprepared to enter the world of globalization, it is rather as if a team of amateur footballers were playing against a team of professionals — against the French team, for example. The outcome is obvious from the start. First you have to train the players and only then give them a chance to enter the competition. A period of transition is vital.

It seems to me that the way the Chinese Government is doing things is more appropriate to meet the challenges of globalization today. So if it is argued today that the IMF and the World Bank constitute a form of global economic government, my question is: Do they always act in the interests of even large States? I doubt it. In my view, policies should be adapted to very concrete situations.

To conclude on this point, the United Nations and UNESCO come in for a lot of criticism, but do you know of anything better today? They are currently the forums that offer the best possibility for people to engage in dialogue and debate, and also to work out decisions and find ways of solving international problems. That is why I feel that if those organizations were in some way or another to become more flexible it would make it easier to solve some of the problems I have just mentioned.

Han
Sung-Joo

We have met for a second time to help draft a report on behalf of this Panel and to draw up a statement that can provide useful advice and recommendations on this very important issue. The

report on our first meeting seems to me to offer a very useful starting point. I went through it very carefully and thought it was very expertly and usefully done. To start with, I would like to make a suggestion for a kind of plan which could serve as a starting point, and which we can later change if necessary.

We should first define democracy and development. And in this connection, we can also discuss the similarities and differences between domestic democracy and international democracy, a topic also dealt with in the draft report.

Secondly, I suggest that we also examine not only what acts as an impediment to the phenomenon (or phenomena) of concern to us, namely the relationship between democracy and development, but also what encourages it. Globalization, among other things, is one such element, insofar as it helps democracy and development to be achieved, but can also on occasion act as an impediment to them. In this context, there are of course other important issues that we can deal with.

Thirdly, it seems to me to be important to talk about the nexus, the relationship between democracy and development and their respective influence on each other, from a dynamic and not a static or snapshot perspective, given that this relationship can shift sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another. And we could include the concept of peace too, which also features in the draft report, and how peace relates to democracy and development.

Fourthly, I would suggest we deal jointly with the role of culture and education, it being understood that education is related not only to culture but to technology, values and so on. Lastly, we might also want to think about very concrete UNESCO programmes. Here, I would suggest three categories of programmes: the first could be a broad and general one that could try to tell States which avenue to pursue, with a very high-profile, very relevant and persuasive philosophical statement; the second would comprise proposals for institutional measures, for example the setting up of commissions, panels of experts, UNESCO-related curricula, educational programmes and what have you, and they would be part of the concrete programmes; lastly, I think we will need a Programme of Action, which could for example consist of an educational programme, lectures, committee work, or the Chairperson of this Panel going on a lecture tour round the world. It would be a con-

Kéba
Mbaye

crete and systematic action that would supply a structure based on the very profound and useful statements we have heard here.

Mr Chairperson, if I ask myself what methods might be used to overcome the impediments to democracy and development, the first method that comes to mind — and those who took part in the first meetings of this Panel will think I am handicapped by having only one idea on my mind — is expressed by the word “justice”. It is mentioned in the agenda, under point No. 3: “Inadequate justice”. Of course it may be wondered how UNESCO can deal with the question of justice. I think that it is through the channel of information and education, which are referred to under point No. 4 of the agenda, where there is mention of “shortcomings as regards education”. Speaking for myself, I would prefer to talk of “shortcomings and deviation as regards information and education”.

Why information? Because I believe that before talking about education one should always talk about information. They are two complementary notions. And “deviation” because nowadays the problem is not so much lack of information as its opposite — a deviation, or “misinformation”. And as both information and education are precisely the responsibility of UNESCO, I think it could look into the question of information and education in the field of justice.

Someone once said that magistrates are the only people whose job is a virtue: justice. And yet the odd thing is that justice is almost never taught. People teach economics, technology, science and everything else, but there is no veritable teaching of justice as such. Well to my mind what currently hinders both democracy and development is inadequate justice. First of all, justice is not familiar to people. I have a confession to make: I had never entered a law court until I was appointed attaché at the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Seine, when I was a student at the *École Nationale de la France d’Outre-Mer* (the National School of Overseas France). That is not normal for a citizen who at the time was almost a quarter of a century old. Justice should be familiar to every citizen. We should know how it works, how magistrates are appointed, what sort of people they should be, and so on. And each citizen should be taught justice so that a veritable rule of law (*état de droit*) can be achieved.

When I say *état de droit* (literally “state of law”), the first letter of the word “state” is not a capital “S”. I am not referring to a State of law that amounts to the primacy of law in an organized State. I am talking about the state of law in the sense of “the reign of applied law”, “the reign of justice”. I believe that if it were possible to create experimentally a society where everyone was imbued with the meaning of justice and applied it strictly, it would be a society in which both democracy and development would thrive. That, then, is a field where information and education, for which UNESCO has responsibility, ought to find an ideal home.

When people talk of justice and democracy, it obviously goes without saying that they are referring chiefly to the principle of equality before the law, to the right of all to express their opinion in the society to which they belong, to the right to be heard, to the right to present their defence, and so on. All that works in favour of democracy, which we defined last time as being not just institutional democracy, not the kind of democracy which consists of putting a piece of paper in the ballot box, but rather everything that goes on before and after the poll, as well as in citizens’ everyday lives. So when one talks about democracy, one should immediately think of justice. That goes without saying, and that is why, for my part, I would like to insist that we try to see to what extent it is possible to integrate a system of information and education as regards justice into the UNESCO programme.

But when we talk of development, justice is also a key issue. A recent experience of mine was particularly edifying. I was asked by the governments of African countries in the franc area to lead a mission whose aim was to see how we might try to stimulate investment in the continent of Africa. I had the idea of dividing up the mission into several groups. We visited all the countries in the area concerned, and the conclusion we arrived at when we met together was that the fundamental reason for the slowdown in development and, in some cases, lack of investment in Africa was inadequate justice. I have to say that in my case this was perhaps not exactly a discovery, though it came as rather a surprise. I said to myself that there must be other factors in addition to justice, such as delays in settling companies’ invoices or the non-payment of certain work, etc. But no. Com-

panies told us quite firmly that the problem was that they did not know what legislation was applicable, and when they did, they did not know how it was going to be applied to them. So it was not only a case of lack of legislation, or inadequate justice, but also a deviation of justice. How, then, can this be remedied? I believe that people need to be educated. We need to dispense a veritable education in justice, and it is here, I think, that UNESCO has a role to play. The solution we tried to suggest to decision-makers in the area in which we had worked was that they should try to go against the general trend of thinking in the mid-twentieth century, namely against a citizen-friendly form of justice. What was needed was, on the contrary, a justice taken out of its context, not a justice that applied theories which had no concrete character, but one over which there was no hold, where the authorities had no hold, public opinion had no hold, the parties had no hold. It is what might be called, in a sense, an independent justice, but I would prefer to call it a free justice.

And in that context, in practical terms, we advocated the setting up in Abidjan of a Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, over which no African government has any hold any more, which applies totally standard legislation (though unfortunately restricted to business law), and which is made up of magistrates who are not directly influenced by public opinion or parties. Mr Chairperson, I really would like to insist that in our report we include something based on the notion, the idea of “the teaching of justice” — though the expression is probably not the right one. I think that this is the key to everything.

I shall conclude by saying that I really hope with all my heart that our report will highlight justice as a foundation, a basis and a means to achieve both democracy and development. I say this because, here again, I am convinced that if all human beings were just and had a great love of justice, and if they enforced justice properly, the world would not be what it is today. Obviously that form of justice is not necessarily the justice we are familiar with, that is to say justice enforced by the State. It could perfectly well be arbitral justice or mediation, which is in my opinion another form of justice; or conciliation, which is the most widespread form of justice in traditional Africa; and so on.

So there we are. I am sorry to have gone on at some

length, but I really wanted to stress this question, which I regard as fundamental to the report we have been asked to produce.

In my opinion, it might be useful for us to dwell at some length on the issue of globalization, given that we all recognize that pluralism, or multipolarity as we in China call it, and globalization are the two main features of the present world. By globalization we mean economic globalization. Now the world is a colourful and pluralistic place, and increasingly so. And the complementarity and coexistence of diversified cultures are important conditions for the encouragement of world progress and development. The diversity of history, culture and economic and social institutions should be the motive force that encourages mutual cooperation and development rather than creating reasons for mutual estrangement and confrontation.

May I say a few words about economic globalization, as I have quite a lot of contact with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC), where, as you know, we talk a lot about globalization. Economic globalization is the result of current economic development and scientific and technological progress. In my opinion, the developed countries are the main beneficiaries of economic globalization. I hope you do not mind my being quite frank with you: given the intrinsic weakness of their economies, the developing countries are more vulnerable and more exposed to unfavourable changes in the economic environment. That is why globalization provides the developing countries in particular with development prospects, while at the same time entailing serious challenges and risks. The economic and technological preponderance of the developed countries puts heavy pressure on the developing countries, but it can also jeopardize their sovereignty and their economic and social security.

Now let us look at the economic crisis in Asia and at how it broke out and spread. It is well known that the crises in those countries occurred at the height of ever-faster economic globalization. This reflected the unhealthy nature of the international financial system as well as the contradiction between the absurdity of the international economic order and the interests of the developing countries. That is why it is understandable that they should wish to defend their sovereignty, safeguard their economic and social security, guard against the onslaught of inter-

national financial risks and protect themselves against them. In today's world of increasing globalization, States are becoming more and more interdependent, and no one can do anything outside the context of globalization. States are forced to adopt an open policy in order to achieve economic growth.

To turn now to China's experiences, we are, as you know, a huge emerging market. We are opening up on the basis of a long-standing State policy, and we shall need to redouble our efforts to keep abreast of trends in economic globalization and to become even more active by opening up to the outside world. But in the meantime we must remain vigilant in order to counter risk and the possibly negative influence of globalization.

If economic globalization takes place and develops in a context where there is no basic change in the unjust and unreasonable old international economic order, the gulf between the haves and the have-nots is bound to widen. Fundamentally, the solution would be to encourage the establishment of a fair and reasonable new international economic order in the joint interest of development in all countries. In my view, there are therefore a number of things to be done.

We should first reinforce international cooperation by preventing the economic crisis from spreading further and thus creating a favourable external environment for the crisis-stricken countries and regions so they can return to economic growth.

Secondly, we should reform and improve the international financial system so that international financial markets can operate in a safe and orderly way. The possibility of creating a new international financial order should be explored in the interest of all parties.

Thirdly, it is important to respect the decisions that the countries and regions concerned have made independently with a view to overcoming the present crisis.

Hisashi
Owada

At this initial stage of our discussion, I tend to agree with what Professor Han Sung-Joo said about how we ought to proceed. I too believe that the Interim Report on our first meeting, which we have before us, and which I have read with great care and interest, serves a very useful purpose as a framework for our work. Some points are not covered by the report, and others will require further elaboration. Nevertheless, I feel it offers an effec-

tive starting point for our discussion, and it is therefore my procedural suggestion, which happens to be rather similar to Professor Han's.

I think that we can divide our task into three or four distinct areas. One area where we need to work further is the area of concepts we employ. We need to conceptualize more and be more specific when it comes to certain concepts. I would like to examine some of those concepts more thoroughly. The first of them is the question of democracy, in the context of the discussion about democracy and development. The concept of democracy is basically accepted as a premise of our debate, but if we go into specifics we can see there are certain questions that require more thought. For example, what are the essential aspects of democracy we are talking about in relation to the link between democracy and development, and particularly in relation to the need to encourage democracy in order to bring about development? That, I believe, is the basic theme that we have to deal with. As our Chinese colleague has just said, it is clear we need to pursue our discussion of what we mean by democracy. What are the elements of democracy that we regard as essential and indispensable? Even if we take into account pluralistic values to some extent, and even if we base our approach on historical, cultural and social backgrounds which may very well not be the same, I think we should identify some of the common elements which we agree should be the essential elements of democracy.

For example, to my mind the essence of democracy must be the question of participation, which allows us to express our point of view on the political or economic or whatever process that we are engaged in. It is in this respect that the right to dissent and the right to the freedom of opinion and expression emerge as important. In my view, the essential thing is that all citizens should be able to take part freely in society in such a way that their opinions can influence the political process. This is an example of what we need to think about and agree on before discussing the relationship between democracy and development.

Here the point that seems to require further elaboration especially in the light of what we read in the first report is the question of democracy at domestic and international levels. I get

the impression that we have not spent enough time discussing this issue. I believe that the framework of discussion is fundamentally different when we talk, on the one hand, about democracy in society in a domestic context, in other words about individuals who take part in the process — individuals who are equal in every respect — and, on the other, about democracy in an international context. What are we talking about in the latter case? It is not clear enough. Are we talking about the world as a whole, the peoples of the world? Are we talking about the sovereign States, which are traditionally the constituent members of international society? And if we are talking about this problem in the same framework of democracy at a domestic level, we have to keep in mind that the picture is very different with regard to the problem of democracy at an international level, given that it involves the participation of individuals in taking into account the views of various participants, such as civil society. And I think that this is a point that needs to be studied more thoroughly.

Another concept which requires further elaboration is that of globalization. Here again, I get the impression that when people talk about such a multi-faceted concept as “globalization” they often have different things in mind. Again, I feel we need to be a little more precise. Globalization is essentially a problem of increasing interdependence, which has turned the world community into a single society. If we stress that aspect of globalization, there are of course certain conclusions to be drawn in the context of our deliberations on democracy and its relationship with development. But there are naturally some inevitable consequences of globalization, such as open competition, particularly in the economic field. And the question then becomes something different, in that we now ask: should we accept the more classical economic theory of “laissez-faire” typical of eighteenth-century economic philosophy, or should we elaborate a theory of the welfare state like that of twentieth-century Europe? In that case, we shall have to take into account the problem of a social security net.

I therefore feel that, depending on what aspect of globalization we decide to talk about, the relevance of this aspect to our work could vary considerably. That is why I think we need to examine it further.

The third concept that needs to be discussed further concerns civil society. In the context of “participatory” democracy, everyone is agreed that civil society has an increasingly important role to play in this globalized world. I have no quarrel with that. At the same time, it seems to me that it is a concept that should not be unconditionally embraced, but defined more precisely. For example, the participation of civil society in the international process or in the domestic process is a very desirable thing. However, in what respect the question of accountability with regard to activities of civil society should be dealt with is something we can consider. It may be the question of a definition of “civil society”. Difference must be there between those civil society organizations which reflect certain social divides in a responsible way, and those described as pressure groups which try to promote parochial interests of a particular segment of society. I think that this again requires further examination when we talk about the place of civil society in the context of the relationship between democracy and development.

Finally, the concept of justice is extremely important, and it seems to me to be one of the essential prerequisites for democracy to be relevant to the development process. Here again, I think one needs to be rather more precise about what we mean by justice in one or more concrete contexts, because, in the abstract, the concept of justice is almost by definition something that needs to be upheld as a whole. But when it comes to the actual manifestation of justice in a given social, historical or cultural context, the question naturally becomes much more complex. That is why I think that here again we need to elaborate the concept a little more thoroughly.

The second broad area where we can have further discussion in order to make headway in our work is the question of policy direction on the basis of the kind of conceptualization I have been talking about. And in this connection I feel we should discuss such issues as advocacy, education and how to get all citizens to take part in the process.

The third and final area I wish to raise as extremely important for us to talk about is the question of a concrete Action Plan for UNESCO, as a follow-up to our exercise. The Director-General, in his letter to the Chairperson of this Panel, made it quite clear that he wanted certain concrete recommen-

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dations of the kind that would enable him to act. We should therefore strive to narrow down the scope of our inquiry in a way that is conducive to the production of the interim report he asked us for.

Mr Chairperson, I shall attempt to contribute to this debate by following the lines of reasoning that have been suggested to us. In answer to the question: "How should economic and social rights be fostered in the context of globalization?", I would say that the answer cannot be found outside the framework in which we live today. What I have to say is connected with Brazil's recent experience, even if I think that the experience we have gone through has already occurred in other countries and will certainly recur in future. So I believe it would be quite unrealistic to pursue our thinking on how to foster economic and social rights, democracy and development without coming up with solutions, methods and mechanisms capable of controlling, as Mr Bennouna has already stressed, the unbridled globalization of the economy.

I shall insist on this point because I think that we run the risk of lapsing into a rather empty and rather theoretical discourse when dealing with this somewhat frenetic globalization, which can only generate inequalities, poverty and political and social exclusion. That political and social exclusion becomes identitarian closure in cases where there is a culture and a set of cultural points of reference, and simply becomes criminal globalization in cases where large cities are drained of their lifeblood. I think that this is a point that should also be dealt with. It is not just the economy which is becoming globalized, but also exclusion from the economy which is becoming globalized, with the whole host of miseries that it brings in its train.

I shall also say that, insofar as globalization of the economy is on the horizon, with all the problems that have just been mentioned, the question of international law is one that is even more urgent to face. Judge Mbaye has already discussed this point at length, but even so I would like to stress that there are hopes as regards the Human Rights Tribunal, because the notion of human rights will, I believe, enter the debate on globalization in a cross-disciplinary way, I would say almost like some essence, without which it would be difficult to conceive of a world society or a global society.

With that in mind, and in pursuit of the construction of a democratic culture which can serve that world democracy, I shall also stress the need for participation. And here I agree with Ambassador Owada. I believe it is necessary to clarify the concept of participation. I now believe that when you think of NGOs and when you look at the practice of those institutions, the most visible aspect of their practice is their role as a pressure group vis-à-vis States. That is how they are seen at UN conferences, when they address the community of States; and that is how they are often seen within States, when they address national governments. But I believe there is a hidden side to NGOs, which consists above all of their direct intervention on the ground, that is to say their practice of more direct democracy and their democratic culture, which is in fact based on a number of principles and needs, such as decentralization. In other words, only the decentralization of national societies can enable citizens to participate more directly. It would perhaps therefore be a good idea to develop more thoroughly the mechanisms of direct participation, the mechanisms that enable the culture of democracy to be learned in everyday life. And here, I think, UNESCO has a major role to play.

I still have one last comment to add regarding the question of impediments to democracy and development. I am talking about shortcomings with regard to education. I think that here we are broaching an extremely serious issue, which comes precisely under the competence of UNESCO and therefore interests us very directly. I am referring to a report issued by UNESCO itself, a report by Jacques Delors entitled "*Learning: the Treasure Within*", which appeared recently, and which draws attention to something that particularly affects the developing countries, namely the speed at which knowledge becomes outdated. I believe that the time has gone by when we thought of childhood and youth as a period of training and education that prepared individuals for adulthood, for their working lives, for competition on markets. Today, we are definitively faced with a situation that requires continuing education throughout our lives. This has undoubtedly had an impact on the world of work and on the organization of the world of work, and this raises the whole question of unemployment. I think it is an issue that can be approached above all with reference to the developing countries,

Mohamed
Charfi

but it is also valid for all countries. I shall also point out that investment in formal education should be examined more closely, so that in educational matters we are not constantly trying to catch up with situations that have already moved on. It is an issue which, I believe, deserves more reflection.

The main question facing us is how to foster economic and social rights in the context of globalization. A subsidiary question concerns measures of a political, economic and social nature within the framework of globalization. Usually, the arguments put forward by States, as well as by most intellectuals in the developing countries, denounce the hegemony of the wealthy States, the hegemony of the West, the hegemony of multinational companies and unbridled exploitation, etc. It is a fashionable argument which, to my mind, follows on from the anticolonial discourse. I believe that this argument, without being totally wrong, has had its day. What we need to do today is not so much correct it as enrich it through a self-critical discourse.

Criticism is a good thing when it is justified, and while a good proportion of such criticism is justified, we should not be content to let things stand at that. A self-critical approach is necessary. The developing countries, or at least most of them, suffer from social, economic and political inadequacies, as well as inadequate justice. In our countries, there are several domestic causes of those inadequacies which need to be acted against. So what immediately emerges, of course, is the problem of the sovereignty of States, an issue we tackled at our last meeting. We agreed that there should be a right of peaceful intervention in order to encourage measures capable of mitigating or even ending those inadequacies. I think that this idea of a right to peaceful intervention needs to be examined more thoroughly.

Today we can truly say that there exists an international society, which is both an organized international society and a civil international society. The organized international society consists of the machinery of the UN, UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the ILO, etc., to which should be added the WTO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which have real powers; and the international civil society consists of NGOs and international pressure groups, which are important. I think that organized international society

should support international non-governmental organizations (International IGOs), because those international organizations have greater freedom of expression and need to see their efforts to inform taken up by inter-State societies and by organized international society. The principal means of action used are peaceful means, international trade and information campaigns.

In connection with what I called social inadequacies, we must take into account, with globalization, the existence of a world economic market. The rules of that world economic market are that the highest-quality and least expensive products are the products that sell. That market would be fair if equal trade union rights existed in every country. But there is a flagrant disparity. There are a great many countries where child labour, and even slave labour, is accepted and practised, and a great many countries where there is a total or partial lack of trade union rights, where the right to strike is not recognized, or else in some cases recognized but not practised, countries where either there is no index-linked guaranteed minimum wage and no index-linked minimum growth wage, or else it is too low, at a level well below the poverty line. So competition between countries that produce goods under those conditions and countries which have well-developed trade union rights amounts to unfair competition; and that justifies, in my view, the intervention of organized and non-governmental international society. In Europe that process has resulted in what is now called relocation, but relocation in Europe is not as significant as all that, because it does not weigh heavily in the balance. Western Europe is so well developed and so wealthy that it can live with the minor drawbacks of relocation. For countries in transition, on the other hand, whose economies are just beginning to expand, the problem is a serious one. As regards budding industries in countries that recognize a minimum level of trade union rights, competition from countries where there are no trade union rights is truly unfair, and acts as a brake on the development of such countries in transition.

How can we act against that? I can hear people saying, of course, that the WTO Convention or ILO Conventions are designed to remedy such problems. I do not believe that the WTO has taken energetic steps, or energetic enough steps, in this connection. As for the ILO Conventions, there are a lot of them, of course, but many States have not subscribed to them, while

others have done so without enforcing them. And there are no effective control mechanisms which can be implemented, and no penalties.

As regards democratic inadequacies, I think that we should chiefly rely, within States, on those who actively support human rights and democracy. What international society can provide is a guarantee of those activists' security. Human rights activists in the developing countries are the first to suffer from the drawbacks of democratic inadequacies, and are very poorly protected at international level. Recently, within the Economic and Social Council, the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a defence motion, with a list of named victims, but I do not think there is any veritable international information campaign for the defence of human rights activists.

There can be economic inadequacies as well as social inadequacies and political inadequacies. I think that one of the factors of economic inadequacies is corruption — we need to call a spade a spade if we wish to be practical and get straight to the point. Corruption is not only something that is totally reprehensible in itself; it also acts as a brake on economic development, insofar as it clearly distorts the operation of the market and results in losses for the State. And, above all, the proceeds of corruption are usually exported to countries where bank secrecy is an effective guarantee. There ought to be international measures to curb corruption. The OECD has made recommendations; they have not been followed, or not been enforced sufficiently. For example, there is currently talk in France of a parliamentary bill which, in accordance with the OECD's recommendations, will abolish tax allowances on commissions and even punish those guilty of corrupting foreign officials. I think we need to go further than that, because it is not just officials who are corrupt; there are also far too many middlemen with no official position, and we should find ways to strike at them. I feel, then, that international society has a multitude of ways of intervening to remedy these various inadequacies.

Lastly, Judge Mbaye mentioned inadequate justice a moment ago. I wholly subscribe to what he said, while at the same time drawing attention to the fact that States often declare their adherence to lofty principles. There can be no justice without an independent magistracy. To my mind, that is the ABC, the

prime requirement. A glance at most of the constitutions of the UN's 188 Member States today will show that almost all of them assert that their magistracy is independent. Magistrates are independent. The Constitution says so. What better guarantee could there be? In actual fact, that often means nothing at all. They are just words. And it is up to a report like ours to spell it out and to say that it is not enough to assert the independence of the magistracy for it to exist. What is an independent magistrate? It is first of all an irremovable magistrate. It is a magistrate whose promotion depends on a body that is elected and not appointed by the executive. We need to give words a precise meaning, so that there is no more playing with words.

Attiya
Inayatullah

I look forward to the prospect of a very substantial interim report, which we shall produce under your guidance, Mr Chairperson. I would like to associate myself with what Professor Han said about our report, and to emphasize the quality of the report on our first meeting. It seems to me that Judge Mbaye made an essential point about the teaching of justice, and I am convinced that this concept of the teaching of justice should be developed in the report, as I consider it to be vitally important and crucial for our work as a whole.

I would also like to say how wholeheartedly I agree with what Ambassador Owada said, in particular with his suggestion that, given the vastness of the subject, we might scale down the scope of our work. The topic is so vast that we shall not be able to deal with it all. He suggested we further examine the question of international democracy and, in a second point that seems to me to be extremely important, the whole question of civil society, which has been raised by a number of speakers.

At this point, I would like to talk about social, economic and technological injustices, in other words the most important point. It seems to me essential to reaffirm the pluridimensional aspect of the global process of development, including of course its economic and environmental dimensions. But I want to focus on the dimension of social justice, democracy and human and humane development. I submit that what we need are structural adjustments of society, and I use that term rather than the much-used "economic structural adjustments". In using it, I refer to three areas.

The first is the need to strengthen the endogenous capacities in each country — UNESCO is very good at doing that — through education and the sharing of knowledge, which has now become crucially important, particularly with everything that is offered us by technology and the information society.

The second social structural adjustment of society I would seek concerns democracy and commitment to democracy, at both international and national level. I am sure the report will discuss that. What I am talking about is a democracy that leads to peace and develops the values of tolerance, which could be directly tied into UNESCO's Culture of Peace programme.

The third area in which I am seeking structural adjustments of society is equity, whether it is between the sexes, between different age groups or between the rural and urban populations. And the tool with which I would like to recommend that we do this is, in a very general way, a human-centred form of development, thanks to which development is recognized as a social process. And it seems to me that we are somehow missing out on this, for it is a social process where the individual is assisted through education and through a sharing of knowledge, and where individuals are induced to liberate their energies in the hope of material achievement, of course, but also of social, cultural and mental fulfilment. So how do we proceed from the exclusive logic of development seen solely in terms of economic progress to the approach we have today?

I suggest we use a new paradigm of development within the overall process, and this brings me directly to globalization. We have already noted that globalization has been accompanied by more and more social interdependence between nations. But in the post-Cold War context globalization results in the marginalization of the poorer countries in global affairs. Because of their diminishing influence on the political, economic and strategic scene, the poorer countries are being sidelined and edged out of this whole process of globalization. Globalization has even been described as market fundamentalism, which is tantamount to saying that it is a form of extremism.

I would like to draw attention to the three dimensions of globalization that strike me as interdependent and closely interconnected. The first is the economic dimension, which is the primary focus of interest: the restructured international economic

system has created entities which take the form of transnational companies and financial markets. They are the main phenomena that have emerged: \$1 trillion changes hands every day through those transnational companies and financial markets. We have moved into a world where speculative capital is in the process of dominating the economy and supplanting the real economy of investment in productive activity — and I think that finance has triumphed over productivity and thus caused exclusion and marginalization. That is why we need to look at economic dimensions from a fresh perspective and consider such measures as the Tobin tax, which was mentioned, among other things, in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994, which proposes to tax currency transfers at a rate of 0.5%, which would bring over \$1,500bn per year into the international market for the purposes of development and international welfare.

The second perspective of globalization is the development of what has been called the “global village culture”. Our colleague spoke about it when we started our session this morning, drawing our attention to the swift and very extensive innovations that have taken place throughout the information technology sector. It is a revolution. It is an evolution towards a kind of international homogenization. It is important to study it. These two issues have a political impact — an impact on the autonomy of the State, which we have also referred to. Thus, for example, the revolution in communications triggered by technological innovations has taken us from the era of democracy into the era of “telecracy”, as the French newspaper *Le Monde* put it when covering the recent election of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. This is a consequence of the technological revolution.

The third dimension of globalization is that we now move easily across national boundaries and create supranational political groupings such as the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These are issues that should be addressed, and I urge UNESCO to engage in a substantive analysis of them. These issues have been addressed individually, but they need to be studied jointly. UNESCO could take the initiative of carrying out a substantive analysis of this new development paradigm, taking into account the triple challenge of lasting peace, sustainable development and democratization,

Nicolas
Valticos

within the framework of good governance and the fight against corruption.

To go back to what was said a moment ago about the problem of justice. The question of justice is indeed one of the key questions to be examined in connection with democratization and development, but it is worth pointing out that it is not a problem that solely concerns the developing countries. It is undoubtedly a problem for the developing countries, for reasons which have already been stressed: there is the question of the independence and the number of magistrates. But it is also a problem for the developed countries of the West.

I was talking about it the other day at the *École Nationale de la Magistrature* (National Magistracy School): true, justice must first of all be just, by definition. Measures therefore need to be taken that guarantee, among other things, the objectivity of justice. All this is self-evident, but justice must also not be too slow, because, when it is, it can no longer be called justice. A worker who wins his case after ten years is not getting his just deserts, even if he is shown to be in the right. It is not the magistrates' fault, but often that of the justice ministry's slender budget. It is often the fault of changes in administrative staff, and this is one of the problems that has been of great concern to us at the European Court of Human Rights, noting as we have that in certain important cases — in the developed countries, which have upright and competent magistrates — justice is too slow because there are not enough magistrates. When raising the question of justice, one of course needs to point to the various problems it encounters, but in all countries justice tends to get a poor deal in national budgets, and that is above all the point that needs to be stressed.

As for the question Mr Charfi raised about the lack of trade-union rights, he touched on what is for me a sore point. But I would like to add that trade-union rights are still a very fragile area of freedom — indeed they are still inexistent or barely present in many countries. But there are now well-tried international procedures which make it possible to lodge complaints in this department, even if the State concerned has not ratified the convention on trade-union rights. I say that not in order to justify my past actions, but because it is a fact. As you know, Mr

**Robert
Badinter**

Chairperson, I was involved in that whole area for years. What people are sometimes reluctant to do is to lodge an international complaint, possibly out of fear of being penalized, or simply because they are not aware that they can do so. But it should be remembered that one of the steps forward made by international action on trade-union rights is precisely that there now exist procedures. People need to be made aware of them. In some cases, they need to have the courage to resort to them.

Many excellent points have been made. I, too, would like to be brief at this stage and, insofar as it is possible, to try to answer the request that has been made to us by you, Mr Chairperson, and by the Director-General of UNESCO.

As regards impediments to democracy and development, I would now like to ask you to focus on a problem which was very well formulated by Judge Mbaye, namely the relationship between justice, democracy and development. A moment ago, the issue was also very well explained by Mr Charfi, but I think we need to pursue our analysis a little further. Why? Because democracy is the rule of law, or else it is not democracy. I mean law in the democratic sense of the word, in other words issuing from those who have been chosen by the people to make legislation. If we have legislation, even democratically voted legislation, and it is not observed, then the public, the people, immediately lose confidence in democracy. I have been able to observe this, notably in Central and East European countries, which I have often visited in the past few years, and where there is widespread disillusionment with democracy, largely as a result of the powerlessness of justice and — something which always goes hand in hand with that, as you have mentioned — the reign of corruption and organized crime. For that is the only way one thing can be compared with the other. From that point on, there is no longer any faith in democracy and no longer any hope for democracy. The same could be said — as has already been mentioned — of development. Obviously, there cannot be any economic exchanges or investment in areas where they enjoy no guarantee that is not only legal but jurisdictional (not necessarily judicial, but jurisdictional).

So on the basis of what I have just said, within the framework of national order and international democracy, the interna-

tional democratic order so close to the heart of our Chairperson, may I put forward a number of suggestions? First, in the case of national order — and this squares with UNESCO's mission — I am convinced that there are everywhere fundamental principles without which it is not possible to talk of justice or democracy, and that those principles express themselves in different cultures. One should not impose, as though they were some kind of absolute model, forms of justice which have been developed to an extreme degree of sophistication in Western societies, and which today are guaranteed, controlled and sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights, to take only that case, or by constitutional or supreme courts in other cases. What remains is a group, a body of straightforward principles with which we are familiar, from the hearing of both sides of a case to habeas corpus and the right of appeal. But when it comes to their implementation, as it was so well put by my friend, Judge Mbaye, there has to be a return to the various cultures. We have to see how these principles should fit into the framework of national, or even regional, cultures. And since, when all is said and done, judging always involves resolving a conflict, we should not be afraid — at a time when an alternative way of settling conflicts is, rightly, gaining ground fast in the most economically advanced countries — of practising what I would call a form of judicial anthropology. I say that on purpose, here, in this institution, because in this connection we find the following notions set in stone: (1) the cultural dimension; (2) the dimension of universal principles without which I do not think that one can talk of human rights anywhere; and (3) attentive study of what cultures have succeeded in producing down the ages and in expressing as a method of resolving conflicts and getting their rules observed.

The idea is not to dissociate one culture from another, not to tend towards a single model but, on the contrary, to get the principle respected in all its diversity. And I do not think there could be any better place to do that than at UNESCO. So that is already a dimension which to my mind needs to be sought after.

Secondly, there is the very profound problem of the development of what is called globalization and its relationship with justice. We have to be lucid in this respect. What is this globalization that people talk about so much if not the triumph

of one culture, one power, and the multinationals? Now I would not want to blame the multinationals for this, or indulge in demagoguery, but the characteristic of multinationals is precisely to make a profit. It is their *raison d'être* and they have no other. While they are at it, they can salve their conscience by acting in other areas, such as cultural foundations, the fight against disease, etc., but profit remains their basic aim. And the most remarkable thing at this point in time and in this globalized society, Mr Chairperson, seems to me to be that the relationship which exists between States and economic forces has been reversed thanks to globalization. It is now the multinationals which get States to appear before them in a competitive context. And indeed, in the holy temple that the Swiss mountain resort of Davos has become, where the high mass of globalization is ritually celebrated each year, you have witnessed, I have witnessed, we have witnessed the extraordinary sight of a trade fair where States come before potential consumers and buyers, which this time are the multinationals. One after the other, the States appear before them and say: labour is cheap in our country, you know, and social legislation is moderate. Do not worry too much about industrial unrest. In short, what kind of State are they selling? A State characterized by asociality and a lack of guarantees, of the kind that encourages powerful multinationals to compare the various States courteously, though deep down with a certain form of superiority, not to say contempt, and to say to themselves: it would be quite a good idea to go here, but, if it is not as good as all that, then we will go there instead. The States are very grateful. And as though they were at some international trade fair, foreign ministers and finance ministers pack up their briefcases and say to themselves: let's hope that went down well.

It is an incredible phenomenon, I am sure you will admit, and one that is radically different from anything that has happened in the history of the world. So, in that respect, you will note that the multinationals — and once again I am simply stating the facts — have their own laws, with which we are all familiar, and which are moreover extremely sophisticated, finely tuned as they are by the world's top institutes and top law consultancies, and which are laws that boil down to the *jus mercatorum* of old with the kind of modern gloss required by globalization. They also have their own jurisdictions and their own

ways of resolving conflicts through international arbitration, which is also part of the same culture and practised by the same familiar people, the same consultancies, with the same profits. For that too is an international industry. Do I need to remind you that 3 per cent of American GNP is accounted for by law firms? So those forces, I mean of course the multinationals, by their very nature have only a very tenuous connection with what we were talking about. So what can be done? Here, there is no answer, except through an international organization. And I stress the word international.

To return for a moment to the issue of corruption and the issue of crime, there is no organized crime anywhere that is not organized internationally. I do not necessarily mean it is globalized, but it is in any case internationalized. And that is true as regards business corruption, true as regards drugs, and true as regards international prostitution. In this respect, there exists an extremely efficient crime multinational, with its own operatives, if not its own laws. Well, there is no way out of the situation unless: first, people are made aware of the problem — and here UNESCO can play a useful role by disarticulating the phenomenon or, to use a modern philosophical term, deconstructing it, and by revealing the reality that lies behind what is said to exist, which is not necessarily the same thing, and showing that it is this discrepancy, precisely, which offers an area of absolute freedom that is so favourable to the most profitable undertakings; and second, we have to realize that the only line of defence so far available to us is to be found in international institutions, including international judicial institutions.

Mr Chairperson, in this respect, I would say that the International Tribunal at The Hague is of enormous value, and even more so, of course, at a symbolic level. But I would like to add that, when we talk about the need for international action, we should not necessarily think of supranational action. It is indeed international action, that is to say close collaboration between States which are aware of a situation that is threatening all of them, this solidarity of States which have all — bar one — been reduced to a state of humility as they face the overall situation created by multinationals. International judicial cooperation, if I may say so, is the most urgent and the most important thing to achieve. Well, it has only been limping along, even within

the European Union. We are in a good position to be aware of that: it is that third linchpin, international judicial cooperation, which has proved the most difficult to promote, even though it is currently of prime importance. I shall conclude simply by saying that, on this issue and others, there are two fields in which it seems to me that UNESCO can play a useful role. One of them is that of “micro-justice”, or everyday justice of the kind that citizens everywhere demand, an area in which the judicial anthropology I was talking about should be practised: that entails working out how, in every country, citizens can be taught to assert their rights, and seeing what can be done, if necessary through international judicial cooperation, to ensure that those rights are recognized. But this is a question that needs to be dealt with culture by culture, continent by continent and region by region.

As for the other side of the question, what one might call “macro-justice”, here we really have to go further than we have so far. Much has already been done, but not enough. Much has been done on international commissions, particularly in Geneva. Much has been done, and to great effect, in the field of labour laws, but means of recourse are not well known enough and not used enough. In this case it is a problem of awareness and education, not only as regards justice, but in knowing how to assert one’s rights through the courts. The same is not so true when it comes to the fight against international corruption, but in that case I think the light that UNESCO could shed on the problem would be of some use.

Alexei
Vassiliev

I can only agree with what Mr Badinter has just said, which ties in with quite a lot of what I was saying earlier. But I would now like to stress one thing: namely the internationalization and, in some cases, globalization of the criminal world, along with corruption. There are many aspects of this problem.

One aspect is the level of criminal activities and the financial gains of this criminal world. According to some calculations — even if calculations can never be 100 per cent sure — those gains amount per year to \$300bn-\$400bn, or the equivalent of Spain’s Gross National Product (GNP). That is believed to be the amount of money generated globally by the criminal world. That means that crime has become one of the big players in the world. At the same time, one can also include in the equa-

tion the many countries which have what might be called a “booty economy”. When the State itself, or the State apparatus, becomes criminal, and is solely interested in laying its hands on and consuming the economic, social and cultural output of a whole country, of a whole society, the result is a “booty economy”. One of the most glaring examples of this is Mobutu’s Zaire, but it is not the only one. They exist all over the African continent, and similar characteristics are to be found in the icy cities of Siberia and in a few other small centres of this so-called “booty economy”. And, you see, the fight against such a phenomenon can only be international, through inter-State cooperation and the participation of international organizations, including, of course, UNESCO.

But I would also like to stress another aspect of this situation. This criminal economy could not exist without the connivance of the legal economy. The amount of money and capital involved is so great that crime on that scale could not exist without the connivance of very respectable and very sound global financial organizations. I shall conclude my brief intervention by recalling a meeting I had with members of Nigeria’s Institute of International Affairs. When we started talking about transfers of Russian capital to Western banks through black-market channels, they said to us: “Welcome aboard! Welcome to Nigeria! Welcome aboard!”

This criminal economy is a global phenomenon. But let me stress once again that it could not exist without big money-laundering factories in the form of perfectly “respectable” institutions at international level. Now this criminal economy is very dangerous. We were talking about the vital need for international legality, for international law. However, this criminal world has its own legal system — an illegal legal system — and it is very dangerous. It is like a cancer gnawing at the body of the world economy. And with globalization this cancer is spreading everywhere and becoming global. We need to be able, within the framework of international organizations, to use some form of chemotherapy against this cancer.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

It is a *coup d’état* in a context of illegality. Since the ultimate aim of our meeting is to make a series of suggestions and recommendations to the Director-General of UNESCO, I would first like

to mention the insistence of all the Panel's members on the problem of globalization, whether it be unbridled globalization or the globalization of crime — globalization in its various dimensions, its various specificities and its various accelerations.

I would like to mention a second idea, that of the creation of a new digital wall which will replace the Berlin Wall and divide the world, and the notion that one of the ways of combating this new wall is to share science and technology.

I would also like to mention the teaching of justice and the struggle to remedy inadequate justice.

I would like to mention the impact of economic crises on democracy: first of all on development, then on democracy.

I would like to mention the idea of an international information campaign to protect and defend human rights activists who, unlike some, work under difficult conditions and are the best instrument for promoting human rights.

Lastly, I would like to mention international measures against both national and international corruption. I remember how I shocked a lot of people many years ago by saying that the international Mafia was an international organization. But I do indeed believe that today, within the framework of globalization, the Mafia is an international organization, which has its own laws and customs. The term has never been used in connection with the aggressiveness of drug traffickers, who occupy large parts of some countries and have their own airstrips and their own police. This new category of aggressors is barely mentioned in books on international law. It is a phenomenon that represents a real danger for democratic development.

Nicolas
Valticos

Mr Chairperson, in my view you have not overlooked anything, but what seems important to me is that our report should be clear, that we should avoid official jargon, and that we should produce a report that can be quoted in parts and contains some striking phrases. We must not make the mistake of using rather overdiplomatic phraseology in an attempt not to ruffle feathers. The report must pack a punch.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I would like to emphasize a point about education I mentioned briefly at the end of my contribution. Since UNESCO is involved, it looks to me very much like a worldwide challenge, and it will

not be possible to achieve the aims identified here unless people have received a minimum degree of education, and unless they are capable of being taught about justice, of receiving knowledge and of increasing their knowledge. That is why I feel that it is important to give our work a high profile and to insist, among other things, that the Delors report on education should become a worldwide strategy. It is important, then, to identify education — and the Delors report — as a strategic priority in relation to democracy today.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

It is true that when you have a billion illiterate people, they are marginalized from the start, whether it be in their relationship with justice, with the labour market or with new information technologies — which in any case they cannot use because they are illiterate.

**Abid
Hussain**

Mr Chairperson, I shall refer to only three issues, namely democracy, development and globalization. I shall strive to be brief and try to point to what is relevant to UNESCO, as there are other agencies responsible for various other activities connected with democracy, development and globalization. I shall therefore not go into that.

As regards democracy, one thing has become very clear: the disillusionment it has caused today. We need to take it into account and oppose it at all costs, otherwise it could result in fascism, fundamentalism and authoritarian regimes, which would set the clock back. When I think of UNESCO and democracy, it is the electorate that immediately comes to mind. The absolute minimum requirement for there to be good democratic government is that voters should be educated and know how to read and write. I believe that UNESCO has a very important role to play in this respect. As a matter of fact, it had been decided that there would be total literacy at a basic level by 2000. But that did not happen. And the victims of that state of affairs are above all to be found in Africa and South Asia. That is why I would say that the most important thing we must do to ensure that the foundations of democracy are sound is to see not only that the education and literacy programme is given more and more emphasis, but that its budget allocation is increased.

When it comes to education, I am also thinking of the sort of curriculum that needs to be worked out. My feeling is that there is much to be done in this regard and that we need to see that we are in tune with the times. Education must help people to create adequate social conditions in their villages and make them realize how their crafts and their agricultural produce, among other things, are being treated.

May I make a passing reference to the M.S. Swaminathan Research Institute. Swaminathan has done outstanding work in some villages by linking knowledge with labour, in combination with the technologies required for agriculture. I think this is the form that education should take. Furthermore, I believe that a teleteaching system should be brought in, again with the help of technology, information, electronics and communications. That is how one can do without a blackboard, chalk and exercise books when teaching people.

My second point is this: that to consolidate democracy it is not enough to allow elections to be held every five years. People near the grass-roots, country-dwellers, need to be empowered, given that 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, at least in my country and some others. And women need to be empowered. In most countries, some 50 per cent of the population has been disenfranchised. We have seen that in India, with the introduction of Panchayat, two thirds of all jobs have been reserved for women. I feel that it is now absolutely vital, if democracy is to move ahead, for gender empowerment to take place. This is also an undertaking that falls within the competence of UNESCO, and it can be achieved.

A third area which I regard as being of great importance is freedom of opinion and expression. Without it, democracy has no voice. There are cases where people have no freedom at all, and the utilitarian argument is that freedom does not really interest them, that women are happy with the lives they lead at a cultural level, and that men believe they do not have to compete with those living in urban areas, among others. But in fact they do not know what freedom is, or that it needs to be guaranteed. And that is why I feel that freedom of expression and opinion is the mother freedom, the cornerstone of all freedoms. And here again there is a UNESCO programme which needs to be reinforced and emphasized, so that we can move forward.

As far as development is concerned, Mr Chairperson, my point is that poverty will need to be redefined. It is true — as you so rightly said — that poverty is a very important element from an economic point of view. But we have come to the conclusion today that development cannot be complete unless problems of education, health and maternity care are solved. And the countries where there has been successful development are those where democracy and development have been linked with education at that particular level. So poverty has to be redefined so that, in order to deal with it, we do not restrict ourselves to economic means, because more than that is needed. As a matter of fact, there is empirical evidence that wherever education has been brought up to that particular level, development has been very much strengthened.

The second point I would like to make — forgive me for repeating myself here — is that without science and technology, development will remain an empty shell. The countries which have become developed or are developing are indisputably those which have genuinely believed in science and technology.

In this connection, may I remind you again that UNESCO is going to organize a conference on science and technology in the service of the professions in which people are involved. It is true that justice cannot be done unless a just environment is created in terms of science and technology. In this respect, as regards development, I would say that the State should continue to play a part. To use Mr Galbraith's language, those who are placed in a comfortable position do not need the State. It is the underprivileged, the overworked and the underpaid who need the State to come to their rescue. Consequently, although I am one of those who would like to see some of the activities of the State cut back, I would not argue that it should be abolished. I would say that its qualitative characteristics should change. It is not necessary for the State to run hotels. It is not necessary for it to go into trade and industry or get involved in as many bureaucratic activities as it does today. The State should concentrate on providing its people with enabling factors. It is in this respect that the role of the State is important.

One last point, Mr Chairperson, on globalization. I listened with great care to the account of the adverse effects associated with it. But globalization has come to stay, and we cannot

avoid it or turn the clock back. What we need to do is to act accordingly, to handle globalization. What is more, globalization should not be restricted to economics. It would be reductive, for it is a notion that embraces other areas, such as culture among other things. It is vital to understand that globalization is driven by science and technology, and that the boundaries of the State have been rolled back by the speed at which things are happening, by currency transfers, by the way in which industries have been denationalized and new groupings created. Nowadays, there is no longer any such thing as a product “made in Japan” or “made in England”. It is made in various countries, and the finished product is the work of the place where the profit is highest.

I accept, as my Russian friend said, that there cannot be a competition between a team of amateurs and the best of all teams, and that in order to compete one needs to train. But we now live in a world where economics is dominated by competition, and we need to prepare ourselves for that. Nobody would claim that there is anything automatic about globalization or that things will change overnight. A preparatory phase is necessary, and States cannot get out of it. Otherwise, whether we like it or not, we shall be overtaken. After missing the boat twice, as regards first industrialization and then automation, it seems to me that the developing countries need to be careful about this particular point and to take advantage of this situation. They are in a world ruled by competition, and they have to face up to it.

We are all very sorry for some things that are happening, but this is the historical stage we have reached, and history is made up solely of historical trends and not of an interpretation of history. I therefore humbly suggest that we have no alternative but to accept this state of affairs, that globalization has arrived and that we have to act.

Now the question is: what can UNESCO do? I am not suggesting that UNESCO should replace the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. I am not suggesting that it should take over the responsibilities of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) or the ILO. But UNESCO could act, and the advantage we have is that we are in the game of intellectual fermentation. My whole point is that we are on the threshold of a new world, but incapable of making out its features. Discussion is in progress and it

needs to be continued. It needs to be encouraged, even if it does not produce results. What really matters is that, when a historical turning point comes, there are people with ideas who can move ideas forward. Dickens, Tolstoy and a few others wrote the saddest stories about their century, and Karl Marx turned up with an answer. Similarly today, scientists, technocrats, philosophers, poets, artists and painters should join forces in order to cause this fermentation of ideas. And I repeat: in my view, no organization would be better fitted for that task than UNESCO. Globalization is therefore of concern to UNESCO, given that it is a question of intellectual effervescence and information.

My last point concerns the two opposing forces inherent in globalization. We should examine them. One of them is a force of attraction, which pulls it towards universality and removes it from national boundaries. The other is a push from below, which is based on the realization of identity. I think they are both valid, and we need to find a way of resolving these contradictions. Any dynamic age which produces a new mode of thinking creates contradictions, which need to be resolved. That is why I agree with Mr Cornillon that there comes a time when you have to come up with new ideas, a time when old myths, old methodologies and old religions have less of a hold on people's minds. In the case of globalization, there is no such thing as a blueprint that we can provide, but the time has come to raise awareness, and UNESCO has an important role to play in this respect.

And it just occurs to me that UNESCO could also have its own television channels in as many countries as possible. Just as there are geographical channels, discovery channels and other specialized channels, let there be a UNESCO channel in almost every country, which would serve to disseminate some of those ideas as they appear.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

What is UNESCO's budget? It cannot be more than \$200 million or \$300 million. That immediately gives one some idea of its scope for action. To have an international television channel or radio station would cost a few billion dollars. I believe it is important, when considering UNESCO and what it can do, to keep UNESCO's budget in mind. It is very important, otherwise we may start day-dreaming. But the reality is there. What is the budget of an international organization? The normal budget of the United

Nations is \$1.2 billion, in other words less than any American foundation or any multinational corporation.

This morning, I spoke about inadequate justice. I did not elaborate on the question, as I was afraid it might have taken up too much time. I would now like, if I may, to return to the issue. Mr Badinter spoke earlier, and quite rightly, about the distinctive national and cultural characteristics that need to be respected. I wholly agree with him. There are countries where the predominant practice is to have a single judge, and others where justice is dispensed collegially; countries where proceedings are presided over by an interrogating judge, others where they are accusatory; there are countries where an attempt at arbitration is mandatory, and others where it is not. All these distinctive characteristics are respectable. All these specific national and cultural characteristics are respectable. We have talked about teaching, the teaching for justice that is necessary. I wholly agree.

The point I would like to make is that, whatever the type of procedure, and whatever kind of education he received as a child, a judge needs to be able to be just. Now to do that he himself needs guarantees. The judge is a man, a human being who has his profession, who has his family, who has his own interests. He knows what sort of ruling the public prosecutor would like him to make, and he should be able to rule while at the same time risking the prosecutor's displeasure. He will of course not be able to do that if ever he has reason to believe that if he displeases the prosecutor he may be transferred to some remote place, if he knows that his family life will be turned upside down, that his wife will be forced to leave her job or change professions, that his children will be forced to change schools, or simply that his promotion will be jeopardized for a long time to come. So the crucial problem about justice is that the judge must be independent. But mere words or an article in the Constitution are not enough. There need to be concrete measures that guarantee that independence. I have referred to the irremovability of the judge as being the ABC. But one can go much further than that.

However, that is not the purpose of my remarks, and I have quoted irremovability simply as an example — though a revealing example — a fundamental example of the independence of the magistracy. We cannot ask judges to be heroes in

order to be just. They should be able to be just without being heroes, without risking their personal interests, without jeopardizing their professional life, their own peace of mind or that of their family, and their chance of promotion, to which they are as entitled as any other human being.

If we look at the whole set of international instruments regarding democracy and human rights, we can see the range of rights they protect. There are the two very well-known pacts — there is the International Convention against Torture, and even as regards the protection of prisoners there are minimum rules which have been adopted by the United Nations. But as far as I know, there are no minimum rules to protect the independence of magistrates. There are no minimum rules to guarantee that the courts will be just, or that a magistrate can rule according to his or her conscience, and not according to the wishes of the executive. You may say that it is not up to UNESCO to rectify that shortcoming, or that deficiency in international regulations. That may be true, but UNESCO can still do something. UNESCO has the power to inform and intervene in educational matters. It may also, I hope, be in a position to define the ideals of justice. In order for an ideal of justice to be accepted and put into practice, there are minimum conditions which UNESCO is perfectly capable of enumerating without it being necessary for an international covenant to be put up for ratification by States. And I believe that in this connection irremovability and the existence of a high magistrates' council, mostly made up of elected members, which would guarantee both the independence and the regular promotion of magistrates, are concepts that UNESCO can formulate. The declaration we are preparing could perfectly well contain a paragraph along those lines, and I believe that to be essential because, just as we have not been content to talk about "democracy" or "human rights" and we have worked out pacts which go into the details of what democracy is and human rights are, we can also go into some detail when talking about magistrates' independence. The concepts need to be defined because we live in a world where there is unfortunately too much lying and too much hypocrisy. Everyone is in favour of democracy. But we know very well that there are all too many democrats who say they are democrats without putting democracy into practice. There are all too many States which say they respect the separa-

Pierre
Cornillon

tion of powers and magistrates' independence, but which do not adopt legislation that guarantees that independence and that separation of powers.

I in turn would like to return to that essential issue of justice which has been discussed most pertinently by several of my colleagues. While allowing for the concern you have expressed, namely that UNESCO has no power to impose anything and has very modest financial resources, I believe its action can have an impact. I am convinced that formulating and repeating concepts, tirelessly repeating them, does eventually have an effect. Mr Badinter just now spoke of the "need for justice". It is a very good concept that we should adopt because it is a fact that every human being is born with a keen sense of fairness and suffers when he is treated unfairly. So we need to define the means to satisfy that fundamental need.

To satisfy that need, there have to be institutions for the organization of justice and mechanisms for the administration of justice. Mr Badinter, in his capacity as senator, referred to the existence of a parliament. Indeed, a parliament is needed in order to establish legislation on which decisions of justice will be founded. That legislation, as Mr Kéba Mbaye pointed out, has to be adequate. That is, it has to meet the demands of the situation and the needs of society. So there needs to be a representative, competent parliament which formulates acceptable legislation. But this legislation must not remain purely theoretical and decisions of justice must be enforced. In order for this to happen, there must be tribunals and other authorities and mechanisms which take account — as has been said — of the national characteristics and distinctive cultural features of the different countries. Mention has been made of the "barefoot judges". That can be a good thing where there is no democracy and if people have the impression that disputes with their neighbours — what I would term differences between equals — cannot be settled quickly and fairly.

But the inadequacies of democracy are even more strongly felt when the weak sense that they can do nothing against the powerful. Justice needs to be done to the weak in relation to the powerful, to the poor in relation to the rich. And that demand is far more difficult to meet because a great deal of power is needed

to pronounce sentence against a powerful person and force them to comply with it. In this case we can no longer talk of barefoot judges. On the first rung of the ladder of powerful people is “public power”, that is to say the administration. Democracy supposes that the simple citizen has the possibility to appeal against a decision of the administration and, should such be the case, of winning. This recourse can be through the courts, through an ombudsman or through a parliamentary commissioner under the authority of parliament which is, for the latter, an indirect way of acting as a check on the government.

The exercise of justice also means making the administration accountable for the use of public funds. That is the task of the Court of Auditors, an institution which bears a different name depending on the country. In many developing or newly independent countries, there is no such institution or it does not work because of lack of funds or auditing traditions, lack of independence or of real power. This brings us to the question of the independence of judges which most certainly must be established in the texts but the effective reality also depends on several factors, notably the level of remuneration of the judges and the general climate. The irremovability of judges — in theory a guarantee of their independence — is not always enough. Examples abound of countries where irremovable and theoretically independent judges end up having to bow to the multiple pressures of the public authority.

These varying mechanisms that are necessary in order to satisfy the need for justice are costly and UNESCO should doubtless insist that priority should be given to justice in national budgets. I would also advocate that part of development aid should be allocated to strengthening the judicial system because if that does not happen, then the remainder of the funds provided under development aid may well be misused or even misappropriated.

Well, Mr Chairperson, those are the thoughts I wanted to share. In our report, we could restrict ourselves to a certain number of essential ideas, without going into the detail of procedures or mechanisms which may vary from one country to another, and which never, in themselves, guarantee a result. As we know, democracy depends on a certain number of concrete elements but it is also the outcome of a general state of mind and of leaders' attitudes.

I would like first of all to respond to some of the ideas put forward by Mr Hussain, most of which I agree with. Maybe some marginal notes, no more. Karl Marx was indeed a genius for his time. But it might perhaps have been better if he had not been a genius, for Russia at least, which became the victim of his genius and paid the price for that grandiose and terrible experiment. But history cannot be rewritten.

At the same time, if we do not have a genius right now, it is perhaps a good rather than a bad thing. And what we need to do is organize a dialogue between representatives of different civilizations, ethnic groups, cultures and countries, so they can understand one another and together work out an answer to the challenges of globalization. I think we would all agree that globalization has reached a point of no return. It is here to stay, and whatever we may come up with it will continue.

The problem is how to handle this situation, how to respond to it, and how to adapt the various parts of the world to it. That is, I think, one of our main tasks here. Through this forum, through the forum of UNESCO, it may be possible to come up with some of the answers to those questions.

But, as we inevitably leap from one point of our programme to another, may I add a few more ideas about extremism? You would agree, I think, that extremism forms part of the history of the world. There have always been various forms of extremism, such as the extremism of the Catholics and Protestants in Europe, traditionalists and the Orthodox Church in Russia, and so on and so forth.

Why are we talking about extremism today? To answer that question, I think we need to refer, as Mr Bennouna so rightly said, to the image of the horse and the cart: which should be put before the other? It seems to me that what corresponds to the horse continues to be discrimination and inequality, both at the level of States, nations and ethnic groups and between States and nations worldwide. The response to that challenge has been the proliferation of various kinds of extremism, which take the form of internationalized terrorist groups or which manifest themselves by the emergence of States with extremist regimes. Of course, any extremism produces counter-extremism. But the reason for the appearance of such forms of extremism is the crucial issue raised by our Chairperson: the issue of inequality, both

economic, cultural and civilizational. Some sort of reaction can be expected when people are free, or allegedly free, when nations are politically free and yet still dependent, not just economically, because their school curricula — which are sometimes full of lies — continue to be brought in from abroad. Lastly, this situation is caused by a factor that has already been mentioned: the absolute, massive poverty of a large proportion of the world's population. We can talk about globalization, the Internet and e-mails, but with a billion human beings who cannot read or write there is still plenty of fuel for extremism.

So, to conclude my remarks, how can it be dealt with? I am always reluctant to suggest ideas or answers to all these difficult questions. A number of proposals have of course already been made, but I think that the idea of a very free dialogue between different peoples will produce results. And even including people who are regarded as extremists, for extremism is sometimes, and perhaps always, synonymous with total ignorance and a lack of any wish to understand others. But if some sort of dialogue got going, it would at least make it possible to work out some form of mutual understanding and to avoid the extreme elements of extremism.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

May I say just a few words to add another argument to explain extremism? René-Jean Dupuy often used the following image: "The dialectics between the satellite and the bell tower". It expresses the feelings of insecurity in ordinary citizens when faced with globalization, which causes them to withdraw into themselves and return to their family traditions, their village and their bell tower. They are afraid of other people.

**Alexei
Vassiliev**

I would just like to add that if the citizen who is a victim of globalization finds himself faced not with genuine justice but, on the contrary, veritable corruption, he will get not only a feeling of insecurity but the impression that he has no future. And he could well become an extremist.

**Hisashi
Owada**

Mr Chairperson, at the end of our morning session you summed up our discussion by stressing some of the salient points that could be included in our debate and in the report that will be submitted to the Director-General of UNESCO. I think that is a

very effective way of approaching our mandate. In that spirit, I would like to focus on a single issue which has been the subject of much discussion since the beginning of our afternoon session. There are other issues which should be looked into at a later stage, but here I wish to take up notably the issue of justice. Like many of those who have spoken before me, I believe that justice is the fundamental concept which should serve as a basis for our discussion of democracy and development, because I feel that democracy is possible and feasible only when it is based on justice. Similarly, development can also be based on justice, at least when it is a case of sustainable development.

In that sense, the concept of justice is a connecting factor between democracy and development. Having said that, I feel that perhaps one should keep in mind something which is obvious, and which was implied by several earlier interventions. That is the problem of justice as a concept and as a mechanism, two notions which to my mind are, of course, closely and inseparably interlinked. I think, however, that it would be useful to make a distinction between them.

As regards the problem of justice on a conceptual level, the basic factor we need to keep in mind is that the realization of justice in the context of society, or, put differently, the realization of social justice on an individual basis, is the most important element when thinking about the link between democracy and development. The problem we have to face is the concept of justice in relation to all the individual components of society, as opposed to justice as seen from the viewpoint of the interests of the community. Perhaps we should give more thought to the question of how to identify and reconcile those two different aspects of social justice.

Secondly, and more broadly speaking, when we talk about justice at an international level, the problem becomes even more acute, in the sense that the concept of justice is sometimes used in the context of the sovereign State. It is then the justice of a given State in relation to the international community. But more generally I think that what we should probably be thinking about here is justice at the level of citizens, and that concept may not always have the same meaning as it does at the level of the sovereign State. One typical example is the problem of anti-personnel mines, where the concept of justice may be dif-

ferent depending on whether it is being considered from the viewpoint of the citizen or of the sovereign State. Here again, I think we have to be specific about what we mean by justice as a conceptual issue in the context of democracy and development.

The other aspect is, of course, that of the mechanism of justice, and I do not have much to add to what has already been said. There is a third aspect of justice, to which Judge Mbaye referred this morning, and that is the role UNESCO could play with regard to the problem of justice as a basis for democracy and development. I think education for justice will be extremely important and that we should give our attention to it. In this connection, I would like to stress that we are not just talking about education for justice in the narrow sense of the term, but about the concept of social justice I mentioned earlier. This aspect is essential as a basis for democracy and development, to the extent that in many countries, and particularly those in Africa, but also elsewhere, where conflicts are rampant, the culture of tolerance becomes a very important factor, which needs to be emphasized. For there is a political will to live in tolerance and to accept differences and freedom of expression as important elements of justice. That is obvious, but it has to be brought into the educational process at a community level. That is vital if society is to become democratic and if development is to make headway thanks to the elimination of possible conflict situations which can hamper the realization of democracy and development.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

As I listen to this debate unfold, I cannot help thinking that we have in the end been elaborating something which is very fashionable nowadays, as we move from one century and one millennium to the next, and which has everywhere become a kind of slogan, and that is something known as the moralization of public life. When it comes down to it, the whole debate we have conducted so far has centred on the moralization of public life. When we talk about justice, we are of course talking not about positive justice, as my friend Kéba Mbaye pointed out this morning, but about the idea of justice. The application of what jurists call positive justice can be extremely negative, because anything can be included in legislation, including ethnic cleansing. There can be racist laws; as everyone knows, there have been. So in fact

it is the law in relation to the idea of justice; it is an idea. I therefore believe it is a problem of ethics. What is proposed here is the idea that an ethical dimension should be introduced between democracy and development. I think that this is what it is all about; and it is true that today this is a talking point of our time — on condition, however, that we introduce the idea of relativity, which is dear to me, not specificity but relativity. I do not much like the notion of specificity because, under cover of that term, anything can be accepted, such as particularism as against universalism, and so on.

It is true that relativity is a philosophical concept, and this brings us back to the notion of anthropology, which was proposed a moment ago. But since we are talking about moralization and ethics, this does not prevent us from pointing out in our declaration that there exists a basic set of common values. That, I believe, is the debate of our time, the debate that can no longer be circumvented by declaring allegiance to Islam or Buddhism or any other particularity. It is an issue that can no longer be dodged. There is a basic set of common values, which constitutes the foundation of the international community, the foundation of UNESCO, of the Universal Declaration, of the 50th anniversary. And it is not possible to use the pretext of sovereignty to act against those common values. Impunity is not possible. In other words, the moment there is impunity, there is no longer democracy or development. I believe that to be the problem. It is not possible, then, under the cloak of either politics, or reason of State, or some form of Machiavellianism, to trample on, so to speak, these values which are common to the whole of humankind, for the simple reason that it is humankind as a whole that is being trampled on. This is what jurists call humankind's common heritage. It is the heritage of us all, and so we should all defend it.

UNESCO's role, the role of the international system, is to encourage and help the defence of those common values by using various techniques. But I do not think it is the role of our group to waste time worrying about techniques, about technical aspects. There are people who know how to deal with the technical aspects. The problem is all about setting out a framework. Now it is up to us to say that the international system and in particular UNESCO have a historical responsibility to defend that set

Nicolas
Valticos

of common values, and to affirm that there can be no democracy or development unless that set of common values is respected. I believe that we are thinking along those lines. This, then, brings me back to ethics. I believe that we are now involved in the ethics of Spinoza, and that, I think, is the fundamental debate of our times.

Mr Chairperson, I think we are on the right track. I think that despite divergences of opinion, which are only to be expected given the large number of participants, a kind of consensus is beginning to emerge. Earlier on you said, partly as a joke — though it is never easy to know when you are joking and when you are not: “What does UNESCO’s budget represent compared with the budgets of multinationals?” But good ideas, straightforward ideas, do not always need a budget. After all, Moses did not have a budget, Jesus did not have a budget, Muhammad did not have a budget, and yet their voices were heard because they were voices that lived up to certain expectations of their time or of their people. So this is not what is going to stop us, especially as there is nevertheless a certain UNESCO budget that could perhaps partly help to act as a mouthpiece for our humble views.

The main point, I believe, is that, at this important juncture we have reached at the turn of the century, when people are asking themselves questions about the direction that society will take in future, and when the whole notion of the State is being eroded to a certain extent by supranational values, some of them good and others bad, some straightforward advice on our part to counter the excesses which could be generated by a certain conception of globalization might have some chance of being heeded, whatever budget were devoted to it. So I believe we should not allow ourselves to become demoralized at the idea of the slender resources that may be made available to us. A good cause will sometimes be heeded if it is properly presented and defended. That is why I would like to return to my suggestion that we should prepare a clear and straightforward text which would not go into too much detail that we might disagree over, which would make the essential points, which would explain how we see the future of world society within the framework of a certain justice and a certain equality between human beings and between States, and which would try to counter the some-

times monstrous appetites that are part and parcel, in a sense, of globalization. And we would not say that everything was bad, but identify the dangers.

I do not intend to go into specifics about what UNESCO should do. I shall be content to bring up two points, in general terms.

The first is about the universality and specificity of a democracy. We are striving to define democracy, which is rather difficult to do comprehensively and systematically. But in my opinion democracy is essentially a system where the people is its own master, all the power of the State belongs to the people, and, as the saying goes: "Sovereign power resides in the people". Democracy is more than a political system. It is also an expression of basic political and ethical values. Democracy is rich in content, for it embodies not only tolerance and respect for others, but also justice, equality and freedom, and it is inseparable from the rule of law. But democracy in any part of the world has its own specific and relative characteristics: it is neither abstract nor absolute. That is the reality of the world today. The essence of any democracy is determined, like its content, by the social system of the country concerned, and its development goes hand in hand with the economic and cultural development of that country.

We in China are currently giving priority to the rule of law and the setting up of a sound and comprehensive legal system. We are establishing the rule of law by systematizing and legalizing democracy, so that laws and the legal system will not change every time our leaders change or their views and priorities shift, which is typical of the rule of man as opposed to the rule of law. It will take some time for us to make headway, but we are moving in the right direction. At present, even under the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, what we call democracy and human rights involve constraints as regards one's duties towards the community, respect for others and for the freedom of others, the requirements of morality, law and order, and general welfare, and conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They are the universally accepted principles of democracy and human rights, and must be observed.

On the other hand, as I said, democracy and human

rights are neither abstract nor immutable. States differ in their social systems, levels of economic development, and historical and cultural traditions. It is therefore only natural that they should have a rather different conception of human rights and their implementation, as those rights reflect the concepts, the philosophy, the economic and cultural development, the religious beliefs and the lifestyles of different societies. Hence the need to adapt the universal principles of democracy and human rights to the specific conditions of each country.

I would like to attempt a comparison between the different conceptions of human rights espoused by the Western countries on the one hand, and the countries of the East on the other. In the West, the rights of the individual are regarded as the basis of human rights. The Western conception of human rights derives from the Christian humanism of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment, as a reaction against the domination and tyranny of the Middle Ages. Subsequently, with the rise and fall of fascism, colonialism, racial discrimination and oppression, other elements emerged. Historically, this played a positive role in opposing feudalistic and aristocratic privileges, as well as fascist and autocratic rule. But, on the other hand, human rights should not be regarded as being restricted to the rights of the individual alone. Importance should also be attached to collective human rights.

The oriental tradition pays more attention to the individual's responsibility towards the family, society, the community and the nation. Maybe the oriental conception is a combination of individual rights and collective interest. While upholding self-respect and personal dignity, Orientals stress the value of the individual as an integral part of society, the nation and the people as a whole. It is important that relations between individuals and the community should be dealt with properly. The homeland, the nation and solidarity represent strength, hope and honour, whereas selfishness and uncoordinated individual efforts in different directions serve no purpose. Social progress does not hinge solely on the freedom of the individual. A well-organized and disciplined community is capable of major achievements. Without the solidarity of a whole people under the authority of dynamic leaders, national independence, democracy, social stability, economic development and prosperity cannot be achieved.

Moreover, it is important that there should be a balance between rights and obligations. The government is duty-bound both to protect the individual's rights in accordance with the law and to safeguard national security against threat. Absolute and unlimited freedom of the individual is incompatible with the law and discipline. Western experts maintain that democracy and political freedom pave the way for economic development, whereas experts from many developing countries believe that economic progress and social stability play a crucial role in the attainment of civil and political rights.

The actual implementation of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights therefore requires the specific conditions and historical backgrounds of various countries and regions to be respected. And it is highly desirable that East and West should be complementary on the basis of equality and mutual respect, whereas, given the specific conditions peculiar to each of the parties concerned, it is counterproductive and objectionable to impose one's views high-handedly and, even more so, to apply double standards as regards human rights.

The second point I would like to make is about democracy at international level, that is to say the democratization of international relations. I am Chinese, and I can only speak from my own experience as a Chinese. We Chinese have been victims of aggression and oppression over the past century, which means that we are aware of the fact that colonialism, hegemony and power politics are the root causes of aggression and war. It is war that causes the worst violations of basic freedom and human rights. And peace is the precondition for the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights. The international situation is currently undergoing profound changes. And now, at a time when multipolarity, as we call it, or pluralism, is gathering pace, efforts are being made to try to establish stable, pragmatic and balanced international relations. This has the effect of contributing to peace and development. It is our logical view that State-to-State relations should be based on principles of mutual understanding, equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, transcending differences in social system and ideology. Each country should safeguard its own interests and at the same time

respect those of others, and continuously expand mutually beneficial cooperation by seeking points of convergence that are of mutual interest.

As regards differences and disputes, which are inevitable, it is necessary to engage in dialogue rather than confrontation, and to strive to settle them by peaceful means rather than resorting to force or the threat of force. The Cold War mentality needs to be completely eliminated because the Cold War is over. And a new concept of security needs to be advocated. International and regional security problems should be resolved through consensus and the participation of all States on an equal footing. We have always advocated the equality of all States, both great and small, although we are a big State. And it is impossible to talk about democracy without referring to the democratization of international relations.

World affairs should be handled through consultation between all States, and no single State should impose its will on the others. The purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the principles of peaceful coexistence act as a fulcrum for the settling of international disputes, whatever their nature. So the correct approach to maintain peace and stability is to settle differences between States by peaceful means, without resorting to the use or threat of force. My remarks may sound like jargon, but I believe that in talking about UNESCO matters we cannot disregard such major questions of principle.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

My friend Professor Bennouna and Mr Chairperson Valticos talked about ethics a moment ago. I agree that it is an important notion given the present state of the world in which we live. There is a writer whose opinions I do not share, but who said something that hit the nail on the head. He said: "What modern man lacks is a soul supplement". I believe that man did indeed develop many tools by lengthening his arms and legs, but his soul has remained what it has always been. There is perhaps something here that it might be worth trying to explore further, in order to find out to what extent this could help human beings today to get out of their difficulties, and in any case to try and resolve the problems of democracy and development which are, in the end, humankind's two main problems.

I am glad there has been a veritable consensus on the

notion of justice, either in its general sense, from an ethical viewpoint, as Mr Mohamed Bennouna said, or else in its twin aspects, namely justice as a general rule to live by, or justice as a concrete institution, on both the national and international level. I remain convinced that if justice actually existed in those two senses our Panel would have immediately been wound up because we would no longer have needed to ask the question: "What needs to be done to achieve democracy? What needs to be done to achieve development?" Men are not just, and it is precisely because of that unfortunate fact that there is no democracy and there is no development.

I would also like to say, as regards globalization, that as Mohamed Bennouna said at our last meeting, but in a different and slightly less cheeky form, globalization naturally does not ask for our opinion — it is, it exists. So we are forced to live with it. But let us at least say that we accept it only insofar as it has two main consequences: universality and solidarity.

Universality of what? Universality of human rights. And, precisely, what is happening today, Mr Chairperson, is that the universality of human rights is under threat. That universality is threatened by various forms of particularism, by what you very rightly called, on our agenda, identitarian closure, by all kinds of extremism, religious extremism, political extremism, racial extremism, and so on. I believe that globalization, as long as it shows itself incapable of assimilating both the universality of human rights and solidarity, is and will remain unacceptable, even if it is imposed on us by force.

What kind of solidarity? I would not say a solidarity of States, because nowadays, in many parts of the world, the solidarity of States tends to be the solidarity of their leaders, and that can result in some rather intolerable situations. The solidarity of nations, the solidarity of peoples is what I think it is all about, as well as the solidarity of individuals within each nation and each people. That is the only way it will be possible really to counter the problems that have been raised here, both in our report and on our agenda, namely identitarian closure and social and economic inequality.

Before concluding, I would like to raise another problem and set the cat among the pigeons, and that is the problem of how to promote economic, social and cultural rights. As

Mr Charfi put it, in that respect it is not the definition or even the acceptance of those rights that causes problems to arise, but their practical implementation. People have been talking about the implementation of economic and social rights for a very long time, ever since everyone has agreed on what genuine human rights are. But how can it be done? I believe that this is the real problem today. And when I mentioned setting the cat among the pigeons, it was because in 1977, on the occasion of a conference organized by the International Commission of Jurists in Dakar, we had already come up with a formula which specified not only that development was a human right, but that it was a precondition of the legitimacy of governments. It was of course a rather subversive idea. I think we could perhaps use it, unless you find it too cheeky. But in my view it is important to broadcast loud and clear, to many governments, that their *raison d'être* must be to guarantee the development of the peoples for whom they are responsible, and that their legitimacy naturally depends on it.

I would like to conclude rapidly with a word on what I regard as an extraordinary feature of UNESCO's Constitution: it says that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that war must be combated. But that is true of everything. It is true of everything, and it is particularly true with regard to the exclusion and discrimination we talk about in our programme. I believe we need precisely to act in such a way as to combat exclusion and discrimination in the minds of human beings.

**Robert
Badinter**

I have to be quite frank and admit that I am both amazed and bewildered. Amazed by the quality and diversity of your remarks and suggestions, and rather bewildered precisely by their range and diversity. I went back to the original text, in the way that modest jurists do, to find out what was at issue, and what question had been asked. At the end of the last meeting, which unfortunately I could not attend because I was in hospital, the participants said they intended at their next meeting to reach conclusions of a practical nature and to formulate practical recommendations for the Director-General of UNESCO.

If that is the aim of today's meeting, I think it would be a good idea, Mr Chairperson, if before tomorrow's meeting — since we shall still have a whole day at our disposal — we refocused

the direction or scope of our final efforts before making recommendations. Two months ago we met in this institution, UNESCO, to commemorate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and we spent two whole days, not counting the two months which had preceded the ceremonies that were about to take place, discussing only one subject, which was: "What is the state of human rights in the world today, and what are the prospects for tomorrow?" Many eminent figures expressed their views on the subject, and we arrived at a conclusion which I feel the need to recall here, and which was: the message of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has lost none of its topicality. It boiled down — I think it is worth recalling — to two main categories, one of which is called universality, and the other indivisibility, which of course includes the notion of solidarity you mentioned. And we also concluded that if we examined only certain rights and not others, then it was clear that human rights were lopsided, which I think you will agree is not the best position for an ideal to be in. But everyone was agreed on that, and we said as much when we parted.

And we were also agreed on the need to go more deeply into the threats hanging over human rights at the turn of the twenty-first century, and we thought in particular of globalization — with all that that conceals as regards economic and social rights — and of technical progress, and we were concerned about how it would be possible to control the sorcerer's apprentices, notably the Internet. We also reflected on contemporary forms of racism, the appallingly unfair distribution of the wealth of humankind, and the resulting social exclusion. Regarding these issues, I have the feeling that what you expect from us, and what the Director-General expects from us, is that we propose certain lines of action.

I think that this morning we have put our finger on an important issue, namely that there can be no democracy and no development unless there is justice. That is no revolutionary discovery, but that plain fact, if spelled out and cogently articulated, already enables us to make a few practical recommendations. I feel that we broadened the field of debate during the afternoon. I for one would like us to deal with this issue, to go a little more deeply into the relationship we envisaged this morning between "democracy and development" and between "law

and justice”. Why? Because — and I feel it is worth repeating — the rule of law is not only a set of legal categories and instruments. The rule of law is a culture. And the moment the word culture comes up, one naturally thinks of UNESCO. It is a culture, and I think that the Germans, our German neighbours and friends, underscored that better than anyone, above all constitutionally, when they stated that the Federal Republic of Germany was a constitutional State, a State where the rule of law prevailed. That, to put it plainly, means that there are principles that cannot be abandoned without abandoning the rule of law.

So, on the basis of that observation, and without distinguishing in this respect between human rights issues and rule of law issues, I propose to examine how, within the framework of UNESCO, it might be possible to develop what qualifies as the culture of the rule of law — both the instruments and knowledge of those instruments, both recourse to those instruments and the cost, dear Mr Chairperson, of those instruments, for alas they cost money. Secondly, as regards the demands of justice, and to take into account the different cultures of various States, which are each as respectable as the next, how can we succeed in getting judicial anthropology to allow, with regard to those same principles, solutions to conflicts to be worked out that conform with the rule of law without necessarily being fashioned along the same lines? And above all how, through education, do we get people to understand that respect for the rule of law is the precondition of democracy? And I believe, here in particular, in an absolute rejection of corruption and in the necessary combat it entails everywhere, whether in societies which subscribe to a more collective view of human rights, or in a society which subscribes to a more individual view. Everywhere it must be possible for corruption to be prosecuted, hounded and repressed, on both a national and an international level. In short, I am not here drawing up a limitative catalogue, but as for the rest, on the basis of what we have discussed, I would simply like you, Mr Chairperson, to be able to draw up a catalogue of what our creative imaginations should seek to achieve while at the same time holding themselves in check.

I would like to point out that there have hardly been any contradictory statements in everything that has been said around this table. Our report will of course have to comprise recommendations that are at once specific, feasible and straightforward regarding the issue before us, namely democracy and development. Some very profound and relevant observations have been made by the members of our group. As a practitioner of social engineering, I respect everything I have heard. As we move into the year 2000, I think our discussion should first focus on a state-of-the-world report on democracy and development. And within that framework we could present the issues we have chosen, such as globalization and its impact on human development, the economic world, security and peace. After that, of course, we could go on to specific recommendations, within the framework of the report which resulted from the first meeting.

Focusing on our agenda, I would like very briefly and practically to touch upon the issue of identitarian closure and its relationship with extremism. I would like to support one of the first comments we heard today, namely that exclusion and discrimination cause extremism, and that it can work both ways: they can also be caused by extremism.

Exclusion is a well-known global phenomenon. It is rampant and spreads at an economic, social and political level. So it exists in three distinct forms. I would like to deal with the economic aspect, and I feel compelled, in this connection, to talk about poverty. With the phenomenon of exclusion comes inequality, which is caused by poverty. It is well known that poverty — the situation of people living below the poverty line — is steadily increasing. That is what emerges from the annual Human Development Report. What happens to those people? Economic exclusion can result in their being pushed out of the labour market. They are deprived of a regular income and no longer have a job, and this causes comprehensive instability, which can cause serious upheavals. When that economic exclusion is compounded by social exclusion, which is caused by unemployment, those who have no work and no social status lose all their self-respect. And people who fall victim to that situation go and get trapped by the mafias of extremism. Since they are not members of mainstream society, they are excluded. So they easily fall into the hands of religious mafias, religious funda-

mentalists and other mafias. We should therefore examine the question of this second category of exclusion: social exclusion.

The third type of exclusion is political. By political, I understand the exclusion of certain categories of people. More broadly, it is a question not of poverty, but of the exclusion that affects women, certain ethnic groups, certain religious minorities and immigrants. These are the categories which are victims of political exclusion, and which do not enjoy their fundamental rights. Ambassador Hussain rightly mentioned the Panchayat system in India, where women were intentionally brought into local government through affirmative action. At parliamentary level, that had not been possible over the previous two or three years, which only goes to show that exclusion is very real for certain categories of people — and I am thinking of women and religious minorities in particular.

What are we going to do about this? I would like to arrive at some recommendations aimed specifically at UNESCO and involving the issue of education. Given that the Social Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995 gave UNESCO the responsibility of implementing recommendations on social exclusion and integration, I would like to propose a first recommendation: that a monograph devoted to the phenomenon of exclusion and its causes should be published. And some examples of good practices should be given, with indications as to the results they produce, whichever countries are chosen as examples. I think that that would be a very useful tool for us here in UNESCO.

Another recommendation I would like to make concerns education of course. One of the main factors that causes exclusion is lack of education. Now it seems to me very important that we realize that “education for all” is within our reach. It is no longer a wild dream, and the work of the 1990 Jomtien Conference can be brought to fruition. There is talk of there being 1 billion illiterate people. But we must highlight the E-9 programme, the “education for all” programme, that UNESCO has implemented in the nine most populous countries.

A second suggestion: when we talk about unemployment, poverty and exclusion, it means something is wrong with our education systems. It is generally accepted that knowledge and technical skills must go hand in hand — and I am here referring to vocational and skill training — rather than trying to make all

young people go to college or the tertiary sector. I think there is a real need for the developing world to relate general culture to technical skills. Now UNESCO has great experience in this respect: there is an excellent programme at the International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (UNEVOC). Perhaps we could recommend that this be stressed.

My third suggestion concerns the question of how to move from social exclusion to social cohesion. We are not supposed to answer all the questions raised by this problem, but we can select some of them and ask UNESCO to get them examined by another group which is possibly more competent than us in this area. For the social crisis is worldwide, no matter what action is being taken by the multinationals and certain leaders, who have no legitimacy and are wicked. Today we are told there is a single global society. I feel that humanity is by nature plural, and that we overlook this fact. I think that the fiction of a single global society needs to be reviewed. Unless we respect cultural pluralism, or human pluralism, these problems will stay with us. That is why I recommend that this factor of pluralism be taken into account in the study I am proposing, which will focus on the transition from social exclusion to social cohesion.

I also feel that there is a need for social accounting. We are very ingenious, and there are many ways of doing economic accounting, but we have not yet set up systems for social accounting — in both the qualitative and quantitative sense. This is something UNESCO can do: create qualitative and quantitative indicators for social accounting. And I would like us to move beyond descriptive indicators such as school attendance rates and to use qualitative analysis, which takes account of the complex situation we are trying to analyse. What I am saying is that we are aware of the quantitative indicators, but that qualitative indicators are important. No one has been charged with this in the United Nations, and so no other body will take on that task. So these are small, simple things that we may be able to take forward.

Han
Sung-Joo

What I have to say follows on naturally from what Senator Badinter said, namely that it would be a good idea to make our report concrete. I am still wondering about the shape it will take, and through an effort of the imagination I can see what it will or

should look like. It should at the very least contain a message. What message do we want to put across when we have finished our work?

Probably what we want to do — but all of this is subject to discussion — is to show what kind of society we want to build and to live in, in other words a society where democracy and development prevail. That is why we need a conceptual definition of democracy and development. That being our aim, we may want to examine the practical problems posed by it and the conceptual options it entails. For example, at a conceptual level, the dilemma would hinge on the opposition between the universal nature of human rights or democracy and what might be called the particularistic nature of human rights that Mr Guo talked about earlier. I think that this debate could result in a solution. Even if there are different conceptions of human rights, there exist certain common denominators: they all condemn genocide, for example, famine and the absolute violation of individual rights. This means that it is possible to resolve the dilemma caused by the opposition between what might be called universalistic and particularistic values. As for the dilemma between individual rights and community rights, it too can be resolved. Consequently, a solution can also be found to the dilemma between exclusion and what might be called pluralism. And I think it is up to us to make that effort when drawing up our report.

Thirdly, we want to suggest ways of dealing with those problems. How do we intend to resolve them and, more particularly, how can certain very concrete problems such as extremism and globalization be dealt with? If we fail to come up with practical ideas, we shall have worked in vain. Finally, we should show how such societies can be brought about, and what role UNESCO, for example, or the United Nations system as a whole, or the international community, can play in this respect. This could be the message. We should adopt a broader perspective in preparing a report of this kind, so that it is not only effective, but satisfactory to ourselves.

To move on to issues of a more specific nature, like those we were talking about this morning, such as corruption, justice, globalization and so on, I feel they should be dealt with, but not in isolation or in a fragmented way. I think the issue of corrup-

tion can be dealt with within the context of democracy and development. Does democracy condone or even encourage corruption, which would affect development? The causal relationships are much more complicated in this case, but it should be possible to find some kind of intelligible relationship.

As for justice, it is an issue which impinges on democracy and human rights, but also concerns economic development — in fact transparency and the rule of law are factors which are also important for economic development. The same is true of globalization. We need to find a context within which we can deal with this issue rather than looking at it in isolation.

Finally, I would like to suggest that we examine a new problem, which is close to my heart: humanitarian aid. You may take it or leave it, but there are countries — I am thinking of North Korea, for example — where there is a vicious circle due to lack of development, irresponsible leadership, a disastrous economic situation, food shortages and famine. And with all that that implies for peace. I wonder whether, as a group, we could take an interest in the issue of humanitarian aid to countries or social groups that are facing catastrophic difficulties.

I would like to restrict myself to practical proposals. When he began his speech this afternoon, Mr Hussain used an expression that particularly struck me. He spoke of disappointment with democracy. Coming as I do from a developing country, I can say that it is something which can be observed very often, and I believe there are various reasons for that disappointment, which we are not going to discuss now. But we have been implicitly referring to it throughout the day. We are faced with a worldwide need to reconstruct citizenship. In other words, what we need to do — and it is a task involving both education and culture, and therefore largely UNESCO's responsibility — is to boost the image of democracy and citizenship. That can be done, on the one hand, as has been said here, through an ever more extensive idea of justice. That was Justice Mbaye's proposal, which we all supported.

But I also think we need to examine the notion of participation in greater depth. I am struck by the degree to which peoples feel excluded from power today. This means that elections, the act of voting, no longer suffice to give people the feeling that

they are exercising a minimum degree of control over their lives, a minimum degree of control over their interests. This can — it is a theory I put to you — be treated not only from the angle of the rights of the individual, the right to justice, the right to vote, but also perhaps from the angle of the duties of the individual. In other words, we should activate in people's minds an idea which exists intuitively, namely that States are not up to the job of providing answers to the problems of society that face us today. In my view, we need to stimulate people so that they are mobilized into providing those answers and to reassess the duty of individuals towards their community. UNESCO could then refine the instruments of citizens' participation and turn it into a culture, a culture of citizens' participation. As was said earlier, the aim would be to circulate an idea of justice and, along the same lines, to circulate an idea of participation, of active participation. We should perhaps not restrict ourselves to expecting or demanding a solution to all society's problems from the State. We should promote the idea of an active, lively civil society which itself seeks to contribute, along with the State, to the solution of its problems. That is, I think, a cultural change, and it would be a cultural sea change. So here is an initial suggestion: the culture of participation.

The second point I would like to make — and I am perhaps repeating myself — is that I believe we cannot evade the problems of education when we talk of democracy. There is nothing less democratic in the world than the sharing of knowledge. For a large proportion of the world's population, the sharing of knowledge boils down to nothing. Absolutely nothing. So I fear that this situation may become an instrument of social Darwinism, that it may become something that grows in geometrical progression and creates more and more exclusion. That said, it is, I think, up to UNESCO more than any other international organization to find a way of turning a number of questions that have been raised into a worldwide strategy. I am thinking, as I have said before, of the Delors report, for instance, which is an important UNESCO document. That is my second point.

And since I have spoken of citizenship at the level of communities, of the exercise of citizens' duties, I want to make a point of referring to a debate that was mentioned by Mr Chairperson at the very beginning of the session: the participation of

States — the phenomenon whereby States in the international community are excluded, and the mechanisms whereby they can be included. If I understood you correctly, Mr Chairperson, one of your concerns is how to democratize the international scene. Is it possible? Is it conceivable, and if so, through what kind of measures, through what kind of policy can it be achieved?

Nicolas
Valticos

I believe that at the point we have now reached we have, in a sense, looked at the issue from every angle, and we are still faced with two major problems. What dimensions should the conclusions we are moving towards have? And what should their content be? As far as their dimensions are concerned, it is obvious that we have been, and are, thinking about many issues, many topics. But a meeting like ours can only formulate conclusions which have a certain concision, not to say brevity. We are not putting together a report, we are presenting the conclusions of a Panel. And if those conclusions are to have any effect, they must be brief and they must stick to essentials. And those essentials must be clearly formulated. In other words, some of the important issues that have been raised, more particularly a moment ago, could be mentioned as issues that need to be examined rather than issues which we should ourselves examine. They would serve as pointers to studies that UNESCO might be advised to carry out, or even to studies that might be carried out in collaboration, in a wider-ranging framework than UNESCO's. But for our conclusions to have any effect, they must be brief, they must take up two or three pages, and they must indicate the points of interest and the basic principles.

As regards the content of our conclusions, there is a first point — although it is obvious, I want to make it — in respect of which we should not at this stage, 50 years after the Universal Declaration, be seen, even indirectly, to be less than fully committed. We must not seem to be having second thoughts or having reservations. We should take the Universal Declaration as our starting point and be more specific about certain points involving problems which have since arisen, and which the authors of the Universal Declaration did not have in mind, on which René Cassin or Eleanor Roosevelt had not focused. And one of those topics, as we have already amply stressed, is precisely the issue of globalization. I was very pleased to note that, as far as I could

judge, we all agreed to warn against certain dangers it may comprise, without necessarily saying that it is a bad thing. There are two good reasons for not saying that: first, it might not be true, and secondly we would not be believed.

There is however a point, Madam, on which I beg to differ slightly from you. But we are here to exchange ideas and to have the pleasure of prolonging our conversations, and therefore to differ from one another, democratically and politely. That point is what you mentioned as being one of the duties of humankind. The “duties of humankind” are a dangerous thing. We know where we begin, and we do not know where we end up. We already began with *taille* and *corvée* before the French Revolution. The duties of humankind exist, the duty to pay taxes exists, military service exists, and so on. But precisely at a time when we are stressing the need to inject some rationality into the actions of certain governments which may be authoritarian, I would, generally speaking, be extremely reluctant to recognize duties that might be improperly used. So I do not believe there is any point in raising the issue of the duties of humankind here. I know that it is even in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. But in that case the frame of reference is the family rather than the State. And States being what they sometimes are, I think it would be a better idea not to discuss that.

Having said that, were we to work on the assumption that we were going to produce a relatively short report and come up with ideas which go beyond those already formulated, so as to avoid repetition, but highlight topical issues such as globalization, I believe that we would be on the right track, and that we would be capable tomorrow of organizing ourselves with a view to preparing these conclusions, indicating the chapter headings or the main points we should raise and suggesting how they might be prepared, probably by a select working party, with a view to our next meeting. Because we may need another meeting. But that is a question I leave you to judge for yourselves.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I may not have made myself clear, but I would like to point out that I was not talking about the duties of humankind. I talked about citizenship, and I talked about the duty to participate, in other words I tried precisely to ensure that citizens were no longer assisted by the State but became masters of their fate, i.e.

capable of making contributions to their communities. And in that case I do not think there can be any doubt about the end result. The result, I hope, can only be good.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

I would like to conclude by saying that 31 people have spoken this morning. That is the first point. As regards the contents of the report, I have noted your recommendations, but in truth it is hard to know what its contents will be until we have completed our discussions tomorrow.

Secondly, should we draw up an interim report or a final report, or should we be content with the minutes of our discussions? That is up to you to decide.

Thirdly, it is also up to you to decide whether it is important to hold a third meeting in order to discuss the completed report, or if, on the contrary, you think that an exchange of letters will suffice. It is your decision.

Finally, I would like to make one last point: we must not give the impression of not being fully committed, but it has to be admitted that international public opinion is not fully committed, which is something that happens very frequently as a result of a widespread disenchantment with democracy. We have lost the enthusiasm that existed in the years after the end of the Second World War in 1945, or in the 1960s, at the time when many countries gained independence and everyone thought that democracy was going to solve all their problems. Today there is considerable disappointment, both at the level of national democracy and at the level of international democracy.

[beginning of next session]

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

Yesterday, we chiefly discussed the role of justice in the relationship between democracy and development, namely social justice in national societies and in international society. But we were not able to discuss international justice in detail, even though several of our number are judges who sit on international tribunals. Having said that, may I suggest that today you do not deal with the issue of justice, so as to avoid repetition, but deal with a problem that was indirectly referred to yesterday? It is the problem of identitarian closure, or unbridled opposition to unbridled globalization. In some people's eyes, the phenomenon can be described as micro-nationalism, identitarian closure,

Mohamed
Charfi

extremism, fundamentalism or neotribalism. All these terms designate different expressions, or different forms, of that violent reaction to globalization, but it is also a very long-standing phenomenon, which has resurfaced today and uses new technologies. So I propose we focus this morning's discussion on identitarian closure.

I had indeed asked to speak on the issue of identitarian closure, or of extremisms. We all realize we are going through a period of mounting extremism of all kinds, racial, national or religious. These extremisms are found all over the world, and there is often a tendency to see them as being caused by economic and social factors. I think that economic and social factors come into it, they play a role, but it is an aggravating role and not that of a root cause. I think the main cause is chiefly cultural. The Iranian revolution took place 20 years ago. It is an example that does not fit in with an economic and social explanation of the phenomenon, because at the time, 20 years ago, Iran was not the poorest country in the region. It even enjoyed a certain economic affluence. The Iranian revolution was organized by ayatollahs and by bazaar traders, that is to say social strata of at least average level.

Cultural causes, then, are essential in my view. Throughout history, culture has been handed down from parents to children, but nowadays, with the phenomenon of very extensive schooling (not to say generalized — it depends on the country), culture is chiefly handed down no longer by the family, but by schools. In any case, schools are an essential factor. Schools can become a vehicle for extremism, a vehicle for identitarian closure, because schools are not good or bad in themselves, everything depends on what is taught in them. I believe that the chief cause of extremism is ignorance. In Arabic, there is a saying: "He who does not know a thing hates it". As far as racism is concerned, for example, scientists now state quite categorically that the notion of race is erroneous. There is no such thing as race, there are just racists. But that truth still needs to be known, and for it to be known it is useful, indeed necessary, for it to be taught.

UNESCO has already recommended multilingualism. I think it is time to go a little further than that and suggest, encourage what I would call multiculturalism, or openness to

other cultures. That way, children will be taught that the notion of race is false, that no race is superior to another, but that all cultures deserve respect and that all religions deserve respect. Clearly we are not going to suggest that the same thing should be taught in every school in the world. It is only normal that in each country most teaching should be devoted to the national language, to the national culture, that the religion of the country should be taught. But, just as jurists devote 5 to 10 per cent of their teaching to comparative law, it would be a good idea, when teaching philosophy or literature, if some time were devoted to comparative philosophy or comparative literature. The Arab high-school pupil needs to have some notion of Shakespeare, Molière, Goethe and Dante, in addition, among other things, to a knowledge of Arab thinkers and Arab intellectuals. Conversely, if German, English and French high-school pupils had some idea of Averroës, Maimonides and Ibn Khaldun, that would make it possible for both sides to learn something about the civilization of the other, to discover interesting elements in it, and to learn that it is a civilization worthy of respect. And thus people would feel less hatred for something they were less ignorant of. And when people are a little more familiar with something, they can love and appreciate it more, or decide to coexist peacefully with it. I am arguing, then, in favour of a minimum of comparative philosophy, comparative literature, comparative civilization in history lessons — I would add comparative geography to that. Here again, it is the same thing. It is only normal that pupils should be mainly familiar with the geography of their own countries, but it is no bad thing for them to have some examples of the geography of foreign countries: the geography of a rich country, the geography of a poor country, the geography of a country in transition, so they realize that all the peoples of the world are trying to develop, that they all have problems, and that each of them is trying to solve them in its own way.

Lastly, there is the extremely tricky issue of what I would call comparative religion. I believe it is vital not to ignore the religious issue. In countries where religion is taught, people should not focus solely on their own religion, and they should not glorify it inordinately at the expense of other religions. I think it is vital that each individual should have some idea of other people's religions. Here again, I am not under any illusion:

5 to 10 per cent of teaching time could be devoted to other religions, but here we have to beware of a very serious danger: people should not teach another religion while looking at it from their personal viewpoint, because in that case they will distort it, and that will be more serious than not teaching it at all. Those who teach another religion should put themselves in the shoes, if I may so express myself, of someone who believes in it, so as not to present it from a viewpoint which is by definition erroneous, or by definition reprehensible.

One last remark about the advantages of teaching the humanities as compared with the teaching of so-called hard or exact sciences. Given that our century is a century which has seen the triumph of techniques and technology, there is a worldwide tendency to get schoolchildren to specialize at a very early age. From the age of 13 or 14, pupils, including even the brightest of them, begin to specialize, already at secondary school level, by opting for the so-called exact sciences. And as a result there will be a shortfall in general culture. This early specialization is, in my view, regrettable, because the aim of primary and secondary education is not really to prepare pupils for job-orientated training. The aim is to train future citizens. If, as soon as pupils are 13 or 14, the teaching of history, geography, literature and philosophy is neglected in favour of mathematics, physics and natural sciences, we will end up training what I would call computer minds, that is to say future adults who know how to work a computer and know how to use machines, but have no idea of what is going on in the world, and have no general culture; and as a result, out of ignorance, they will be people who are receptive to extremist ideologies. I believe we should provide pupils with what I would call a cultural “basic minimum wage”, a basic minimum of general culture, in order to inoculate them against ignorance of other people, which is precisely what leads to extremism. I am not saying this out of pure speculation, but I have noted that in several countries — I am reluctant to mention particular countries, but if you talk me into doing so, I will — in many countries it is in science faculties, in engineering colleges and in schools of medicine that you will find the highest proportion of extremist students. This is in contrast with law, literature and social science faculties, precisely because law, literature and sociology students have that mini-

mum of general culture which has taught them to put their certainties into perspective, whereas students of the exact sciences have learnt that two and two make four, have become accustomed to certainties and are therefore more liable to be won over by ideological certainties which are in fact based on ignorance. I believe that UNESCO can make recommendations here. It is absolutely up its street. It is a question of education, and education lies within the competence of UNESCO.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

I would like to make a very brief remark. That is an elitist point of view, which only concerns students of secondary school or university level. But what, incidentally, should be done about the 90 per cent of the population who are illiterate, or who have not got beyond primary school level, where it is virtually impossible to undertake comparative studies? They just about know how to read and write, add and subtract. So there is something elitist about this approach, which affects only a small group of people.

**Mohamed
Charfi**

First of all, the number of countries in the world where schooling has become widespread is now high. I know very well that there are still huge numbers of young people who are not lucky enough to have access to education, but nowadays education is, for instance, available to all in the whole of the Arab world. All Tunisians, Egyptians and Algerians go to school, and it is vital that they should get that basic minimum culture, and not the opposite form of indoctrination. Moreover, what I said about education can also apply to culture and information. In all the countries of the world, television and radio now play a role which can be negative if they encourage people to withdraw into themselves, if they spend their whole time glorifying their own civilization at the expense of others. And conversely, that role can be positive if the media and more particularly governments adopt that spirit of openness. Naturally, everything I have said about education could also be applied to culture, particularly as regards everything that is the responsibility of the State.

Kéba Mbaye

Mr Chairperson, I would like to thank Mr Charfi for everything he has said. I shall try to be concrete and follow your guidelines. But, with your permission, I trust you will forgive me for perhaps looking at the problems of identitarian closure and extremism

from a different angle. Why? Because — as Mr Badinter pointed out yesterday — we have been asked to formulate opinions for the Director-General of UNESCO with a view to the elaboration of programmes. That means we are in fact being asked to come up not with complete solutions, but rather with ideas that can be exploited. But, after having taken part in our first session, and after having listened to many extremely interesting speeches yesterday, I realize that in the last account the problem facing us at the end of this century and during much of the century to come is globalization. Now, if globalization is really the characteristic of the end of this century and of the century to come, it is UNESCO's duty to intervene, and ours to give UNESCO our views on that globalization.

First of all, I think UNESCO should draw up a list of the characteristics of that globalization. I am going to use a rather telegraphic style so as to be more concrete, and above all so as not to waste a lot of time. Then the responses triggered by globalization should also be listed. And among those responses, as you have pointed out, Mr Chairperson, we find identitarian closure and extremism. After that, we need to study the consequences of globalization on what I would call moments of democracy and development, in other words the subject of our discussion. I use the word “moment” in the physical sense, i.e. a specific vector. It would thus be possible to study the impact of globalization on the transmission of scientific and technological knowledge, on education, on human rights and on culture.

And then I think UNESCO should propose that Member States adopt what I would call a set of principles and rules for the future, in response to globalization. A certain number of principles come to mind. I have recapitulated some of them, but there are many others: the principle of the universality of human rights, as a means, precisely, of fighting identitarian closure and extremism; the principle of compensatory equality between States and between individuals. I owe that notion of compensatory equality to the late lamented René-Jean Dupuy, who worked on the assumption that you cannot treat unequal things or unequal situations in an equal manner. That principle is, by the way, to be found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but I believe that René-Jean Dupuy's idea deserves to be discussed by us. The principle of compensa-

tory equality, between States on the one hand, but also between individuals, is a way of fighting both compartmentalization and exclusion. The principle of national and international solidarity is an idea that greatly appeals to me, as does the notion of a single and diverse humankind. I do actually believe that we are moving towards a single humankind, but we should never forget that that humankind is diverse. It is a fact of life discussed yesterday by Chairperson Badinter. I totally subscribe to it, and I feel it should be established as a principle.

There is also the principle of participation and its corollary, the principle of non-exclusion. And I believe that UNESCO should also look more closely at ways of fighting the moral, cultural and educational excesses of globalization — Mr Charfi talked about them earlier — and suggest an answer to them. One such answer, I think, could be the dialogue of civilizations through multilingualism, through a bringing together of young people and adults from different regions and civilizations, and with different convictions and religions — this is the idea that Mr Charfi floated earlier: we only love what we know — and through exchanges of teachers between peoples who live very far from each other. If teachers from Zimbabwe, or somewhere else in the world, were able to come and teach in Paris, for example, I think that would make it possible to show a different picture of their regions of origin. It would make it possible to set forth a different conception, a different way of seeing and understanding things, that would be very different from the stereotypes that people often pass on out of ignorance. It would make it possible to strengthen cooperative links as regards democracy and development, notably through exchanges of ideas and experiences, which demonstrate that there is not strictly speaking a single way of conceiving democracy (though nowadays people tend to think the contrary) without, of course, abandoning the essentials of democratic culture.

It would also prompt thinking about the reality of people's social and financial conditions (we very often know nothing of how peoples who are far from us live, and this can be a factor which encourages cultural contempt, or, conversely, a complex that needs to be fought and eliminated). It would prompt thinking about the duties of States, and the rights and obligations of the new citizen — contacts between local communities, in other

words, for example, between the population of a commune in France and a commune in Côte d'Ivoire, and therefore contacts between communities belonging to different countries and between elements of civil society beyond national borders. The advantages and limitations of pluralism also come into it — there are not just advantages, there are also limitations. Let me take as an example the political pluralism to be found in some African countries, whose face is not always acceptable and which, in my opinion, does not add much to democracy — on the contrary.

And now one last idea regarding electoral observers. They are usually thought of as coming from the North to the South. Well, when there are elections in the North, why not send observers from the South to see how things turn out? It would in my opinion be a way first of showing certain things they may not know about or practise, and then of accustoming them to a possibly slightly more sophisticated way of exercising democracy. This is a series of ideas that are perfectly practical and unpretentious. I thought we could take as our starting point the idea that globalization will be the phenomenon of our time after 2000 and perhaps for the quarter of a century to come, and try to see how we are going to experience that globalization.

**Abid
Hussain**

Mr Chairperson, to my mind, extremism is another name for totalitarianism. That means that the absolute truth is known to a group, a party or a State, and that as a result that particular truth must prevail over all others. It has to be admitted, however, that culture came much earlier than the State — the State and international organizations emerged at a much later date than the culture of a people.

What is culture? Culture is a way of life, an attitude, a belief, a moral code. It is dance and theatre. All that is part of culture. It is quite wrong to believe that culture is based on the number of television sets or cars or telephones a person has. It is equally wrong to claim that an industrially underdeveloped country is culturally underdeveloped.

What you said about literacy, Mr Chairperson, seems to me to be quite right. There are communities and tribes that may be regarded as illiterate, but, for all that, it cannot be said they have no culture: they have their dances, their customs, their

theatre, their songs and their attitudes. They may not be able to sing better, but they compose their own songs and they reflect their environment, everything that really goes to make up the basic culture of a people. That means that tolerance is absolutely indispensable as a bulwark against totalitarianism. The Greek philosophers always talked in terms of limits, even limits between religion and logic. Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, as well as non-Western philosophers, have always emphasized the theory of limits.

The second point I would like to make is this, Mr Chairperson: the clash of cultures, or the clash of civilizations, is the least civilized way of describing the situation. I quite agree that today we find ourselves back in a particular situation where gods are fighting for supremacy, where anarchic tendencies are dominating all that is best in religions, and where, at a political level, anarchy is becoming the ally of religious intolerance. Now it is against that intolerance that we have to fight, against that misguided confidence that one is in possession of the absolute truth. The idea that there is a unity in diversity is the very essence of life. That is why I said that values came into existence before the emergence of the State, values such as a sense of justice and of what is right. Those values long pre-dated the State or even the introduction of democracy.

But there is yet another area where extremism is showing its ugly face, and that is in the resurgence of old ethnic rivalries. We have to take that into account. There may have been unlovable structures in the past, but under their domination various and varied cultures were all kept under tight control. I believe that when that control eases its grip, those who had to submit to it rediscover their own personality and want to assert it. I would not say there was anything wrong in that phenomenon. As a matter of fact, I usually take the example of a bouquet that consists of different flowers, with different colours and shades and scents, which when brought together make a lovely bouquet. Another example is the rainbow, whose colours complement each other and stand out against the sky, forming a beautiful whole. Or again, take the example of music by Beethoven or Mozart: there are hundreds of musical instruments which, when brought together, produce a wonderful harmonious sound. So there is some truth in harmony, some truth in keeping the sig-

nificance of each individuality as an individual and bringing them together to produce that kind of feeling. It is when equality is not allowed and disparity is encouraged that the coexistence of different cultures creates problems.

Whether we are talking about a religion that decrees that women are inferior to men, about Hinduism, which recognizes the existence of castes and holds that no compromise is possible in that area, or about the various shades of Christianity, the same question comes up: “How can these divergences be reduced?” In those cases where there are very great inequalities and disparities, which are condoned by social customs, and where religion allows political “democracy” to tolerate such a situation, there will be a democracy which is itself intolerant and uncultured. We must tackle that issue, and here we come back to the question of freedom: freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom to achieve and do what one likes. A person who has been granted the freedom to speak frankly may go beyond the limits of the imagination, attain new areas of artistic creation and make discoveries. It will not be possible to define a position for the world of tomorrow unless the heart opens up to these new images. That is why freedom of opinion and expression, along with pluralism, seem to me to be important elements which should be instilled into and assimilated by civilizations and cultures.

How can we do that? There are many ways in which that new awareness can be triggered — as indeed it has been. It is people of ideas who create the new world, first in their imagination, then in reality. Human beings wanted to travel on a flying carpet, then they discovered they could actually fly and even reach the moon. People who thought there were angels and gods in the skies went up there and discovered that it was all hollow and that there were no angels there. These are the freedoms which are indispensable if humankind is to be able to face up to the future. And I always come back to the same idea: freedom of opinion and expression, equality of the sexes, and equality of all kinds must be taken on board, and taken on board with awareness. And I think that UNESCO, the Organization for Education, Science and Culture, has the mandate to work towards that objective.

I think it will be useful for our discussion if a slightly dissenting voice makes itself heard from time to time with respect to some of the ideas that have been expressed here. And first of all: let us not stress the relativity of everything too much. Certain basic principles of democracy and development should be accepted by everyone, for relativity is always a source of dispute. If you have only two hairs on your head, it will be too few. If you have two hairs in your soup, it will be too many.

I greatly respect the ideas that Mr Charfi has expressed, but may I beg to differ on one point which is relevant to our discussion, namely the notion that the Iranian revolution was a kind of cultural revolution. May I say that, in my view, it was above all a revolution against corruption? Secondly, and without wishing to create an order of importance, it was a revolution against despotism, the cruelty of the Shah's regime and foreign domination. There was no element of democracy in Iran, and the democratic forces which might have been able to play a part in bringing about change had quite simply been destroyed. So other forces came to power. At the time there was no talk of globalization. There was talk of foreign influences, modernization and the stepchildren of modernization, and yet all that existed. As for the actual situation there, we must remember that because of their culture the Iranians always believe there are two sides to every question. I went to Iran last year. They said to me: "What is the difference between nowadays and the days of the Shah? In the Shah's time, we used to drink vodka openly and pray in private; now we pray openly and drink in private. That is the difference!"

To return to the question of a culture of democracy or of a democratic culture, I think that when we discuss such an important matter as democracy there will never be a complete convergence of ideas between two people, let alone 15 esteemed persons. But at least everyone will agree that democracy means freedom as well as voluntary restrictions on freedom, that is to say responsibility — at a social, national and global level. Democracy means freedom and law-abidance. But in this respect, what is important nowadays is that democracy is sometimes replaced by "telecracy". Now that is a very dangerous phenomenon, because the mass media are a business, and they are sometimes ruled by ignorance, irresponsibility and profit. And they

have the resources to appeal to people's hearts. Dostoevsky once said that in any human soul there are both God and the devil, who are constantly clashing. But it is much easier to appeal to the devilish side of the human soul. That is why the mass media's sense of responsibility needs to be encouraged. UNESCO should come up with a way of influencing the media to produce propaganda — it is not a word I am afraid of — in favour of the culture of democracy, but on a basis acceptable to all.

Yet another question: "How can we encourage the internationalization of democratic principles by introducing them into a given society?" By way of an answer, my advice to UNESCO would be that it should use the democratic elements that already exist in cultures, civilizations and ethnic groups outside Europe. For example, some Councils of Elders that are to be found in some African countries or in the Caucasus; some ideas which are connected not with the machinery of voting but with the consensus that exists both in Africa, the Far East and elsewhere. A form of collective responsibility, or collectivism — in Russian it is called *sobornost* — which could be incorporated in one way or another into the principles of democracy. Traditions which advocate responsibility on the part of rulers vis-à-vis those they rule are also part of traditional principles. The responsibility of a group or a community for its members, and, conversely, the responsibility of members of a group for the welfare of the group as a whole — it is along those lines that people should be educated, as long as it does not contradict the general principles of democracy.

Hisashi
Owada

I am glad we are having a focused discussion on each of the salient points that should be considered in connection with democracy and development. I feel that extremism is one of the most important factors, and that is why I would like to focus exclusively on it. I am inclined to agree with Mr Charfi that cultural factors are extremely important, insofar as they are the framework which constitutes a breeding ground for extremism. I am not saying that culture is a factor which causes extremism. Cultural factors can be considered in various ways, but it is undoubtedly a background that needs to be examined properly in order to deal with the issue of extremism. But it is only a background, and there are some other factors, which trigger extrem-

ism, create it and bring it to the surface in a particular context. I think we shall have to look at both those aspects.

I do not believe in the inevitability of the clash of civilizations. I feel it is a poor slogan insofar as it has connotations of a self-fulfilling prophecy and can be used against peace and democracy. And why is that so? Because of ignorance of other cultures which should be respected if not adhered to — and there is a difference between adherence and respect. And I think that this is an important point in relation to Mr Vassiliev's warning against total relativism, which should be avoided. To say that there are universal values is not to deny that one and the same value can be expressed in different ways. I feel it is essential to stress this difference between the principal quality of universal values and their concrete manifestations, which can vary greatly.

In order to deal with this problem of cultural factors as a background, I believe exposure to be an extremely important factor. It is more a question of education. Otherwise, we have to wait for a sense of tolerance that will be created automatically, or at least more spontaneously through direct exposure. Short of direct exposure, I feel that education in the intellectual sense is a way of exposing ourselves to different existences.

“Culture of tolerance” in that context will be very important. Here again, I think that it is a question of education. Of course, direct exposure can encourage a sense of tolerance, which will arise automatically or even spontaneously. Short of that, the teaching of tolerance and of a culture of tolerance through education is extremely important.

In this connection, I would like to mention a few historical examples of Japan that I am familiar with. It is obvious that extremism is not a phenomenon unique to Europe, nor is it a problem unique to any particular type of religion. Japan itself experienced a certain form of extremism, particularly in the 1930s, and it is interesting to note that, while the majority of the Japanese population is Buddhist, extremism took the form of fundamentalism within the framework of Shintoism, and not Buddhism. It is an interesting phenomenon, because Shintoism is a more exclusive religion, which exists only in Japan, whereas Buddhism is a much broader concept and dominated the whole of East Asia.

This brings me to my second point, namely the question

of what mechanism triggers extremism. I think there were very specific reasons why Shintoist extremism, or fundamentalism, appeared in Japan in the 1930s. In my view, what triggers fundamentalism, or extremism in general, is a feeling of social alienation. When that comes about for various reasons, which may be political, economic or social, the extremism which has been quietly feeding on cultural factors comes to the surface. In the Japan of the 1930s, two factors were at work. One was the great Depression, which created a very profound feeling of social and economic alienation at a domestic level. There occurred as a result a widening gulf between the rich and the poor, and a steadily increasing number of Japanese came to live in extreme poverty. Those conditions were a hotbed for extremism.

The other factor, at international level, was a very strong feeling of political alienation, which was caused by racial discrimination and the failure of multilateralism within the League of Nations, for which Japan was of course responsible. However, whatever the causes and effects of that situation, the Japanese had a very strong feeling of political alienation at an international level. I think this demonstrates the point I am trying to make. And in this respect, what Mr Charfi said about “computer minds” seems to me to be very interesting.

In the course of the postwar period in Japan, we experienced a very limited but very interesting and very threatening form of extremism, which emerged with the Aum Shinrikyo cult incident involving a mass killing in Tokyo with sarin gas. Here again, this was a form of extremism, insofar as the attack aimed to destroy the whole structure of the Japanese State. It was of course unsuccessful, but it is interesting to note that most of the cultists are people with a scientific background: engineers, doctors, scientists and mathematicians, who had had a good record at university. This only goes to prove Mr Charfi’s point, namely that an individual will approach problems in a much more reasonable way when his or her horizon broadens as a result of general education, of contacts with various cultures, of comparative philosophy and of a comparison between different civilizations. And that is true even if the person concerned is put in a position of frustration, because of a feeling of alienation.

Mr Vassiliev also touched on this issue. I think it is very important to think about the role of the mass media, because the

question which you, Mr Chairperson, raised is interesting. In your comments on Mr Charfi's remarks, you said: "But that is an elitist approach". It is indeed an elitist approach. But my own feeling is that when extremism appears it is normally an elitist action, which is subsequently followed by the masses and thus becomes a social movement. It is never a mass movement from the beginning. I think there is an elite, which leads the movement, and then, when the terrain is favourable, the masses follow. We should therefore examine these two aspects: on the one side the leaders, who make up the elite, and on the other the followers. The followers will follow, and it becomes a social movement because of the frustrations and the feeling of social or other alienation. And it is very often the mass media which fuel all that. That is why the role of the media is to my mind a very important factor that we should not neglect.

Of course our report is not going to deal with that issue extensively, but I do think it is one of the points we should emphasize in recommending that UNESCO examine the role of the media very comprehensively and see what should be done and what should be safeguarded, while at the same time preserving the freedom of the media, which is the very essence of a free and democratic society.

When I say "media" in this context, I do not just mean the newspapers and TV news. I believe more broadly that TV and cinema films also play a role. I was very surprised by one film which was shown in Japan, in which the commentator was interviewing the leaders of child warriors in Africa — it was Sierra Leone or Liberia, I think. Child soldiers were being recruited to fight in the internal war. Their leader said quite categorically that the best textbook for training those child soldiers, who were not used to fighting, was, to begin with, violent American films. It was a very interesting observation and fitted the facts, since he was speaking from his own practical experience. I think that when such films are shot in a country like the United States, the aim is to entertain spectators by going through the experience of virtual reality, without their really being involved in it. But when the film is used for training child soldiers, virtual reality is transformed into genuine reality in the children's minds. That is why, without wishing really to criticize the intentions of the makers of those films, it has to be recognized that when used in this way

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

they can produce results that were not intended by the producers, but which can turn virtual reality into genuine reality. I think this is another area worth exploring, a problem we should deal with in connection with the fundamental extremism that is a characteristic of our modern age.

Finally, one word on globalization in that connection. I believe, like Judge Mbaye, that the problem of globalization needs to be dealt with in its full context as far as creating a sense of alienation is concerned. I think it is important to study and explain the various aspects of the globalization phenomenon. It is not enough to say that globalization is inevitable and that we have no choice but to accept it. It is also very important to show its beneficial side as well as the problems it raises. Globalization should be presented in a more balanced way. Its beneficial side should be emphasized as much as possible, without neglecting its negative aspects, which, if unattended to, could become very dangerous in the context of the crisis caused by extremism. I think it really is possible to create an environment that enables the problem of extremism to be dealt with more effectively.

Mr Chairperson, my colleagues have put forward some highly interesting suggestions. For my part, I would like to focus on a single point, not at the expense of the others, but as a specific contribution. I think we all have dreams of a global society — that is what the United Nations is all about. In that context, the Declaration of Human Rights is the fundamental text, a kind of common denominator of the beliefs to which the whole of humankind subscribes. Now in Beijing we had some difficult moments during the Conference on Human Rights because there were some highly sensitive questions, which were put on hold until the end of the Conference. One of them, in particular, was the question of whether or not the text of the Declaration should specify that women's rights were human rights. In the end, women were able to celebrate the extraordinary — to my mind — fact that at the end of the twentieth century the need was felt to declare that women's rights were human rights. Well, it was necessary! That is how it happened, and I think that the women were absolutely delighted to be there, as indeed I was.

Having said that, I believe that the consensus that took shape in Beijing enables us today to state that it is the desire of

the international community that anything which can prove an impediment to that assertion of human rights, which include women's rights, should be the subject of an intervention, of criticism and of arguments in favour of the assertion of those rights. So I would say that the fight against this reaction of identitarian closure cannot afford to disregard the issue of women's rights. We cannot afford to disregard all that it represents, as regards physical integrity, the right to education, the right to come and go as they please. So I would say that it would be an ideal opportunity for UNESCO to intervene on this point when the international community meets in New York to assess the results of the Beijing Conference. I for one have often said that the twenty-first century began in Beijing. I am personally convinced of that.

So on this occasion I think it is important to see what role UNESCO could play in that assessment. Would it be a good idea, for example, to organize a special forum to discuss the cultural aspect of the assertion of women's rights at world level? For my part, I think it would be extremely important to ask the following question: "How are we to achieve the aim of constructing a global culture that abides by the United Nations' decisions at the Conference on Human Rights?"

**Robert
Badinter**

On the basis of that excellent speech, I would like to discuss an observable fact. Our world seems to me to be moving in two directions at the same time: one is towards globalization, which fascinates and indeed dominates the end of this century; and the other, in parallel, is towards localization. The term "identitarian closure" has a pejorative connotation, but the rebirth of, and increasingly manifest attachment to, regional and local cultures goes precisely in an apparently opposite direction. And we cannot envisage the future without taking into account one or other of the two dimensions. There is much talk of the world being a village, but in the same way it is also a fact that my village is becoming the world. It is both things at the same time. When we choose what I would call the macrocultural level, the world-village level, what do we observe? We indeed observe a cultural and universal predominance connected with the development of technology. Technology has brought in a whole new ball game compared with former times. We live in the age of the audio-visual and the age of the Internet. If we had met within these

walls 45 years ago, we would not have experienced what is the predominant characteristic of cultural globalization, namely an ever-faster standardization of world culture resulting from the fact that the predominant cultural medium is essentially global. We should start with that basic fact, which dominates our era, and from there see what precise recommendation we can make. I think we need to ask ourselves questions — and UNESCO is in a better position to do so than any other organization — about that culture, that world macroculture, that universal culture which floods our small screens everywhere. We need to see what values and negative values are inherent in that culture, because, if I may say so, it is not good enough to assert that school and university education should transmit positive values such as the universal values of tolerance, etc. To help those values make headway, we need to detect the threats and the negative values that are truly inherent in our society. For while it is true that children go to school, a very great majority of them, it seems to me, still watch television much more than they take an interest in the message put across by their teacher. Mr Owada had some extremely interesting things to say about that a moment ago, when he talked about the children who are mobilized in Liberia and fired up on a diet of familiar films on this or that war.

I will, if I may, mention an example I came across quite by chance when I got home yesterday. I was watching television, like everyone else, and I happened to see an educational programme. And in the course of that educational programme, according to the prevailing principle of interactivity, children were asked about violence at school. There were some very interesting children, and then there was a little girl — and I mean the caricature of a typical little girl from a bourgeois middle-class family. She was French and was wearing socks and a little skirt, and her hair was in bunches: she was perfect. Someone asked her: “Tell me, Eliane” — she had a very fashionable first name — “can you give me an example of what you regard as a really silly thing to do?” The little girl thought for a moment, smiled and said: “Yes, killing mummy and daddy”. Dr Freud was not around, but when I heard that, I said to myself: now that is really extraordinary! Killing mummy and daddy equals a really silly thing to do! Nobody reacted, the microphones did not explode, and the commentator was not thunderstruck... The world’s absolute taboo had become

a silly thing to do. The reason I am telling you this story is that you can see that in our hypersophisticated culture, and in an obviously privileged social milieu, parricide and matricide have been reduced to the category of “silly things to do”. So it is very important to look at the negative values conveyed by this world culture, because if we do not detect them there is no point in preaching. One first has to know what is wrong before saying what should be done to improve matters. When I was holding a seminar on justice at university, we only worked on injustice, because as I said to my students justice is a very difficult concept to grasp, whereas injustice, with its horns, can easily be recognized. So we worked on that — witches and all that — on every kind of unjust and iniquitous repression imaginable that had occurred during the history of humankind. It is an endless catalogue. So I would like, if I may, to recommend that UNESCO should ask itself questions not only about negative values, but about the values conveyed by that universal culture.

This brings me to another observable fact: we have entered a radically different age, now that we float and surf on the Net. I believe, Mr Chairperson, that in this institution work has already begun on the Net as a forum, on the Net as a cultural medium, and so on. Now it is precisely there, via the Internet, that the globalization of minds is in the pipeline, there that the first genuine internationalization of cultures is going to take place. We therefore need to ask ourselves questions not only about good and evil and about democratic values, but about democratic negative values, for, as was rightly said a moment ago, everything begins with an elite. All acts of terrorism originate somewhere in the subtle mediation of a philosopher, which is subsequently distorted, and which mobilizes people, with the results we all know. This is true of fanaticism, this is true of terrorism, we are all familiar with the process. Now the Internet encourages, in a phenomenal way, the development of anything from racist propaganda to cults and other perverted forms of democratic values. Here again, we should think about this, and make it a priority, given the way things are going.

There then remains the fascinating question — and one on which UNESCO has already worked a great deal — of micro-cultures: in other words, for me the world is my village. It is a very widespread form of cultural preservation. To counter the

threat of standardization and eradication, we need to preserve precisely those things over which the audiovisual macroculture has no power, quite simply because you cannot carry out audience research on, for example, a charming little fête in Tunisia, which is of interest to Tunisian villagers, or, beyond that, to those who are interested in festive culture in North Africa. But in terms of audience ratings, that would be the equivalent of 4 a.m. on a local television station. Here, then, the preservation, the protection, the way we can integrate or use, through those microcultures, what constitutes to my mind the reality of immediate human exchanges in the world we live in are also a source of research and essential suggestions. For they are very strong defences, or very pernicious sources. But in either case they are major places which we should take into consideration. It is always the same approach: common principles and diverse cultural expressions. Another point: they both need to be considered jointly.

Lastly, I shall conclude by answering or asking myself questions in my turn about the question at hand (asking oneself a question about a question is the most delightful of pursuits, that is how one makes progress intellectually. In the end, Carbonnier was right: law is the science of the contradictory. That is also true for any other form of dialectical thought). Should we, as Ms Darcy de Oliveira suggests, distinguish in our quest, so to speak, two separate aspects, which are separate but also, I hope, connected: on one side the issue of women, and on the other the issue of men? In this respect, I am familiar with the “gender-specific” approach that is greatly in vogue. Now I am once again going to give you my feeling on this, which is one that is nowadays accused of being thoroughly conservative and reactionary. But you cannot be a supporter of the universality of human rights, which are also all the rights of the human being, without, by definition, being concerned by the idea of dividing them in two, since we have to call a spade a spade. My reply to you will be both yes and no. First it will be no, because, if you look at what is quite rightly stressed — and I for one think that it can never be stressed enough — namely violations of the rights of human beings, of the human person, you see that their main target, and I repeat target, who is not different either in nature or in essence, but their main target as victims are women. The vio-

lation of fundamental rights affects women first and foremost, and that is something that can never be stressed enough. If one considers human beings' right to physical integrity, right to respect, right to culture and education, it is always, or most often, women who are the main victims. Because they are the main victims, does that mean that a different body of legal rules should be set up for them? My answer is no.

Excuse me for saying so, but that would mean confusing two levels of thinking: there is the level of the definition of rights, and this is a question of universalism, and there is the major problem of how to combat violations of those rights, and this brings us face to face with the question of female priority. But in my view it is not because women are the main victims, as are children in other societies — I would even say child-women in many cases; it is not because they are the main victims, which is a fact; it is not because they suffer from the greatest combination of handicaps or violations that occur to varying degrees in our various societies; it is not for those reasons that their rights are different in nature. In other words, action in favour of women should continue, but not according to a concept of human rights that depends on gender, not according to a "gender-specific approach to human rights". You see, I believe that in this respect differentialism (a notion that sprang up in American universities, and it is here that the ideas dear to Mr Owada come into their own) drags us, and I repeat drags us, via that elite towards a conception that will eventually destroy the universality of human rights. I am sorry to say so, and I shall always repeat it: let us give priority to the fight for the recognition of rights, which are the rights of the human person in the case of women. But let us not make any divisions, because then you destroy the universality of human rights. And as I cannot see anything that more deserves our support in this poor world of ours, I for one beg to differ with you.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I do not want to keep the dialogue going for too long, but, even so, I would not want my contribution to be misunderstood. I believe that Mr Badinter is in fact referring to a worldwide controversy, which is very real, and which he summarized in his last remarks. I myself am not involved in that controversy, because I simply say that if human rights are universal, if there are vic-

tims, and if there is a world conference that sets a number of objectives in this respect, then the United Nations' various bodies must all ask themselves the same question: have those objectives been achieved? That is the point of what I have to say.

Another question. I do still think, Mr Badinter, that to say "women are victims, but one cannot talk of women's rights" also runs the risk of silence. In other words, I am not asking for rights, but I do still think that with the emphasis on victims it can clearly be seen that this collective victimization today represents a threat of barbarity. If one is looking for a civilizing process, one cannot, whatever intellectual argument or quarrel with the Americans is invoked, omit to mention something which stands out as an assertion, a need for civilization. I am not, frankly, too worried by what American universities may have to say, but I am concerned enough as a humanist that we should not here imitate Greek democracy, which excluded women and slaves. In this sense, I maintain that a debate at UNESCO on democracies cannot fail to mention the situation of women, the victimization of women, and the question of what practical measures should be taken to remedy the situation. That is why I requested, on the occasion of Beijing +5, that a UNESCO space should be opened to discuss the cultural issue of the marginalization of women. That so-called cultural issue turned into, took the form of physical attacks, physical violence, which were excused all over the world in the name of culture. That is what I am protesting against here. I now claim to be speaking solely as a woman.

**Marrack
Goulding**

I would like to begin by apologizing to you, Mr Chairperson, and to our colleagues for not having been here yesterday, and I must ask you, Sir, to tell me to shut up if I am about to say things which have already been covered at yesterday's meeting. Mr Charfi started us well this morning with his thesis that the causes of extremism are more cultural than economic and social. I was tempted to speak before Ambassador Owada, but I agree very much with what he said. Extremism is a response to discontent, to discontent which cannot be resolved in other ways. I would submit that discontent rarely has cultural causes. It is generally due to political factors such as bad governance, corruption, discrimination and exclusion, or to economic factors such as disparities of wealth, economic exploitation and so on.

Now one consequence of recent technological developments is that improved communications have the effect of spreading discontent. It is much easier for economic disparities between countries to become evident to those in the country which is doing less well. It is much easier for groups of people within a country to see the disparity between their situation and that of their richer compatriots. Another problem is the one created by a world in which there is one superpower, especially if that superpower is one that is prone to believe in extraterritorial jurisdiction. And this is a source of political discontent which can lead to extremism.

So I would argue that if we are thinking about the causes of extremism we should focus more on the political and economic causes of extremism than on any cultural ones there may be. And we should recognize that because of technological development it is much easier for discontent to spread and for those with an extremist response to disseminate their views. I very much agree with those who have spoken about the role which UNESCO can play in spreading the gospel of tolerance and the other factors which Mr Hussain and Mr Mbaye mentioned. And I believe that these ideas are a possible basis for recommendations which this Panel could make to the Director-General of UNESCO.

But I also think — and this is my last point, Mr Chairperson — that we must also bear in mind the point which is implicit in the title of this Panel, that economic development is one of the most important ways of addressing the causes of economic discontent, which can lead to extremism. So we are, if you like, closing the circle.

Guo Jiading

Throughout these meetings, faced with colleagues who have all long been expert on matters concerning UNESCO and human rights, I feel rather like a schoolboy. And before coming here I had to do my homework from the beginning on the relevant basic documents, so that I would not stray from what constitutes the fundamental spirit of the United Nations and of UNESCO. On the occasion of the recent 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I read through a few articles and found that Article 29 was of some relevance to our discussion. The Article reads:

- 1) *Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.*
- 2) *In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.*
- 3) *These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.*

Now it follows from that Article, to my mind, that when exercising human rights and freedoms one needs to bear in mind a few things:

1. The duties of the individual to the community;
2. Respect for the rights and freedoms of others;
3. The requirements of morality, public order and general welfare;
4. Conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

And as for the United Nations Charter, in my understanding, the purposes and principles consist of the essential element, that is respect for the principle of equal rights, the sovereign equality of members of the Organization, and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Other elements include refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. I think we need to bear in mind these principles when conducting our discussions.

A second point concerns UNESCO. As this was to be the first time I had occasion to deal with matters connected with UNESCO, I hurried to read the Constitution of UNESCO before coming here. I noted that the aim of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture. And in another passage, we read: "They do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which

the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims”.

So it is my understanding that the job of UNESCO is clearly education, science and culture. Education comes first, it is UNESCO's top priority.

We in China have learned a lot of painful lessons, and one of the main lessons we have learned is that over a long period China neglected education or did not pay sufficient attention to it. So we have now realized — and it has even become a State policy — that we must build the nation through science and education. Now UNESCO is education and science! But UNESCO's action has its limits, which are due to the constraints of its limited budget. I think we should, when discussing projects and programmes of action, take priorities into account and, because the budget is limited, devote the lion's share of it to educational matters.

As for science and technology, their importance is steadily increasing. We live in an age of what is known as the “knowledge economy” (not knowledge of the economy). I think that in our programme we can give an important place to the transfer of knowledge, to the sharing of knowledge, particularly in the area of science and technology, through training, exchanges and, to use a fashionable expression, “capacity-building”. My British colleague will be able to explain to me what is meant by that.

As for culture, we have talked about it at great length and from very varied viewpoints: the culture of peace, the culture of democracy, and the culture of justice. But it seems to me that in its traditional sense the term “culture” is easily grasped. I therefore feel that we should also consider devotion to culture in the traditional sense of the word.

As for freedom of expression and press freedom, we are all fully aware that there cannot be democracy without freedom of expression and press freedom. However, as some speakers have pointed out, there is something else that needs to be stressed: the ethical standards and social and moral responsibility that are incumbent upon the press and the media. Press freedom should be conducive to the development of the nation and to social stability; and individual freedom should not impinge on the freedom of others. There is no such thing as absolute freedom, because it would impinge on the freedom of

Pierre
Cornillon

others. And also, at a given period of development, some developing countries may think it necessary — understandably — to establish a balance between press freedom and the maintenance of social stability. Only then is it possible for the States concerned to continue to make headway and boost their economic development, at the same time as their press freedom, on a sustainable basis.

Now with regard to the question of extremism, I am happy to be able to share some of the opinions expressed by my British colleague, Mr Goulding, when he talks about the economic aspect of the issue. I think that the economic causes of extremism cannot be ignored. Given that we are talking about those causes and ways of combating them, I agree that the economic aspect may sometimes be the most important.

On the issue of “identitarian closure” and extremism, I think that much was said at our last meeting. I think we should make an overall analysis which is the only way to come up with recipes for action, and which will anyway not be easy. We have already stressed that today’s world is moving too quickly. It is moving too quickly for many men and women on this planet, and for a number of them, it is becoming standardized. It is not becoming standardized through a harmonious mingling of values and cultures, but through the imposition of a single external model. That is one of the fundamental points.

In response to this situation, a feeling is emerging which is both material and psychological. A great number of people feel they have been left by the wayside by this train which is travelling too fast. They have been left by the wayside of the route to modernity which brings them nothing and even impoverishes them and makes them lose their identitarian bearings. They therefore have a feeling of alienation, a feeling that their values are being diluted, a feeling of fear and, very often, of being overtaken by events. And this is all the more so because their leaders do little or nothing to help them get on that train but instead show them a negative image of modernity. These are complex and varied feelings but they explain the prevailing situation in many countries. It seems to me that is the major reason for this identitarian closure which, as Mr Badinter quite rightly pointed out, can have both a positive and a negative aspect. The positive

aspect is the return to the village, the strengthening of certain traditional values, the return to the community and the rediscovering of local culture. The negative aspect is support for extremist movements and violence, etc.

When you talk about a movement, you have to talk about leaders. I think Mr Owada put his finger on the essential point: in our analysis we need to make the question of leaders a separate issue. We need to do that because it requires a different form of action on the part of everyone, including UNESCO, which we are here to advise. In this group of leaders there are sometimes philosophers whose writings are exploited, or theoreticians who are politicians and people of power. Being attracted to power is not unlawful in itself; but thirst for power becomes suspect when people go to extreme lengths to quench that thirst. And I would say to Mr Charfi that it is a fact that these movements are very often led by extremely cultivated people who have considerable comparative knowledge. These are people who have decided that the ideology they have espoused — and which they are themselves capable of denouncing just as a lawyer can plead either one argument or its counter-argument — that this ideology is a good vehicle for taking people where they want to take them, in other words to come to power.

What action might we recommend to UNESCO? First, to spread the idea that, as regards extremists, it is necessary to act within the framework of the law and in the spirit of democracy, because — I already made this point last time — one cannot, on the pretext that a movement is extremist and anti-democratic, begin to play its game. Democracy must defend itself with its own weapons and use them resolutely, within the framework of the law but with all the rigour of the law. I also believe that there is a fundamental duty incumbent upon all politicians — whatever the context, whatever their needs or their desire for power — politicians have a duty never to compromise with such movements. What can we recommend that UNESCO should do to stop people joining extremist movements? To my mind, we can recommend that with all the resources at its disposal, it should encourage solidarity, promote the meaning of solidarity, encourage exchanges, the mingling of ideas and the culture of tolerance.

Mr Kéba Mbaye has underlined the importance of exchanges and, in turn, I would like to tell you a little story. The

other day, I was listening to two youngsters from a disadvantaged Paris suburb who were describing on the radio how they had just got back from a humanitarian trip to Romania — they had more or less been enlisted. It was interesting to hear how they assessed their own living conditions and the situation in disadvantaged suburbs and to find out how they reacted in the light of what they had seen during their trip. Their former dissatisfactions, demands and frustrations that can generate violence were beginning to appear to them in a very different perspective.

In all its actions, UNESCO should stress the universal nature of democracy, and clearly demonstrate how democracy transcends all forms of particularism. The major instruments of human rights should be promoted ceaselessly and by every means possible and their content should be publicized. Confronting extremism is an enormous task which calls for general mobilization on the part of all democrats whose tireless action will contribute to get things moving and contribute more solidarity and tolerance so that the train of modernity — travelling too fast and it is not going to be stopped — does not uncouple some rear carriages and leave too many people behind on the platform.

Han
Sung-Joo

I think that after a day and a half of very intense and very extensive discussion, we could wind up our debate. We have indeed had some very useful, very intense and very philosophical exchanges of views on a variety of issues. Because of my background as an East Asian and a professor, I tend to be a very pragmatic person and not terribly philosophical — which does not mean that East Asians are not philosophical. In my capacity as a professor used to supervising doctoral dissertations, I am often just as interested in the structure of the dissertation as I am in its content. As I suggested yesterday, I think our report should start by defining the concept of democracy, its connections with justice, the relationship between freedom and equality (a topic that interested Alexis de Tocqueville a century and a half ago), what we mean by the term “human rights and development”, and so on.

Secondly, we ought to analyse the present situation. That is what Mr Cornillon just said with reference to the state of democracy, of human rights and development in today’s world. About a dozen questions have been raised. They could serve as

sub-headings for our work. The order in which they are listed could be changed, but here, in a random way, is the list:

1. Democracy and human rights as universal values: this would be the first heading, in line with the point stressed by Mr Valticos this morning; and it is an aspect that I do not think Mr Guo would object to, even though he insisted yesterday on the specific characteristics of various societies and cultures, because it is possible to come up with a common denominator regarding human rights in various societies.
2. Also discussed this morning was the question of how to deal with the clash of civilizations. This does not imply that we accept Samuel Huntington's thesis, but there are of course different civilizations which compete and sometimes clash, at a local, if not a global, level.
3. I think we discussed the issue of making individual rights compatible with the responsibilities or needs of the community. We may not have a conclusive answer to this question, but we should undoubtedly be able to deal with it.
4. How do we make democracy work for development, and vice versa? In this connection, Mr Goulding mentioned the question of how to make development work for democracy and peace and to counter extremism, for example.
5. Yesterday, we discussed the question of globalization at some length. There could therefore be a sub-heading: "Coping with globalization".
6. A point that Ambassador Hussain emphasized is how technology, particularly in the field of communications, can be used to encourage democracy and development.
7. The issue of democratization through education is, of course, right up UNESCO's street .
8. The eighth sub-heading could be the promotion of human rights, and in particular the rights of minorities (and women's rights and children's rights could be included in those of minorities, although they may not necessarily be a minority in America). This is an issue that was discussed yesterday and today.
9. The role of the media in favour of democracy and human rights could be the ninth sub-heading. We discussed them today.
10. The next sub-heading could be: the use of democratic tradi-

tions that are peculiar to different cultures. This is, I think, a point you raised this morning, Mr Vassiliev.

11. The 11th sub-heading could be: how to cope with extremism? Mention would need to be made of such issues as alienation, discontent and fundamentalism, which often overlap, a fact that would have to be allowed for.
12. We should encourage a culture of democracy. How we go about that is another matter, which was abundantly discussed in the report on our first meeting.
13. There is also the rather different issue of the problem of sovereignty, namely how do we deal with the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs? This is a very tricky problem. A superpower may wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of another State, and even a State that is not a superpower may wish to do the same, and with good reason. How can this problem be resolved?

I imagine that much of the afternoon will be devoted to the following issue: "What can we actually do?" I shall make my own twopenny-worth suggestion, which is that a very visible and even signature-type conference should be organized, which would be based on our forward-looking report. Visibility would be guaranteed by the presence of our Chairperson, a former Secretary General of the United Nations. We should therefore be able to get the attention and impact we are seeking.

I am not suggesting that we follow the agenda I have suggested to the letter, but simply that you might perhaps take my suggestions into account.

Nicolas
Valticos

I would like to raise three issues briefly.

First, I have listened with interest to the series of ideas that the previous speaker has just set forth. We shall subsequently look more closely at how our conclusions will be shaped. What I wanted to say was that we have gathered here to talk about democracy and development within the framework of human rights, and the discussion did indeed get under way along those lines. Democracy and development, and the development, if I may say so, of democracy and development. We are not here to talk about limitations of human rights, but to define the scope of those rights, the extension of those rights, and I

believe that in our final report it is the positive, not the restrictive, aspect that should be emphasized.

A second issue is the eternal — and fortunately always changing — issue of men and women. To my mind, it is not really an issue that needs to be addressed, since we all basically agree. It is simply a question of deciding how, in our report, we present the problems connected with women's rights within the framework of the future programme for the continuing emancipation and legalization of women's rights at every level. Here the question of terminology looms large, since in the French expression "*droits de l'homme*" there is only the word, "*homme*", which means both a male and a human being. I think we will find a way of dealing with this problem without any difficulty.

Thirdly, I was very interested in the principle which Chairperson Kéba Mbaye set forth at the beginning of our meeting, when we were all feeling fresh and his brain was teeming with ideas. I agree that the points he raised are the essential points which should be included in our conclusions. There is one in particular, perhaps, which deserves to be specified, and that is the question of equality of opportunity — one of the points you mentioned, dear Mr Chairperson. It deserves to be elaborated on a little. If one of the questions that is of concern to us, and which should also be mentioned in the report, is globalization, one of the dangers that should be noted arises precisely from the lack of equality between States. Equality of opportunity should be mentioned in the case of States as well as of human beings. So suggestions should be made as to how to approach the problem of equalizing opportunity in areas where equality of opportunity does not exist. We should ask the question: how is it that certain countries live in such poverty, have no raw materials or trade, etc.? And how can international society, in its present form, answer the challenge posed by the problem of globalization? Unless we find an answer to these questions now, globalization will result in a growing gulf between rich and poor, or between the middle classes and the destitute. And this problem should be looked at not only from the point of view of individuals, but also in the context of the global economy. Those were the few questions I wanted to raise, Mr Chairperson, and I think we should soon think about how we are going to shape our conclusions.

Attiya
Inayatullah

First, I would like to say how much I agree with Ambassador Owada and to thank Professor Han for the very clear structure he has presented for our report.

I would like to look at the issue of extremism, which we are now addressing; and, as I mentioned yesterday, I see it as a product of exclusion, and not the other way round. I see it as the result of the game of power politics, economic exploitation and social aberrations. I therefore feel that extremism is a state of mind and that it is an instrument which results in three types of conflict.

The first is the power struggle, whether it takes the form of terrorism or war, which is organized across national borders by States or mafias. It is an organized power struggle that often impinges on sovereignty, and I truly believe that we need to examine it.

The second type of conflict that causes extremism is connected with the feeling of fear it causes, and in this connection I would like to point to three social categories which fall victim to abuse and oppression, and which feel threatened: they are women, religious or ethnic minorities, and migrants. In the case of women, it is important to combat this form of social exclusion, because they have been left too far behind and because they suffer. I think that their suffering is so intense and their wounds are so deep that they will end up emerging and becoming a power. But that will happen only if they are enabled and empowered. For that to happen, they will need positive discrimination, whether it be within the framework of the Beijing Conference or anything else. I think it is something that will happen.

The third result of extremism I would like to mention is alienation. It can be either political or social. You are disappointed by something, and that leads to people-led conflicts. There can be alienation from the existing political system, from the social system. I think that is what happened in Iran: to my mind, it was not a cultural phenomenon, but very clearly political and social, and that resulted in disappointment and alienation. And we have examples of local and regional conflicts of that kind which are clearly visible in the present situation.

So, Mr Chairperson, what should we do about this in the context of education? I think that UNESCO is already doing a reasonable job of promoting democracy and development and

human rights through education. I agree with Mr Charfi that tertiary education is the nursery that breeds extremist leaders. On the other hand, however, the populace can unfortunately behave like a dumb herd and, eventually, become cannon fodder. If I may say so, it is very often their ignorance which is exploited. So the problem of extremism needs to be addressed at two levels — at the tertiary level and at the school level. For, as I already said, I regard extremism as a state of mind.

Of course a great deal of subject matter could be included in such a curriculum, but it is our job to define its boundaries. As Ambassador Hussain pointed out this morning: your rights end where my nose begins. That is one concept. But there is another one which is also important; and that is the knowledge and understanding of different religions, because there is so much misunderstanding in this area. Let me take the example of Islam and the concept and philosophy of moderation. Is it generally known that Islam is a religion of moderation? No. It is known for many other aspects, but not that. That is why I feel that the teaching of comparative religion, which Mr Charfi mentioned this morning, is an essential part of any education curriculum, be it at the tertiary level or the school level.

Another question is: “How can one encourage multiculturalism as opposed to ethnocentrism?” That is a familiar issue, but to my mind it should be a priority in any teaching curriculum.

And finally this question: “How do we encourage tolerance?” Of all the United Nations agencies, there is one that specializes in this area, and that is UNESCO. Its skills and know-how in that respect should be recognized and exploited.

There is one last point which I feel needs to be included in our report, and that is the whole question of modernization versus traditionalism. This is a field where it is important that there should be both a mixing and a blending. You cannot condemn my religion on the grounds that yours is better: that is extremism. And it is a source of conflict. That is why I think we need to be able to combine modernism with traditionalism. What is bad in traditionalism can be dropped, but let those who claim to be modern accept what is good in it. What is needed is dialogue and interaction. We talked about dialogue this morning. What is meant by the word? I think that the people of Africa,

Latin America and Asia are very proud of their traditions and have a lot to share. And yet those who are “modernists” want to throw everything out of the window, and that results in a conflictual situation. That is why I would include those four or five points in any teaching curriculum.

How can this be taken forward? As far as tertiary education is concerned, UNESCO has a programme called “UNESCO Chairs”, and there are already a number of Chairs for promoting democracy and development through education. I would like our report and our recommendations to be linked to that programme by seeking to strengthen the number of Chairs and to allocate them more broadly.

My second suggestion concerns UNESCO's excellent project entitled “A New Policy for a New Century (DEMOS)”, which began in Latin America and was followed by a second DEMOS project in Africa. I think that this action should be stepped up so that all the regions of the world have their own DEMOS project.

A third and final suggestion: young people suffer from massive exploitation, and as I was saying earlier they are used as cannon fodder. I would like our recommendation to refer to that by using as its point of departure the programme entitled the “UNESCO Associated School Project Network (ASPnet)”, which is universal in scope and which operates in all the Member States of UNESCO. It should serve as a starting point, since it aims to do exactly what we are talking about.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

I have tried, very modestly, to sum up the proceedings of the various meetings we have had so far. During our first session, which took place on 4 and 5 May 1998, we defined the various forms of democracy and development in the broadest sense. All the Panel members agreed that there is a close relationship between democracy and development, and that human rights are an essential component of democracy. Also during those meetings of May 1998 the Panel argued, as it has again this time, that globalization is today the greatest challenge facing both democracy and development. And the impediments to development and democracy that were mentioned included the unequal distribution of income and wealth, fundamentalism, identitarian closure and extremisms. And emphasis was placed on the ever-increasing role played by new actors in domestic and interna-

tional public life, from international organizations and NGOs to members of parliament, large cities and universities.

The Panel's second meeting, which took place yesterday, focused on the role of justice. And justice was understood in a very broad sense, ranging from social justice at State or inter-State level to plain justice at domestic or even international level. In the view of the Panel as a whole, justice is the catalyst between democracy and development. There can be no democracy without justice, and no sustainable development without justice. And the Panel recommends that, in the very concept of justice, the legal institutions should be the subject of teaching programmes, at the level of schools, universities and cities. The Panel also urges that the duty of justice be encouraged, that human rights be popularized, and that the defenders of those rights and the national NGOs which look after their protection be protected.

During this morning's meeting, we focused on another of the major impediments to democracy at national level as well as to democracy at international level, in other words the democratization of international relations. I am referring to identitarian closure which, again according to some Panel members, has its positive sides, such as the promotion of local and regional cultures and resistance to standardization, as well as its negative sides, such as micro-nationalism, extremism and fundamentalism. This phenomenon can be explained by a feeling of marginalization, serious fear of globalization, the loss of identitarian bearings, the return to the village, all of them elements that encourage that metaphor, the dialectics between the bell tower and the satellite, between the minaret and the satellite: the return to the village, and the opposition between village and globalization. The struggle against the counter-values that are conveyed by world culture and the various forms of extremism and fanaticism, which are fuelled by local culture and identitarian closure. That seems to be one of the objectives we should recommend that UNESCO pursue.

That is my very incomplete summary. I have not dealt with the problem of the equality of men and women, nor with the importance of Beijing +5, a topic that comes under the heading of the protection of human rights.

This, then, is my very incomplete summary of our ses-

sions of 4 and 5 May 1998, and of those of yesterday morning, yesterday afternoon and this morning. Please correct me if I have left out certain elements you regard as important. I have tried to make this summary in such a way as to bring out more clearly what we have not yet examined or what needs to be examined further. The various interventions were very rich in content, but it might perhaps be interesting to devote a little more time to two issues I have singled out from the various reports.

The first is the question of the actors of civil society, the new non-State actors. What role can they play in the development of democracy and in the relationship between democracy and development, or, rather, between democracy and a sustainable and fairer development?

This brings us to a second issue, which we examined during the sessions of 4 and 5 May 1998, and which features on the agenda of today's sessions: the culture of democracy. There has been a lot of talk at UNESCO about the culture of peace. There is talk of the culture of democracy, there is talk of the culture of development, which is a way of bringing various notions together. In fact, if we are talking about the actors of civil society, the new non-State agents that have to play a role, whether it be in the field of development or democracy, or again in the field of the democratization of international relations, it is interesting to know what action they should take. Now, that action is dependent on a culture of democracy. I would tie in another idea, which has also come up often: it does actually seem that we are unanimous in recognizing the importance of the market economy, which can help to speed up development, but we are also unanimous in recognizing that the market economy needs to be corrected, that competition needs to be corrected by grass-roots solidarity and social justice.

I therefore propose first of all to examine the following points.

The first question: in this summary, has an important idea that deserves to be re-examined been overlooked?

The second question: do you agree that the actors of civil society should be allowed to play the role that could be theirs, namely that UNESCO may undertake actions with other organizations?

**Kéba
Mbaye**

Thank you for that summary, which is completely accurate. There is one idea, however, which I regard as important — I may not have spotted the moment when you mentioned it. It seems to me that in connection with our first meeting you said that human rights were part of democracy. Of course I totally agree. But there was also another idea which was expressed, and I myself believe it to be extremely important and even worth stressing: that is that human rights are also an element of development. I believe that to be fundamental.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

I am very pleased that the major themes of our discussion, which we seemed to have lost sight of at one point, should have been gathered together and reorganized. I think that in the light of our discussion it might perhaps be useful and even important to insert somewhere a point that was raised this very morning. I am thinking of continuous development, at every level, and of equal opportunities and treatment for men and women. I believe that this would be worth mentioning.

**Abid
Hussain**

I would like to compliment you, Mr Chairperson, on the way in which you summarized the main points of our discussions yesterday and today. But it occurred to me, to take up Mr Han's point, that the summary of our deliberations should include our recommendations as a whole, since it will take the form of a report, and it should have two sections. The first part, in line with what you have just proposed, will concern the programmes and our reactions on various points. But the second part will be more important, since it concerns the way in which UNESCO will orientate its programme of action. It is in this particular area that we stressed the importance of education and the need to reorientate education programmes. How? Mass communications will play an extremely important role here — and that really must be mentioned. The third point, which most of us agreed upon, I think, concerns science and technology, and the fact that they are the driving force. It is important to stress and take account of that in our report.

Another question is the programme on women's status, though there are other minorities and other people whose problems have not been fully dealt with. But up to now the real victims of development have been women. They must therefore be given pride of place, as we have done.

Han
Sung-Joo

A final point: UNESCO should organize meetings where intellectuals, artists, writers and many others can meet, juggle with their ideas and think about what the future is going to be. As we said the other day, whether we are talking about globalization or any other issue, we cannot present a blueprint for action, but we can suggest an idea as to how we can act to trigger awareness worldwide, and create a momentum in favour of that action. I feel that it is these writers and other figures who will sow the seeds of ideas, thus creating a social dynamo that will result in a mass movement. Since UNESCO is the one organization which is in contact with intellectuals, artists and creative people of all kinds, and which acts on them, it is important that we mention that issue.

I shall try to answer the two questions you raised, Mr Chairperson. Your summary was faithful and complete, but I think that what we overlooked in our discussions was the time element of things, the dynamic relationship that exists between democracy and development. To my mind, that relationship is not a constant one, not a snapshot kind of relationship in the sense that one element helps the other to move forward, and vice versa. In fact, if we look at the experience of many South-East Asian countries, we see that they all started with some degree of authoritarianism in the early stages of their economic development. That is true of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and in some ways Japan (if we start from the end of the nineteenth century), as well as Indonesia and Thailand (though those two States are now grappling with some difficulties). And that ultimately contributed to their democratization, with democracy playing a constructive role for a more dynamic form of economic development. That relationship cannot therefore be looked at as though the two elements, democracy and development, occurred simultaneously. The fact is that if we want to say that democracy is consistent with, or contributes to, economic development we must be aware of the fact that we are talking about two totally different elements.

One of them is the degree of economic development that a country has reached. In fact, during the early stages of economic development, democracy can be useful, but probably not as much as it can subsequently, at later stages. Most scholars

and experts are reluctant to say as much, as it is not very *kosher*, that is, not very politically correct. But I think that objectively the facts go to show that this is usually the case. In saying that, I am not advocating some particular system of government other than democracy.

The second element is the global relationship: do we live in a globalized world or in a more compartmentalized world? What characterizes the world of today is globalization, and in that context an economy can function properly only if it is democratic, if there is accountability and transparency, in other words the hallmarks of a democratic political system. And so from a scientific or academic point of view, I think this kind of variation and the time element should be taken into account.

As for the second question you raised, about the role and the importance of actors other than States and governments, everything points to the fact that their weight and their importance are growing, and I think this trend will continue, particularly as a result of the development of the technology of communications and the Internet. That is why it seems to me very important that our report should emphasize the importance for UNESCO of combining its efforts with those of NGOs and non-governmental actors as well as those of governments. In this connection, and in connection with what was said earlier, it would be useful, it seems to me, to take stock of all the NGOs and various actors involved in this endeavour, as well as of conferences and all other activities connected with it.

Alexei
Vassiliev

First of all, I would like to express my agreement with what Mr Han just said. It is in line with what I said at our last meeting in May, namely that the facts show that development sometimes takes place before the introduction of a fully democratic system. But at the same time I would say that at a certain stage the authoritarian regime in the countries that were mentioned had to change and turn into a democratic system so that development could continue.

But I would also like to refer to what Mr Hussain just said, which was included in the questions you listed with such perspicacity and accuracy, namely the role of the mass media. I think we should mention that their action can produce contradictory effects. In some cases, they help to promote the ideas

Pierre
Cornillon

and values of democracy. But they can also produce very different results, when it is a case of promoting the selfish and profit-motivated activities of a commercial organization.

As for the causes of extremism, you mentioned, I think, inequality before the law and many other factors.

A final question: we can continue our discussion, as there are still some points to be dealt with, but when we talk of the growing role of NGOs on the international scene, it is important not simply to mention the new and recently set-up NGOs. We must include traditional institutions, the dialogue between churches, the dialogue between Christianity and Islam, the dialogue of the Christian clergy, be they Catholic or Orthodox, with their Muslim and other counterparts. So, due to the fact that the reaction to globalization is, as was said here, the return to one's village, which includes the relationship with religion and culture, the dialogue between those institutions could be very important.

I would like to thank you, Mr Chairperson, for the summary you have just read. I observe that it is indeed a summary, in other words, it reflects the general structure of the thoughts that were expressed here last time, but not their content *in extenso*. So I do not believe it negates any of the detail that was said and above all written in the report. Let us quickly get back to the issue of the link between democracy and development. I think the myth that there can be considerable development under an authoritarian regime has been torn to pieces. I can remember many conferences where experts proudly boasted about the economic miracles of certain Asian countries. No one would dare make those same statements today after what has happened, particularly in Indonesia. So I think that what has been said here and what is written in the previous meeting's report should remain in full, for example, if democratization and development are not happening together it leads to failure, whereas the combination of the two maintains duration.

This morning Mr Badinter spoke of the role of the audiovisual sector. It is a fact that we live in an audiovisual society. But I am extremely hesitant about bringing up this subject in this building and urging UNESCO to look at what it could do to improve the message that is put across by the audiovisual media.

I know how powerful the audiovisual industry currently is, and I know that it is in very bad taste to attempt to criticize the media and that new power in any way. But I think that behind the closed doors of this room we could give some thought to the issue, even if it means we may conclude that we are to a certain extent powerless. For example, I know of African countries where, with the advent of democracy, it was nice to see how little broadsheets and other roneoed papers proliferated. But unfortunately, some of those papers turned into rags. Of course society is not free of conflicts and abuses and what is precisely so good about democracy is that it can denounce such abuses and thus remedy them. With the proliferation of these scandal sheets, often of exaggerations or even pure inventions, never giving positive news, the ordinary citizen of these countries discovers democracy in a very negative light. And that is undoubtedly not conducive to the development of a culture of democracy.

What may happen is that a general will appear on the scene and seize power with the pretext of sorting everything out. Whatever may be his possible good intentions at the outset, that general will very quickly set up an authoritarian regime and one that is far worse than the imperfect democracy he has overthrown. But then the ordinary citizen will have a perfect image of it because the general will make sure there is only one official newspaper and this newspaper will sing his praises. What can be done? Press freedom is an essential, fundamental element, but what can UNESCO do to encourage a responsible press? I do not know if there is an answer to that question and I say this with some anxiety because I know to what extent the media are major actors of civil society.

Hisashi
Owada

I unfortunately missed your summary, Mr Chairperson, which everyone has described as excellent. But some points were mentioned in the ensuing discussion which I would like to touch upon with a view to being included in the document you are preparing. I do not intend to get into its controversial aspects, but I shall take up the following three issues in succession.

First, a few words about what Mr Han Sung-Joo said. He and I have taken part in many conferences and symposia. It is very seldom that we disagree, but today I have to express some reservation. I very much agree that the time factor is very impor-

tant, and that it should be taken into account in our report. I have no objection to that. Having said that, the categorical assumption that in the course of the development process there must be an authoritarian government which speeds up that process is not a proven universal truth. There have been examples of that happening, but that does not prove that the reverse process cannot take place. I believe that at the very least this thesis has not been proved, and while I have no objection to the issue being examined I would be against our saying, in our conclusion, that at an earlier stage of development democracy is irrelevant or that an autocratic government is preferable.

There are examples to demonstrate this point even in East Asia. During the postwar period, for example, Japan made huge strides forward with a democratic government. Compared with other East Asian countries, the Philippines made similar progress, except for a very brief period of autocratic rule, during which no progress was made in terms of development — the Philippines progressed only while it had a democratic government.

I am not making these assertions in order to put forward a counter-thesis to be adopted. I simply want to say that, if the time factor is indeed a relevant factor, then Mr Han is right to point that out. But I have strong reservations about the conclusion he comes to and about the idea of adopting it as the conclusion of our group as a whole.

Second, Professor Vassiliev mentioned the role of the media, as I myself did this morning with reference to extremism. I feel we should perhaps avoid coming to a simplistic and categorical conclusion based on the negative aspect of the media. The media are a very important element of the democratization process, but, when it comes to a case like extremism, the greatest caution is required in formulating a proposition. That is why I feel — without coming to any categorical conclusion — that the importance of the role of the media in the whole process should be emphasized, though cautious phrasing will be needed.

And finally, as regards civil society, there is no question that the role it plays in the process of development and democratization is very important and positive. Having said that, its role can also have a problematic side, as I pointed out yesterday. It is related to the circumstances and the nature of the elements of society. Also there is the question of accountability

of a civil society organization, which cannot always be guaranteed in relation to society. To the extent that the influence of civil society is beneficial, it is most welcome. One has to be aware of the fact at the same time that in some cases an action of a concrete organization, however opportune it may be, carries no institutional guarantee as regards accountability. That is a factor that should be kept in mind. I am not saying for all that that we should make a negative assessment of civil society. My evaluation and appreciation of its role in the process of democracy and development would be extremely positive, but it is important that we should carry out a much deeper and more careful examination of some of the elements I have mentioned.

**Marrack
Goulding**

Mr Secretary-General, I share the admiration that colleagues have expressed about your summary. I had not realized that we had been so well structured and so intelligent in our discussions! I still have one point, which I mentioned at our last meeting, which worries me a little bit. Some of the recent speakers touched on it. How do we move from the analysis which we are carrying out, and which you have summed up so well, to the drafting of prescriptions and recommendations to UNESCO about how it could modify its existing programmes? And that is partly a question about who drafts what, and do we submit a report in two parts, and so on. It is also a question — as far as I am concerned — of not knowing a great deal about what UNESCO's programmes are at present in this field. And I would be interested to hear — hopefully this afternoon — how you envisage bridging that gap.

The second point I wanted to mention was the media. I agree with everything that has been said about the damaging effect that the media can have, but I think that we should not give any indication of being tempted by ideas about controlling the media. The media cannot be controlled now, with globalization and the Internet (as our friends in Amman have seen in the last few days, when they wanted to avoid revealing the whole truth about the King's illness and put out statements which did not reveal the full truth, whereas everyone in Amman knew that those statements were false because the real news was coming in via news agencies in the United States). In China, similarly, there have been attempts to control access to information on the Internet, and I do not think that they have been entirely successful. I

believe that we have to accept that the media, like the weather, can be nice and helpful, or nasty and unhelpful, and we simply have to build that fact into our calculations of how we can set about promoting the objectives of democracy, development and human rights.

And the third point I wanted to make is about civil society and NGOs. And here I am going to differ a little bit from what Ambassador Owada has just said. I think it has become politically incorrect to be critical of NGOs. I agree entirely with what has been said about the fact that the institutions of civil society have become very important players in these international issues like democracy, democratization and development, as well as peace and security. But I think that, for a while anyway, it has been politically incorrect to question the value of their contribution. I would like to suggest that perhaps we should be a little more outspoken than Ambassador Owada was suggesting, in saying that the institutions of civil society come in very good shapes and very bad shapes, and there are some which can play an enormous part and make an enormous contribution to promoting the objectives that we are all seeking to achieve, whereas there are others which have a negative effect. If you look at what happened, for example, with the very practical question of humanitarian relief in Bosnia. There were institutions which made a wonderful contribution to achieving that humanitarian objective, but there were also others which caused far more trouble than good. And I would therefore like to suggest that we should avoid a blanket endorsement of the role of the institutions of civil society in those matters, and suggest that it is necessary to pick and choose. Like the media, they cannot be controlled, they are like the weather. It is important that the international community should work hand in hand with the best of them and take advantage of their action, as you suggested in your summary. But we should also recognize that in some cases we may have to keep our distance from the less good ones.

**Hisashi
Owada**

Excuse for speaking again, but I have the feeling that I may have caused a misunderstanding with Mr Goulding. I have never set out to criticize civil society. I have said quite clearly that its role is very important and positive. What we should avoid is giving it an unreserved and blanket endorsement. I regard the question of

accountability as the key element and the core of the problem. Now the problem of accountability does not necessarily make the activity of civil society useless or even illegitimate. It can quite well be legitimate. It is only that if there is no institutional framework in which the accountability problem is reflected, the action of civil society can, depending on the circumstances and on the nature of the NGO concerned, be less than satisfactory. I am not saying this should be specifically indicated in our statement. I simply wanted to illustrate my point of view to you. I think that in the case of the media and civil society we should emphasize the importance of these elements as decisive factors in the process of democratization and development. All that I am saying is that we should not be unreservedly categorical in drawing our conclusions on such issues as the time factor which Mr Han mentioned, or the role of the media and civil society. That is all I wanted to say.

Attiya
Inayatullah

When we discuss the causes of extremism, I would like us also to discuss its consequences. I think it is important that we realize what is happening to the world as a result of extremism.

My second remark is about communications. I fully agree that we need to mention the fact that one part of the world lives on an information super-highway and benefits from it, while most of the world lives in an information subway. And what I would like to see is a sharing of that information revolution. How can it be put in the service of the people, in a positive sense? Here again, it is a question which should be the subject of a global dialogue. The letter C in UNESCO stands for culture and communication. So it is perhaps UNESCO's job to seek such a global dialogue and to find a way of using that breakthrough in information technology. And since we have talked about and discussed this, I would suggest that we allude to it positively in our report.

I have a third request, which concerns a people-centred sustainable development paradigm. We know that globalization is now the force that leads the world. We also know that it bypasses people and bypasses people-centred development, and that, in order to succeed worldwide, globalization needs to go hand in hand with democracy. We also understand that it will take time to democratize the whole of the world. Thus, the

largest part of the world has been bypassed by globalization, and is not yet on that democratic grid. That is why I am asking for language to be used that is based on a new sustainable development paradigm. It is up to UNESCO to take forward this concept of a people-centred sustainable development paradigm. This would be extremely useful, in view of the globalization of the market and all its other aspects, as well as massive efforts in favour of democracy. But it will take time.

My last remark concerns the culture of democracy vis-à-vis civil society and non-State actors. The culture of democracy must devise mechanisms involving the participation of all citizens. At this point in time, democracy seems to be reserved for an elite inside each country. That is why, when we talk about civil society, we should be thinking of decentralization (it is one of the problems before us) as well as bottom-up initiatives and means of ensuring participation. Democracy is currently confined to politics. It has not spilled over into the economic and social arena. When you say “democracy”, you are thinking of politics. But it is more than that. I believe that we need to broaden the concept of democracy and extend it to cover the economic and social areas as well.

To conclude, I would like to talk about NGOs and civil society. Coming from that sector myself, I fully subscribe to what Ambassador Owada said about accountability. But I think the answer is that there should be two-way accountability, that of the State or the government to the NGOs — a term taken in its generic sense to mean the whole non-governmental world — and that of the NGOs to the government. Accountability and transparency must be two-way. It is a fact of life we have to live with: the non-governmental actor is more directly concerned by development, democracy and the need to give development a human face, particularly in the social sector. Confidence has to be created and built up. The United Nations must learn to get non-governmental actors to participate. And in this connection I would like to make a plea to younger people, to the billion young people, the largest age-group that has ever existed in the world, who are about to become adults. We need to involve them in civil society activities as well. Governments do not do that. So while accepting what Ambassador Owada said about accountability and transparency, I believe that civil society needs to be vigor-

ously encouraged to play a role and take part in democracy and development.

Guo Jiading

I just want to answer Mr Goulding, because I do not know what he was talking about, in other words alleged attempts in China to block access to the Internet. Up to now, I have heard nothing about that. Perhaps he is better informed than I am!

Marrack
Goulding

Maybe this is another offence by the media.

Guo Jiading

I do not know. For the moment I am in complete ignorance.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

Thank you, Mr Chairperson, for the summary you made. As regards the two questions you asked us in connection with the actors of civil society and the culture of democracy, I have to say that I am rather puzzled. And I think that I am not alone in this and that many other people share my puzzlement as to the actual meaning of civil society. Some people use the term civil society, or NGO, or again third sector, when they want to describe anything which has nothing to do with the market or the State. In short, I feel that it is still a rather hazy concept. So I would suggest that if we ever work on that topic we shall need to define the concept a bit better and establish what we are talking about. I believe that such a clarification would bring us in line with what Mr Goulding was saying, when he mentioned the fact that there are various kinds of NGO, even within one and the same country. I therefore believe that in the end the real question is: who are UNESCO's interlocutors? In other words, UNESCO believes in certain values — I believe Mr Badinter referred to that this morning — which it is supposed to disseminate throughout the world. And the question we are asking ourselves is: how should we disseminate those values — for example, values like democracy, development and peace, which is also now one of UNESCO's own themes. In short: who are UNESCO's interlocutors? They are, I believe, those who defend its values. That is my first remark.

Secondly, I would like to focus, again with some puzzlement, on the question of the culture of democracy, because we are currently faced with problems of modernity, something which, by virtue of its being a recent phenomenon, forces us to react and places us before some very difficult decisions. I think

I would once again agree with Mr Goulding when he says that it is impossible to control information. I do not even know if it would be a good thing to do that, but it is in any case impossible. That is particularly true because information no longer circulates solely through what we call the media — newspapers, magazines, television — but also uses the new phenomenon called the Internet, whose full impact has certainly not yet come home to us. But it is clear that the phenomenon is in itself a cultural phenomenon. And here we are right up UNESCO's street, and we could say, at the risk of being wrong and even seriously wrong, that it is a cultural phenomenon which provides information with a certain degree of democracy. For I believe — and I am taking the risk of being wrong, like all those who are contemporary with phenomena of this kind — that the future of the computer is like the destiny of the telephone, in other words in the near future the computer will be as commonly found in people's homes as the telephone is today. If that is true, if that turns out to be true, we shall have to take into consideration the fact that it is a conveyor of information which is important and which is a vehicle of democracy.

Faced with these possibilities, let me return to the question of values. We should be concerned to find out who the non-governmental interlocutors are and to see how we can dialogue with them in the name of certain values. So, as regards the media, let us take the example of the American television channel, CNN: CNN is important, it is a news medium that has an impact on people's attitudes, on the way people see the world. The question is: how can UNESCO dialogue with CNN? Is dialogue possible? Is there a way of putting across the values we defend? The same principle that applies to the actors of civil society also applies to the media, that is to say the mass media. I believe that in this way we shall be able to put across a certain culture of democracy.

I would like to make a remark, because I may have helped to create some confusion. When I spoke of civil society, I also meant non-State agents. Now the United Nations has approached those agents, for example, paragovernmental agents and members of parliament: the United Nations concluded an agreement with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. There is no reason why UNESCO

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

should not have direct contacts with MPs, cities and the mayors of cities. The International Organization of Francophonie includes among its operators an Association of City Mayors. We invited city mayors to the 1996 United Nations summit on Habitat in Istanbul. Some cities have budgets that are far higher than those of a majority of United Nations Member States. That is another extremely important element: city mayors and parliamentarians. We might also think of bringing in businesspeople. We invited businesspeople to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development.

What I wanted to say was that non-State agents are either para-State agents, that is to say mayors and members of parliament, or businesspeople, academics, academicians and so on, who can serve as transmission relays. They can help UNESCO to promote certain ideas that this Panel is defending. That can be done through relays which are not necessarily the nation-state, in other words independently of the NGOs, which constitute a new element. There are NGOs that have purely national objectives and others that have international objectives. The role of NGOs had a crucial bearing on the adoption of the plan for an International Criminal Court in Rome. The role of NGOs has a crucial bearing on the adoption of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. So here again we need to distinguish between the various categories of NGOs, some of which have ecumenical or international aims and others which are purely national.

I made a mistake of simplification, when I talked of civil society and agents. In fact, there is a whole series of new actors which are different, and which all have their own specific characteristics. The International Law Institute, which was set up in 1873, played an extremely important role in the codification of international law. Unfortunately international organizations do not communicate enough with such institutions. International organizations, be they the United Nations or UNESCO, reserve their main activity for their main clients, which are the Member States. I am not saying they do not have contacts with other organizations, with other actors, but it does not take place on such an institutionalized basis and is much more difficult. There are 188 States, but there are thousands of NGOs, which are extremely important. Eight hundred mayors belong to the Association of French-Speaking Mayors, which causes extremely difficult communication

problems. But I believe that if we want UNESCO to succeed in producing a multiplier effect, it is useful to be able to turn to a member of civil society. However, that is only one aspect, for there are also non-governmental agents which do not necessarily belong to civil society — it depends on one's definitions — as well as many new actors that will appear over the next few years. You mentioned CNN. There will be new actors which will suddenly find an interest in international politics. Multinationals, as long as a way is found of collaborating with them without having to submit to their desiderata, can play an extremely important role as relays to defend certain ideas. So I believe that I was wrong not to have been clear when talking about non-State agents and members of civil society. And here again, we need to take into account their role at a national and an international level.

Alexei
Vassiliev

I would like to be as brief as possible, but, as part of the discussion, I would like to answer Mr Goulding about the possibility of looking at the mass media as one would the weather, as something that one cannot control. I find the comparison very picturesque, but I would say “influence” rather than “control”, or “influence in one way or another”. One possibility would be to do that through NGOs, the thousands of NGOs which can influence the behaviour of actors or agents in the mass media in one way or another. That is my point of view. The media cannot totally escape the influence of public opinion on an intellectual plane.

On another point, I have a question for Ambassador Owada: can it be said that democracy is a precondition for development?

Hisashi
Owada

I made it quite clear that no categorical statement on that issue should be made.

Alexei
Vassiliev

I agree. One example is the fact that before World War I there was very successful economic development in Tsarist Russia, even though there was no democracy. And it was healthy development — I am not talking about the Soviet Union. As for the Philippines, that was true during the democratic period. But there is Viet Nam, the most successful story of economic development today. I think we should avoid being categorical. I agree.

There is one more question I would like to raise because

you mentioned it yourself, Mr Chairperson: should we meet again, or have we already come up with all the answers? Let me give you just one example, which is directly connected with democracy: we all agree that there is no direct link between more development and more democracy, or between more democracy and more development, whatever the kind of development. That is a big question mark. People tend to refer in an automatic, throwaway manner to American-style development. But in India and China that kind of development will simply result in everything exploding as regards the environment. But I do not want to elaborate on that.

And even as regards development as such, including communications and all that, I would like to remind you that there are dissident views on this, at least in the academic community I represent. The world is not moving towards democracy. It is moving towards a new type of totalitarian regime, which will reject the market economy in 20 or 30 years — that is one point of view, which does not necessarily mean that I share it. The argument is that in our world of global communications we are controlled or manipulated as individuals from the cradle to the grave. Your state of health is controlled, your telephone calls are controlled, your bank account is controlled, and your movements are controlled like everything else. And you are manipulated by the media.

I do not propose that we discuss this today, but what I would like to stress is that, rather than hone our text in order to establish the final draft of our report, we should perhaps meet again if UNESCO and our Chairperson deem it useful and constructive. It seems to me that just two more hours of debate will not enable us to work out all the answers to the highly stimulating questions that may crop up.

Pierre
Cornillon

May I return for a moment to the question of the media and say how astonished I am that we could think of discussing here, ways of controlling the media. As far as I am concerned, it is out of the question. We can more or less think about what could be done to encourage society, including the media, to adopt an ethical attitude. But I think it can only be a question of seeing whether UNESCO could instil, from time to time, the idea that the media also have an ethical responsibility.

I am grateful to you, Mr Chairperson, for the clarifications you have made on the issue of civil society. Yes, the term “civil society” is imprecise as is the word “globalization”, which sometimes implies national neoliberalism and can also mean the opening up of borders to everything except the movement of persons — this proves that globalization is always selective. You have made a distinction between the recommendations we might make to UNESCO concerning the action it could undertake to promote this or that value, and those we might make concerning the mechanisms through which it could multiply its initiatives and amplify its action of promotion. This would mean, as you yourself and Mr Owada have said, working with national actors. In the international milieu we sometimes have a tendency to favour those international NGOs whose representatives we meet in the corridors of the United Nations. I think our Panel should take a closer look at national organizations of the civil society because they reflect and mobilize active citizenship. I should like to recommend to UNESCO that it contribute as much as possible to the development of these national institutions — which often play a major role in the life of their country — and to call upon these national actors whose actions could multiply UNESCO’s initiatives.

You mentioned, Mr Chairperson, the agreement that was signed between the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Similar agreements have been signed with almost all the organizations of the United Nations family. I am proud to have been one of the co-signatories with Mr Federico Mayor and President Sorour, of the agreement between UNESCO and the Inter-Parliamentary Union and I can tell you that UNESCO relies heavily on the relays constituted by parliaments and members of parliament. Again, I would like to make it clear that parliaments are the institutional and legitimate representatives of the whole of civil society. They are institutional because parliament is one of the instruments of the State, and they are legitimate because their members are elected by universal suffrage at free, regularly-held elections. They represent the whole of civil society because it is within civil society that the different lines of political thought are debated and the divergent interests of diverse sectors of society are discussed. I can only recommend that UNESCO listen to parliaments and use their channels even more, in order to put across its message.

Of course — and I agree entirely with what Ms Inayatullah has said — UNESCO must promote education for all, but I think that with regard to democracy, it must make a special effort directed at young people. We must bank on young people because a culture of peace and democracy, a culture of human rights takes a long time to establish. Citizens must be made aware of these values from an early age. I greatly regret that the Western countries did not help the countries of Africa when they were opening up to democracy and when their young people could have been converted to be democracy enthusiasts.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

Mr Chairperson, I would first like to speak briefly about the mass media. I totally agree with Mr Cornillon's analysis. Similarly, I agree with Mr Goulding that one cannot control the mass media, and that it is not even desirable that they should be controlled, but I would like to make a general remark regarding them. Mr Cornillon described to us what the media in Africa are like in general, in terms that were possibly rather caricatural, but strictly true nonetheless. They are newspapers which are generally little more than scandal sheets, and which describe the latest spat between people or reveal that this or that woman is the mistress of this or that person in authority. Or else, if they do discuss serious matters, the authorities do not heed them, or even act in the opposite way to the one suggested. I think that those who know Africa well will entirely agree with me. So what purpose do such papers serve, what is really the point of them? I have no answer.

But on the other hand there is another civilization which to my mind goes almost to the opposite extreme, namely that when people want to do something they do not wonder whether it is a good or a bad thing, but they wonder what the media will think of it. I recently attended a conference I regard as important, during which four essential themes were discussed. The first three were the subject of unequivocal agreement, while the fourth was the subject of an agreement on which there was no unanimity. All the media said the conference was a failure, even though the fourth theme was certainly the least important. Why? Simply because the media were clearly determined to turn the conference into a failure. That is the point we have now eventually reached. Consequently, between not trying to control the media — which is neither good, nor desirable, nor even possible

— and becoming their total slave, I think there is perhaps a middle road. But I am not certain that this Panel is really the body in the best position, given where it is located, to pursue this matter further.

As regards, Mr Chairperson, what you described as the actors of civil society or non-State agents, they can serve as relays and, in short, as a sound-box for UNESCO. Why? Because, in our mandate, I have selected three notions which are essential in my view, namely the search for new initiatives, precisely in order to help democracy develop, the search for partnership and the search for synergy. It is precisely here that the agents you mentioned could find their proper place, seeking initiatives, partnership and synergies to be developed with UNESCO, so as to extend UNESCO's action and the projects it cannot always carry through alone. It is here, in my opinion, that your suggestion slots in perfectly.

And now I shall come to a problem which puzzles me, because I do not have an answer to it. While I have been very enthusiastic about most of the issues we have discussed here, I was flabbergasted when the issue called "democratic culture" came up. That is because I am convinced that democracy cannot be achieved without a democratic culture. But how can a democratic culture be acquired? Is a democratic culture inherent in certain peoples, or does it have to be acquired? And if it has to be acquired, how does one go about it? Should it be imposed from outside, or should it come into being from within?

In Africa today, there are seven countries where terrible wars are going on. Seven. So the Director-General of UNESCO declares: "We cannot tolerate the fact that thousands of people are being massacred, raped and mutilated in almost total silence". But there is not just silence. If only there were just silence! Perhaps one day we might hope that it will all come to an end, because in other parts of the world there have also been wars, there have been events of that kind and, in the end, the peoples survived. But Africa became independent too late, insofar as it cannot do what it wants, and its States cannot do what they want: they are under the yoke of overlords. Depending on what you look like, you are either left alone to do what you want or you are not. It is a terrible tragedy. It is something that torments me personally, because I cannot see a solution, I cannot

see an end to it all. But perhaps there are ideas or people in our gathering that could indicate to me how one can get countries to adopt a democratic culture, so that democracy can thrive. For it is in fact the lack of a democratic culture which is the cause of all those wars. And today it is extremely difficult to get a democratic culture adopted by precisely those countries which suffer from the lack of democracy at an international level — a notion dear to your heart, Mr Chairperson. Such countries are not masters of their own destiny, they cannot do what they really want to do, they are forced to do what they are asked to do. That naturally generates situations like those I have just referred to, where there seems to be no end to it all. That is why I say it is a crucial issue, but it depresses me because I cannot see how a democratic culture can be achieved in the continent where I live.

Abid
Hussain

Mr Chairperson, you kindly allowed me to speak at some length yesterday and today. But the question of the mass media has come up, and it is something I feel strongly about. So please allow me to say a few words. I would like to point out one thing to you which I learned from my experience as the Rapporteur to the United Nations on freedom of opinion and expression. Over the past three years, I have visited a number of countries, and I have found almost everywhere that, when there is an authoritarian government or a government of an extremely fundamentalist type in place, it always criticizes the mass media and is tempted to bring freedom of the press to an end. And the pretext is sometimes culture, sometimes stability, and sometimes outside interference in its internal affairs.

And I discovered that, whenever democracy emerges from the shadows, it is the mass media that play an extremely important role. The notion of the fortress State is an old one. It is not only parliament that is considered important, there are the media and the press, which take a stand in order to provide the correctives which the executive may fail to provide. This is the case in almost all countries, even in my country. It was the mass media that revealed the atrocities suffered by certain minorities and by women. Atrocities committed and covered up by governments in most countries were revealed by the press. The press has also been hounded: one way of going about that is to abolish the news press and give a monopoly to the electronic media.

That is why, in my limited experience, I can assure you that free media and democracy are two sides of the same coin. I am quite prepared to admit that the media can go too far and that comments are sometimes made which are unfair to certain public figures or governments. But the answer to that is not censorship. Censorship really passes the buck on to the bureaucrats and the police, and it then becomes impossible to guarantee a fair dispensation of justice. But there are other institutions capable of acting in this respect — the law provides for it. Thus, for example, to protect my name and reputation, I can go to court and sue the publishers. There are even examples of that in Singapore. There was a time when Mao Zedong said that revolutions grow out of the barrel of a gun. But they have also been known to occur through the lens of a television camera, at CNN or elsewhere. It is a very big force nowadays and has to be taken into account.

Thus, for example, an ombudsman has been created in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia, and they are not the only cases. Press councils, whose task is to impose certain limits, have been set up in other countries. Now these various institutions have different meanings and nuances which need to be understood: control, manipulation, regulation. Control is wholly blameworthy, manipulation should be forbidden, and regulation should be allowed only up to a certain extent, though in certain countries, such as the United States, even indirect control is regarded as unacceptable on the grounds that when you try to correct one particular vice you only cause more competition in the area concerned. Let me take the example of a country where there was only one television channel, and it was controlled by the State. When private channels were introduced, and when the horizon opened up, it became very difficult for a single channel to adopt, on its own and for its own particular purposes, a position that might prove to be invidious.

There is now at UNESCO a programme on freedom of opinion and expression and the media. I work very closely on it. We organize field research and when we discover excesses we tell the media about them. But we try, even in countries like Iran, not to put an end to certain programmes or press organs. Even in Iran, however, many people look at the electronic media without State officers realizing it, or even in connivance with them. It is

not possible to control or curb the electronic media as it was in the past. Moreover, thanks to such action and with the other forms of institutional protection we have, I am confident that the mass media are destined to play an extremely important role not only in ensuring that democracy moves in the right direction, but also in educating people and bringing to light certain problems that are as yet unknown.

**Mohamed
Charfi**

I sympathize with the cry of despair we have just heard about the consequences of press freedom in certain African countries. It has resulted in scandal sheets, invasions of privacy, and curious donations to what I would describe as an irresponsible press. But if we go along with that line of argument — I am sure that this is not at all what Mr Mbaye meant, and I am continuing on from what he had in mind, so to speak — the choice between a press that reports scandals and a press that merely reflects government thinking is surely obvious. There may be a way out of this dilemma, and the question is: how can a culture of democracy be acquired, how can a responsible press be encouraged?

I would say first of all that in my opinion democracy cannot exist without press freedom. It forms part of the basics. It is the first step. But where should one start? With the egg or with the chicken? As the saying goes, you have to get into the water in order to learn how to swim. And you have to exercise press freedom in order to learn how to exercise it. I cannot see any other way of going about it. True, there are safeguards, and they must work. In most countries, invasions of privacy, lies which hurt or prejudice other people, and calls for violence are punishable by law. If those safeguards are brought to bear by a fair, independent and moderate legal system, it is thanks to that legal system, which plays a regulatory role, that people will learn how to use democracy and press freedom. We shall have thus come full circle, and we come back to the notion of fair justice that Mr Mbaye was talking about this morning.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

The point that has just been mentioned is essential, and it has been well highlighted. I do not think we need to go into these points further, as we are all agreed on them. But I do believe that at this stage we should include in our conclusions both the need for press freedom and the need for the press to have a sense of

Robert
Badinter

its own responsibilities and its role. And it should do so before thinking of the legal sanctions that exist, while maintaining a taste for its freedom and a sense of its responsibility. That could be done in two phases, given that there is the legal rule that Mr Charfi has just mentioned.

I am joining in a debate that is already under way, so I shall throw myself into the scrum without knowing exactly what the price will be. I would simply point out that there can be no democratic culture without press freedom, that much is obvious. But we still need to agree on what meaning we give to press freedom. For we approach the notion of “press freedom” like old-fashioned liberals, which we are, brought up on the masters of the Age of Enlightenment, and always with reference to a political regime. But that is inadequate in the context of the economic realities of today. I ask you the following question: when we talk about press freedom in relation to economic power, who controls the press? The press is always, and by definition, even if it has a free hand vis-à-vis the government, an economic enterprise that has to make a profit or serve a purpose other than making a profit, which is sometimes worse. One of the major problems for democracy, since there is also a fourth power, is control of that power: by whom and under what conditions?

And that brings us back to a fundamental question: if you tell me who controls the media, I will tell you who controls public opinion, and if you tell me who controls public opinion, I will tell you who has power in a democracy. In the circumstances, if we talk of press freedom being a guarantee of democratic culture, we need to guarantee that press freedom in relation to the economic power than controls it, which means, in a democracy, that one has to keep a very close eye on the problem of concentration in the press. And I do not need to remind you that this does not happen only at a domestic level, in that we are no longer talking about the kind of press freedom that was achieved in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. We are talking about massive international investment. So we need, at an international level, to ascertain who controls what in the case of the audiovisual media. Without wishing in any way to point a finger at an individual, I think that Mr Murdoch is undoubtedly one of the most powerful men in the world.

So I ask you the question: who controls Mr Murdoch? So the end of the spiral comes into sight.

I perfectly understand the deep sadness of Mr Mbaye as he contemplates the state of mind of people in Africa, but the degree to which people's minds are manipulated in the developed countries is equally interesting. I would add that when it is the same people who control not only the companies which rely on orders from the State but the media, you can imagine how incestuous it all becomes. So it is very simple: if you want press freedom, make sure it is independent from the political regime (that is a classic, as we all know). But also look a bit further and size up the true dimension of press freedom in relation to the problem of economic power, which in this case is unfettered, I repeat unfettered, because what is involved here are not small investments or low levels of profitability. Not to see that is, it seems to me, to turn a blind eye to one of the key problems of the next century. That is all I wanted to say on the subject.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

Thank you very much, Mr Badinter. You have enabled us to reach the same number of interventions yesterday and today: 31. The third meeting will be devoted to discussing the text of the recommendations. If you feel that the account of those discussions can serve as a basis for the final report, then we shall have completed our work. I would like once again to thank you for having found time to take part in these meetings over a period of two days and to tell you how much I personally benefited and learned from them. But I want you to know how useful these discussions have been for the Secretariat of UNESCO. I am convinced that this report will help the institution that commissioned it from us to adopt new or original initiatives in line with the changes that are taking place as we are about to enter a new century.

**Robert
Badinter**

If I am intervening again, Mr Chairperson, it is to thank you for your patience, courtesy and skill at gently guiding us along. I also wanted, on behalf of all the participants, to thank the members of the Secretariat, those assisting them and of course our interpreters, without whom this place would still be the Tower of Babel — which, as every schoolboy knows, was the earliest expression of international society.

Debates

Third meeting

UNESCO Headquarters, Paris

3-4 April 2000

Agenda

1. Democratic development versus economic sanctions.
2. International aid and democratic development.
3. Decentralization and democratic development.
4. Minorities and democratic development.
5. The rule of law and development.
6. General discussion of the Recommendations presented to the Director-General of UNESCO.

We are about to begin the third meeting of our International Panel on Democracy and Development, and I would first like to congratulate Ambassador Matsuura for his splendid election as Director-General of UNESCO and to thank him for the support he has given us.

The Secretariat of UNESCO sent each of us the report on our last meeting, which was held on 8 and 9 February 1999. We received seven responses to that report: three of them approved the report we had been sent; the four others — five since Ms Inayatullah's remark — suggested a number of amendments, which were included in the latest version of the report you received.

A reading of that latest report would suggest that the dialectic of the relationship between development and democracy has not been sufficiently analysed from a practical viewpoint, and, as you are aware, we were unable to take into account the latest major debate on the subject. I should remind you that at the moment — today actually — a meeting between Europe and Africa is being held in Cairo, and that one of the issues up for discussion is precisely the relationship between development and democracy.

I have read the European Union's report on the discussions and the partnership agreement between the group of States in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) and the European Union, and the key element of that discussion was the relationship between democracy and development. That is why the Secretariat and I suggest that today be spent hearing your reactions to certain issues that have been the subject of lengthy debate over the past 12 months.

What is the relationship between democratic development and economic sanctions? What is the relationship between international aid and development, insofar as democracy and development in many countries, and notably the ACP States, depend on the aid they receive, whether from the European Union or from other international organizations? Next, what is the relationship between development and decentralization? And, finally, how should the issue of minorities in relation to democratic development be handled? We have received a letter from Ambassador Owada, who asks us to add a fifth theme, which he calls: "The rule of law in development", or the primacy of law in the context of development. We have done so. And the sixth

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

and final topic, to which we shall devote the whole day tomorrow, is precisely the report and the recommendations that will feature in the report we are going to present to the Director-General.

So I should be most grateful if you would indicate your point of view on these five topics with brief comments, so that we can complement our report by giving it a dimension that is more practical and closer to what we are actually experiencing today. As soon as we have finished our exchange of views on the five points, we shall return to the recommendations and the report we are going to present to the Director-General.

[beginning of next session]

I would like to remind you that economic sanctions have been the subject of much debate over the past few months. As you agreed, development is vital for democracy. It is clear that any action designed to hamper development will have a direct impact on democracy and, unfortunately, it is a fact that the economic sanctions provided for by the United Nations Charter are still relevant today. Statistics reveal that, between World War I and 1990, no fewer than 115 sanctions programmes were implemented. Now you know better than I do that the great weakness of economic sanctions is that they are doubly selective in that they mainly affect the weakest States, the developing countries and, what is more, the poorest and most destitute sections of the population in those countries.

In other words, it may be said without any exaggeration that economic sanctions help to weaken democracy. To use a hard-hitting phrase, economic sanctions constitute a human rights violation in the name of human rights. What also needs to be added to the list of criticisms of economic sanctions is the problem of collateral damage, that is to say damage suffered by other countries, whose requests for reparations provided for under Article 50 of the Charter have never been heeded. But I do not believe it is possible to abolish the system of economic sanctions, because it is a process accepted by the United Nations Charter and, more importantly, it is practised bilaterally by certain States and, in some cases, by a group of States outside the framework of the United Nations.

In this connection, I would remind you that a group of African States decided to impose economic sanctions on Burundi.

Kéba
Mbaye

On the other hand, it is perfectly realistic to envisage what are known as “smart sanctions”, which entail taking action against the bank accounts of the leaders of the targeted countries. Again, according to the corpus of published studies, it would seem that financial sanctions are more effective than trading sanctions. In any case, one thing is certain, and that is that economic sanctions run totally counter to democracy and development. And I suggest we debate the issue briefly, so that your views on the subject can be included in our report.

Mr Chairperson, I think you have put your finger on an extremely important issue, that of economic sanctions. It is a subject very close to my heart. In the report, there is talk of the legal obligations of States as regards democracy and development.

Exactly 22 years ago, African jurists — or in any case many of them — met in Dakar under the aegis of the International Commission of Jurists to discuss the issue of “Development and Human Rights”. I can state that it was on the basis of the conclusions of that symposium that the notion came into being that the right to development should be regarded as a human right. But you know better than anybody, Mr Chairperson, that there are no rights, that there are no veritable legal obligations unless there are sanctions. But, as you so rightly pointed out, economic sanctions are not really sanctions at all, because a sanction has to be imposed on the guilty party, on the responsible party. And that is why the African jurists said in 1978 that once development becomes a human right, an obligation on the part of States, then it is the leaders of States who are responsible. But States do not have feet to walk with or flesh to feel with. So we laid down the principle, which is naturally unpopular, especially in government circles, that once development becomes a human right the State authorities that fail to guarantee it put their own legitimacy in jeopardy.

That is an extremely important thing in my opinion. That had a considerable impact at the time, and that is why I would like to suggest we include in the report a theme that might for example be called: “The legal obligations of States as regards democracy and development: the consequences”. Or else, formulated much more categorically: “Democracy, development and political legitimacy”.

Nicolas
Valticos

It is up to you, of course, to see if you think we could include a theme like that in our provisional agenda on the practical aspects of our work.

Mr Chairperson, I think the point you raised is of crucial importance. It is also extremely problematic, because it involves a dilemma between, on the one hand, the need to impose sanctions on States which violate international law, which are guilty of aggression, and so on, and, on the other, the consequences of economic sanctions, which, as you said and as we all know, hit the innocent most of the time. But the difficulty lies in the way the problem is formulated. It needs to be formulated without giving the impression that, by virtue of that very fact, we are recommending a certain impunity for acts of aggression or ill-treatment inflicted on the population on the grounds that children must not suffer. The result of that is no sanctions.

At the same time, we need to think about the methods used as sanctions, as punishment and as an incentive to States, and we need to find methods that will not have the tragic effect on children which we hear about in Iraq and elsewhere. I think we should deal with this issue in our report, and the general terms in which you have done so seem to me to be appropriate. True, economic sanctions are the only weapon provided for at international level, apart from armed action, which always needs to be opposed if at all possible — it has all too often been misused in the past, and even recently. But, on the other hand, retaliatory measures that affect the poorest and most innocent should not be used. There are the financial methods you envisaged, and again others. We should indicate the problem clearly and suggest, if not a solution, a direction in which to move, such as the one you mentioned. I am wholly in favour of including this issue.

Abid
Hussain

I very much agree with the formulation of certain fundamental issues and certain concepts relating to both democracy and development that we have to examine. But I think that our main focus must be on UNESCO's mandate and its scope for action. There are many other organizations which are concerned with issues relating to democracy and development. It seems to me — and I say this subject to your approval — that it would be better

if we restricted ourselves to those areas where UNESCO is in a position to play a major role. It is a good idea to discuss the concept of democracy, as we have, but we should refocus on areas where we can usefully encourage its development.

I shall take the example of globalization. We have dealt with this issue in general terms and, on the specific question of how globalization is activated by science and technology, we have identified certain steps that should be taken. Now there are many areas of globalization where economic and trade issues come in. I do not think we should linger on this aspect, as UNESCO — excuse me for saying so — will not be in a position to act in this respect, unless we claim to call other organizations into question.

Similarly, with reference to other relevant areas such as sanctions, which you call interventions, on the question of how far interventions can go and within what limits, I doubt whether UNESCO can play a very important role. We therefore need to decide what areas we can tackle and when we can say “This is feasible” and “It is in the lap of the gods”.

Alexei
Vassiliev

You have, it seems to me, put on the table everything that needs to be added to our draft report. I have to agree with you on the main points, and in particular on the fact, which is confirmed in practice, that when sanctions are applied to dictatorial regimes they only reinforce them, they only reinforce totalitarianism and the dictators themselves, at the expense of great suffering on the part of the people. There are examples of that in many countries. And this is particularly true when the situation persists for many years, as in the case of long-term economic sanctions, which are inconsistent with all the requirements of development, and which highlight the need for democratization. You are right.

That being the case, and in view of the limited nature of our role as a Panel appointed by UNESCO, we could perhaps recommend that the issue of selective sanctions be studied. Your idea of targeting the financial assets of leaders, elites or countries whose behaviour is contrary to the rules of human rights and democracy is an excellent one.

Another problem is: who would be in a position to undertake such actions? I do not intend to formulate any critical remarks about any country, but if a parliamentary assembly in a

given country adopts a rule that is then compulsory for the whole world, a dangerous precedent is created. Thus, for example, the law adopted by the United States Senate — which is in fact no more than a new addition to American law — imposed the American way of handling problems on the whole international community. I feel that such selective sanctions should be adopted only by a decision of the United Nations, especially when the selfish interests of a State or a group of multinationals are involved rather than the interests of other entities in the international community. That is why I believe that your idea of selective sanctions applied by an international organization, and particularly by the United Nations, could be the best of recommendations. But I would repeat once again that harsh and indiscriminate sanctions serve only to reinforce dictatorial regimes for a very long time and without producing any of the desired effects. I totally agree with you.

**Hisashi
Owada**

I would like to make a few points in connection with this issue. First, Mr Chairperson, I would like to say that you have treated the issue of sanctions and the problems it raises in a very comprehensive way. I do not think there is any need to add anything to what you have said. However, the second point I would like to make is that, like Mr Hussain, I am somewhat sceptical about possibly expanding the scope of our remit. I am fully convinced that the problem of sanctions is very important, and that it should be touched upon in our report. But we should not go too far, particularly as regards economic sanctions, because it is an issue that perhaps goes beyond the bounds of our work carried out within the framework of UNESCO. It is within the context of its own area of expertise that UNESCO should approach the issue of democracy and development, in order to determine what it can do to improve the situation in that area. So to that extent I share Mr Hussain's view. I am not opposed to our examining the issue of sanctions, but I feel that we should be careful not to pursue the matter too far.

My third point is that a fundamental distinction should be made between the issue of sanctions as such, and the issue of economic sanctions as concrete manifestations of that problem. Sanctions as such, as a concept, are a precondition for the application of certain rules to a given situation, insofar as rules can-

not be effective unless they are confirmed and backed up to some extent by sanctions, whatever their nature may be. And I believe, as Judge Mbaye said, that it is part of the system: the moment normative rules exist, they have to be combined with sanctions. Having said that, it is obviously a delicate issue, as it is not always easy to apply sanctions to the guilty party, to the perpetrator of the wrong. In the case of the International Criminal Court, for example, the aim is precisely to apply sanctions to the perpetrator of an illicit act. The problem we need to examine is precisely whether or not certain sanctions can be applied in that way.

This brings us to the issue of economic sanctions. In many cases, the dilemma is that when you apply such sanctions it is unlikely that the guilty party will be affected, whereas innocent people suffer from them. As a result, when an attempt is made to promote the cause of democracy by applying normative rules in the form of sanctions, that action may well prove counterproductive. And the paradox is that all too often it is those undemocratic regimes which remain quite unaffected by the sufferings inflicted on the people. A democratic government undoubtedly feels the effects of sanctions, whereas in the case of undemocratic regimes sanctions hit the people directly, while the government remains quite unaffected either psychologically, politically or morally. So there is a real dilemma here, and I think we should perhaps analyse the link that exists between the problem of sanctions as we see it and the suffering inflicted on the society that is targeted, as well as the negative or positive impact on the democratic process. To that extent, I believe the exercise may be useful. The basic problem facing us is whether what concerns us is really the validity of sanctions as such, including the problem inherent in the regime of sanctions, as opposed to the question of how sanctions can be made more effective both technically and practically. Mr Valticos touched upon that point. I think it is the distinction that needs to be made.

I do not subscribe to the view that sanctions are always ineffective. There is, for example, the case of South Africa with regard to apartheid, and also of Southern Rhodesia. I am not saying that those sanctions were perfect, but I do feel they played a role in bringing about a political change that genuinely contributed to the introduction of democracy in those countries.

Guo
Jiading

So rather than restrict ourselves to economic sanctions, I think it would be useful to think about the regime of sanctions in general, and to try to distinguish between the various categories of sanctions. In that way, we could from a conceptual point of view clearly determine the scope and limitations of sanctions in the context of action that UNESCO could usefully undertake in this area.

I have had another look at the United Nations Charter with respect to the issue of sanctions. Despite the explicit provisions contained in Article 41, I regard sanctions as special measures that are capable of having a negative impact. Therefore, when it is a question of finding a solution to international disputes and armed conflicts, the international community should strive to adopt such peaceful means as dialogue and negotiations, and refrain from frequently resorting to sanctions. This is all the more true in today's world, with the Cold War long over.

Recourse to sanctions is an extreme measure provided for by the Charter with a view to solving international disputes. It is applicable only to serious breaches of peace and security and to acts of aggression. So an excessive, wide-ranging and cursory definition or interpretation of breaches of international peace and security, followed immediately by sanctions on that basis, will only turn sanctions into a disguised political tool for exerting pressure. Past experience has shown that in most cases, far from solving problems, sanctions tend to have serious consequences for the general population and even to be prejudicial to third States.

Mr Owada mentioned a few successful cases of sanctions, against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia for example — I was there in the 1970s. Generally, however, there have been very few cases of recent Security Council sanctions that have really achieved their aim. On the other hand, there have been quite a number of cases where innocent civilians have been harmed. Many sanctions applied over the years have not been lifted at the right time and have caused suffering over a long period of time to the people of countries or regions subject to sanctions, thus defeating the very purposes of sanctions. In order to prevent sanctions being used by certain States as a tool with which to bully the weak and the small, the adoption of sanctions by the

Security Council as a whole must be subject to very strict procedures. No State or group of States has the right to threaten other States with sanctions or to apply them as they see fit, while hiding behind the banner of the United Nations. If the peace efforts of the international community fail and the Security Council has no choice but to resort to sanctions, fair rules should be applied in accordance with the following express provisions.

As Mr Boutros-Ghali rightly pointed out, in his capacity as Secretary-General, and as specified in the statement of the President of the Security Council in September 1995, the purpose of applying sanctions is to remedy the situation created by threats to international peace and security, and not to punish or retaliate. When the Security Council decides as a last resort to apply sanctions, it should first of all clearly specify the aim of the sanctions and determine on that basis their content, scope and duration. And before they are actually applied, clear-cut warnings should be issued to the party concerned, giving it time to change its conduct, so that the desired goal can be achieved without applying sanctions at all. And when they are applied, certain steps should be taken to meet humanitarian needs, including permission to import certain goods and measures designed to allow humanitarian institutions to operate.

Article 50 of the United Nations Charter gives the States concerned “the right to consult the Security Council” with regard to “special economic problems’ arising from the execution of sanctions”. Consequently, when deciding to apply sanctions, the Security Council should also consider the question of how to ease the additional burden that may be caused by sanctions, so as not to increase the burden on the States concerned and thus to avoid the negative impact of the sanctions.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

I believe, Mr Chairperson, that you have invited us to embark on an exercise that will prove fascinating yet at the same time risky, and I think this is a point that has been made on various occasions by Mr Hussain and, a moment ago, by Mr Owada, namely that there is a highly political side to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is an issue that comes under the authority of the Security Council, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, as is well known. The problem is to establish to what extent we can discuss it within the framework

of the Organization where we are today and of the exercise in which we have been invited to take part within the framework of UNESCO.

Since the end of the Cold War, in other words since the 1990s, the number of sanctions has greatly increased. I do not much like the term “sanctions”, as Mr Guo said a moment ago, because it has a punitive connotation. I think that you yourself, Mr Boutros-Ghali, made the same point when you said that sanctions should result not in punishment but in a return to international legality. The aim of sanctions is the cessation of illicit behaviour.

I believe that since the end of the Cold War it has in fact been recognized that sanctions have cultural and human aspects that cannot be ignored. So it cannot be said that it is merely a question of peace-keeping, because there are whole countries — it has to be said that this is the case with Iraq — which have been subject to sanctions for almost ten years. A decade of sanctions involves a country’s whole heritage, its whole culture, its people’s individual rights, and a whole generation. And this is not mere speculation. It was speculation in 1990, but became a fact of life in 2000: in Iraq there is a doomed generation of children. That means the heritage is involved, in one of the regions of the world which played a central role in the evolution of human culture. Human cities were spawned in that region. Town-planning came into being there. So it is a region where the responsibility of this Organization is involved. What is more, to return to more topical matters, there has recently been a succession of resignations, not by politicians but by the heads of humanitarian institutions, a series of resignations by people who were in charge of humanitarian programmes and who had to resign because it was becoming unbearable for their conscience. So this is a problem which is both cultural and humanitarian. That is my first point.

My second point is that — as Mr Owada said a moment ago — it is an unfortunate fact that those sanctions have precisely no effect — you already said as much, Mr Boutros-Ghali, some time ago — on undemocratic societies, because the population has no influence over its leaders. It is a fact that in democratic societies the population can influence its leaders. In other words, a leader’s job depends on his or her election. When the population is too much at odds with what is going on, it can vote

one way or the other and thus put pressure on the leadership. This is not the case with undemocratic societies. So this only slows down the rate at which such societies become democratic. And I feel that all the cultural problems which this entails for such countries should not be forgotten. There is also the fact — I think the case of Haiti clearly showed this — that sanctions, or an embargo (a term I personally prefer), encouraged crime and, more especially, smuggling for the benefit of its leaders.

Here, the international community today carries a responsibility because, in the name of human rights, some very serious violations of human dignity, above all in the case of vulnerable populations, are being carried out.

An initial step, a first idea that has been put forward, is that we should above all ensure that sanctions are not adopted for an indeterminate period. The least we can ask — and I say this subject to Mr Boutros-Ghali's approval — is that we be allowed to proceed along the same lines as the despatch of emergency forces or peace-keeping forces, who have a limited-term mandate that is renewed each time by the organization that decided on the despatch. This means that they can be assessed. And each time there is a fresh vote. This prevents what American researchers have called "the reverse veto", that is to say the vote of a single country that prevents sanctions being lifted. This is of course very obvious in the case of Iraq. As matters stand today, if a single permanent member of the Security Council disagrees the sanctions continue.

This situation, I think, was not properly examined when the Charter was adopted, but it is very much with us in practice. It may not necessitate a revision of the Charter. I do not think anyone still has any illusions about the revision of the United Nations Charter. For the past 30 years, attempts to revise it have been fruitless, apart from increasing the number of members of certain bodies to bring them into line with the increase in the number of Member States. While we cannot bank on a revision of the Charter, something can perhaps be done at the level of the Organization's practices.

The second very important idea, which has just been stressed, is that if there is punishment — even if there should not be — if there is punishment, one could almost say that it should not be collective. That is the whole problem, and I think

Mr Mbaye said as much at the outset: punishment should be aimed at the person responsible. It cannot be collective, otherwise the end result is the kind of aberrations with which we are familiar.

So what should be done? I believe that, beyond even financial sanctions, the elaboration today of an international court of justice is opening up possibilities and should be seriously emphasized. I think that a court of justice is one way forward. Of course, we are still only at the stage of ad hoc tribunals — I have the honour of sitting on one of them at the moment. It is not a case of international penal law being planned by a court with general powers, but there are plans for an international court of justice which are making headway. That may well provide the means for bringing before a court the true perpetrators of a serious violation of international law, which should lie behind the imposition of sanctions, even though it is up to the Security Council, by virtue of its discretionary powers, to indicate which violations are a threat to international peace and security.

But I believe that punishment of those serious violations and the naming of the people really responsible for them would be a way of avoiding the human disasters we see today. That is why I think that a report like ours, provided we take all the customary precautions, as has been stressed by all speakers — we are not at the United Nations, at the parent organization, but at UNESCO — I think that a report like ours cannot ignore this problem, which is an agonizing one for our conscience. When we see whole generations doomed, we cannot look the other way.

One last point about the proposal made by my friend, Judge Kéba Mbaye. I am personally in favour of the term “legitimacy” being included in the report. I think it is important, very important. I believe that democracy and legality have to be accompanied by the notion of legitimacy, and that somewhere — here again there is perhaps a problem of formulation — we need to show that a ruler or rulers are legitimate insofar as they care about the general interest and the cause of the people who put them in power, and that loss of legitimacy ought to have consequences. And this is connected with development. It may also be connected with the problem of corruption, which we have already looked at here. I think that both of them are important problems.

With regard to our conclusions, Mr Chairperson, you are right in thinking that it would be good to look more deeply at the general ideas in the report.

Above all, I too would like to subscribe to everything that has been said in favour of our being qualified to discuss the issue of sanctions. I believe you have indeed raised an important question which comes within the remit of this Panel and within the remit of UNESCO. We know very well there is nothing more political than UNESCO's whole field of action.

Legally, it is fact: we need sanctions. The rule of law cannot exist unless there is a sanction for anyone who violates it. But a sanction serves also to protect people and to try to end the violation. A sanction also carries the idea of rehabilitation. So we should look at what has happened up to now and shed light on the purpose of a sanction which should be effective and fair.

As regards effectiveness, many speakers here have said that sanctions — and particularly embargoes — have never been effective. So as not to take a recent example, it is common knowledge that Franco's regime in Spain would certainly not have lasted so long if there had not been an embargo just after World War II.

Indeed, the example that is always quoted — and Mr Owada has just said as much — is South Africa. However, we should take into account the special situation of South Africa. In effect, when confronted with an embargo situation or sanctions, the all-powerful leader or leaders of a country can usually mobilize all the citizens, the whole population, into reacting in defence of their identity and against what is presented as a foreign diktat. That is what General Franco did with great skill at that time. In South Africa, the same sort of reaction could not be engineered because the very aim of the sanction was to put an end to the situation where a minority was preventing the majority from having any identity. It was impossible for the white minority to mobilize the whole country and create a common front against a foreign stranglehold. You spoke, Mr Chairperson, of financial sanctions. I think it was the decision of some very large financial groups to withhold their finance from South Africa that certainly tipped the scales more than the general embargo measures which were often circumvented.

Nowadays people talk about "fair and proportionate" steps. I can but subscribe to this idea because much has been

said here about the fact that present sanctions, economic sanctions, are unfair and disproportionate and they usually do not affect those they are intended to punish. You have said, Mr Chairperson, that the present economic sanctions are inadequate. I think that is because of the embryonic state of international law. We are in a situation like that of a State having decided that a certain act is criminal, does not have the policing or judicial facilities to put a stop to the act, nor to arrest or try the person who committed it. The international community has developed the rule of law but possesses no means, apart from fraudulent ones, to apply it. Without going quite so far as world government, the international community must try to bring the various possibilities into line with each other.

Sanctions should be selective and appropriate. We should resort more often to 'smart sanctions' and improve our assessments of the situation. This also means there must be no interests involved other than the one that serves as a pretext for the imposition of a sanction. Thus, a genuine assessment of the sanctions could be undertaken and the sanctions modulated depending on their effect. I also believe that sanctions should be complemented by positive measures. At the moment, for example, in former Yugoslavia, we are trying to enforce sanctions and take positive measures in favour of civil society. It is a step in the right direction but we could do better because positive measures lose all their effect and are vitiated when they are implemented together with disproportionate or unfair sanctions.

But I think that progress on the way to solutions will come from the development of international justice. Yes, the latter will very soon come up against the problem of being unable to enforce its rulings, but its development is promising. When guilty leaders are no longer able to travel and have to live in hiding, even if there is no possibility of arresting them, we will have made great progress. The Pinochet case may seem unsatisfactory but the fact that for two years he experienced a certain anxiety — even though that anxiety was nothing compared with the anxiety he caused many of his fellow citizens — the fact that he will end his days ignominiously, does seem to be a step in the right direction. The development of international penal justice, combined with financial and individual sanctions and also combined with positive measures to encourage and support civil society

action within the countries concerned, does seem to me to be the right way forward.

I am very happy that we have met again for a further round of discussions about democracy and development. I would first like to congratulate those who drafted the interim report, although there are parts that will require further discussion. The report made very good sense of our two earlier meetings, which were very productive and at the same time very wide-ranging and often confusing.

I would first like to look at the issue of sanctions from a certain perspective, namely that of the task we have been given. To quote the Director-General's Note, which announced the setting up of our Panel: "The Panel's main task will be to advise me with a view to carrying out UNESCO's programmes relating to the building of democracy which form part of a global strategy aimed at establishing a culture of peace in a multicultural world". Throughout our discussions, I tried to find out how we could be useful to the Director-General. Up to now, we have been discussing the issue of whether UNESCO is qualified to discuss the topic itself; then, whether recourse to sanctions is effective; and finally what kind of sanctions might be useful and effective. But in my opinion there are some issues we need to clarify first.

There is certainly no reason why we cannot discuss these issues. Indeed, I think that whatever the conclusions and recommendations we make, they could prove useful to UNESCO and the Director-General. Having said that, UNESCO cannot impose sanctions. In my opinion, only the Security Council can do that. But UNESCO can specify the criteria by which such sanctions can be decided on and what kind of sanctions can be applied under what circumstances. But above all we need to discuss the following questions: "Who is going to determine whether sanctions should be applied or not?" and "How will that be determined?" Our discussions will remain very abstract if we do not know the answer to those questions. It is only when we know that answer that we shall be able to decide, or the appropriate body will be able to determine whether to apply such sanctions, what kind of sanctions are to be applied, and the identity of those bodies which will apply them, namely international organizations.

We have to examine certain issues, but the recommenda-

tions we make to UNESCO will be very limited in scope, and we shall above all have to think about the methods and criteria to be used when choosing sanctions. As for the sanctions themselves, I think there is a very narrow definition of sanctions which we have been discussing up to now, and which ranges from an embargo or a refusal to trade and commercial, financial and other sanctions to a rather broader definition including what might be described as economic pressure. That could include, in addition to or instead of positive steps such as restricting trade and finance, the practice — which already exists — of refraining from giving assistance — this was done in the case of Myanmar — or refusing to allow such States to become members of certain international organizations, such as the WTO or the European Union. And we have to consider a whole series of economic measures through which democracy can be encouraged, rather than what is generally understood by the narrow notion of sanctions.

The report contains some very useful recommendations, and I would certainly agree that it is important to make recommendations concerning education, the rule of law, the culture of democracy, and the need to encourage the activities of NGOs and emphasize transparency and accountability. I would like to point out that, even if they are useful, these recommendations are very abstract. I would like us to add certain elements to them. One activity that we could recommend is the monitoring of certain situations in all parts of the world. The aim would be not to intervene but to be in a position to bring moral pressure to bear, and at the same time to remind the rest of the world and other international organizations of what is going on, because it is rare for there to be fact-finding on the spot that can help us to understand. In many cases, the necessary information has been largely lacking for the action-orientated Organization, namely the United Nations. I hope that we shall be able to formulate concrete recommendations for UNESCO and its Director-General.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

I would like, if I may, to sum up very briefly what has been said. I would like to reassure both Mr Hussain and Ambassador Owada. We do not intend to go into the issue of international sanctions in detail. The idea is simply to include a paragraph indicating that we are aware of the problem and that this problem has repercussions on a State's development and democratization.

Without going into detail, I would like to say to Mr Owada that we are talking about economic sanctions and not sanctions in general. And, to answer Professor Han's questions, bilateral sanctions exist: the United States of America and Cuba. Regional sanctions exist: the embargo inflicted on Israel by the Arab States. There are sanctions adopted by the Security Council. There are different types of sanctions. The simple idea we need to keep in mind is:

1. that sanctions can be an impediment to development and therefore indirectly to democratization;
2. that sanctions have an effect on third States, which have no connection with sanctions but are nevertheless subjected to them. I experienced the problems that affected Romania and Bulgaria: the fact that bridges were destroyed in the former Yugoslavia had disastrous consequences for all the countries along the Danube.

[beginning of next session]

If you agree, we shall now move straight on to the second topic, which is "International assistance and democratic development". Here, we have a problem which recently cropped up between the ACP States and the European Community. What is the role of international assistance in the democratization process? During the Cold War, bilateral economic assistance or multilateral economic aid was designed to achieve the superpowers' specific aims, whether it was a question of increasing their influence or weakening that of their adversary. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a tendency to cut back economic aid, on the one hand, and to combine it with the democratization process: in other words, a partnership based on a common political vision has tended to replace the donor-recipient pattern.

What is much more to the point is that some donors add a further condition to the democratization process: good governance. Now do such conditionality clauses really cause democracy to thrive or, on the contrary, to lose ground at the same time as development? Does this not sometimes result in the birth of sham democracies? The response of the recipient States — I am thinking above all of the developing States in the Caribbean or in Africa — varies depending on whether they reject the democratization process or whether they are in a state of decay — as was

the case with Somalia — or else whether they are emerging from a devastated economy in which political institutions are weak or non-existent and they are in no position to become more democratic. So the problem remains: what should be done? Should there be in each case a thorough and specific analysis in order to define the instruments and methods that are most appropriate to a given situation, so as to achieve democratic development through international assistance? Or should we be satisfied with general provisions that can be applied to all recipient States?

I can give you an example I have experienced over the past few months: that of Burundi. The President of Burundi said: “Give me economic aid so I can become more democratic. I do not have the resources to become more democratic without economic aid”. The international community, whether in the form of the European Community, the United Nations or bilateral aid donors, replied: “No. First become more democratic, then we shall provide you with the assistance you require”.

This is a concrete problem, and I think it would be a good idea for our report to include a paragraph about this problem and its possible solutions. I believe it to be an extremely important problem, which has been the subject of very lengthy debate in the European Union over the past six months. I think that one of the Secretariat’s tasks should be precisely to establish what UNESCO has already done in this field, so as not to go over the same ground twice or repeat what has already been said. Mr Kéba Mbaye has just reminded us that there was a conference in Dakar which focused on this topic, and there have also been dozens of conferences throughout the world that have done the same thing. It would be a good thing for our report to take into account the other discussions that have taken place in other institutions on the issue of development and democracy.

**Kéba
Mbaye**

Mr Chairperson, I think that this second topic is much more important than the one we have just discussed. I think it is more important because, first of all, it obscures the sanction. As you have just pointed out, conditionality is in fact first a form of sanction, then a form of reward — though I do not much like the word “reward”. Mr Chairperson, I have just experienced, within a few days, an extraordinary change — I would even say a revolution — in my own country. For 50 years, we had a political regime

where people succeeded each other, but were always at the same end of the political spectrum and similar in thought and action. Suddenly, all that came to an end, and there was a change in the attitude of the Senegalese, who carried out a veritable democratic revolution. I have to say that this did not take place thanks to international assistance, either at the economic level (because that assistance vanished into the sands of private interests, often, by the way, with the full knowledge and, I would even say, sometimes the complicity of donors), or as regards development, which had no impact on the development of democracy.

Mr Chairperson, if I were in your shoes, I would have suggested that we put our foot down a little more firmly as regards the second topic and, rather than talking merely of international assistance and democratic development, use the term “international assistance to democracy”. I believe that, just as we have tried since the creation of the United Nations — and incidentally with little success — to assist development, we should try to assist democracy. For — as I once again came to realize over the last few days, which I experienced with great intensity during the latest elections in Senegal — that is something that requires resources, though not, in fact, considerable resources.

I would like to digress for a moment, then return to the matter in hand, since what I have to say is unlikely to go down well here: I believe that, if UNESCO wants to make people think about such important issues as democracy and development, it is not its vocation to confine us within fixed limits. I believe we should give free rein to our thoughts. UNESCO will choose. When one makes recommendations, one naturally has to step carefully. But as far as thoughts are concerned, there should be complete freedom. We are free to say what we want, even though very often — I can see this from my international experience, which is unfortunately beginning to become rather too long — very often we draw on thinking that goes well beyond the boundaries of the programme or purview of the Organization in which that thinking takes place.

So what we are saying here could one day be used somewhere else than in UNESCO. When we come to make recommendations, we shall of course have to be much more moderate. But what I observed in Senegal was that the decisive element was first of all education, the education of the population as regards

democracy. It does not seem to amount to much, but you just need to say to each citizen: “With your ballot paper, you can get things changed. You don’t have a job, you’re having difficulty in making ends meet, so you’re unhappy with the government. With your ballot paper, you can get things changed”. It is very important to say and repeat that all the time.

Another extremely important thing as regards democracy is freedom of the media. I have witnessed a veritable sea change in society as a result of private media and mobile phones. What used to happen in Senegal? The elections took place at a polling station in a village in the depths of eastern Senegal. When the polling station closed, the results were displayed or announced, and that was that. Matters then went via the prefect, the governor and the interior minister, and eventually ended up at the Court of Appeal.

Well this time, everywhere, at each polling station, there were representatives of the private media which now exist in my country, and every representative had his mobile phone. My wife and I had a notebook, and we jotted down the results. The results could not be tampered with. That was impossible because everyone knew what was going on everywhere at the same time.

That does not seem very important, but in a developing country it is extremely important. If one wants to assist the development of democracy, the private media need to be helped, and those private media need to be given the possibility of communicating with the population.

Then of course there is the role of international organizations. Mention was made a moment ago of civil society. That too is very important. Civil society needs to be educated so it can accompany assistance to democracy or, if you prefer, help to achieve democracy. But there is of course, as always, the role of intellectuals. Intellectuals do not always have to choose sides. They can of course do so, but they have to be on the side of justice and the side of the truth, and they must always speak out. What I have noticed is that in fact they can speak out only if there are private media. So it all hangs together — education, information and then freedom of speech. It is in those areas, in my opinion, that the international community can help democracy to be achieved, and that is how sham democracies can be killed off, because what actually happens — and it is something

Hisashi
Owada

I have long experienced, Mr Chairperson — is that there is a connivance between certain developed States, or even the international community, and the ruling authorities which reject democracy. That is the truth.

Once again, Mr Chairperson, you have admirably summed up the problems inherent in the situation we are examining. Like Judge Mbaye, I feel we should think about this problem of international assistance not only in terms of sanctions, but rather from the point of view of positive cooperation which is potentially inherent in the question of international assistance. The fact is that the approach based on conditionality, which is linked with the sanctions aspect of the problem, has proved ineffective. I think that the whole world has come to recognize that. Evidence of that is to be found in the new approach of the World Bank, which is based on a comprehensive development framework. When I was at the United Nations, I approached the issue of development in very much the same kind of context, by advocating a “new strategy for development”, which involved striving to think about the problem of development, cooperation and international assistance in terms of a comprehensive approach to development, with the sense of ownership of the issue by the people on whom the solution depended, combined with the sense of partnership on the part of those who are outsiders. This is tantamount to recognizing that development is a voluntary process, which must have a general significance and whose success depends on the political will of society as a whole. Failing that, there cannot be genuine development. And for such development to be feasible it needs to have a democratic basis.

But this cannot be imposed on people from outside. That is why it is essential to try to create structures of cooperation and partnership, so that society as a whole — not just the government, but also the people — is in a position to feel directly concerned by the problem of development and take it into their own hands. Rather than talking about international assistance as a problem of conditionality — that is a sanctions approach to the issue — I think we need to approach the problem more in terms of a complex process of cooperation based on those two concepts of ownership and partnership. That is the approach which, for example, the World Bank is now striving to practise in the

context of a comprehensive development framework. In my view, it would be extremely useful to mention all that in our report.

The concept of democracy is defined in the report as being based on the rule of law and the freely expressed will of the people, which must lead to good governance. It is only on that basis that development can succeed. That is why it must be based on a democratic social framework, the problem being that this cannot be imposed from outside. Even if you try to impose it by attaching conditions to it, you will fail. This has been shown by past experience, and institutions like the World Bank have had to recognize that.

I think our report could usefully emphasize this link between international assistance and democratic development in the context of a more positive relationship between the two issues. The aim is for the international community to try to convince the States and societies concerned to have the will to act in favour of development in a spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation — when everything comes from outside and when outside partners try to impose their conditions in order to achieve their own goals. Rather than doing that, they should realize the importance of creating a framework of cooperation based on partnership and ownership of the society in question. To that extent, I think we could adopt a more positive approach in our report.

Alexei
Vassiliev

The problems that have just been raised are very important, as are the contradictions you have pointed out: democracy first, and then aid; or else aid first, and then democracy. It is not very constructive to use the slogan of democracy as a precondition for aid. It was in the name of democracy that aid was provided — to take the example of my country, Russia — to people who declared themselves to be democrats, whereas they were actually the biggest thieves in history. Another example is the considerable aid that was given to such a perfect democracy as Mobutu's regime in Zaire, when the money smuggled to the West came from robbing all the country's resources, including aid.

I believe that if there is real development it will sooner or later produce democratic institutions from inside society itself. That is why, when there is a possibility of international assistance, whether it be bilateral or multilateral, it should be

granted whatever the regime, but in very concrete fields and for very concrete projects. I am thinking of education, public health and the development of industry and infrastructure. If the country in question, whatever its situation, progresses satisfactorily in the economic field, that also means that little by little conditions will always become more conducive to democracy. We have among us representatives of countries which, with or without foreign aid, have been very successful in their economic development — that is the case with South Korea, among others. Little by little, the authoritarian regimes that ruled them began to adopt much more democratic behaviour as their economies developed, something that would have been impossible without democratic rules.

As for insisting first on democracy, one might cite the example of Senegal, which was supposed to be a kind of showcase democracy. And yet when I was in Senegal, I was told that the amount of aid going to Senegal and the amount of money smuggled to Western banks was exactly the same. So what kind of showcase democracy was that?

If, on the other hand, aid is given to concrete projects, it can create an impetus and better conditions for the development of democracy that is inherent in that society itself. But the Western notion of democracy, which emerged after evolving for some 2,000 years, should not be imposed. It is counterproductive to try to impose the same rules on other countries. You cannot impose the rules of British democracy, which is 800 years old, on African countries. It would be absurd. Finally, the granting of aid for economic and social development will produce better results than declarations about democracy.

Hisashi
Owada

I am sorry, but I forgot to mention one important conclusion that I wanted to draw. I shall be brief. The overall approach, in this particular case, should include three elements: the first is human capacity-building; the second is institution-building; and the third is good governance. However, all three should be based in the country concerned, in the society concerned, rather than take the form of conditions imposed from outside.

Abid
Hussain

I fully agree with the terms used when introducing this issue, and I am convinced that this is a very favourable approach for strengthening democracy and development through international aid and support. My feeling is that this is a part of the new international dependence, which takes the form of interdependence between States. The haves must always be prepared to give to the have-nots, and there are many areas of deficit in the developing countries. It is therefore only natural that there should be a flow from the haves to the have-nots.

Over the past two or three decades, that international aid and assistance has often been very effective. Aid should act as a catalyst to help States to do what they want to do but cannot. Assistance should go to areas where there are technological and other deficits, and in particular to countries that are striving to develop through democratic processes.

Democracy is in itself a very slow process. So one of the things that can be done to help a democratic experience of growth and development is to provide effective aid. Having said that, Mr Chairperson, I fully agree with Mr Owada that such aid must first of all go towards the development of human resources, which also comes within the scope of UNESCO. For it is a state of mind, a kind of culture of thought, mind and soul which can result in the transformation of society. That is why aid orientated in that way can be of great assistance. Similarly, assistance must be given to governance, because democracy can sometimes become very chaotic, and some countries where the democratic administration, democratic proceedings, parliament, and legislation have failed greatly need to be assisted. This leads me to attribute a great deal of importance to the development of human resources which are devoted to development and good governance. These are two very important elements to which assistance should be directed.

Just one more point I would like to submit to you, Mr Chairperson: this kind of assistance should not be allowed to lead to dependence. There have indeed been cases where the beneficiaries of aid have become increasingly dependent on support from outside. A time limit needs to be defined after which the assistance is withdrawn and society must take over. Now this is possible only when people in the community have participated from the start. So it would be advisable to lay down

as a condition that aid and assistance should be restricted to programmes in which people in the local community can take part. Otherwise those people become too dependent and aid becomes counterproductive. This point needs to be stressed.

Another point, Mr Chairperson: some donors have political motives. And this sort of assistance becomes politics by other means, or intervention in some countries through other means. One has to be extremely vigilant about this and keep out such donors. We must be able to screen candidates, or at least be very well informed, so that this sort of thing does not happen.

Lastly, Mr Chairperson, I would like to stress that in some countries the question at issue is whether assistance should go through the State or through an NGO selected from outside. Legitimate doubts have been raised by States about NGOs, and there have also been cases where aid has gone to the State and been used by it for its own political purposes. So the mechanism of this kind of assistance to States needs to be defined very clearly. I think these ideas should be presented to the World Bank and to other agencies and donors, because they have the financial resources that enable them to intervene effectively. However, and this is my last point, their aid, far from eradicating poverty, has in some cases accentuated it. And in some cases, too, tensions are created in new societies between the new classes created by that aid, which are not on the same level as the overall development of the country. So steps should be taken to prevent a small group in a given society from becoming, in some way, opposed to development, democracy and the State. No State, however good or bad it may be, could allow that to happen. So by way of conclusion, Mr Chairperson, I would say that a reference to this should be included in our report.

Pierre
Cornillon

As many speakers have stressed, here we are broaching an extremely complex issue. I totally agree with Mr Kéba Mbaye. One does not much like the notions of sanctions or rewards. Besides, I think that African countries have been very poorly rewarded for the remarkable peaceful revolution they led at the beginning of the 1990s, when they tried to open up to a multi-party system. Those efforts were in fact 'rewarded' by a substantial fall in development aid.

That being so, one cannot state that aid should be provided if it serves no purpose. So we come back to this notion of effectiveness that I mentioned earlier regarding economic sanctions. This notion, however, is not everyone's main concern. The donor countries — or their officials — often have an interest both in taking the credit for being donors and in receiving in return, in their banks or elsewhere, a good proportion of the money they have donated. You give with one hand, and you are a generous donor, but you make sure you recover what you have given. That is why one needs to keep in mind the situation both in the receiving countries and in the donor countries, as well as people's motives, as Mr Hussain pointed out. An important point is knowing whether the donor countries' motivation is really development aid.

I am not opposed to there being a certain conditionality attached to aid. Of course we should show solidarity but we are not obliged to provide assistance when that assistance is clearly not going to serve any purpose. Some of us here have made a distinction between purely economic assistance and assistance to democracy. And yet the two are closely interlinked. Because it is very difficult to provide a country with effective assistance to democracy unless there is at the same time a minimum improvement in the economic situation. It is difficult for citizens to become involved in the management and the political life of their country if they have empty stomachs. If the donor countries have genuine motives for helping development, I think they can find a way — apart from strict conditionality which is a form of sanction — to set up a procedure enabling them to assess the validity and proper use of the resources they provide. We could surely establish a certain number of procedures enabling them to assess the validity of a project and the proper use of the resources provided. But such an assessment must be undertaken advisedly. I was recently on a human rights mission in an African country where a foreign ambassador said to me: "We set up a training programme for judges, but we have had to put it on hold for the time being, given the current situation". There was clearly an assessment problem. One might think that it is not right to train judges if they are going to be serving an authoritarian State and thus enable it to exercise even greater oppression. But alternatively, one might think that by training a corps of competent

magistrates, whose independence will go from strength to strength, one would be contributing to democratization.

I am well aware of the difficulties involved in modulating assistance: the means, the ways in which it is applied and the amounts provided, for that assistance to be appropriate. I know, for example, that it is very difficult to provide civil society with assistance when there is a very authoritarian regime that will not authorize it. Technical assistance usually depends on agreements and negotiations with the government. It is an obstacle international NGOs sometimes manage to avoid in providing assistance direct to domestic NGOs. However, I feel that greater efforts should be made to gear that international action to results, to goals and to the prevailing conditions in the receiving country. These efforts could be made and would give some favourable results for democracy and development.

Guo
Jiading

Economic assistance should not depend on any condition of a political nature. That is the first principle. The second is based on equality and mutual advantages, as well as non-interference in internal affairs. Those principles are very important. China provides a modest amount of assistance to other developing countries that need it. In so doing, we never intervene in the internal affairs of the States concerned, and we assist them in the choice of their own political system and of the way they want to develop, in accordance with their own specific conditions. And we support their efforts to defend their independence, their sovereignty and the integrity of their territory against any outside intervention, as well as their efforts to remain united and settle their differences peacefully. In our view, that is the only way that international aid can help to encourage democracy.

There are a number of examples of this happening in various parts of the world. Mr Hussain also mentioned the need to avoid using assistance to intervene, with ulterior motives, in the internal affairs of others. I feel that international aid will produce good results as long as a number of fundamental principles are observed, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual advantages, and non-interference in internal affairs. Otherwise, aid can sometimes have the opposite outcome. Recent examples can be seen in the action of the World Bank and the IMF, which, over the past ten years, have

Han
Sung-Joo

forced some African countries to accept structural adjustment plans which stress the need, among other things, for privatization and a complete lifting of trade restrictions. Now those measures destabilized the African countries concerned and had a negative impact on their economic development. And we can now see that those two financial institutions have changed their approach and give the recipient States greater latitude in making macro-economic decisions. They have learnt from their past experience of granting financial assistance to those States. I think this approach is justified and needs to be encouraged. That is what I wanted to say about the principle of aid.

To return to UNESCO, what should it do in terms of recommendations? I think we should always keep in mind the goals and the mission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in other words not stray from UNESCO's field of action as regards education, science and culture. I am not in a position to go into details, but we should remember those goals and that mission when drawing up our recommendations.

I would broadly agree with the arguments so far put forward that assistance should not be conditional on the taking of measures regarding democracy. At the same time, however, I would like to say that this absence of conditions should not be total. There are a few elements I would like to mention.

The first case is that of egregiously undemocratic acts perpetrated by regimes or leaders. I feel it is important to ask oneself whether there is any justification for rewarding them by granting them aid. There naturally remains the problem of determining where the dividing line lies between unacceptable behaviour and acts which are certainly undemocratic but cannot act as an impediment to the granting of aid.

Secondly, although, as has already been pointed out, we cannot bring in political conditions, it is permitted and probably necessary to insist on certain conditions of accountability and transparency.

My final point is a little more complicated: those who are fighting for democracy in those countries feel that foreign countries or outside organizations should not provide assistance to such regimes. It is very difficult to determine the legitimacy and

usefulness of such views, but there are cases where leaders who are indisputably recognized as democrats strongly argue that such aid does not contribute to the democratization of their country. This of course causes a dilemma that needs to be taken into account before arguing that assistance should be unconditional.

And finally, as regards humanitarian assistance, I feel it should be unconditional. In some cases, it is difficult to provide humanitarian aid because of restrictions that are imposed on regimes on the grounds that they have misappropriated and improperly used such aid. It is very difficult to deal with such cases. And yet, as far as it is possible, I feel that hunger, famine and other disasters that hit mankind should be fought; and conditions can be waived regarding such aid.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

While I fully subscribe to the principles that have been enunciated on non-interference, I think that today they can no longer be interpreted in the same way as in the past, notably as regards the issue of aid and assistance to democracy and development.

I think that unconditional aid, namely aid given to leaders without any checks or guarantees, can be used simply to feed the leaders in question and therefore misses its goal. To my mind, when we talk about “conditionality”, we mean conditionality in relation to goals. I think that Mr Owada, in his second contribution, made that very clear. The conditions, or the way those conditions are implemented, must originate in the society concerned, although the goal should be the same for the donor and the recipient. But it needs to be adapted to each of the societies concerned, and no one knows a society better than someone who lives in it. I regard it as an aberration when conditions are parachuted from on high by people known as “technocrats”. And that was probably the case with certain aberrations that were mentioned earlier in connection with the IMF or the World Bank.

So it is a question of interpreting what is known as “objective conditionality”, while keeping in mind the fact that one needs to adjust to each of the societies concerned and its requirements, its specific characteristics, its level of development, its culture — all of them questions that must not be lost sight of. That is the whole problem of standardization and globalization. Globalization does not mean a standardization of models.

H.R.H.
Princess
Basma Bint
Talal

I should like to say a few words on the relationship between international aid and development, insofar as democracy and development in many countries, and notably the ACP States, depend on the aid they receive, whether from the European Union or from other international organizations.

First of all we need to separate out the term “international aid” and recognize that there are different kinds of international aid providers: UN multilaterals, multinationals like the World Bank and the IMF, regional multilaterals like the EC, and then bilaterals.

Each of these agencies has their own objectives and agendas, and is accountable to a different constituency. Central to the debates about their role in the development process — to what extent do aid agencies have the right to dictate the way aid money is spent by the recipient country? Do they have the right to promote their vision of how the world should be organized, i.e. with democratic structures?

Clearly, if this is what their constituency, or electorate wants, then they have a right — and indeed an obligation since they are accountable. Clearly one can raise questions here about the voting powers of such bodies but in theory we can all influence the rules that are set. And the organizations can only operate within their mandates. The issue then is one of how far the recipients are prepared to modify their own objectives and mandates in order to receive the aid.

Why would aid agencies invest in “democracy”? In this case we can interpret democracy as a wide range of processes which ensure that people are actively involved with decisions which affect their livelihood opportunities. Democracy is about transparency and accountability. Development agencies recognize that economic growth, human development, environmental sustainability all require the full participation of citizens in the decision-making process. It is not a case of first economic, then social, and then governance. They are all tied together.

The question then arises — why would any recipient country resist the concepts of democracy as a prerequisite for human development? Or is it an issue of the interests of one sector dominating the decisions about how limited international aid should be spent. In this context, the current trend of international aid agencies is to recognize the legitimacy of the State as

the accountable body (as opposed to NGOs and the private sector) and to work from the assumption that they act in the best interests of the people — with the result that the majority of assistance is now channelled through governments for them to fund their own programmes rather than the previous trend for development projects where the donors played a very strong monitoring role.

In this context, the role of NGOs again is central to the process — they act as the counterbalance and check on the power of the State and the private sector. In this vision then, international agencies promote democracy and good governance by stimulating the civil society to play a role of advocacy, influencing policy makers to make decisions which are pro-poor and equitable, empowering poor and excluded people (especially women and children) to play an active role in the process. In theory, this will ensure that there is space for voice and audit to emerge.

But what happens if the recipient country does not want the aid agency to play this role? What happens if they don't want any money to go to NGOs — especially NGOs which advocate human rights? Often this proves the very point. Governments which exercise excessive control over civil society are the very ones that are losing out on opportunities for human development.

In this debate lies the whole issue of the use of 'conditionality' in aid contracts and the leverage they exert over governments to implement changes in policies. Traditionally this has been seen as a tool for enforcing human rights and promoting democracy as the preferred mode of political organization. Although cynics might say it has been much more utilized as leverage to enforce globalization and opening up to markets to the detriment of poor countries.

Where the extremes of aid and conditionality have been most discussed is in relation to the previous apartheid regime of South Africa, and subsequently with the denial of needed humanitarian aid and the application of sanctions against Iraq (and therefore the impositions of conditionality on aid to 'friendly' neighbours like Jordan). And that exposes the problems of "whose rights? — whose idea of democracy?"

The issue is one of the right to self determination of any country — and to choose its own path to democracy and account-

able governance. The fine balance has to be achieved between promoting universal human rights and interfering in the internal decision-making processes.

There are also major questions to raise about the even-handedness of such leverage. There are notable exceptions to recognition of the rights to democratic systems to which a blind eye is turned, whilst other, poorer and less powerful countries find themselves forced to move in directions their own citizens may not have chosen at that time.

There is also the fundamental dilemma that there still appears to be little evidence of “democracy” being a necessary precondition for economic and human development. It will be interesting to monitor whether previously “undemocratic” regimes like Yugoslavia will fare any better in their current (fragmented) democratic states — and whether they will show a commitment to social values.

Those countries that exist in situations of political instability and conflict may achieve greater human development under “benign dictatorship” than if exposed to constantly fluctuating political changes. One can see the danger that people will abandon democracy if they come to believe that it will only perpetuate economic inequality and stagnation. There have been warnings that popular support for democracy in newly democratizing countries will wane if there is persistent economic hardship.

So from the viewpoint of the recipient countries, the issue of dependence on aid and the possibility of leverage being applied is a serious one. Interestingly for NGOs, they have more often found themselves in agreement with the donors in terms of promoting the need for governance structures and democracy. Priorities and needs should be identified according to the realities of the people involved. I fully agree that aid should not lead to dependence but rather it should be targeted to help people build their capacities and provide facilities for sustainability.

Nicolas
Valticos

As regards the need to take into account the requests of the recipient countries, we have to remember that there can be requests for aid which are directly or indirectly contrary to democratic change. That is why we need to specify that as a general rule aid must match the request and the priorities defined by the recipient State. Otherwise, aid that is intended to con-

tribute to democratic development may get diverted towards purely economic and undemocratic development goals.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

We are now going to move on to the third topic, entitled: “Decentralization and democratic development”. In the course of our last two meetings, we did not discuss the role of decentralization in the process of democratic development. Decentralization tends to give local authorities considerable freedom of action and encourage citizen participation. It also enables cities and regions to run their own affairs with their ears closer to the ground, by allowing for the diversity of people’s needs. Having said that, I want to make it clear straight away that one should not underestimate the dangers of decentralization for newly-fledged States which are trying to maintain their territorial and administrative unity. Whether decentralization takes the form of federalism or something else, it risks bolstering local feudalities and authoritarian regimes. So here again I call on the International Panel to think about the role of decentralization in the democratization process and economic development. In some countries, results have been excellent; in others, they have had extremely serious consequences.

**Nicolas
Valticos**

Just to start the ball rolling: one cannot lay down absolute rules that are valid for all countries, except in the case of one principle: depending on whether a country is big or small, the terms of the problem are completely different. A small State does not need as much decentralization as a State with a far-flung territory. True, we are talking about decentralization and not devolution, but the very dimensions of a country and the fact that it is made up of units that may contain different cultures and even races can obviously raise questions about decentralization. So this is a field where we should allow a certain degree of flexibility while at the same time mentioning the existence of the problem.

**Alexei
Vassiliev**

I agree that there can be two types of situations. On the one hand, greater participation by local elites or leaders in decision-making can have positive results. On the other, the selfishness of local elites can destroy everything if they put their own interests first, on the basis of local, feudal, religious or other traditions. So we need a well-balanced definition.

Abid
Hussain

Here is an example: greater decentralization can sometimes lead to undemocratic decisions because members of a local elite — or ethnocrats, as we call them in Russia — impose their will, even against the majority of the population. As you may know, we have a quite well developed autonomous Republic of Bashkiria. Bashkirs make up less than 20 per cent of the population, Russians more than half, and Tatars the rest. In practice, however, the Bashkirs control everything — the administration, finance, everything. In a case like this, does decentralization foster democratization or, on the contrary, does it encourage undemocratic practices? There are many examples of this kind of situation in Africa. It is important that we address this problem, but in a very balanced way.

I agree that when it comes to democracy it has to be said that a concentration of power in a given place can give rise to difficulties. “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. It is therefore vital that power be shared on an equal basis. And power should be given to the powerless, so that the participation of citizens becomes possible. But we need to take two or three elements into account.

Many States have decentralized, and created bodies at a lower level that are totally unviable in financial terms. They depend so vitally on receiving money from the top that they are nothing more than paper tigers. Therefore, in order for them to be in working order, they need, through decentralization, to be financially viable and to some extent independent of the organizations at the top.

The second important point is this: linkages need to be established between the various levels of democracy. It is a very good thing that there are various levels of democratic institutions and that democracy should be decentralized, but not to the point of giving independence or autonomy to all those units. One way of ensuring functional decentralization is to make sure that each element’s remit is clearly defined and that the responsibilities of the central power and those of the other levels in a federalist structure are clearly defined. And the administrative capabilities of those institutions need to evolve constantly, as the decentralized levels are often incapable of governing. The 40 or 50 years of experience acquired in India clearly show the vital

importance of governance. Self-government is important, but at the same time effective government must be kept in mind. In the field that concerns us, and in view of the role that UNESCO can play, I think that new technologies should be used to obtain the latest information and knowledge. That is why it is very important to computerize them, put them on the Web and provide them with all the facilities that are available from the modern communications system. Failing that, I doubt whether it will be possible for us to pass on the knowledge necessary for the development of rural areas, which is the basic role of the authorities at those levels. In short, democracy will remain incomplete unless power is given to the people. For that to happen, it is vital that the government is operational at various levels, and financial, administrative and technological support is necessary for it to function effectively.

My last point is that most countries are dominated by party politics, and it can generally be observed that if the lower level does not belong to the central echelon of the party in power, the central echelon, it will be treated differently. I do not know how that difficulty can be dealt with, but I think we need to take it into account.

Guo Jiading

In this connection, it seems to me that the principle of universality does not apply here. We need to refer to the principle of specificity, namely that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the specific conditions of the countries or regions we are dealing with. We need to take into account those conditions, as well as the time factor and the stage of development that a country has reached. In China, for example, we have experienced both centralization and decentralization. It all depends on the stage that has been reached and on the need for one or the other. It is not possible to tell someone to decentralize at a given point or to claim that there is a universal rule of decentralization that can be applied to everyone.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

I wonder whether there may not be a problem of language or terminology here, because we have just in fact said that people should not be dictated to when it comes to whether or not they should decentralize. What we of course know is that decentralization presupposes a certain autonomy on the part of the body

Pierre
Cornillon

concerned, as opposed to devolution, which is a simple organization of the central power. Would it not be better to eschew the word “decentralization” and talk rather of bringing those concerned by decisions closer to the decision-making process?

I think that this is the key issue. When the decision-maker is at the centre, far, sometimes very far, depending on the size of the country — obviously things are not the same thing in China as they are in smaller countries — when the decision-maker is very far from those affected by his decision, problems and difficulties can arise. That can be an impediment to development and democracy. I believe that this is the essential point. A person sitting in an office at the centre does not know either what needs are to be satisfied or what steps to take, and does not talk to those affected by the decision, who are sometimes in remote places.

We are once again faced with a complex issue where the pros and cons intersect. I am going to play devil’s advocate. Personally, I am not entirely convinced that decentralization is a panacea. Of course power can be too centralized or too far removed from the people and in that case it is a soulless power. Bringing power and decision-making closer to the people is a good idea but I am not sure that it necessarily means fairer or better decisions. The inhabitant of a village may prefer some official in the far-off administrative capital to grant planning permission for his house rather than the mayor of his village with whom he may not be on good terms. Decentralization of power may make it easier to gain support but it is useful that a possibility of appeal exists, that one can appeal to a higher authority and that a decision at local level is not final.

Although decentralization — the British call it ‘devolution’ I think — is, in principle, a good thing, we should be on guard against the setting up of feudalities or strongholds based on an identitarian or selfish response. We have seen this happening recently in Europe and the drawbacks of separatist reactions, based either on ethnic identity with violent rejection of ‘the other’ or based on wealth — why should we pay for our poor neighbours? The European Union provides a safety net for those countries that are members but we have seen the devastating effects of these reactions in other regions of this continent.

In order to be a good thing, decentralization needs to go hand in hand with a homogenization of development and of democracy as well as with the assertion of solidarity. We should not forget that in mediaeval Europe it was not without good reason that people felt greatly relieved when they were able to appeal to the king rather than depend entirely on the local lord. That is how kingdoms became more powerful but also, unfortunately, centralized: the population could appeal to them for help against local feudalities.

Hisashi
Owada

My two predecessors have just made the point I intended to make, so I can be very brief. It seems to me that this dichotomy, or rather this way of presenting the problem as a dichotomy between centralization and decentralization, may sometimes be misleading. I believe this is a point touched on by Mr Hussain. A concentration of power is a source of corruption and does not encourage democracy. It should be avoided. Decentralization could be one of the ways of achieving that aim, but what is at issue is not so much the choice between decentralization as a system of political governance on the one hand and a centralized political system on the other; it is a means of avoiding a concentration of power. It is on that aspect that our report should focus.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

What concerns us here is the possibility for everyone to have a share of political power. And I believe that the examples we can see, particularly in nations which are significantly large in area, such as Brazil, suggest that as far as administration is concerned decentralization has proved rather effective.

I can see very well that some of us are worried that decentralization may cause the country to be divided up politically. But, in order to avoid that, decentralization at an administrative level, in other words local political participation, must change into a more deeply rooted local political democracy and become the very instrument through which democracy can take root. It is a fact that administrative decentralization, because it brings in transparency and makes it easier, for example, to control the phenomenon of corruption, represents in itself a political step forward and a step forward for democracy.

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

It seems to me that we have considered only one aspect of decentralization. At an international level, local councils, cities and mayors have recently played an extremely important role. By forming associations, they have succeeded in playing a major role on the international political scene, thus contributing to the democratization of international relations.

Another aspect of decentralization was touched on by Mr Badinter. He reminded us that some regions are made up of parts of various neighbouring States. I am thinking, for example, of the Lyon-Geneva-Milan axis. A certain entity is thus formed whose elements cooperate with each other. So regionalization, which is not necessarily restricted to a single State, but can occur at the level of a group of States, is also a form of decentralization. We can, then, take these two notions on board, namely that it is up to the State to decide, because it is the State that knows whether it is ripe for such a process of decentralization, which puts real power in the hands of mayors and local authorities, or whether, on the contrary, it prefers to maintain centralized government for an intermediate period.

[beginning of next session]

Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

I would now like to move on to the fourth issue, the issue of minorities. It is well known that any society is in a sense plural. Why? Because any individual has a wide range of loyalties. The important idea is that all those loyalties should be prioritized and channelled so they do not get diverted and create real impediments to democracy. On the other hand, well-articulated and controlled pluralism is a source of enrichment and teaches people to be tolerant and open to dialogue. Those are two very important ideas. How can democratic development be brought about in a multi-ethnic society? How can democracy be protected in situations where political groupings have an ethnic, religious or linguistic basis? How can the rights of minorities be guaranteed in a context where a majority rules? How can the multiparty system, one of the pillars of democracy, be prevented from exacerbating divisions within the State? I think this problem also deserves our attention.

I would like to stress that last January the International Organization of Francophonía and the Commonwealth held a conference in Cameroon on the theme: "Democracy in a pluri-

ethnic society". A highly pertinent report was drawn up. It chiefly focuses on African countries, where a multitude of tribes and ethnic groups coexist. So what should be done to deal with this problem, which, incidentally, is not specific to Africa but can even be found in Latin America and Asia? Here again, it would be useful to include some recommendations on that topic in our report.

**Abid
Hussain**

The first idea that occurs to me is that democracy is not the same thing as majoritarianism. Consequently, minorities are entitled to be represented in parliaments and governments. The problem is: how do we ensure this? In some countries, quotas have been introduced. In others, certain areas are earmarked in which the minorities govern themselves. In some countries, commissions have been set up which study the problems of minorities and work out what needs to be done.

My feeling is that, with the spread of knowledge, information and education, identitarian closures have emerged. As a result, those who used to remain silent, without demanding their rights to their own language or their own culture, have begun to assert themselves. Their demands must be heeded. In my view, a good State is one where minorities are safe, and where the State is safe from minorities. I want to make my point again: the State must provide minorities with everything, but minorities must not wreck the framework of the State. The legitimate aspirations of minorities must be satisfied through a system where there is one State, but with distinct elements that enable the various minorities to express themselves. In my country, for example, if the country had been divided along religious lines, that might have satisfied the minorities at a particular point in time, but clearly did not allow peace to prevail in that part of the world. So there is no solution to the problem. Minorities have to be allowed to have their say, as democracy is not the rule of the majority, and it is up to the individual countries to find a way in which they themselves can safeguard the minorities' interests.

As regards special treatment, allowances have to be made for a pernicious side-effect, whereby certain communities or minorities, because of measures introduced in their favour, are sometimes tempted to hang on to their minority status indefinitely. The advantages inherent in reserved positions and areas

Guo
Jiading

at governmental, legislative or other levels can work against the natural momentum that would normally encourage integration into the nation. It might perhaps be preferable that such measures should have a time limit and that after a period of time everyone becomes equal within society, irrespective of their religious or ethnic expression. We have not yet been able to find an answer.

In India, we are now revising our Constitution. I am one of the ten members of the Commission that has been appointed to do that. And one of the points we are examining is that very question: do the special measures that were introduced to help minorities result in their remaining minorities for ever? That is why it is important to consider universality and the specific nature of things. Yet at the same time minorities have got to be protected, and they must have their say in order to safeguard their culture and defend their rights.

In connection with this issue of national minorities, I shall again refer to our experience in China. China is a country that has 56 different ethnic groups. The Han are in the majority, and the 55 others are minority groups. The way these ethnic minorities are treated is based on two principles: the equality of all ethnic groups, and special protection for minorities.

In China, not only do ethnic minorities enjoy all the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by law on an equal footing, but they also enjoy, according to the law, all rights that are specially granted to ethnic minorities. They are entitled to participate in the administration of affairs of State and of their own ethnic group. The 55 minority ethnic groups each have their representatives in the National People's Congress and in the Chinese Political Consultative Conference. Where there is a concentration of minority ethnic groups, ethnic regional autonomy is practised, and the State assists in the economic and social development of minority regions by providing funds, technology and specialized personnel, thus promoting economic development and social progress in those regions and improving the minorities' standard of living. The educational and cultural rights of the minority groups are guaranteed, and their traditional culture and religious freedom protected.

What is more, the minorities are free to use and foster

their own languages and to preserve or reform their own customs and traditions. Considerable efforts have also been made to improve not only their situation as regards medical facilities and health in general, but also, now, in the field of ecology. Things are not yet entirely satisfactory, but much has been accomplished. I refer to China's experience as a matter of principle and in order to be concrete. But I do not know what UNESCO should do in this respect.

Alexei
Vassiliev

There are two ideas which I think we could include in our report. The relationship between the majority and the minority within a State could be based on two principles, namely territorial autonomy for minorities where they live, which can have both positive and negative effects, and secondly, recognition of ethnic groups' distinctive cultural, linguistic, religious and historical characteristics, which they would be quite free to develop.

Which is the better choice? That depends on very specific conditions. In any event, this should be done on a basis of mutual respect, cooperation and freedom to develop their own identity. However, particularly in the countries of the South — and not only in the South, as Russia is also an example — these principles need to be taught and people educated. I might mention in passing that I have made efforts in this area in a Russian weekly called League of Nations, which is devoted to the non-Russian citizens of Russia, their problems and what they can do to cope with them.

But, together with the principle of allowing national identities to develop freely, the principle whereby the Constitution and the law of the State is respected by everyone should also be recognized, otherwise there will be a contradiction between the two notions. The specific characteristics of each society should be taken into account, particularly in a context where the population is becoming increasingly mobile. In regions which have been settled for hundreds and sometimes thousands of years, a wave of migration can create entirely new situations which can sometimes have disastrous effects. Our analysis must be balanced and multidimensional.

Pierre
Cornillon

We should not forget the difference between what can be called the broad principles on the one hand and reality on the other. In effect, situations can be different. For example, when a minority, whether religious, ethnic or other, is concentrated in a single geographical region within a country, the problem is very different from a situation where the minority in question is scattered throughout the territory. It is easier to apply broad principles in the second case than in the first. In the first situation, there is a tendency, beyond a demand for democracy, towards autonomy, the constitution of a federal State and even towards independence. And the fact that this localized minority is the result of relatively recent immigration poses problems that should not be underestimated. Such situations can be seen in Kosovo, in Nepal and certain Baltic countries.

When the minority or minorities are scattered throughout a national territory, that is when a solid democratic culture is needed for the rights of a minority to be respected. This is a difficult objective to aim for and I think that all the countries represented here are faced with this difficulty of genuinely integrating minorities into national life.

As for the system of quotas and other reserved positions in assemblies, it is a good starting point for democracy — as we have seen in the case of women — but it can be a question of formal or superficial measures which are not necessarily transposed into the citizen's daily life. So it seems to me that respect for the rights of minorities can but be the end result of a veritable culture and a very advanced, solid democracy. The fact that to date there is no country which can boast of having resolved this problem is one of the reasons why we may suppose that democracy is everywhere incomplete.

Mohamed
Bennouna

By virtue of my present job, I am very sensitive to the issue before us. We are unfortunately faced with the following phenomenon: in a certain number of countries, the introduction of democracy has encouraged conflicts of an ethnic nature. That is the terrible problem. It is tragic. It was tragic for the former Yugoslavia, but the same is true of many other countries and, for example, many African countries, where the constitution of parties and election campaigns are based on ethnic groupings. We then see a return to what might be called "tribalism", in other

words, people do not vote according to political or ideological programmes, but according to membership of a tribal nature, to membership of a group.

This is of course very serious for Africa. It is also very serious elsewhere — it was observed in some European countries, notably after the collapse of Communism. It can go very far, as far as conflicts, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide and so on. So we need to tackle this extremely difficult problem, and I think we should focus on two aspects: the first is respect for cultural diversity. It is one of the problems of our time, and is connected with democratization and development. The second aspect is that democracy is incompatible not only with the use of ethnic or cultural differences as a basis for access to power, but also with an exacerbation of those differences.

That is what has unfortunately happened. In other words, ethnic or cultural differences are used as a means of access to power. And this has sometimes sparked explosions of violence and clashes, which are truly the conflicts of our era. I think that we should stress the following point, namely that cultural diversity should be respected, but that membership of an ethnic group or a culture should not be used as a basis for being allowed to participate in democracy or have access to power, because of the risks I have just mentioned. It is a vast topic and it impinges directly, very very directly, on our discussions. It is not easy.

Han
Sung-Joo

On the subject of minorities, I believe that the relationship between a majority and a minority can vary greatly. There can be a dominant group facing one or several small minority groups, as was the case in China, the former Soviet Union, and possibly Indonesia today. Another pattern is a situation where you get one dominant group facing a large minority group, as in Northern Ireland or Canada. In either case, there are both problems and opportunities. There can be many minority groups within a dominant group, as is probably the case in the United States today. In another case, there might be a small number of minority groups — several but not many — as is probably the case in the former Yugoslavia.

I think democracy has some difficulty in facing these problems of minorities, as can be seen today. But at the same

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

time democracy is the only system capable of dealing with the problems of minorities in a peaceful, fair and just way.

There are, I think, four areas which we might examine, and which could perhaps provide material for recommendations. One is the area of education, where the aim is to cultivate and propagate a culture of mutual tolerance on the part of the majority towards the minority, and vice versa. The second area is that of politics, where the problems can be dealt with by certain political and institutional means within a federal structure; or else, as in China and elsewhere, the autonomy of a minority group could in some cases be considered within the framework of a larger political system. The third area would be the area of culture — and the question of cultural diversity, respect and mutual understanding of other people's cultures has already been mentioned. Finally, the fourth area would be that of the economy. There is talk in our report of compensatory equality between individuals and States. Perhaps the same principle or the same policy could be applied to the case of minorities, by giving destitute minorities the same or even increased possibilities. Our contribution could be to ensure that these various areas arouse special interest, and that measures are taken as a result.

I think that here we are touching on one of the trickiest issues in our debate, because dialogue between different groups lies at the heart of the very concept of democracy. It is risky to assume that political representation is an adequate response to the problem of a dialogue between a majority and a minority. Let me say in passing that there are cases where people we call minorities are not in fact minorities from a numerical point of view, but they are as regards political power. This is true, for example, of non-whites in Brazil.

So what concerns us is how to find a way of establishing a better dialogue between various groups. In this sense, to see political representation as the only way of achieving that could easily result in a rather ambiguous situation, where various classes of society would find themselves being represented, without however having any communication at a cultural level. That has even happened in some countries which have imposed rights, laws and quotas, but without for all that having resolved the problem of a real communication between those sections of

the population. The situation then gradually changed and became a new form of segregation, that is to say a situation of segregation where political rights are guaranteed, but where there is no common life and no cultural fabric which would justify one really talking about the end of discrimination.

So I think we need to find instruments which go beyond mere political representation and make it possible to create spaces where lifestyle exchanges and cultural exchanges can gradually break down the barriers that separate minorities from what we here call majorities. We cannot be content with a solution whose sole aim is political representation.

**Boutros
Boutros-Ghali**

Once again, I will try to sum up what has been said. A first point worth noting is the diversity of cases involving minorities. There might be a case where there is a minority and a majority, cases where the minority is territorial and cases where it is not, and cases where there is a succession of minorities that are almost equal. Here is a first idea: the problem of minorities varies depending on the characteristics and specificity of each minority.

A second idea is that democracy is not the majority.

A third idea is that it is not enough to grant a purely political representation to a minority or minorities. A comprehensive approach is needed which covers both political representation and participation in economic life and cultural life, as well as participation in the field of education.

A final idea is that one should not go from one extreme to the other and end up with a situation where a minority has a right of veto, or where a minority that enjoys certain privileges is keen to maintain its minority status, which is based on those privileges.

**Hisashi
Owada**

I have just one or two remarks to make if I may. When I suggested we should pursue further our discussion of this topic, the rule of law and development, I got the impression that we had touched on the issue in connection with other problems rather than directly as such. And I thought there were one or two points that could still be highlighted. But after examining the revised draft of the report of our last discussions, and also in the light of the need to save time, I am quite prepared to give up the idea of having a further discussion on this topic. I would simply like,

if I may, to make two points which should be mentioned in the report.

One point is that it should be clearly recognized that “the rule of law” is a very different notion from that of “rule by the law”, which is a much more pragmatic and concrete notion. “Rule by the law” is a very formalistic notion, whereby any process of governance must be based on existing legislation, in the positive sense of the word. It matters little whether it is a good law, or a bad law, because of the way it was adopted without necessarily representing the will of the people, or because of its contents that do not necessarily reflect the sense of justice prevalent in society. “The rule by the law” is obviously necessary in contrast to a government that tries to rule without a legal basis, but the rule by the law in itself is no more than a formalistic notion that serves as a framework for the due process of government. On the other hand, the concept of the rule of law denotes the concept of primacy of law and is much more deeply rooted in and essential to an organized society, insofar as it really reflects the sense of justice in society as a whole. That is the first point I wanted to make, which is particularly relevant when one talks about the system of governance in a democratic context.

The primacy of law is the basic framework for the exercise of power in three areas in particular. One of them is the legitimacy of the exercise of power; the second is the accountability of the exercise of power; and the third is the transparency of the exercise of power. These three elements, which are the basis of the primacy of law, play an essential role in the process of democracy and in the process of development.

The second point I would like to make is that the primacy of law is not only the basis of good governance, which is itself the basis of democracy, but also relevant to the problem of development, insofar as we now have to understand development as a holistic concept. The issue needs to be approached from that angle. It should be seen not merely as the inflow of resources to the process of development in terms of official development aid, direct investment and trade, but also as the inflow of resources that need to be used in a much broader framework of social development. And that social development should be looked at in terms of capacity building and institution building as well as good governance that can guarantee the proper

functioning of these two. I think this covers all the issues we have already examined, including that of education and public health.

The media are crucially important in terms of institutions. As regards good governance, it is vital to set up a system capable of guaranteeing the participation of all sectors of society.

All this should be done not within a formalistic framework, but in a basic context that guarantees the rule of law in the philosophical sense of the word. And that is why I believe it is useful to examine this problem in a comprehensive way, so that attention is focused on the issue of the rule of law as an essential ingredient for both democracy and development.

**Mohamed
Bennouna**

The aspect that Ambassador Owada has just outlined is essential. There cannot be development in an arbitrary context, and when we talk about the “rule of law” there is an element of “the reign of law”. The rule of law is the reign of law, a rule of the game that is precisely the opposite of the arbitrary, of “I am the State”, the arbitrary which means that we never know how tomorrow will turn out. There is none of the certainty, the minimum amount of confidence necessary for economic development, for investment, for building or producing something, and so on. For that, a minimum amount of confidence is needed. One needs to know what rule is applicable and how it is applied and what the future holds in store — the future of course being understood in a purely relative way. It is the opposite of the arbitrary, it is everything which goes into the legal edifice and which is absolutely essential. There cannot be development without it. Development is linked with the rule of law. Now the rule of law itself is not something that can be established overnight. I think that jurists are aware of that. It is something that requires a legal culture, an apprenticeship, a whole evolution, a jurisprudence and a way of reacting to the rules.

This, then, presupposes the establishment of a legal culture, or just a culture with a legal culture on top of it. When I say “legal culture”, I mean literacy, I mean the ability to read administrative documents, papers and so on. The rule of law goes hand in hand with the existence of the citizen, with citizenship. It is an obvious fact today — but perhaps such obvious facts need to be pointed out — that, while the aim of the rule of law may be

clear, it is equally necessary, in order to achieve it, to go through several stages and fix the aims. It is up to the international community to show the way, but it is up to each country and each region to find the appropriate means to achieve that, depending on its possibilities, its whole history and its environment. In a sense, a strategy and a tactic need to be worked out. The strategy should be worked out at the level of the international community, but the tactics and the methods should be defined on the ground, *in situ*.

That does not mean that each region and each country should be given *carte blanche*. It means that the international community should work out the strategy, and it should establish accountability, or a means of checking. Explanations must be given, mechanisms for that must exist somewhere — and many of them already exist of course. They are very well organized in international institutions, where governments are asked to explain and justify themselves.

Kéba
Mbaye

The first time I came across the notion of “the rule of law” was at the first Conference of African Jurists in Lagos in January 1960.

One of the main topics of the conference was “the rule of law”. As my English is not too good, I wondered what “the rule of law” meant. By dint of discussion, we eventually managed to define what was meant by it, or at least to translate the notion into French. It is very important. Chairperson Valticos stressed that, and my friend Mohamed Bennouna used a term which is extremely important: “the reign of law”. That is much more important than “the rule of law”. The French definition we found for “the rule of law” is “*la primauté du droit*” (the primacy of law), which is not all that different from “the reign of law”. The primacy of law means that the law takes precedence over everything, including the use of force, elections and so on. The law must be the supreme authority that governs all our actions. Without the primacy of law, there can be neither democracy nor development.

Alexei
Vassiliev

When travelling in Russia in the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: “Russian laws are burdensome, but, fortunately for the Russians, they are never abided by”. This is a problem that has been familiar to the Chinese ever since Confucius,

who said: "Which is more important? To have good people or good laws?" Which means that it is necessary to educate the people, sometimes for generations, to create a democratic culture and a political culture, and that it is not enough to create judicial institutions. You can pass 1,000 laws, but they will become a dead letter if you do not have a civil society, traditions, accountability and abidance by the law.

This means we need to define the problem of the rule of law in relation to reality, particularly as regards civilization, history and religion. We must insist on the need to create this democratic culture and these democratic traditions in the context of civil society, in other words to create all the elements of civil society, which cannot be done by waving a magic wand.

The elements that are vital to democracy and development are undoubtedly equality, fairness, certainty and a lack of arbitrary behaviour. Hence the importance of laws in this respect. Secondly, laws must be straightforward and direct, and formulated in a language that people can understand. But laws are generally formulated in such a complex way that lawyers are perhaps the only people who can understand them and ordinary people cannot benefit from them. So an effort is needed to ensure that laws are simplified and formulated in straightforward language. Thirdly, laws have to be kept up to date, which means that in many countries some old laws which are a legacy of the past and cause problems should really be scrapped.

I can assure you that in my country there are laws dating from about 1918 which are still in force, and which cause people a lot of difficulties. A second point about updating: the laws have to take into account the provisions of new treaties and other conventions. And, as far as possible, laws should be in harmony with the laws of other States, for we are entering a period where people will no longer be content to define what is equitable within a national context. My fourth point particularly concerns certain societies where there are very specific laws, such as *sharia* and other laws, which can cause problems, but need to be taken into account because allowances have to be made for the culture, religion and other features that are characteristic of certain societies. Steps should be taken to bring about the necessary adjustment, otherwise the very workings of democracy will be affected.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

My fifth point concerns judges. Laws may be good, and lawyers may be good, but when people have doubts about the independence and honesty of judges, major problems arise. There are examples of countries which have very satisfactory legislation, but where judges are appointed simply so that they echo the opinion of the Establishment much more than a fair interpretation of the law or a reflection of public opinion, as is only right in a democracy. And to conclude on a somewhat humorous note, let me quote a saying that is common in some parts of my country: “No law is greater than son-in-law” — and that is how a law comes into being.

I would like to stress in the most insistent manner possible the need for the rule of law, the reign of law, and the primacy of law. Having said that, there are problems that can jeopardize that primacy of law, and I would like to highlight them.

The first is the degree to which justice is accessible for various strata of the population: in virtually every country, there are very marked inequalities in the accessibility of justice. And the second problem is the behaviour of judges towards the various strata of the population, in other words the independence of judges, not only vis-à-vis governments, but above all in relation to the image they have, as human beings, of the people before them.

I am thinking in particular, for example, of the different situation of men and women in their dealings with justice. In the history of almost all countries, it would be possible to draw up a rather long catalogue of the differences between men and women as regards their access to justice. That is also the case for other elements of the population. So we should stress the importance of access to justice, an egalitarian and a fair access on the one hand, and, on the other, the need for judges themselves to be retrained whenever necessary. It is important to train people who are competent and who can assume the important responsibilities of their profession, for justice lies at the heart of the concept of democracy. So there must be some guarantee as to the calibre of the people who shoulder such responsibilities.

Mohamed
Bennouna

This question of the accessibility of justice is very important. I am very alive to the problem. In Morocco, my country, I have seen cases of truly destitute people who find themselves involved in court cases. There are litigants who, for matters involving common ownership, disputes between neighbours and other everyday things, take out proceedings against people who cannot afford a lawyer. I am sorry to go into particulars, but when it comes to justice it is a very concrete matter: somebody takes you to court and, to defend yourself, you are forced to hire a lawyer. Now lawyers cost money, a varying amount of money depending on the lawyer's reputation, but money all the same. In this respect, there is glaring inequality.

In many countries, you can qualify for legal aid if you are accused of breaking the law. In civil cases, however, the notion of legal aid does not exist, and in the case of the destitute, of people who have no resources in poor countries — incidentally it is a problem, like access to health care — one can see that this problem of unequal access to justice limits the notion of the primacy of law.

Hisashi
Owada

Just a clarification, if I may. The expression “the rule of law” is very hard to translate into other languages. Perhaps the best French translation would be “*primauté du droit*” or even “*règne du droit*”, in the sense that it is not simply a problem of law enforcement. When one talks about the rule of law — law with no definite article, or in the plural — it is a more abstract concept which represents an element of justice. It is different from “rule by the law” or “by the laws”. Mr Vassiliev mentioned the Soviet or Russian example, but I think that in Russian there is a single word for “a law” (a piece of legislation) and “law” in the abstract sense of the word. This is where the confusion may have arisen. In French there is a distinction between “*la loi*” (the law) and “*le droit*” (law), as there is in German between “*das Recht*” (law) and “*die Gesetze*” (laws). I am not talking about the importance or the primacy of law in the sense of “laws” or “*Gesetze*”. I am talking about the notion of law as a primacy, a rule to govern the situation.

Pierre
Cornillon

It is a fact that, in the English expression ‘the rule of law’, the word ‘law’ has several meanings, and can be translated in French by several words. When one says ‘*la primauté du droit*’ (‘the pri-

macy of law') one knows very well that one is not talking about the primacy of the law but the primacy of what is just and non-arbitrary.

In this connection I should like to add that the role of justice and its smooth working is essential for there to be primacy of law. Not only must citizens have access to the law but there must also be the possibility of appeal, of equal access to appeal. Moreover, democracy demands that State bodies, bodies answerable to the authorities, and ordinary citizens, must apply not only the law but also court rulings. We all know that even in advanced democracies, it is not always easy to force an administration to obey a court ruling.

Kéba
Mbaye

The primacy of law naturally implies the existence of laws, but also implies the respect of laws by everyone and their enforcement by a judiciary worthy of the name, in other words made up of competent, independent and, of course, law-abiding magistrates. Consequently, if one talks of the primacy of law, one has to understand that this primacy of law requires everyone to abide by the law, not just formal law but also the law in general, including regulations and by-laws. But this also implies — and this is what is important in my view — that the law is not an iniquitous law. It is not just a question of saying: I am laying down the law, I can choose the law I want to. No, the reign of the law is the reign of the law's general principles, that is to say the rules that are generally accepted by the international community. I think it is very important that we should be in total agreement on this.

Pierre
Cornillon

The expression “the rule of law” [*l'État de droit*, or, literally, “the state of law”] is very often used in French but it is a term that is not always very clear. I have attended debates at international organizations that focused on the problem of whether the '*é*' in *État de droit* should be capitalized or not. I think the term “*primauté du droit*” is greatly preferable.

I would add that in the Universal Declaration on Democracy that the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted in Cairo in September 1997, we read: “Democracy is based on the primacy of law and the exercise of human rights”.

Nicolas
Valticos

The term “primacy” imposes a recognition of importance. The rule of law is a static definition, and the primacy of law a dynamic definition.

Rosiska
Darcy de
Oliveira

I can well understand that a general concept can comprise all the others, but, given the practices of societies that claim to adhere to the rule of law or the primacy of law, given the social and political experience of all that, it would surely not be too far-fetched to indicate some of the impediments to the practice of the rule of law. I say this because there are obscure aspects and shadowy areas on which light should be shed. I have already mentioned the issue of double standards as regards men and women, and I would like to insist on this point. This is part of the history of court rulings in most countries, as was mentioned at the Beijing Conference and in other documents of that type.

So in order to make democracy first of all real and secondly effective, it would be useful, I think, to underline some of the impediments and difficulties and stress what needs to be done if that primacy of law is to exist in the reality of our societies.

Mohamed
Bennouna

I would simply like to say a word to Arabic-speakers: in Arabic, too, both terms are in fact used. There is “*Siada el Kanoune*”, which means “sovereignty of law” or “primacy of law”, and there is “*Awolawia el Kanoune*”. The problem is that “the rule of law” has gone into everyday language. So, if we use the expression “the primacy of law”, we must either add a footnote, or make a cross-reference to “the rule of law”. This would aim to avoid ambiguity, as it has gone into everyday language, the language of the media. It is an expression that has in a sense become part of popular parlance.

N.B. A further session was devoted to the drawing up of recommendations. Those discussions are not however reproduced here, as they mainly focused on problems of formulation that would be of little interest to the reader.

Final recommendations and conclusion of the panel

The text of the recommendations drawn up during the last meeting was edited by the Chairperson on the basis of those discussions. It has been approved by all Panel members.

Pursuant to the mission it was given, namely “to advise the Director-General with a view to carrying out UNESCO’s programmes relating to the building of democracy”, the Panel submits its recommendations according to the plan outlined below:

- I The impact of globalization on democratic development**
- II The juridical conditions of democratic development**
 - A. The reinforcement of justice and the rule of law
 - B. The effective defence of human rights
 - C. The development of free and responsible media
- III The socio-economic conditions of democratic development**
 - A. The elimination of poverty and social exclusion
 - B. The dissemination of a democratic culture
 - C. The mobilization of non-governmental actors

I The impact of globalization on democratic development

Considering the inevitable existence of the phenomenon of globalization at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a phenomenon that will probably gather momentum in years to come;

Considering the still incomplete state of knowledge and understanding of this phenomenon;

Considering, too, the probable extent of its positive or adverse impact on the values and concepts of democratic development, on the economy and finance, on ways of life and culture, at both local and national or international levels;

In accordance with the principle of the universality of human rights, the principle of compensatory equality between States and between individuals, and the principle of participation and non-exclusion.

The Panel recommends that UNESCO engage in an in-depth analysis of the impact of globalization on democratic development with a view to better understanding its consequences and helping to formulate policies that are designed to counter the excesses of globalization and amplify its positive repercussions.

That analysis should focus on the ***impact of globalization and of the “liberalization” of international trade***, more especially on the national economies of developing countries and countries in transition. This entails a study:

1. of the standards capable of democratizing the globalization of the economy;
2. of the role of international economic institutions in the management of globalization;
3. of ways and means of spreading international solidarity at an economic and technological level.

That analysis should also focus on the ***impact of the worldwide development of science and technology*** (in particular the new technologies of knowledge and information) on people’s living conditions, on bioethical legislation and on cultures. This entails:

1. evolving strategies which can enable the progress of science and technology to benefit the largest possible number of people, and particularly those who are the most marginalized;

2. preventing the gulf between rich and poor, both within and between States, from growing wider;
3. consolidating, given the globalization of the media and the Internet, positive values relating in particular to human rights, democracy, tolerance and openness towards other cultures;
4. discouraging the propagation of negative values, such as the acceptance of violence, prostitution, xenophobia and undemocratic values as part of everyday life.

Lastly, that study should analyse the **impact of globalization on the development of extremist movements**, in particular the phenomenon of aggressive identitarian closure produced by micro-nationalism and neo-tribalism, which manifests itself in a violent and aggressive rejection of any other culture or way of life, since such forms of religious, ethnic or ideological extremism are a direct threat to democracy. This entails:

1. **pursuing and stepping up the promotion of tolerance** by appropriate means, such as education, the media and meetings of teachers and young people of different cultural origins and with different experiences, with a view to strengthening cooperation as regards democracy and development;
2. **supplying technical assistance** so as to offer all pupils and students, whatever their level or field of study, an education in comparative social science (history, religions, philosophy, etc.) so that they can acquire a general cultural grounding that encourages tolerance and respect towards others;
3. **continuing action in support of multilingualism** and multiculturalism, so as to foster the respect of linguistic and cultural identities and to prevent the social or economic exclusion of people on the grounds that they belong to a linguistic, economic, religious or cultural community.

II *The juridical conditions of democratic development*

The Panel formulates recommendations on the three following issues:

A. A reinforcement of justice and the rule of law; B. The effective defence of human rights; C. The development of free and responsible media.

A. A reinforcement of justice and the rule of law

The reign of justice and the rule of law are an essential precondition for the exercise of democracy and for viable development. This presupposes the existence of judicial and legislative institutions effectively operating on the basis of universally recognized principles, and more particularly of an independent judiciary.

In this respect, **the Panel recommends that UNESCO:**

1. should provide technical assistance to States so that they can consolidate their legal system on the basis of the principle of the rule of law;
2. should promote the dissemination of information and, through technical support, the enforcement of the principle whereby magistrates may not be removed from their posts and the establishment of institutions that guarantee the independence of the judiciary;
3. should develop its training activities for people in the legal profession (magistrates, arbitrators, lawyers, etc.) and for legislators;
4. should encourage the introduction of good governance so as to facilitate the effective conduct of public affairs and the fight against corruption;
5. should facilitate comparative research into institutions which encourage the decentralization of power, while at the same time avoiding the creation of local feudalities;
6. should support the elaboration of national and regional strategies aimed at developing a legal culture based on the principle of the rule of law;
7. should encourage States to give the indispensable priority to justice in their budgets;
8. should engage in a series of anthropological studies in order to identify and understand the various institutions, customs and behavioural patterns which, on the basis of those universal values, form the common heritage of humankind, and on which human rights are based;
9. should use the findings of these studies to create linkages between, on one side, customary or traditional practices as regards the settlement of disputes and, on the other, international standards in respect of human rights and justice;

10. should provide itself with the resources to extend education for justice both in the educational system and among the population, notably by explaining the mechanisms and workings of justice and the rights of individuals in relation to the legal system; and should encourage field research into access to justice, particularly on the part of underprivileged groups, women and the illiterate.

B. The effective defence of human rights

The effective application of and respect for civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are essential prerequisites for the strengthening of democratic development.

Conscious as it is of the work already undertaken by UNESCO in this connection and of the conclusions of the debates held in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

the Panel recommends that UNESCO:

1. should pursue and step up its work relating to human rights research, promotion and education at all levels and among the various professional and social actors responsible for the application and safeguarding of those rights;
2. should increase the number of UNESCO Chairs in Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, with emphasis on the relationship between those four concepts;
3. should support and develop activities to inform and make people aware of their fundamental rights while at the same time allowing for the specific cultural and historical characteristics of the various States.

C. The development of free and responsible media

The essential role which the freedom and independence of the press and other media have to perform in the sustainable establishment of democracy is bound up with the fact that they make it possible to express different points of view, to disseminate information and to hold open debates on public affairs.

However, that press and those media must behave responsibly, since the proliferation of scandal sheets and obtrusive advertising tends to detract from the credibility of the news and causes the public to lose interest in public affairs.

In this respect, the **Panel recommends that UNESCO:**

1. should pursue its programmes to support the development of free, independent and responsible media, in particular through the training of journalists and presenters;

2. should ensure widespread dissemination of its existing and future works on the necessary interrelationship between freedom, independence and responsible behaviour on the part of the press and the new information media, particularly the Internet;
3. should encourage the adoption of legal provisions which exclude the loss of liberty and imprisonment for violation of press or audio-visual laws;
4. should provide technical support for the establishment of such institutions as independent press councils, in order to keep prostitution and procuring out of the press and the new media;
5. should proscribe any confusion between information and advertising and reaffirm the collective responsibility of those running the media for their professional code of ethics.

III The socio-economic conditions of democratic development

A. The elimination of poverty and social exclusion

The main impediment to democracy is extreme poverty. Continual efforts to obtain the essentials for survival and the relentless struggle against the evils associated with poverty, hunger, disease and violence make it extremely difficult to take part in political and social life, even at the local or community level. It will not be possible to eliminate the exclusion from political and social life that is the fate of marginalized groups unless poverty is gradually eliminated, thanks to sustained participation in the life of the community and to the ability of individuals and groups to ascertain their rights and to influence decisions affecting them.

In this respect, ***the Panel recommends that UNESCO:***

1. should support grass roots training programmes in cooperation with the United Nations and specialized institutions;
2. should engage in a campaign to alert political and economic decision-makers to their responsibility and the relevance of these programmes;
3. should prepare a comprehensive study on exclusion and marginalization by identifying their causes in different contexts on the basis of quantitative and qualitative indicators and of successful ventures of a similar kind;
4. should develop training programmes for managerial and administrative staff and continue its vocational and technical training programme;

5. should undertake studies on the impact of conditionalities connected with international aid and on the adverse effects of sanctions on democratic development.

B. The dissemination of a democratic culture

The practice of democracy hinges on the existence of institutions enabling members of society to participate in decisions that concern them, on an attitude of mind, a spirit of tolerance and respect for others, and on a wide-ranging ability to accept divergences of opinion and differences. The development of a genuine democratic culture is a prerequisite for the reinforcement of political, social and economic democracy.

The Panel therefore recommends that UNESCO:

1. should strengthen its action with a view to developing endogenous capacities and setting up appropriate institutions at local level, so as to enable individuals and groups to exert a more direct influence on decisions affecting them;
2. should support new forms of partnership in civil society with the involvement of various social actors at different decision-making levels;
3. should help to elaborate national strategies to promote democratic culture, through education and the mass media, particularly among young people;
4. should develop and distribute, notably through new information techniques, informational and educational materials for decision-makers and people with social responsibilities;
5. should stimulate debate and reflection on the issue of the democratization of globalization;
6. should pursue its reflection on the concept of “democratic culture” and on the conditions under which it can be developed.

C. The mobilization of non-governmental actors

The major role played by non-governmental social, economic or political actors in connection with democratic development is a new phenomenon. Such organizations, along with civil society, can have an effective impact at national and international level in promoting development and giving it a more human dimension.

The Panel recommends that UNESCO:

1. should develop strategies to support civil society and NGOs, so as to encourage the organized participation of the greatest possible number of people in public life and thus to foster the population’s control of political and bureaucratic institutions;

2. should, in the framework of its action strategies, pursue its collaboration with non-governmental actors as partners and multipliers of UNESCO's action and as a source of new initiatives;
3. should encourage the accountability of NGOs and transparency in relations between NGOs and States, and vice versa;
4. should support the development of civil society organizations at national and international level, in order to foster the democratic participation of the population in political and economic decisions;
5. should study the contribution which international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) make to the democratization of international relations;
6. should pursue and step up its cooperation with parliamentarians and their representative organizations, in view of the essential role which they play in the exercise of democratic rights and the definition of development policies.

Conclusion

Throughout its work, as in its recommendations, the Panel has striven to define the main challenges that humankind, in the early twenty-first century, must take up in order to embark at last on the road to sustainable and democratic development. In so doing, it does not claim to have been exhaustive, and hopes that the issues it has raised will be the subject of more detailed study.

That is why the Panel expresses the wish that UNESCO will be able to pursue and develop this work. A detailed study of some of the themes discussed in the course of its debates might subsequently form the subject of UNESCO publications and usefully fuel further discussion, for which there remains considerable scope.

Annexes

Annex I

U N E S C O

DG/Note/98/18
26 March 1998
Original: French

The Director-General

To: Deputy Director-General
Deputy Director-General for Africa
Assistant Directors-General
Directors of Bureaux, Offices and Divisions at Headquarters
Directors of Established Offices away from Headquarters

Subject: Establishment of the International Panel on Democracy
and Development

1. Democracy today forms the natural framework for the exercise of human rights and is a precondition for the establishment of a lasting peace, as long as it is accompanied by equitable economic and social development. The strengthening of democratic processes therefore takes its logical place among the objectives pursued by UNESCO (whose Constitution expressly mentions 'the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men'), it being understood that it is for each society, taking into account its own cultural and historical specificities, to find its path towards democracy on the basis of universally recognized principles.
2. Through this approach, UNESCO intends to strengthen its partnership with the various actors in the field who are working towards the reinforcement of democratic processes, namely governments, parliaments, regional authorities and municipalities, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, in particular the teaching community and associations working to promote the freedom of the press. Freedom of expression and its corollary, freedom of the press, constitute one of the main foundations of democracy, and UNESCO's action to promote the free flow of information and the development of pluralistic and editorially independent media consists primarily in suggesting practical responses to the challenges posed by the ongoing processes of democratization in many countries.

3. With a view to clarifying and optimizing UNESCO's action to foster a democratic culture, I have decided to establish an International Panel on Democracy and Development (IPDD). This Panel will also help to advance thinking about the international community's commitments to the promotion of fundamental human rights and freedoms, at a time when it is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The IPDD's mission

4. The Panel's deliberations will be guided by the Organization's Medium-Term Strategy for 1996-2001 (28 C/4 Approved), which sets out in its paragraphs 172 to 176 the principles of UNESCO's action with a view to the consolidation of democratic processes. It will also take full account of the provisions contained in the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference at its 29th session, in particular 29 C/Resolution 38, which the transdisciplinary project "Towards a culture of peace" is designed to put into effect, within the framework of the Organization's Approved Programme and Budget for 1998-1999, and 29 C/Resolution 47 "Communication in the service of democracy".
5. The Panel's main task will be to advise me with a view to carrying out UNESCO's programmes relating to the building of democracy, which form part of a global strategy aimed at establishing a culture of peace in a multicultural world. It will also be called upon to promote initiatives, to mobilize partners and to create synergies for the purpose of implementing these programmes. It will submit to me its conclusions and recommendations, which will assist me in shaping the Organization's future action in this field.
6. The Panel will submit to me an interim report on its work in the course of the first half of 1999, so that I can take it into account in the preparation of the Organization's Draft Programme and Budget for 2000-2001 (document 30 C/5).
7. Without prejudice to the focus which the Panel will wish to give to its work, the following themes have already been identified: education for democracy (propagation of knowledge on the workings of democratic institutions) and for citizenship (participation); the development of research and training capacities; democratic practices in everyday life; support for the consolidation of current democratic processes; parliamentary democracy; the role of local authorities; democratic governance; the role of international institutions in supporting democratic

processes; freedom of the press, free flow of information and the development of pluralistic and independent media; and the democratization of international relations.

8. The Panel will take full account in its work of the lessons to be learned from the activities which UNESCO is already carrying out on the consolidation of democratic processes. At Headquarters, these activities are essentially the responsibility of the following Secretariat offices and units: the Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace (SHS/HRS), the Section for Humanistic, Cultural and International Education (ED/SVE/HCI), the Division of Social Sciences, Research and Policy (SHS/SRP), the Co-operation for Development Unit (SHS/CFD), the Division of Cultural Pluralism (CLT/CPL), the Unit for Freedom of Expression and Democracy (CII/FED), the Culture of Peace Programme Unit (CPP), the Bureau of Studies, Programming and Evaluation (BPE), the Office of the Assistant Director-General for the Directorate (DRG), the Unit for Relations with Parliamentarians (BRX/PLM), and the Division of Relations with International Organizations (BRX/RIO).
9. The field units also have a contribution to make in turning to account, in all their diversity, the experiences of States, regions, cities and local communities in respect of the development of democracy. This is particularly the case of the Unit for Democratic Culture and Governance (CDG) established at the UNESCO Office in Mexico City (DG/Note/98/6) which, under the DEMOS project, has gained experience in the promotion of democratic culture. The conclusions and recommendations of relevant regional or international meetings held to date (the Regional Summit for Political Development and Democratic Principles, Brasilia, July 1997, and the International Conference on the Culture of Peace and Governance, Maputo, September 1997) will be taken fully into consideration.

Chair and composition of the Panel

10. The Panel will be composed of some 20 eminent persons from the different regions, serving in their personal capacity. The list of members is annexed hereto. The IPDD will be open-ended; it may be enlarged in accordance with the themes selected. It will function interactively, drawing upon modern communication technology, in particular electronic mail and video-conferencing.
11. I have decided to entrust the chair of the Panel to Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who drew up an "Agenda for Democratization" when he held office as Secretary-General of the United Nations. A member of the

“curatorium” (academic board) of the Academy of International Law of The Hague since 1978, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali has been Professor of International Law and International Relations at the University of Cairo (1949-1991), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt (1977-1991) and thereafter Vice-Prime Minister responsible for that country’s foreign affairs (1991), before becoming Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-1996). Subsequently, since November 1997, he has been Secretary-General of ‘La Francophonie’.

Secretariat

12. The secretariat of the Panel will be provided by the Democracy Unit of the Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace (SHS/HRS). This Unit will provide the IPDD with the support services necessary for the efficient conduct of its work. The secretariat will prepare the Panel’s meetings as well as proposals concerning its programme of work. It will provide the necessary documentation for its discussions. It will help to identify key questions and problems as well as persons and institutions able to provide assistance for the Panel’s activities. It will ensure the follow-up to the IPDD’s decisions and will see to the execution of the tasks assigned to it by the Panel, particularly with regard to the preparation of its report. It will also ensure the necessary links with the Secretariat bureaux and units concerned with the Panel’s work, both at and away from Headquarters.
13. I call on the entire UNESCO Secretariat to contribute actively to the Panel’s work.

Federico Mayor

Annex

*List of the members of the International Panel on Democracy and Development (IPDD)**

Mr Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI (Egypt), Chairperson

Mr Robert BADINTER (France)

Former President of the French Constitutional Council
Senator

- Mr Mohamed BENNOUNA (Morocco)
 Director-General of the Arab World Institute
- H.R.H. Princess Basma BINT TALAL (Jordan)
 President of the Queen Alia Fund for Social Development
- Mr Juan Antonio CARRILLO SALCEDO (Spain)
 Professor of Public International Law and International Relations
 University of Seville
 Former Judge at the European Court of Human Rights
- Mr Mohamed CHARFI (Tunisia)
 Member of the Arab Institute of Human Rights
- Mr Pierre CORNILLON (France)
 Secretary-General of the
 Inter-Parliamentary Union
- Ms Rosiska DARCY DE OLIVEIRA (Brazil)
 President of the Brazilian Government's National Council for Women's Rights
- Mr Peter GLOTZ (Germany)
 President of the University of Erfurt
- Ms Nadine GORDIMER (South Africa)
 Nobel Prize in Literature (1991)
- Sir Marrack GOULDING (United Kingdom)
 Warden of St Antony's College, Oxford
- Ms Rosario GREEN (Mexico)
 Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mr HAN Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea)
 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
 President of the Ilmin Institute of International Relations University of Korea
 Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Cyprus
- Mr Abid HUSSAIN (India)
 Former Vice-President and member of the Advisory Council of the Rajiv Gandhi
 Institute of Contemporary Studies
 Special Rapporteur of the United Nations for Freedom of Opinion and Expression
- Ms Attiya INAYATULLAH (Pakistan)
 Former Chairperson of the Executive Board of UNESCO
 President of the Family Planning Association of Pakistan
- Mr Kéba MBAYE (Senegal)
 Former Vice-President of the International Court of Justice
 First Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee
- H.E. Mr Hisashi OWADA (Japan)
 Ambassador
 Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
- Mr Bruce RUSSETT (United States of America)
 Director of United Nations Studies
 Yale University

Mr Nicolas VALTICOS (Greece)

Judge at the European Court of Human Rights

Mr Alexei VASSILIEV (Russian Federation)

Director of the Institute of African and Arab Studies

N.B. Add to above list:

H.E. Mr GUO Jiading (China)

Former Ambassador to the United Nations, New York

Executive Vice-President of the

China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation

* This list will be completed on the basis of the replies received by the Secretariat and with due regard for the need to ensure as equitable a geographical distribution as possible.

Annex II

List of participants

First meeting: 4-5 May 1998

Chairperson:

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt)

Panel members:

Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco)

Mohamed Charfi (Tunisia)

Pierre Cornillon (France)

Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira (Brazil)

Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom)

Guo Jiading (People's Republic of China)

Han Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea)

Attiya Inayatullah (Pakistan)

Kéba Mbaye (Senegal)

Hisashi Owada (Japan)

Bruce Russett (United States of America)

Nicolas Valticos (Greece)

Alexei Vassiliev (Russian Federation)

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Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences

Janusz Symonides

Director

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Rapporteur:

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Jean Beadman
Division of Human Rights, Democracy and Peace
Sector of Social and Human Sciences

Second meeting: 8-9 February 1999

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Mohamed Charfi (Tunisia)
Pierre Cornillon (France)
Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira (Brazil)
Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom)
Guo Jiading (People's Republic of China)
Han Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea)
Abid Hussain (India)
Attiya Inayatullah (Pakistan)
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Qung Nam Thai

Chief, Coordination and Evaluation Unit

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Sector of Social and Human Sciences

Anne Guilbaud

Unit for the Promotion of Human Rights and Actions to Combat Discrimination

Department for Peace, Human Rights, Democracy and Tolerance

Sector of Social and Human Sciences

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Jean Beadman

Department for Peace, Human Rights, Democracy and Tolerance

Sector of Social and Human Sciences

Third meeting: 3-4 April 2000

Chairperson:

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt)

Panel members:

Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco)

H.R.H. Princess Basma Bint Talal (Jordan)

Pierre Cornillon (France)
Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira (Brazil)
Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom)
Guo Jiading (People's Republic of China)
Han Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea)
Abid Hussain (India)
Kéba Mbaye (Senegal)
Hisashi Owada (Japan)
Nicolas Valticos (Greece)
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Secretary:

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Democracy Unit
Department for Peace, Human Rights, Democracy and Tolerance
Sector of Social and Human Sciences

Panel Members

Robert Badinter, (France). Senator; President of the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Professor Emeritus, Paris University I (Panthéon-Sorbonne). He held the offices of Minister of Justice (1981-86), President of the Constitutional Council (1986-1995), and President of the Arbitration Committee for former Yugoslavia (1992-1995). He is the author of *L'Execution; Liberté, Libertés; Condorcet, un intellectuel en politique; Libres et égaux; La Prison Républicaine; Oscar Wilde ou l'injustice; Un antisémitisme ordinaire* and *L'Abolition*.

Mohamed Bennouna, (Morocco). Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations. Doctorate in Public Law and Political Science (1972); graduate of the Academy of International Law of The Hague; member of the United Nations International Law Commission; Judge, International Criminal Tribunal, The Hague (1998-2001); Director-General of the *Institut du Monde Arabe* (IMA), Paris, (1991-98); member of the International Bioethics Committee (UNESCO); *Prix national de la culture* (Morocco); *Médaille de la culture* (Yemen); Chevalier of the *Légion d'honneur* (France). He is the author of numerous publications on peacekeeping, international security, the Law of the Sea and International Criminal Law.

H.R.H. Princess Basma Bint Talal, (Jordan). Chairperson of the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development; founder and head of the Jordanian National Commission for Women; member of several international Boards, Honorary Human Development Ambassador for UNDP; Goodwill Ambassador for UNIFEM and UNFPA. For over thirty years has worked nationally, regionally and internationally to promote a wide range of global issues, notably, sustainable development and advancement of women. She holds a doctorate from Oxford University.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (Egypt). Secretary-General of the International Organisation of the Francophonie (1997-). Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-96); Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt (1991-92); Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1977-91); member of the UN International Law Commission (1979-91); Professor of International Law and International Relations, Cairo University (1949-77). Diplomat, jurist and scholar, he is the author of many publications on regional and international affairs, law and diplomacy, and political science.

Mohamed Charfi, (Tunisia). Professor Emeritus (Law), University of Tunis. Former President of the Tunisian League of Human Rights; former Minister of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research. He is the author of *Introduction à l'étude du droit*, Tunis; *Les droits subjectifs*, Tunis; *Islam et liberté*, Albin Michel, Paris; *La réforme du système éducatif en Tunisie*, Alger.

Pierre Cornillon, (France). Honorary Secretary General and former Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1987-98). Specialist in parliamentary diplomacy and comparative parliamentary law, he has addressed these subjects at numerous international symposia and in various articles. Very involved in the fields of the promotion of Human Rights and democracy, he contributes to several international institutions and sits on various international committees.

Rosiska Darcy de Oliveira, (Brazil). Professor, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro; President of the Leadership Center for Women, Rio de Janeiro. She holds a Ph.D. in Education from the University of Geneva. Former President of the National Council on the Rights of Women, Government of Brazil; Brazilian delegate at the Inter-American Commission of Women. She is the author of *Le Féminin Ambigu* (Editions du Concept Moderne, 1989) and *In Praise of Difference* (Rutgers University Press, 1998).

Marrack Goulding, (UK). Warden of St Antony's College, Oxford (since October 1997). Educated at St Paul's School, London, and Magdalen College, Oxford. British Diplomatic Service 1959-1985. Served in Foreign Office (1964-68 and 1972-75); seconded to Cabinet Office (Central Policy Review Staff) (1975-77). Held overseas posts in the Middle East, North Africa, Portugal, New York (UK Mission to the United Nations), Angola (Ambassador). UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping (1986-93) and Political Affairs (1993-97). He was knighted (KCMG) in June 1997.

Guo Jiading, (People's Republic of China). Executive Vice-Chairman of the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation. Panmunjom Armistice negotiations, Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Korea (1952-58); Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks, Warsaw (1958-62); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1962-71); Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations (1971-81); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1981-86); Ambassador to Malta (1986-89) and Portugal (1989-93); Senior Chinese Representative of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group in Macao (1993-97).

Han Sung-Joo, (Republic of Korea). President of Korea University and Professor of Political Science. Director, Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University. Republic of Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-94); UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus (1996-97); member of the UN Inquiry Commission on 1994 Rwanda Genocide (1999); Chairman of the East Asian Vision Group. Graduate of Seoul National University (1962), he holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley (1970). Professor Han taught at the City University of New York (1970-78); Columbia (1986-87); Stanford (1992) and

Abid Hussain, (India). Professor Emeritus of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT); member of the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco, and B.P. Koirala Foundation, Kathmandu; Chairman of several educational and cultural organizations; member of the Asia Society, New York. Served in the Indian Administrative Service; former Commerce Secretary, Government of India; former Chairman of the IIFT; former Ambassador to the U.S.A.; former Vice Chairman, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi; former Chancellor, Central University, Hyderabad. He served on many Government Committees. Former member of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. He was UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression; former UN Adviser to Turkey on Community Development; former Chief of Industry, Technology, Human Settlements and Environment, UN Regional Commission, ESCAP. Awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1988.

Attiya Inayatullah, (Pakistan). Representative of Pakistan on the Executive Board of UNESCO. Former Minister for Women's Development and Population Welfare; Ms Inayatullah holds a master's degree in Sociology from Boston University and Ph.D. from Punjab University. Chairperson of the Executive Board of UNESCO (1993-95); President of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (1995-99), she has been the moving force behind the Family Planning Association of Pakistan.

Kéba Mbaye, (Senegal). Honorary Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Senegal; member of the French *Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer*; member of the International Academy of Comparative Law; member of the International Law Association. Former Vice-President, International Court of Justice (1982-91); former Vice-President, Curatorium of the Academy of International Law, The Hague; former Vice-President, International Olympic Committee. He has been awarded honoris causa doctorates from universities in France, Hungary, India and the United States; honorary member of the Institute of International Law; honorary member of the Belgian *Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer*. He is the author of numerous publications on the law and human rights in Africa.

Hisashi Owada, (Japan). President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs; Professor of International Law and Organization at Waseda University; Senior Advisor to the President of the World Bank. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1955. Director-General, Treaties Bureau, Principal Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1984-87); Deputy Foreign Minister (1989-91); Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (1991-93); Permanent Representative of Japan to the OECD (1988-89); Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations (1994-98).

Bruce Russett, (U.S.A.). Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Director of United Nations Studies at Yale University. He is Editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and served as Co-Director, with Paul Kennedy, of the Secretariat for the Ford Foundation's Working Group report, *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century*. Among his many books are *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (1993), *The Once and Future Security Council* (1997), and *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* (2001, with John Oneal).

Nicolas Valticos, (Greece). Member of the Academy of Athens. Corresponding member of the *Institut de France*. Law doctorate (University of Paris); Barrister (Bar of Athens). International Labour Office (Geneva): Chief of the International Labour Standards Department and Assistant Director-General (1949-1981). Former Secretary-General of the Institute of International Law and Commander of various national orders. Officer of the French *Légion d'honneur*.

Alexei Vassiliev, (Russian Federation). Director of the Institute for African and Arab Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; President of the Center for Civilization and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Council for Foreign Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the advisory group for Committee on Foreign Relations of the Duma; member of the group of scholars affiliated to the Security Council of Russia. Author of numerous publications on Africa and Asia, he is also Editor-in-Chief of *Asia and Africa Today*.

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