Lettres de Byblos
Letters from Byblos

No. 5

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Ethno-Religious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation

Byblos Autumn School 2003
A Conference Report

Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme
International Centre for Human Sciences

Byblos 2004
The Byblos Autumn School was held in Freiburg at the Wiesneck Institute from 28 November to 7 December 2003. Jointly organized by the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, the Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg, the International Centre of Human Sciences in Byblos (Lebanon), and the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, and sponsored by DAAD with funds from the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, the conference brought together a group of political leaders, international scholars, academicians, researchers, and students.
Contents

Objective 5

Opening address 6

Part One: The State of the Art
Ethnic conflict and its modes of regulation 8

Part Two: Case Studies on Causes of Conflict
Politicisation of religion: the case of Sri Lanka 11
The politics of Namibia - from Bantustan to the positioning of ethnicity in a unitary state 13
Unintended mobilization of an ethnic minority in China 16
Politicisation of religion: the case of Northern Ireland 19
Politicisation of religion: the case of India 21
The Latin America exception 23

Part Three: The International Dimension
Separatist movements in a hostile regional environment: The cases of Indonesia and the Philippines 26
Trans-state factors of conflict and accommodation in the Middle East 29
An inter-state conflict over resources under the cloak of civil war: The scramble for the Congo 32
Cooperation across formerly embattled borders 34
Part Four: Modes of Conflict Regulation, Obstacles and Successes

Instrumenta pacis: The peace treaties of Osnabrück and Ta'if in comparative perspective 36

Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems: Can warlords cooperate? The case of the Congo 39

Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems - Did the pre-war Lebanese system fail? 41

Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems: Can an imposed system work? The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 44

Alternatives to power-sharing systems: Can political decentralization defuse ethno-religious conflicts? The case of Indonesia 46

Alternatives to power-sharing systems: Belgium's experience of combining power-sharing with federalism 49

Alternatives to power-sharing systems: Depoliticising ethnicity in South Africa 52

Part Five: Simulation Exercises

Conflict regulation in Kosovo 56

UN conference on the conflict in Cyprus: integration or separation 57

Epilogue

Evaluation session 59
Ethno-Religious Conflict and Modes of its Regulation
A Conference Report

TAMIRACE FAHOURY

Objective

The "Byblos Autumn School" covered two main areas of research: the theoretical part dealt with the causes of ethnic conflict as well as modes of conflict regulation, and the empirical part probed into case studies of ethnic conflict and different patterns of conflict regulation ranging from power-sharing to decentralisation. The international dimension and the increasingly complex role of trans-national factors in ethnic conflict and conflict resolution were also highlighted. Conflicts in South Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America were thoroughly explored and discussed. Comparative perspectives and future prospects for each conflict were also raised.

Work groups followed by plenary sessions whose purpose was to elucidate some controversial key questions took place. In these work groups, participants addressed mainly the successes and limitations of power-sharing, decentralization, federation, and conflict-management within a unitary state. The last day was devoted to simulation exercises which revolved around conflict genesis and preventative interventions. An evaluation session which exposed the findings of the conference was finally held.
Opening address

Dr. Gernot Erler, M. P
Member of Commission for Foreign Affairs; Vice-Chairman of the Social Democratic Caucus

In his opening address, Erler draws the attention to the necessity of tackling comparative case studies of conflict regulation in order to understand the dynamics behind a world order beset with ethnic conflicts. After praising the "Autumn School" for its initiative and the methodical approach it will use in studying models of conflict regulation, he provides a recent overview of the German and European experiences in the field of conflict-regulation.

Erler mainly sheds light on the evolution of conflict-regulation in Europe as a learning process after the outbreak of war in South Eastern Europe. The Balkan problem in the nineties was an alert to the European Union. It made clear that Europe lacked the appropriate strategies to prevent regional conflicts and was not equipped well enough to stop a war. In 1999, the European Council expressed its determination to develop efficient structural strategies in order to prevent conflicts. Nearly 5000 policemen, 280 legislators, civil administrative bodies, and emergency units ready to deal with catastrophic situations, are currently involved in a continuous process whose goal is to define and refine efficient techniques of conflict regulation.

Equipped with new instruments and strategies, the European Union is now better prepared to confront regional conflicts. The last European Council mainly emphasized strategies of stability and stressed the process of association.

New necessities are arising in the wake of the new world order. Thus, it is of prime importance to develop models that can be used to prevent, circumvent and regulate conflicts. In 2001, for instance, the successful intervention of the European Union in Macedonia prevented the eruption of a civil war.

Erler highlights the constructive role that Germany is playing in building civilian capabilities for prevention strategies in the European Union.

The Civil Peace Service in Germany and the specialized peace keeping centres which train and recruit experts constitute efficient measures to promote conflict regulation strategies.

After the challenge of 11 September, defining new instruments and techniques not only for conflict regulation but also for conflict prevention has become primordial. This disaster was an awakening that reminded the international community that a broader and more comprehensive approach is needed to deal with conflicts. Erler alludes to "the need for a transition" and "for a global structural prevention instead of a regional prevention."
The lessons learned after this global shock are manifold.

First, there is the overwhelming need to cooperate in global political alliances against terrorism. Afghanistan is a test case, and Germany is committed to the political transition in this country.

Second, the significance of regional conflicts in context of global terrorism has to be redefined. Regional problems are not only problems of a specific country or a region but reflect failing state processes which have much to do with international strategies and the involvement of the international community.

It is necessary to work for a fairer world order and develop efficacious strategies against famine, poverty, and diseases, mainly in the African continent.

Furthermore, international organizations have to play a new role in order to respond to new challenges. It is essential to strengthen, for example, the role of the United Nations and the instruments that the organization has at its disposal. Moreover, the NATO is in dire need of a new "self-understanding." Nato's challenge is to reshape its role and become a broader organization with a more complex set of capabilities. In the future, the organization will definitely not constrain itself to the traditional role of the American military force.

A new and unified strategy for conflict regulation in the European Union is the only safeguard for a transatlantic strategy. It is only by reaching a consensus and a common European policy that the transatlantic dialogue becomes possible.
Part One: The State of the Art

Ethnic conflict and its modes of regulation

Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf
University of Freiburg, Director of the International Centre of Human Sciences (CISH) and the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute (ABI)

Professor Dr. Joseph Maila
Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Director of the Institute of Peace Research at the Catholic University of Paris

In the first part of the panel, Hanf provides a theoretical overview of the origins and functions of politicised ethnicity, the strategies used by ethnic communities in competition for power, the forms of conflict and the modes of regulation.

Since last century, ethnic conflict has become the dominant form of conflict. The origins of ethnic conflict can be traced back to the break-up of multi-cultural empires such as the Ottoman, Habsburg, colonial or Soviet Empires. This dislocation of empires brought about the atrocious fragmentation of entities into smaller territorial pieces.

The ethno-religious conflict is a catch-all term that covers a wide range of cleavages: language, descent, religion ... Ethnic groups can either flourish or disappear. The decisive factor for ethnic conflict is through politicisation. The latter stems from modernization and is strongly linked to the processes of communication, democratization, industrialization....

When groups are in a situation of competition, many factors at play influence their behaviour. Caught in the sophisticated process of political mobilization, the groups develop strategies in competition for power. The two main strategies are ethnic mobilization or Jacobinism that entails that the state should become one and indivisible.

Ethnic groups make rational choices depending on their position. Thus, if an ethnic group is a minority, it tends generally to accept its role. A non-ruling minority is a group of Jacobins who are aware of their limitations and who know that they cannot beat the majority. Yet, when the group is a majority, it resists concessions and strives to impose itself. The presence of equally strong groups leads to ethical mobilization.

Violent conflicts emerge in two main situations. The first situation is an erroneous power calculation. Groups assume that they are stronger than they really are. The
second case is when a group is cornered to the extent that it reaches the state of despair or verzweiflung.

A violent conflict is likely to develop when it involves emotional goods. In this case, the conflict gains magnified and incommensurable dimensions. When the conflict deals with principles, it is very difficult to bargain.

Hanf distinguishes seven main modes of conflict-regulation:

1 - Genocide or ethnocide
2 - Expulsion or ethnic cleansing mainly practised in the second part of the twentieth century
3 - Domination of one group. This mode of regulation is also called "ethnic democracy." It is a frequent mode of regulation, yet it remains inherently unstable
4 - Assimilation
   This mode of conflict-regulation works under three main conditions
   a. The main group must be open to accept others
   b. Other groups should be willing to relinquish their identity
   c. Good economic conditions should prevail
   An example is prosperous France in the nineteenth century where assimilation took place as a result of pressure and incentives.
5 - Power-sharing arrangements when different groups agree not to hurt each other.
   This mode may take several dimensions: federation, consociationalism...
   Yet, one should be careful to differentiate power-sharing from democracy.
   Whereas some power-sharing systems are totally compatible with democracy, some others can be undemocratic consociations (Yugoslavia).
6 - Open democracy
   Citizens are equal, and ethnic conflicts are depoliticised.

In the second part of the panel, Maila emphasizes other aspects of ethnic conflict, and modes of regulation. He brings into prominence the conflicts that stem from the deconstruction of states after the colonial experience. A striking case would be the African countries where the process or labyrinth of state-building or state construction took unforeseen meanders. The result was imported states where foreign technologies were brought in and applied within internal structures. In this process, eth-
nic entrepreneurs designed states and introduced external tools and instruments. The consequence was utter failure and deep fragmentation.

The controversial word of identity is a main intervening variable shaping ethnic conflict and conflict regulation. Identity is a shifting pattern that is always altered by time, history and environment. Although primordial ties are very important, three other patterns should be taken into consideration:

1 - Identity is a means of introducing strategies that could attract advantages to the minorities. Identity is not anachronistic or parochial, but can be rationalized. It is neither an essence nor a given.

2 - Identity is a means of cultural construction of descent which is seized upon by groups in order to perform tasks of orientation.

3 - Identity is also a means of gaining material goods.

Moreover, rising frustrations and expectations play an important role in fomenting conflicts. When groups feel that they receive less than they should, they engage into violent behaviour. Relative deprivation is seen as the discrepancy between expectations and results.

Counter-elites are another source of conflict. New leaders who are not integrated in the system and who are eager to supplant the legitimate elites may destabilize the internal structure.

Deep-rooted hatred alone does not lead to conflict. Mixing political ideologies and economic deprivation may act as a primordial instigator that adds fuel to the fire and awakens dormant violence.

On the other hand, conflict resolution can result from external political intervention. Yet, stopping violence is not synonymous with peace, and bringing peace is not achieving reconciliation. An example is the Ta’if agreement in post-war Lebanon which froze the conflict by introducing a foreign power.

Maila draws the listeners’ attention to the efficient role of accommodation, compromise and power-sharing in the presence of reconciliation. Reconciliation remains an essential mode of regulation whereby groups unleash their suffering through emotions and possibly tears, and come to terms with the past.
Part Two: Case Studies on Causes of Conflict

Politicisation of religion: the case of Sri Lanka

Professor Dr. Jakob Rösel
University of Rostock

There are different ways that could be used to politicise religion. One of them is to transform a universal or open religion into an ethnic one. To achieve this metamorphosis, religion has to be modernized. New boundaries have to be added to transform an open system of beliefs into a strictly defined belief system.

This happened in Sri Lanka in less than a century. Buddhism was transformed, re-moulded, and finally constrained to the majority group in Sinhala.

The politicisation of Buddhism went through several stages: traditional Buddhism, revived Buddhism, ethnic Buddhism and finally politicised Buddhism. Rösel shows how the concordance of many factors shaped the construction of an ethnic identity on the basis of religion. He first provides an historical overview to explain how these stages were linked and how they operated in order to relocate the boundaries of a new Buddhism.

The first stage is the traditional Buddhism as it existed two millennia ago. Implanted in the third century B.C on the island of Sri Lanka, Buddhism gave rise to a society which took the shape of a circle model. The state first necessitated the existence of a king who upholds law and whose duty is to protect the people and enforce unity. In this society, several concentric circles moving down the social feudal hierarchy encompassed aristocrats and vassals. Further concentric circles comprised the lower caste groups.

This circle model could not differentiate between internal vertical peripheries and external horizontal peripheries. Buddhism was confined to the upper strata of the society or the aristocrats. Yet, the story did not end here. The case of Sri Lanka tells how a religion may become pervasive by designing ethnic identity.

Buddhism was re-interpreted and revived. Historical ideas and concepts were transformed to permit the emergence of a renewed religion embraced by the groups who felt discriminated against. The new Buddhism in the 19th century was re-established, decentralized, and controlled by laymen’s associations. It emerged among intra-ethnic leaders who wanted to build monasteries for their own communities. The new system of beliefs based its veracity on archaeological indices. Buddhist assemblages that looked like sub-urbanized models of huge monuments exca-
vated by the British were built. New forms of Buddhism emerged borrowing from catholic symbols. Processions, festivals, huge open-air altars, carols written in competition with Christian Carols and against the Catholic minorities were invented.

These laymen's movements borrowed even from the Christian Protestant missions and adopted the idea of networking, publicizing, and building organizations to spread their beliefs.

Slowly, the revived Buddhism became an ethnic Buddhism justifying the existence of a Sinhala nation.

To justify their predominance over the Tamil peoples, the Singhalese claimed that their superiority is based on race, territory and language. The race of the Sinhalese is described as the sacred race predestined to carry Buddhism.

Basing their claims on the sacro-saint history of the Island, the Singhalese drew the premises of a noble race embodying Buddha's mission and protecting the Buddhist faith on the island. They also claimed that their language is the genuine linguistic medium through which Buddhism should be articulated.

It is only after the Indian independence in 1947 that the politicisation of ethnic Buddhism took place.

In the fifties, two Sinhala democratic mass parties transposed ethnic Buddhism into the political mainstream. Both parties adopted supplementary measures to enforce the radicalisation of the Sinhala nationalism. The logic behind this politicisation is that the Singhalese are the predestined carriers of the Buddhist faith and therefore own the island. The Singhalese language was imposed and numerous land policies were implemented in order to relegate and discard the Tamils.

Reacting to this ethnic chauvinism, the Tamils created their own terrorist organization and engaged into an open-ended war.

As ethnic differences are polarized and deeply embedded into societal structures, a solution seems improbable. Since the basis for a practical agreement is not found, an eventual outcome is unlikely.

A religion can indeed become an historical construction and a reinvented story of survival. The metamorphose of traditional Buddhism into a political weapon has enabled the claim for an everlasting Sinhala legacy.
The politics of Namibia -
From Bantustan to the positioning of ethnicity in a unitary state

Professor Dr. Gerhard Tötemeyer
Deputy Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing, Windhoek, Namibia

This presentation deals with the Namibian case in comparative perspective: Bantustan versus decentralisation. First, Tötemeyer traces the development of tribalism and ethnicity in pre-independent Namibia, then tackles the radical changes that were introduced after independence. The evolution of the Unitary State in independent Namibia is described through the phenomena of democratisation and decentralisation. In the last part, the present impact of religion, ethnicity and reconciliation on the Namibian society is discussed.

Namibia is a multi-ethnic society where white and indigenous populations constitute fractured communal groups. Thirteen main ethnic groups can be presently identified. While the Ovambo group constitutes 50.1% of the population, communities including Whites, coloured and other minorities can be found.

Racial discrimination in pre-independent Namibia was practiced by the German colons and later by the South African government. The tenets of this racial ethnicity were mainly based on physical and biological differences. The result was a growing ethnic mobilization and a radical politicisation of ethnicity. A clear dichotomy based on the superiority of the whites was deeply ingrained in the Namibian society.

The policy of discrimination practiced by South Africa before independence was mainly grounded on Pigmentocracy. People were granted privileges and advantages according to their colour. Thus, the light coloured, for example, were granted more privileges than the black population. The Apartheid policy justified racial predomination of the whites over the blacks according to the lightness/darkness criterion. The Bantustan policy was the main instrument which helped implement this racial policy and separate ethnic groups. Black and coloured groups were compartmentalized in ten areas or homelands where strong tribal and racial cleavages characterized geographical boundaries.

The interim government formed by the South African regime in 1985, which was supposedly called the transitional government of national unity, fomented more discontent among coloured and black groups. Briefly, it failed to bring justice and freedom.

When Namibia became independent in 1990, its new constitution set about integrating the fragmented ethnic groups, and revoking deeply anchored feelings of domination and submission. In short, it strove to form a non-racial unitary state.
What does this constitution advocate?

The constitution intends to eradicate formally all practised inequalities, and promote reconciliation and integration within a unified territory. It also advocates national identity and cultural autonomy for ethnic groups. Yet, what is flagrant is that group rights are not protected. In fact, the constitution emphasizes individual rather than group rights.

Unfortunately, thirteen years after independence, the unification of Namibia has not yet been fully achieved. The white population feels politically discarded and lacks socio-political engagement. Political apathy among the whites is widespread.

On the other hand, the black population has already expressed its wish to forgive but not to forget. However, there is increased sensitivity towards any statement laden with racial implications.

A general feeling of Ovambo domination in Namibian politics prevails. This group who constitutes the majority of the population dominates in the economic, military and social sectors. As a reaction to the Ovambo predominance, many complaints and accusations were voiced out. Yet, as long as the government concentrates on national unity, enacts development policies in all regions, and bestows services on all groups, this anti-Ovambo attitude is likely to disappear. The present substantial fear does not principally stem from ethnic cleavages but from economic divisions between the rich and the poor. This economic chasm can easily be politicised and radicalised.

The process of democratisation which ended the era of militarism in Namibia, has already announced the ambitious task of consolidation. The country has successfully moved from oppression to peace, from ethnocentrism to an integrated state. Split geographic units along racial lines were replaced by non-racial constituencies and regions. Namibia moved from the Bantustan policy to a complex system of decentralization whereby power is delegated to elected sub-national units.

Yet, how can Namibia guarantee that regionalism does not re-appear with decentralization? Scepticism is strong. Many doubt that the process of decentralization will only revive the Bantustan policy. However, the government has made sure to discard all criteria based on colour, race or origin. In order to avoid developmental discrepancies, a unitary state was empowered. It was indeed claimed that only a strong state with a developed central authority can unify a previously divided and torn country.

Fundamental differences differentiate the actual process of decentralization from the Homeland system. While Bantustan was a closed ideological product founded on apartheid, decentralization is conceived in an open democratic mould. While the Bantustan political leaders monopolized power, free democratic elections guarantee the formation of regional councils in present Namibia. Whereas the Homeland policy mainly emphasized a top-down approach, decentralization is based on a bottom-up approach.
Furthermore, the Bantustan ideology fragmented the national state and instigated secessionist drives, yet the present decentralization based on delegation of power and devolution of functions has increased the powers of a unified state at the sub-national level. The strong interrelationship between the central state and the constituencies is the best guarantee against fragmentation in Namibia.

In fact, the main objective of decentralization has been a national development plan based on a national integrated economy and an integrated land policy. Although many challenges await this ambitious task, the present approach constitutes the main guiding principle of democratic governance in Namibia.

After the Apartheid era and the democratic take off, what are the chances for real reconciliation and forgiveness? What roles do ethnicity and religion play now? What has the integrative process done so far? Was it able to erase resentment?

Many questions still linger, and doubts are indeed justified.

The commitment towards reconciliation is the cornerstone of the transition process. Yet, obstacles such as poverty, economic inequalities, insufficient public services and the unresolved land issue undermine this endeavour.

Understanding the process of reconciliation cannot be isolated from historical development and notably from the struggle of the civil society and the churches. In fact, the Namibian churches played and are still playing a prominent reconciliatory role in promoting racial integration.

But it goes without saying that various impediments still underscore these efforts. The concept of reconciliation in Namibia covers a wide range of issues. In other words, reconciliation is not only a rhetorical term related to abstract forgiveness and the healing of wounds but encompasses material compensation and restitution of lost lands. Without these measures, the term is likely to remain hollow.

Another obstacle is the white groups' silence on the subject. This lack of engagement creates suspicion and a "credibility gap." It is peremptory that whites contribute to the process. Otherwise, the process will not embrace the entire society.

The superficial wave of the reconciliation process is indeed alarming in Namibia. It is only by bridging social and economic gaps, enhancing participative democracy, and uprooting the causes of discrimination that national integration can really emerge.
Unintended mobilization of an ethnic minority in China

Dr. Xuemei Qian
University of Beijing

China has for a long time appeared as a model of unity and stability. However, social unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang since the late seventies disrupted this peaceful image. Although many explanations have been proposed to explain the growing unrest, ethnical problems in China remain strongly linked to the naive policies of the government. The good intentioned policies of the government have paradoxically led to ethnic mobilization. The word of ethnicity, for example, has always been confused with nationality. An ethnic minority is labelled as a minor nationality. In addition, the National People's Congress (NPC), an organ that manages the ethnic minorities' affairs, is called the Nationalities' Committee.

Political culture in China is the complex result of the embedded patterns of multi-ethnicity in the country. After a history of ethnic antagonism and ethnic discourses, the government was determined to create real equality among all communal groups and revoke all policies of discrimination.

In order to understand the historical discourse of ethnicity of China, one should go back to the Chinese pre-history and investigate the evolution of the PRC equality policy.

In Chinese literature, the word Zu that emerged more than four thousand years ago, was used to designate a group of people living together and sharing a common culture. In ancient China, an ethnic distinction between the peripheral Zues and the Xia, emerged. Yet, this division allowed intra-immigration between the different ethnic groups and was not based on a closed system.

The concept of Zu was later refined by the Confucian concept of the Yi-Xia which stabilised ethnic relations in China for two thousand years before the PRC was established.

Among the five bonds that Confucius promoted for human behaviour, only one was purely political. This bond stated that the king was the only privileged whereas the others were subordinates. This means that the Xia and the Zues were perceived as equal entities.

The discourse of equality was later distorted by politicians who built their own ethnic closed systems. The cultural concepts of the Xia and the peripheral Zues were transformed into a political discourse based on the Yi-Xia order. As turmoil started around 770 B.C, and peripheral Zues attacked the feudal states in China, an ethnic Yi-Xia confrontation was legitimised. The Yi-Xia equation based on equality
and openness was re-shaped into a politically unequal system. Yi was viewed as the dangerous aggressor. The Xias demonstrated their superiority by picturing the Yies as barbarians. They strove to eradicate the peripheral Zues who were regarded as a menace.

In the nineteenth century, the Western invasion in the region increased the Chinese sense of unity and created a strong cohesion. The dichotomy between the Yi and the Xia was replaced by the confrontation between the Chinese and the Westerners. This sense of shared fate paved the way for the concept of a Chinese nation. In response to the external threat, national unification became the Chinese people’s ultimate goal. At the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of a Chinese national identity succeeded in transcending the previous ethnic divisions.

Ironically enough, ethnic divisions re-appeared as the PRC equality policy, initially designed to do away with ethnic inequality, ended up reinforcing ethnic identity. What were the bases of this equality policy?

In the 1920’s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) promised a status of equality to the frontier minorities that were discriminated against, and built its premises on the concept of ethnic coexistence.

After its foundation in 1949, the PRC’s main task was to identify how many ethnic groups lived in China, a subject that had never really been brought up. By 1954, the PRC had identified 38 ethnicities. It is only in 1979 that the 56 Chinese ethnic groups were finally detected. In the eighties, the process of re-recognizing ethnic groups was launched, a process which has not been completed until now. According to the 2000 census, the identity of 734,438 persons remains unclear.

Embedded in the constitution, ethnic equality became the governing principle of the PRC. Thus, after the process of recognition, the process of realizing equality started. National unity is interpreted as the resultant of this ethnic equality which is founded upon the principle of regional autonomy.

Achieving equality was indeed a difficult task. Huge socio-economic and cultural gaps impeded these moves especially that the lifestyle of some ethnic groups remained primitive.

To struggle against the ethnic discourse of inequality, the PRC also eradicated traditional Chauvinist ideas based on the superiority of the Han group. The constitution of 1954 conferred a status of equality to the ethnic groups’ languages. It also enabled the use of the ethnic minorities’ languages in the judicial, political, and cultural fields. 55 ethnic groups in China have presently their own language. The Constitution also granted ethnic groups educational autonomy. Local governments have the right to promote their own educational programs and educational methods. In 2003, China has more than 10 thousand schools.

It is undoubtedly that this equality policy has had many positive effects. Ethnic minorities have progressed tremendously in the last 5 decades. But unintended re-
percussions of the policy are endangering present stability. In Xinjiang, for instance, ethnic separatist claims led in September 1999 to several violent clashes.

_ Strong economic inequities have always existed between the western regions and the eastern coast areas in China. Yet, why did ethnic unrest break out in the nineties and not before? _

The source of unrest goes beyond economic disparities, and is an expression of ethnic mobilization or politicised dissatisfaction. Some mobilized ethnic groups in China are using the pretext of economic discrepancies to justify higher politicised aims.

The PRC's naive policies are largely responsible for this politicised discontent. Thus, the effects of identifying ethnic groups has had considerable destabilizing effects. The process of identification created separatist boundaries among ethnic groups. The "Who am I?" question revived in people's memory reminiscences of old hatred and past misdeeds.

Moreover, more than 400 claims regarding separate ethnic identities were raised, but the government recognized only 56 groups. It should be noted that the PRC gave scientific reasons behind this official recognition, but the fact remains that more than 734 thousand people are still fighting for their ethnic identity.

This ethnic process of identification has reinforced ethnic consciousness and resuscitated bitter memories dating back to Old China where ethnic antagonisms were strong.

Second, the equality policy has also had unexpected controversial effects. By imposing equality, it has unveiled and exposed to the daylight inequalities.

These processes awakened in the ethnic minorities' consciousness old sensitivities that were soon politicised.

Equality policies also triggered rising expectations among ethnic minorities. These minorities expected that real equality would be realized in no time. The existing schism between reality and expectation amplified the real magnitude of economic disparities. As a result, many groups feel discontented and deprived.

In short, economic inequalities cannot by themselves explain ethnic mobilization in China. The politicisation of the "equality" ideal and its transformation into an emotional tool are rather breeding frustration.

In addition, by encouraging linguistic autonomy, the PRC transformed ethnic languages into tools of separatism among different entities. Because of the economic and educational privileges given to ethnic minorities, many Han citizens adopted the identity of another ethnic minority. This alarming signal is only an indicator that ethnicity is being manipulated for self-interests. It also implies that ethnic identity might become in the future a dangerous weapon used to claim more privileges and benefits.
This case of ethnic mobilization in China is paradoxically the consequence of the PRC’s well-intentioned policies. The reforms undertaken by the government were initially aimed at remedying to inequality and promoting more harmonious relations; however, the result was a disappointing mixture of ethnic unrest and politicised ethnicity. The PRC could only transcend the Yi-Xia discourse of inequality by depoliticising the concepts of equality and inequality.

Politicisation of religion: the case of Northern Ireland

Sven Meyer
Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg

To understand the present conflict in Northern Ireland, one should go back to the historical roots of the problem. The primary source of conflict was the Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland in the 12th century. When Henry VIII declared himself King of Ireland, an era of English hegemony began. The dividing issue of religion instigated rebellion and resistance as the British-Protestant rulers tried hard to subdue the Irish-Catholic subjects. The displacement of the Catholic Irish, and the redistribution of their lands to the loyal Protestants created mistrust and resentment vis-a-vis the settlers. Irish resistance started gaining more momentum until it crystallised into a spiral of defiance.

Irish nationalism became mainly strong in the 19th century after the 1800 Act of Union which annexed Ireland to Britain. The formation of the IRA in 1919 was followed by the Anglo-Irish war of independence. As the war led to an impasse, the British government proposed negotiations. The Government of Ireland Act in 1929 led to Ireland’s partition. In the six counties of Northern Ireland, lived the Unionist Protestants who formed two-thirds of the population, and the Nationalist Catholics. Although at this stage Northern Ireland was not sovereign, it still enjoyed autonomy and had its own parliament.

The independence of the Republic of Ireland in 1949 was only the beginning of the dramatic era of "cultural apartheid." As the Protestant regime practiced a policy of discrimination in the North, the Catholic minority felt completely marginalized. In the seventies, violence in Northern Ireland degenerated into a civil war that led to the tragic Bloody Sunday. After the intervention of the British Government on the 24th of
March 1972, Northern Ireland was placed under the tutelage of London. England thus became a new target for the IRA operations.

This background of violence mobilized the two communal groups in Northern Ireland. The Protestant feeling of superiority and Catholic nationalism were the main patterns upon which the groups' identities were built. As ethnic cleavages hardened, concessions and compromises became very difficult to achieve. Societal cleavages overlapped with confessional demarcating lines. Sectarian divisions determined citizens' perceptions and undermined cross-cultural interactions.

The 1998 Friday agreement was the fruit of exhausting negotiations which took off in 1972. The Irish and British governments concluded a peace process mainly revolving around three dimensions: relations between Protestants and Catholics, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Britain.

Although dissidents tried to stop the negotiations, the agreement, which finally saw the light, announced the end of British interference and a new era of coexistence in Northern Ireland. Yet, did the agreement put a real end to the conflict?

The 1998 Friday Agreement has in fact introduced efficient measures to guarantee coexistence and peace. Executive power is vested in a cross-party body. Seats in the provisional government are equally divided between the Nationalists and Unionists. The Assembly reflects a large variety of parties in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, three other councils (the North-South Council of ministers, the British-Irish council and the British-Irish intergovernmental conference) were formed. Important measures such as the formation of a regional parliament and human rights commissions, the reform of the police, and the release of political prisoners were accomplished. The right of self-determination was perceived to some extent by the nationalists as a satisfactory outcome.

However, Protestant reluctance is still strong. Despite these guarantees, Protestants fear unification in the political realm. Political deadlocks and conflicts were so acute that the process of self-administration had to be four times interrupted.

Although confessional tensions and mistrust are strong, the Good Friday Agreement has to be seen as a positive step, for it allowed the Unionists and the Republicans for the first time to negotiate as equal entities.

In Northern Ireland, building common interests and integrated institutions may be the best safeguard against violence. The schism in North Ireland continues to be the reflection of politicised ethnic identities which have become rooted in social structures. A definite solution will only come about if these structures are annihilated.
Politicisation of religion: the case of India

Clemens Jürgenmeyer
Senior researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg

Jürgenmeyer analyses in his presentation how Hinduism was reinvented and politicised in India. The primary factor that characterizes India is its unfathomable heterogeneity. Thus, the existence of more than 28 states with borders drawn along linguistic and cultural lines, and 18 recognized official languages with hardly different scripts reflect to a great extent the heterogeneous complexion of India. The caste system which is based on the premises of hierarchy and difference remains a predominant factor regulating Indian social patterns. According to the caste system, Indians are not equal and differ from each other. The positions of the groups are assigned since birth and arranged along vertical lines. Languages are also the expression of regional differences and sometimes religious diversity.

In India, all major religions can be found. Hindus constitute 82.4 % of the total population, Muslims 11%, Christians 2.3%, Sikhs 1.7%, Buddhists 0.8%, others 0.8 %.

In order to explain how and why Hinduism was politicised, one should examine the evolution of the political system. The political development of independent India happened within a democratic framework despite the prevailing heterogeneity. Many scholars admire indeed the Indian miracle where democracy is not only surviving, but also thriving.

Indian democracy was connected to the party of the Indian National Congress which was founded more than 100 years ago. Democracy, socialism, and secularism are overarching principles which form the foundations of the Indian Union. Secularism expresses the neutrality of the state towards the religious groups who have the right to conserve their culture and religion. Furthermore, these groups are entitled to run their own educational organizations. Thus, the principle of segmental autonomy permeates a diverse society with heterogeneous linkages and dimensions.

Yet, the question that arises today is to what extent this democratic framework still holds.

With the increasing riots and destabilizing clashes, new threats are undermining the concept of the Indian secular state. A strong challenge is the rise of Hindu nationalism which emerged as a strong political force in the late eighties.

India has witnessed since this period the steady decline of the Indian National Congress and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) whose share of votes reached 23.7% in 1999. For the first time, in 1988, in coalition with other parties, the BJP was able to form the Indian central government.
The rise of the BJP and the decline of the former hegemonic Congress pose indeed new challenges to Indian democracy.

Hindu campaigns led by the BJP caused the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992, which according to the nationalists was built on the ruins of the God Rama’s birthplace in the town of Ayodhya. Consequently, a Hindu temple is to erected there.

The ideological factors that led to the rise of this Hindu nationalism are not new. In fact, this nationalism goes back to the end of the 19th century.

Backed by the RSS, (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Volunteers' Union) which is considered as the cultural and ideological backbone of Hindu nationalism, the BJP has shaped a new identity for the Hindus in direct opposition to Islam.

Hindu nationalism based on the ideology of Hindutva aims at defining who the Hindu is and who the others are. A Hindu is a person who regards India as his fatherland and at the same time his holly land. It is clear that this definition excludes Muslim and Christians who are seen as foreign to the Indian culture. This kind of reasoning implies that Indian and Hindu are the same and that India is ultimately a Hindu nation.

The inner unity of the Hindus is anchored in common traditions which rest on a common land, a common heritage and a common culture. These three features, according to this ideology, have existed since time immemorial.

The electoral manifesto of the BJP is based on the exclusiveness of the Hindu nation. Religion acquires a political dimension, and the nationalization of Hinduism becomes a tool to reclaim a nation for the Hindu. This logic is deeply rooted in the colonial experience and the fear of being dominated and suppressed by others. Hindus deplore the situation of fragmentation and see unity and resurrection of the glorious religious past as the only way to overcome this weakness. A prosperous Hindu is like a Hindu extended family of equals.

The BJP has succeeded in presenting itself as a highly disciplined body of politicians. The majority of BJP voters are urban, young males and mostly Hindus with a good educational background. Their standard of living is above average.

An anchor in the wave of modernization, the BJP ideology is constantly trying to reconcile the concept of economic success with an Indian harmonious family.

It is doubtful whether this violent ideology of Hindu nationalism is an answer to the problems of social inequity in India, because this ideology is based on a highly selective interpretation of the Indian tradition. In fact, the ideology claims that the nation should adopt a process of homogenisation, a pattern that contradicts the essence of Indian society.

Hindu nationalism will not be able to establish this monoculture, for the simple fact that extreme ideologies cannot reach the majority in such a highly heterogene-
ous country. The proof is that so far at least three fourths of the voters have opted for non-Hindu national parties in national elections.

In short, Hindu nationalism is not a mainstream ideology in India, and will more likely stay so.

The Latin America exception

Ulrich Fanger
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Fanger tackles in his presentation the specificities of the Latin American socio-cultural development and the factors that have placed the Latin American subcontinent in a position where ethnic strife and conflict could, by and large, be avoided. He also investigates whether the Latin American experience might be suggested as an example or a solution to other countries.

Ethnic conflicts are on the increase, particularly in Third World countries. Even Europe could not escape the wave of ethnic struggle. Thus, the "Basque" issue and the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus remain until now unresolved cases.

In international comparison, Latin American has remained amazingly inconspicuous. Despite the fact that the subcontinent is socially very heterogeneous and marked by pronounced ethnic differentiation and stratifications, the number of ethnic clashes has remained limited during the five centuries, mainly since the consolidation of the Spanish and Portuguese settlement, and the declaration of national independence (around 1820).

Which then have been the main traits that characterized interethnic relations and ethno-social policies in Latin America?

Among the major conditioning factors, one will have to point out the following three:

- The "Conquista" (i.e. the Iberian conquest) happened in such a way that the heretofore existing religious world of cosmological creeds or nature worship cults broke up and was eclipsed by the monotheistic faith in its European
Christian form. This has set the scene (at least since Las Casas' intervention on behalf of the Indians before the Spanish crown) for a fundamental - although not always respected - recognition of human equality, thus favouring the concept of an integrated society.

- The originally existing linguistic pattern in the Americas was a mosaic of roughly 980 spoken idioms without written codification (of which some 300 have survived until today). This has allowed the two major Latin languages to dominate the scene as unifying elements of communication.

- In contrast with English settlements in North America, where entire clan groups and families fled for religious reasons and sought to establish new economic sustenance far away from Europe, Spanish and Portuguese colonization throughout the 16th and 17th centuries was carried out by exclusively male crews, virtually without the company of European women. This explains why racial miscegenation became unavoidable and accepted. It initiated the characteristic process of "Mestizaje" (cholificación or ladinización). An increasing proportion of the Southern continent's population has become since the product of ethnic intermarriage of Indian, European, and Afro-American lineages.

Since the national independence and liberal emancipation movements of the early 19th century, Latin American societies have increasingly developed a concept of "social race," under which ethnic differentiation was essentially reduced to social aspects, and racial prejudice has largely been overlaid with class distinctions: upward mobility is therefore no longer inextricably determined by skin colour.

Over time, the topic of ethnic respect has produced intellectual and literary movements that had substantial political impact. This was the case with the concept of "Indianismo" during the second half of the 19th century, and with the Indigenista movement after the 1920s, from which emanated the prophecy that Ibero-America was destined to develop into the land of the "Raza de Bronze" (i.e. the bronze-coloured race).

This is not to say that ethnic problems do not exist. In fact, precisely in recent times, ethnically determined political protest movements have come to the forefront in various countries. Pure Indians constitute 5 to 10 percent of the Latin American populations and can mainly be found in Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In these countries, there are still compact groups of Indians where ethnic problems are intertwined with social grievances. However, despite the fact that social stratification goes along with racial cleavages, there has been the possibility for an Indian to upgrade his position in the society without being hampered. In other words, the mobile social scale exists.

One cannot underestimate the presence of latent conflicts in the subcontinent which are considered as potential threats to the concept of national integration. It is
undoubtedly that with the development of racial intermixture and large-scale mobility, many residual groups were left destitute and impoverished in rural areas. This led to a latent discontent especially that Indian families were dispossessed of their best lands.

Four major areas of conflict in which Indians are involved should be highlighted. First, the issue of the Chiapas remains unresolved. In Ecuador, Indian parties have become so strong that they have significantly contributed to destabilizing the country. In Bolivia, Indian upheavals are also on the rise. Moreover, these uprisings might elicit imitation effects in the neighbouring areas.

Guatemala has the highest percentage of Indian population with clear patterns of segregation and deep cleavages. Although Indian parties have not obtained a majority, their impact is growing and discontent is obvious.

In dealing with such conflicts, Latin American governments have reacted elastically by promoting negotiations and granting privileges and partial concessions. In spite of the recent agitations of the Indian populations, a regional destabilization based on ethnic struggle is unlikely. Chances are that governments will be able to come to terms with ethnic demands. The pervasive national ideology is still valid and has been successful so far in managing and attenuating menaces. Racial mixture in Latin America will continue, because it has its own viable roots.

Invoked by philosophers, journalists, and writers, the Latin American harmonist ideology which reflected a trend towards homogenisation has been criticized by many scholars.

Yet, the fact remains that after centuries of ethnic intermixture, the concept of an ethnic melting-pot won over the concept of a multi-ethnic society.

It should also be mentioned that the experiences of the United States and Latin America are not similar, for the tendencies of homogenisation led to different outcomes. In Latin America, what developed is an integrating ground. The melting pot did not wither away as in the United States.

What practical conclusions could be drawn from this experience? Can the Latin American experience be transferred to other countries?

There are no chances to apply the Latin American example in other parts of the world. This process which took several centuries to mature cannot be expected to be imitated in the short run. Furthermore, intermarriage which has continued over several centuries is hardly imaginable in other countries where ethnic-religious cleavages continue to be strong and domineering.

Consequently, one will have to refrain from drawing large-scale similarities or transposing solutions applicable to other ethnic groups.

The Latin American experience may be considered a fortunate but singular and inimitable case.
Part Three: The International Dimension

Separatist movements in a hostile regional environment:
The cases of Indonesia and the Philippines

Professor Dr. Jürgen Rüland
University of Freiburg and Director, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg

Ethno-religious conflicts have become the dominant form of conflict and have superseded interstate conflicts. The intense wave of ethnic conflict that rose in the first half of the nineties is rather alarming.

Southeast Asia is not immune to this wave. In fact, it is undeniable that ethnic problems are on the rise in this part of the world.

Rüland brings mainly into prominence the security risks posed by two ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines and more specifically by the secessionist movements: the Muslim rebels or the Moro movement in Southern Philippines and the Muslim rebels in the Aceh region of Indonesia.

To explain the origins of ethnic conflicts, one could resort to three main approaches: the Primordialist theory which holds that ethnic identities are fundamental identities seen as givens and as natural affinities acquired by birth, the socio-economic approach which tackles conflicts as the result of socio-economic grievances, and the cognitive or constructivist approach which envisions identity as a socially and ethnically constructed concept based on mental representations rooted in historical legacy.

In addition, four other principal factors help us shed light on the emergence of ethnic conflict:

1 - Tradition and history that unveil the narratives of ethnic relations and system of beliefs
2 - The structural dimension which focuses on socio-economic grievances galvanizing conflicts
3 - The elites' variable
4 - Singular incidences that possess catalytic effects and create traumas which sink in the collective memory of ethnic groups and which are possibly revived with time.
The rebel groups' conflicts in Southern Philippines and Indonesia cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration all these approaches and factors. First, it is undoubtedly that the colonial experience reinforced the magnitude of ethnic conflict and contributed to the separation of the ethnic groups in Southern Philippines and the Aceh region. The post-independence era that started in the late 1940's could be described as a vicious circle of broken promises during which the government alternated concessions with repression.

In Southern Philippines, an atmosphere of instability and violence between the state and the rebels gave rise to Muslim organizations which called for outright secession. Discontent was even accentuated by the failure of negotiations and the breakdown of peace agreements between the government and the rebels. Although both parties tried at many instances to implement negotiations, hostilities resumed in no time, and peace agreements focusing on regional autonomy or plebiscite did not succeed.

In the nineties, with the escalation of insurgencies, the government tried to implement a two-step solution which also failed because of delayed concessions and intra-ethnic elite splits within the Muslim community. Heavy fighting broke out afterwards.

The Indonesian case tells a similar story. The Indonesian government also promised autonomy to the rebels. Yet, these promises remained unfulfilled. The rebels led by Clerics or Ulema resented the secularist tendencies of the state and joined fundamentalist movements in the fifties. They felt betrayed and frustrated. Hostilities escalated in the seventies and were even more exacerbated by the repressive moves of the Indonesian army who forced the rebels to leave.

At the end of the Afghan war in 1989, the Aceh trained rebels returned to Indonesia. This influx inaugurated a new round of military operations and violent clashes with atrocious consequences. In the late nineties, peace agreements also failed as promises for a referendum in the Aceh region remained unfulfilled. Under the Wahid government, despite a series of peace agreements and cease fires, hostilities did not subside and periods of truce were only temporary. The 2002 peace agreement also broke down because of a lack of common interpretation of the pact by the two groups.

This general historical overview only enables us to comprehend how group identities were persistently strengthened as a result of broken promises.

Relating the two conflicts to the variable of modernization and structural changes can also help us better understand their complexity. As industrialization increased, a pressing need to use the resources in the peripheral areas emerged. As the government penetrated the hinterland, incentives for modernization exacerbated issues of political discrimination. Infrastructure developments and foreign capitals only benefited non-local groups. This capitalist intervention was monopolized by the authoritarian government which reaped the efforts of its deeds and heightened the feel-
ing of the groups' marginalization. In other words, the influx of development funds only aggravated socio-economic disparities. In southern Philippines, the Islamic groups were the most impoverished. In Aceh, oil industries and external workers were brought in. These structural changes led to deforestation, depletion of resources, and heightened hostilities.

The intensification of the two ethnic conflicts cannot be fully grasped without taking into account the elites' role and impact. In Aceh, for example, the representation of the Muslim groups in the political system declined. Furthermore, deep intra-elite splits can be found within both ethnic groups. As a result of intra-elite dissidence, many factions emerged and splintered elites were unable to reach a consensus.

After the 11th of September, both conflicts have acquired new dimensions. Islamic revivalist movements did not only gain momentum in the Middle East, but also reached the shores of Southeast Asia. American observers argue that a number of Afghan fugitives are fighting in Southeast Asia, and that the Islamist groups have links to El Qaeda.

Without discarding the possibility that there might be a correlation between the militants and terrorism, Rüland warns against exaggeration. These movements should be seen as second front movements. The Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia is still evolving on moderate grounds, and Islamist organizations have generally distanced themselves from radicalisation. In Indonesia, for example, radical parties still play a minor role.

Prospects for future solutions remain unfortunately dim, yet the search for possible strategies of cooperation should not be abandoned:

1 - Peace agreements should remedy to the problem of intra-elite splits especially that negotiations involving fragmented elites are bound to fail. A splintered group's exclusion from the negotiations only leads to the perpetuation of violence and persisting discontent.

2 - The hostilities should be stopped and confidence should be established. It is important to separate the parties at war and demilitarise them.

3 - Reintegration schemes and amnesties should be emphasized. The past traumas should be exorcized and dealt with for cathartic purposes.

4 - Improvement of material conditions is a must

5 - Giving protection to minorities, decentralization or federalism in Indonesia are crucial parts of the solution.

It goes without saying that these measures are not easy to achieve; the process is arduous and many impediments hinder a linear development towards peace.
Trans-state factors of conflict and accommodation in the Middle East

Dr. Salim Nasr
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Nasr tackles the regional trans-state factors of conflict in the Middle East, and highlights the pervasiveness of ethno-religious conflicts in this area, the weakness of the modern state model and its permeability. He then deals with the development of Arab nationalism and Islamism, and finally lays emphasis on two special unresolved cases: the status of the Palestinians and the Kurds.

The Middle East has been the core of multi-faceted conflicts. These conflicts can be classified into two main categories: the inter-state conflicts (the Arab-Israeli war, the Iraq-Iran war, the Gulf war...) and the intra-state conflicts which are mainly of an ethno-religious type (The Kurdish issue in Iraq, the ethnic conflicts in Sudan, the 1975 war in Lebanon, Syria in the eighties...)

The pervasive intra-state conflicts in the Middle East have claimed many casualties, and have had far-reaching repercussions. Surprisingly enough, the Arab world is a largely homogeneous entity. The Muslim religion and the common Arab language have been unifying factors throughout history. But the presence of minorities in 10 out of 21 countries such as in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, Mauritania, and Algeria has led in the last two decades to the rise of protracted conflicts.

In addition, two strong competing trans-state paradigms, Arabism and Islamism were largely responsible for the rise of "a Middle Eastern community" concept based on the principle of exclusion.

Both political movements were dismissive of state loyalties and borders. They prepared the ground for ethno-religious conflict and created an environment that facilitated the clash of ideologies and perspectives.

The dichotomous struggle of majorities-minorities in the Middle East centred around the denial of existence of minorities and the denial of their minority status. Minority has been pictured as a misnomer. The case of the Berbers in Algeria and Morocco is a striking example.

Unreliable estimates of minorities are only available. There is a general reluctance to deal with demographic changes or to produce objective statistics that study accurately demographic and social shifts.

This reluctance is strongly linked to the core of political equilibrium (the status of Palestinians in Jordan or the issue of parity in the Ta’if agreement in post-war Lebanon). Majorities developed apprehensions or xenophobia towards ethnic minorities. What resulted is the exacerbation of conflicts and massive diasporas. As a result of
this politics of discrimination, many emigrated to the West. The various Kurdish di-
asporas and the Lebanese Christian emigrants who are lobbying against the Syrian
regime in the West are illustrative cases.

Trans-state factors have not only been dividing factors but have also had positive
impacts in the Middle East. They were closely connected to deep historical traditions
which produced a homogeneous culture in the Middle East. Common characteristics
such as a shared social culture and the concept of the extended family greatly
shaped socio-cultural relationships. In addition, with the wave of globalisation, inter-
connectedness among cultures has been increasing.

Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism, two predominant trans-state factors, created
a shared nation or a shared common space. These currents remain to a large extent
more compelling emotionally than political units. State boundaries are perceived by
some as superficial. The loss of Palestine and the 1948 disaster were important
catalysers for the Pan-Arab wave. The 1973 war also confirmed that Arabs are more
successful when they are united. In sum, the *raison de nation* is over-emphasised
whereas the *raison d'Etat* remains less important.

Trans-state identities have also increased the permeability of the state system.
The Middle Eastern state is very vulnerable to trans-state pressure. Territorial
boundaries fluctuated immensely with religious tribal movements. Throughout his-
tory, there were multiple waves of state building and territorial fluxes. It is interesting
that either small units or large units have always challenged the importance of the
state. This has led to an increased fluidity of state boundaries. Outside intervention
such as in the case of Kuwait has been peremptory to prevent the state from being
swallowed.

To complete the image of trans-national factors in the Middle East, a brief de-
scription of the development of Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism is necessary.
The modern Arab nationalist wave, which dates back to the end of the 19th century,
gained mainly momentum under mandatory powers. After decolonisation, leaders
used the magic slogan of Arab nationalism to claim power.

Arab nationalism took two important dimensions. First, Nasserism, which was ex-
ported from Egypt after the Suez crisis, spread to Palestine, Lebanon, Syria... Local
Nasserite movements put pressure on national regimes and led to political changes
and inter-ethnic conflicts.

The second face of Arab nationalism is Ba'athism which constituted the second
manifestation of the Arab wave. This movement played an important role in Syria,
Irak and in Lebanon during the civil war. Certainly, many rivalries emerged between
Nasserism and Ba'athism. There were even attempts to merge states and eradicate
frontiers such as the Egypt-Syria scheme in 1958.

The seventies saw the decline of the pan-Arab movement. After the defeat of
1967, and the Egyptian withdrawal and decision to sign peace with Israel, Arab
movements died out and turned into local ruling parties. Defeat and disillusionment led to the claim of pan-Arab death.

Nevertheless, some argue that Arab nationalism is only dormant and manifests itself latently. Indeed, after the invasion of Iraq, the Pan-Arab spirit has been strongly re-awakened.

After the waning of Arab nationalism, trans-state links have adopted a new Pan-Islamic face. This new wave represented by movements such as Hamas supplanted to a certain extent Arab national resistance.

In the mid-seventies, the rise of the petrol power of Saudi Arabia, Wahabism and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 were all important boosts to the concept of the Islamic state. The trans-national diffusion of Islamic movements developed a competitive character. In the nineties, the ideological force of Pan-Islamism culminated with the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Caucasus. The Arab Afghan and Islamists movements in Sudan or Algeria were a reflection of this ascending Islamic wave.

Islamism claims to recreate a new Islamic identity. Thus, Islam is perceived not only as a religion but as a political identity which should permeate all levels of society. This movement had mainly a strong impact on the Arab youth. The Islamic State advocates the unity with the Uma which supersedes tribal ties.

It is noteworthy that these movements were not necessarily violent and remained generally moderate. Despite the claim that they are supranational, they ended up expressing national identities. The Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, presently stresses the protection of the Lebanese Homeland. Mainstream Islamist movements shifted from a supranational agenda to a national one. These movements which tried to reverberate as trans-state actors could not in fact transcend national boundaries. They helped paradoxically to domesticate the political scene in different Middle Eastern countries, and finally lost ideological grounds.

Yet, while mainstream Islam was restricting itself to a national agenda, other more radical movements were developing in the nineties.

These neo-fundamentalist movements (the Taliban, El-Qaeda…) are supranational movements bringing together uprooted individuals educated in the West who combine archaic linkages with global ones. In other words, these movements tend to reflect the subversive effect of globalisation rather than the past of Islam. Their strong destabilizing effect in the new world order has increased especially after the 11th of September.

It is unlikely that trans-national conflicts will wither away in the Middle East. Thus, the new trans-national effect of the Iraq war is likely to reverberate deeply in the region. The rise of the Shi'ite power and the potential suppression of the Sunni community in Iraq might exacerbate dormant conflicts. It is very possible that these flammable conversions assume devastating and unforeseen dimensions in the wake of the Iraq tragedy.
One should also mention the two trans-state actors in the Middle East, the Kurds and the Palestinians, whose dispersion fomented many crises. Their unresolved status will unfortunately continue to activate trans-state and intra-state conflicts.

Democratisation or the development of democracy is the only way to deal with the legacies of Middle Eastern conflicts. A political system based on participation and power-sharing is the only healing power that could transform destructive trans-national factors into constructive actors. Decentralisation and federal entities based on ethnically pluralistic states are highly recommended solutions. It is important to involve new identities in the Middle Eastern ethnic pot while promoting at the same time traditional legacies such as culture and language.

An inter-state conflict over resources under the cloak of civil war: The scramble for the Congo

Dr. Beatrice Schlee
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What was labelled a war of liberation against Mobutu's authoritarian regime is essentially a war over resources. The Democratic Republic of Congo with its immense mineral wealth constitutes a temptation for far poorer neighbouring countries. External forces transgressed the porous boundaries, starting the "First African World War", a saga of violence and horror.

Unhindered by the international community, Rwanda occupied the eastern provinces of the Congo under the pretext of security reasons, and has been exploiting for the last five years their natural resources. Uganda rivals with Rwanda in rapaciousness, stirring up conflicts in the North Eastern Ituri district, opposing ethnic groups that act as proxies for their weapon suppliers.

Today, low profile war continues between state and non-state actors pursuing economic interests. Therefore, any serious peace effort needs to address the mechanism of the war economy: the interaction of warlords monopolising resources and acting as entrepreneurs with trans-national trading networks. The war economy involves not only illegal export of mineral wealth but also counterfeiting and money laundering exercises. The conflict not only sustains itself, but also enriches its actors.
- while civilians in rural areas of the eastern provinces still suffer almost daily from armed theft and plundering.

Who are the main players perpetuating the tragedy?

The main actors are military, business, and political elites of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe who are highly influential either in the rebel groups, the foreign armies, or the official government. Indeed, illegal exportation of resources is not only practised by individuals or by officials of foreign governments, but by the Congolese government as well.

In the government-controlled areas, joint ventures between private companies and the state, claiming to sustain the government's war efforts, are used by internal elites to sell public goods for private profit. In the provinces controlled by Rwanda, Rwandese military officers dominate existing "comptoirs" and have even created their own selling houses for purchasing Coltan and other precious materials. However, an important condition for keeping the war economy going is the existence of trans-national trading networks, partly of foreign origin, established with countries such as Lebanon, Kazakhstan, or Israel. Profits are used for money laundering and for purchasing diamonds.

Tax rates in the Congo have tremendously increased in 2002, and new taxes have been introduced. Licensing fees for running a business have doubled. Furthermore, the public sector in the Congo is gradually disappearing, because tax revenues are not used for public services.

The phenomenon of resource plundering in the Congo, however, is not new. In colonial times, a shadow economy had already flourished. Under the Mobutu regime, encouraged and practised by the ruler himself, it considerably expanded. Nonetheless, the present war economy presents totally new dimensions: international involvement, criminal linkages, and increasing brutality. Human rights violations such as torture, slavery, mutilations, rape and murder were and are still perpetrated. The conflict over resources has made plundering a way of life; a "culture of looting" has emerged.

Will the new government of national unity formed in 2003 make a difference? UN reports show that the official withdrawal of foreign troops is unlikely to end the control of the economy by Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Direct control by foreign troops is replaced by indirect control exercised by proxies, local militias, and politicians.

In an attempt to reform the regime, President Joseph Kabila has replaced several cabinet ministers and directors of public companies. The International Penal Court has been asked to start investigations, but there are still doubts about their implementation. Unfortunately, the prospects for an effective eradication of looting militarism remain grim.
Cooperation across formerly embattled borders

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This brief presentation emphasizes how a past local conflict could evolve into an admirable case of cross-border cooperation among France, Germany, and Switzerland.

The upper-Rhine, a shared natural space, became a point of socio-cultural intersection. Switzerland, Germany, and France bridged geographical and social differences by promoting cross-border integration. Yet, this has not always been the case. During the Second World War, with the annexing of Alsace to Germany, natural frontiers turned into lines of dissension.

Historical and political rivalries were overcome in the fifties, and the process of coordination was re-launched. The initiatives of the mayors marked the beginning of an era characterized by intense cooperation. Building common structures and shared spaces of coexistence became overarching priorities. Despite the difference of languages, many common points unite the three countries: the Germanic dialect in Alsace and Switzerland, a common architecture, and a common natural environment.

Various treaties were signed in the Southern Upper Rhine to strengthen socio-cultural ties. In 1990, the European Union launched the "Interact " Program. Financial contributions were used to promote cultural, economic and social projects. In 1993, information centres for cross-border cooperation were built. The main objective of these centres was to provide reliable sources of information for citizens who wanted to live on the other side of the frontier.

The Babuschka principle based on subsidiarity constitutes the core of this cross-border cooperation. Many sub-centres such as Pamina, Centre, RegiotriRhena were built to promote regional ties.

The Council of the RegioTriRhena, founded in the Southern Upper Rhine area has been very active since 1995 and has committed itself to enhancing cross-border integration. The council tackles economic, environmental, and educational matters. It also encourages research in different fields.

Many projects were the fruit of this cross-border partnership. The Euro-Airport, a common airport for Basel, Mulhouse, and Freiburg strives to bridge distance and facilitates access to different regions. Moreover, the BioValley networks promote biotechnological projects among enterprises situated in Freiburg, Basel and Strasbourg.
Last but not least, the EUCOR, or the confederation of the Upper Rhine Universities (Freiburg, Basel, Strasbourg, Karlsruhe, and Mulhouse) allows the exchange of students from different backgrounds.

This case of cooperation is a vivid illustration of how previously embattled neighbours were ready to set aside their disputes in order to build a common area for coexistence and solidarity.
Part Four: Modes of Conflict Regulation, Obstacles and Successes

*Instrumenta pacis* -
The peace treaties of Osnabrück and Ta'if in comparative perspective

Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf

This presentation mainly analyses the impact of power-sharing agreements on conflict regulation. Hanf compares two peace treaties that were concluded in different centuries: the treaty of Osnabrück in 1648 that put an end to the thirty-year old war in the Holy Empire and the Ta'if agreement in 1989 that also ended the Lebanese war.

Both peace treaties were concluded at the end of intra-state protracted conflicts. In both situations, the parties at war realised that continuing the war was purposeless. Both treaties emerged as pacts that aimed at re-establishing peace after disruption. The Westphalia peace regulated the ethnic conflicts in Germany on a power-sharing basis, and the Ta'if agreement renewed the consociational pact in post-war Lebanon.

Many similarities can be found between the two conflicts. The length and cruelty of the two wars were similar. Intermittent conflicts between Metz and Prague, and between Innsbruck and Rostock had a relatively similar effect to the continuous battles between Beirut and Masnaa, Marjayoun, and Akkar. While the losses of the civilian population nearly amounted to 4% in Lebanon, the number of casualties in certain regions of the Holy Empire ranged from 1/3 to half of the population.

The nature of the combatant parties was also similar. In both cases, mercenaries and militias played a great role. The relative economic independence of the parties explains in both cases why the conflict lasted so long. In both wars, the warlords were able to enrich themselves as large-scale plundering and pillage became widespread.

Both cases were also at the same time inter-state and civil conflicts. Antagonistic groups in the two wars were communities who defined their identity in terms of religion. Although cross-alliances were possible among various groups, religious labels were rigidly ingrained. In both wars, religion contributed to the bitterness of the conflict, as indivisible goods or principles resisted bargain and negotiation.
What also aggravated the conflict in both wars was the mythical dimension of fear. The fear of disappearance and rigid principles explain to a great extent the durability of these struggles.

Furthermore, external intervention played in both cases a prominent role and contributed to aggravating the conflicts. While the thirty-year old war of the 17th century was according to Karl Deutsch a classical case of external interference, the Lebanese war was a proxy war on Lebanese battlefield. This trans-national character of both conflicts is so dominant that historians tend to relate the stories of both wars in terms of the stages of the foreign intervention.

During the war, Protestants in Germany declared themselves ready to conclude a pact with the devil: the French Catholics. Similarly, the Christian Nationalists in Lebanon allied with Syria and later Israel. The preparedness of the "Renversement des Alliances" was highly obvious in both cases.

In addition, the final big winners of the game were shrewd and intelligent external players: Richelieu and Hafez el Assad.

The war ended when internal conflict parties became aware that a full victory even with the assistance of external allies was impossible. The population was in both cases exhausted and turned finally against its own ruling parties. The mobilizing power of ideologies had waned. In the poems written at the end of the thirty-year old war in Germany, cynicism was predominant. In Lebanese newspapers, disenchantment and disillusionment were obvious.

Peace treaties were introduced to halt the two conflicts. Yet, while at the end of the thirty-year old war, a balance emerged between France and Sweden, one external party predominated on the Lebanese scene and legitimized its hegemony.

What are the analogies and differences between the two treaties and to what extent are they comparable?

First, in order to limit confessional hostilities, both negotiations did not take place in Germany and Lebanon. Osnabrück and Ta’if were the hosting regions for the two treaties. Both included provisions for the internal order. While the Osnabrück treaty became the constitution of the Holy Empire, the Ta’if marked the era of the Second Republic and embodied a new Lebanese consociational renewal. In both treaties, general amnesty was introduced. In addition, the creation of power-sharing systems was enshrined in the constitutions. In both cases, the head of the state’s power was considerably attenuated. Equilibrium was established in slightly different ways. In Germany, equilibrium was at the legislative level. Concomitant majority in both parts of the parliament was needed to solve the problem. In the Ta’if Republic, the search for consensus is at the heart of the Cabinet and requires parity.

To sum up, both cases stipulate that consensus has to be based on amicable agreement. The Ta’if agreement declared the abolition of confessions without fixing a precise date; the Osnabrück treaty stipulated a similar provision.
Whereas several internal resemblances in the content of both treaties can be found, differences in the international realm are manifold. In the Osnabrück treaty, all external and internal parties participated. Conversely, the Ta'if agreement was first negotiated by a tripartite committee composed of representatives from Morocco, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. This commission consulted on the one hand the Lebanese authorities, and on the other hand Syria. The Commission presented a first proposal which was utterly rejected by the Syrian authorities. The final draft was indeed a dik-tat imposed by the Syrian party.

While the Holy Empire lost some territories after the Münster treaty, it regained its sovereignty and foreign groups departed, Lebanese sovereignty was de facto lost as Syria gained the incommensurable right to deploy its army. Lebanon had also to establish privileged relations based on bilateral agreements which had many repercussions on the political arena.

What about the consequences and effects of the two treaties?

At first, German History viewed in a negative light the Westphalia Treaty. The main argument is that Pax Westfalica weakened the ancient Empire and contained the seeds of its dislocation. Yet, in the second part of the twentieth century, German scholars seemed to appreciate the positive aspects of the treaty that paved the way for religious coexistence and peace. The effects of the treaty are seen today more beneficial than detrimental. Cultural diversity, religious freedom and plurality are highly appreciated elements in the successor states.

In the case of post-war Lebanon, the Ta'if agreement has announced a post-war era of hegemony, and its effects are still highly controversial.

It is possible to derive some lessons from the Westphalia treaty that could be applied to post-war Lebanon. In the final analysis, power-sharing arrangements seem to be second-best solutions that allow a reasonable administration of post-war situations. But the comparison should not be pushed too far. The consequences of the two treaties are highly divergent. While the two texts had a similar content, the outcome or the denouement was different. The Münster treaty brought about peace, while the Ta'if agreement remains a hegemonic conflict-regulating treaty.
Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems: Can warlords cooperate? The case of the Congo

Baudoin Hamuli Khabaruza
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In this presentation, the DRC conflict is seen from the perspective of an engaged activist who fought persistently for democracy and civil society in Congo. His story mainly focuses on the nature of the political conflict in DRC, its national and international dimensions, the peace process, and the role of the civil society.

DRC, the third largest African country, has more than 60 million inhabitants and a very important geopolitical position in Africa. If DRC is at war, troubles reverberate immediately in many other neighbouring African countries.

Hamuli argues that the DRC conflict is political and not ethnic. Although the struggle for democracy started years before, many events in the 1990s such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rising number of national conferences in Africa created a political awakening. Military leader Mobutu was pressured to organize a national conference, but the manipulated process was impeded by networks of massive corruption. Governors mobilized ethnic groups against each other. Widespread looting overwhelmed the country. In sum, despite the struggle of the civil society, the national conference failed to bring political change.

When the Rwandan genocide took place in 1994, social unrest increased in DRC, particularly in the eastern provinces. The international community did not actively interfere at that time and left the situation worsening. Attempts of sporadic intervention such as the French Operation Turquoise proved to be inefficient. Two million Rwandans invaded DRC from Goma and Bukavu. The Rwandan army and militias occupied some territories and settled in towns near the borders. From 1994 to 1997, military camps were trained, and given weapons. Guns circulated in the Kivu, and violence haunted the provinces. Since communications were inefficient, the government in Kinshasa could not control the social unrest in the Kivu. The war that started there spread to the whole country. Its leader, Laurent Kabila, called it a liberation war against dictatorship. Surprisingly enough, it was only in 1997 that the international community decided to adopt an active role. Yet, Kabila blocked and paralysed the democracy process that was already on track. In 1998, the war scene revealed a stalemated and fragmented country divided into four regional regimes and controlled by military and political factions.

The multi-faceted DRC conflict is simultaneously a spill-over of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and a national struggle for democracy.
However, major impediments hinder this struggle. One of the major obstacles is the international dimension of the conflict. The West was exerting pressure on the African countries to democratise mainly since the end of the cold war, but no policies that could ensure democratisation existed. It was impossible for democracy to emerge from this abyss. The DRC found itself in a vacuum as international links with France and Belgium and with the NGOs were cut.

How could democracy be promoted when no resources exist?

Hamuli highlights the subversive role of the West in the DRC tragedy as external institutions did not only sustain Mobutu’s autocratic rule, but also pumped money to external aggressors. The plunder of DRC resources happened with the conscious support of Western banks and companies. He calls this sad reality “the degeneration of liberalism.” Incredible gun shipments came to Rwanda whereas the DRC government was unable to arm itself.

When in 1998 Rwanda and Uganda tolled the bell of war once again, the Congo was driven into a vicious circle of hostilities, aggression, and vengeance. As the conflict threatened to invade Central Africa, the UN security council demanded a peaceful settlement for the DRC conflict. All parties namely the DRC government, the rebels, and the neighbouring countries were invited to negotiate. A cease-fire was decreed in July 1999 in Lusaka. But these negotiations were to a large extent problematic. First, the central government and the rebels were given the same legitimacy. Aggressors (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda) were put on the same side as the government’s supporters (Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola). All countries involved in the conflict were asked for disarmament, and the retreat of foreign groups was held to be peremptory. The United Nations agreed to send an approximate number of 5500 blue helmets to the DRC. The organization spread them in all the country without even localizing considerable troops in the eastern provinces where the conflict was mainly raging. A Great Lakes conference and an inter-Congolese dialogue were perceived as vital steps in order to enhance conflict-regulation in DRC. At this stage of the conflict, the opposition and the civil society struggled hard to be on the negotiation table.

After Laurent Kabila’s assassination, a new promising era was announced. The new President, Joseph Kabila, decided to get rid of the old elites and to purge the system. He recruited technocrats and civil society activists. Furthermore, he decided to strengthen his ties with the West and get the peace process back on track. In July 2003, the Accord Global Inclusif or the internal accord of power-sharing was followed by a constitution of transition and the appointment of a new government of unity. It was planned that in two years time elections would be organized. Democratisation and reconstruction were declared as primary goals. The Congolese civil society struggled hard to form human rights, electoral, anti-corruption, and truce and reconciliation commissions.
The power-sharing agreement stipulates that the president has to share power with four other vice-presidents. In addition, power-sharing can also be found in the parliament where 300 deputies are selected from different groups and in the highly representative government of 62 persons. All conflicting parties were involved in the power-sharing pact. Rebel groups, for example, got the status of political parties.

It is too soon to draw lessons and reach conclusions since the agreement is still recent and the interim government did not really have time to reap the fruits of the past efforts. Nevertheless, many problems persist. The presence of five persons at the head of the state is problematic. DRC Politics is not a transparent game and governmental policies are still shady. It is doubtful whether all leaders would really abide by democratic rules. It is also surprising that the debates on looting and illegal exploitation of resources did not really take place. It seems as if past horrors were forgotten or discarded on purpose.

The Congolese population still suffers from widespread poverty and unemployment. The breakdown of the formal economy represents a great obstacle to democratisation. The lack of resources may possibly impede the reorganization of the army in the DRC.

After a long struggle against the daunting shadow of authoritarianism, democracy is still frail. The scattered million voices of human rights commissions and enlightened leaders across the country may not be enough.

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**Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems - Did the pre-war Lebanese system fail?**

Professor Boutros Labaki  
Lebanese University, Beirut

A controversial question that still preoccupies political analysts is why the pre-war Lebanese power-sharing system collapsed. To elucidate this controversy, Labaki proposes to analyse the reasons behind the collapse of pre-war Lebanese system. He presents various variables related to the downfall and tries to establish which specific factors hastened the collapse. He mainly focuses on the economic development till 1975, the pre-eminence of external conflicts and the incompetence of the elites to explain which mechanisms instigated the war.
Labaki first describes the Lebanese pluralistic society, a highly segmented society composed of 18 religious communities among which 12 are Christian, five are Muslim and one is Jewish. These groups which have special characteristics linked to socio-cultural customs and traditions lived before the war on mixed territories. Confessional identities are deeply anchored in the Lebanese societal structure. Thus, intra-communal endogamy is strong, and belonging to a community is compulsory.

The power-sharing system that prevailed in pre-war Lebanon was designed to provide equilibrium among communal groups. In an effort to preserve confessional identities, the system endowed segmental autonomy in the socio-cultural field to the diverse communities and respected the principles of proportionality. In addition, it tried hard to preserve a multiple balance of power whereby the main groups i.e. the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Shiites share power among themselves and with smaller minorities. The parliament, a highly representative body, is composed of deputies elected in multi-plural constituencies, and proportionally distributed among the various communities. Executive power is shared between a Maronite president and a Sunni Prime Minister.

The most important political parties emerged from religious groups and were conditioned by confessional affiliations.

These political parties can be divided into three groups:

1 - The group of traditional notables, frequently represented in the Parliament (The Nahj, the Karameh clique ...) and whose power was gradually declining before the outbreak of the war.

2 - Communal populist parties rooted in the process of modernization (Kataeb, Amal...)

3 - Secular parties with modern ideologies (the Communist Party, the Syrian Nationalist party...) that mobilized the population in the seventies.

The breakdown of the power-sharing formula did not result from internal economic disparities and was not an expression of communal inequities. Communal gaps since the Ottoman period were narrowing and the rift that separated the communities was gradually disappearing. In fact, socio-economic disparities tended to decrease namely after 1960. It is erroneous to claim that the inequalities in income between the Muslims and the Christians were mainly responsible for the upheavals witnessed in the 1970's. Evidence shows that the narrowing of differences and the increased participation of Muslim communities in high level jobs especially after 1958 triggered rising expectations and a sense of relative deprivation.

Second, incompetent elites also contributed to weakening the system. Pre-war elites can be classified into four main groups: the traditional notables whose ascen-
dancy goes back to the feudal period, the modern political elites stemming from the business class and professional circles, the middle and lower-middle class populist elites who were co-opted mainly in the fifties and who were to a large extent affected by external parties, and finally the secular elites who were co-opted in the system after 1970 mainly with the increasing power of Kamal Jumblatt’s National Movement and who were also affected by external forces.

Pre-war political elites were neither able to uphold economic reforms nor respond efficiently to external threats. Although they had introduced since independence gradual dynamic policies whose goal was to reduce the gaps, they were unable to sustain the process of reforms. Thus, the main sizeable reform under president Fouad Shehab which aimed at narrowing economic and communal discrepancies, curbing the power of feudal elites and re-structuring the administration was discontinued as subsequent leaders united to throw the Shehabist model.

Furthermore, the elites’ incompetence was visible in their inability to halt the destructive external forces. Lebanon remained a precarious democracy weakened by several external threats namely the threat posed by the Palestinian Movement that fought along Lebanese borders after the 1967 defeat.

Unlike Jordan and Syria, Lebanon could not deal appropriately with the Palestinian conflict, which constituted a crucial factor in the breakdown of the state.

In the seventies, inflation fuelled by the rise of oil prices, the exodus of the Southern Shi’ites towards Beirut, Israeli attacks, the Syrian intervention and socio-economic grievances accelerated the collapse. The last president before the outbreak of the war, Suleiman Franjieh, was unable to tackle economic grievances or deal appropriately with the regional conflict and the PLO factor in Lebanon. The Lebanese government could not handle the problems mainly because of its indecision, for the divided elites could not agree whether they should repress or support the PLO.

In addition to the incompetence of the Lebanese elites, Lebanon was in itself a regional scapegoat or a territory where others fought their wars.

Syria, for example, wanted to exert pressure on Israel through Lebanon. Moreover, it aimed at acquiring a hegemonic position in the country, and the presence of the PLO on Lebanese soil was the best excuse. After its expulsion from Jordan, the Palestinian Movement saw Lebanon as the land of salvation. Furthermore, Arab inter-rivalries had a substantially destabilising impact on Lebanon in the seventies.

In conclusion, pre-war Lebanon was the ideal situation for external intervention. The ground was prepared for the outbreak of local conflicts, inter-Arab conflicts, Arab-Israeli conflicts, and Syrian hegemony.

The country became a backyard for proxy wars and a field of experimentation.
Exploring the limits of power-sharing systems:  
Can an imposed system work? The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Dr. Karin Kneissl
University and Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

In her presentation, Kneissl focuses on the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and the fragmenta- 
tion of internal structures in the Balkans. She tackles then the limitations and 
successes of the power-sharing system in Bosnia, and discusses finally the Stability 
Pact and its repercussions in South Eastern Europe.

The dissolution of the Federal Yugoslav Republic was in fact the result of several 
stages. This multi-cultural state formed of six Republics witnessed in the nineties a 
radical dislocation and dismemberment.

One cannot overlook the authoritarian legacy and its reverberations on subse- 
quent developments.

In the Yugoslav autocratic era, Tito permitted only one ruling party. He shrewdly knew how to develop equidistant relations between the East and the West. His diplomatic skills enabled him to receive investments from the West and maintain 
good relations with Moscow. This alliance of equidistance, a golden means between 
the Warsaw Pact and Nato, helped safeguard the economic machinery in the coun-
try. As he did not designate a successor, his death in 1980 left the country in a ter-
rible power vacuum. The Republic entered an era of debt crisis, and economic trou-
bles. During the eighties, the intellectual debate on nationalism that started in Croa-
tia and Serbia took unforeseen dimensions as the political elites preached a dis-
course of ethnic superiority. In 1989, many publications and theses tackled the is-
issues of ethnic purity and alluded to a Greater Serbia or Greater Albania. While 
socio-economic problems were on the increase, political leaders awakened the de-
bate of ethnic purism and contributed to deepening and reinforcing cleavages. In 
fact, war in Yugoslavia had already unofficially broken out in the late eighties. The 
ethic discourse was indeed a bad presage.

It is only in 1991 that the mosaic of ethnic groups really started breaking apart. 
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence; Bosnia-Herzegovina followed suit in 
1992. Macedonia also seceded in the same year.

As the status of minorities was not settled, upsurges and upheavals turned tem-
porarily Croatia and Slovenia into arenas of war. As soon as violence reached Bos-
nia, the bloodiest ethnic war (1992-1995) in Yugoslavia took place. Bosnia was in 
fact an artificial patchwork of Croats, Serbs and Muslims. During the Bosnian war, 
not only were ethnic communities at stake but also borders.
The indifference of the international community during the period of dismemberment and bloody upheavals is striking. One is left to speculate whether external actors really cared about this post-war artificial product which was paradoxically created by European powers.

The Bosnian war was an atrocious tragedy of human rights violations, crimes, looting... In fact, it is hard to imagine that such a war could happen in the last part of the 20th century and more astonishingly in Europe.

After the wars of secession, a smaller yet deeply fragmented "former federal Republic of Yugoslavia" remained. Composed of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, this entity is obviously another deeply fragmented mosaic.

Many events prove the fragility of the remaining entity. Belgrade witnessed a sort of Velvet Revolution in October 2000, when opposition revolts raged against Slobodan Milosevic who claimed having won the elections. As security forces sided with demonstrators, the Serbian leader was arrested and later handed to the Hague tribunal. His successor Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, a new democratic hope, was assassinated in March 2003.

Serbia faces currently a deadlock in internal politics. As nationalists are considerably gaining ground, the December 2003 elections promise to be stormy. Moreover, the territorial question in former Yugoslavia remains open. One ponders the fate of these three entities. What will happen to these Yugoslavian remnants? Will Montenegro secede? Will Kosovo remain with Serbia?

Latent conflicts threaten to explode.

The potential secession of Kosovo could lead to an on-going process of fragmentation which is not on the agenda of the EU. It could also awaken other potential secessions in Istria and Dalmatia.

Albania and Kosovo have become transit countries for crimes, smuggling, and trafficking. The moment Kosovo becomes independent, it could become a black box inside Europe.

The second part of Kneissl's presentation deals with the Dayton power-sharing agreement, its successes and shortcomings. Signed in 1995, the agreement was a tool of crisis management designed to end the Bosnian war. However, this agreement was only a means to silence the guns, and did not deal with the roots of the problem. The agreement can be described as "crisis management at its best and at its worst."

The Dayton agreement which has put the Republic under international protection was useful to introduce an interim and temporary solution. However, until now, the pacification of the conflict did not really take place. Many issues are still pending: economic recovery, the issue of the refugees, the political future of the country...
The agreement has in fact major shortcomings. By putting the Republic under international trusteeship, it has transformed Bosnia into a patronized terrain. The regime imposed by the international community is preventing the real concerned parties from assuming their responsibilities. In other words, the agreement is only postponing a final settlement of the conflict. Second, the presence of various organizations in Bosnia has led to growing intrigues among these institutions. This protectorate has ironically become a job-creating machinery for retired professionals. Third, Dayton paradoxically confirmed ethnic cleansing by creating two distinct entities: the Republic of Srbska (49% of the territory) which is a Serbian enclave and the Croato-Muslim federation (51%). Instead of mitigating cleavages, it has reinforced grudges and reanimated past scars.

The Dayton Agreement is by no means a transposable or recommendable solution to any other country beset with conflicts. Tailored to the internal situation in Bosnia, the pact has proven to be an inefficient tool of genuine and lasting conflict-regulation.

The future relations of South Eastern Europe and the European Union are also another burning issue. The Stability Pact which promised the South Eastern European countries eventual membership in the EU is a "double-edged sword." It has indeed opened up the brilliant perspective of an eventual EU membership in the future. Nevertheless, is the proposal postponing the idea of EU membership or preparing the ground? Is it a real commitment or an evasive pact?

Until the status of Serbia and Kosovo is not really settled, the Stability Pact remains a vague measure.

Alternatives to power-sharing systems: Can political decentralization defuse ethno-religious conflicts? The case of Indonesia

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The actual Indonesian political system is the outcome of many earlier phases which matured after the declaration of independence and the first experience of liberal parliamentary elections in 1955.
From 1959 to 1965, Indonesia was ruled under Sukarno's guided democracy which was followed by the Pancasila democracy (1965 - 1998). During this period, also called the Suharto era, a unitary Indonesia was advocated. In 1998, after Suharto's demise, the transition towards democracy and the experience of decentralization took off.

In fact, this experience is regarded as an effective strategy that might possibly defuse conflicts and manage socio-economic disparities in Indonesia.

The presidential system has currently decentralized powers and competences that encompass the national level, the province, the district, the sub-district, and the village. Similarly, the parliament also operates on the national, provincial, and district levels.

Despite these reforms, the roots of the current crisis in Indonesia stem paradoxically from the recent major structural changes in the political regime. There are unfulfilled economic expectations and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Discrimination against certain groups such as the Chinese minority is still obvious. The elites' inflammatory rhetoric (Ulema, priests) which aims at mobilizing ethnicity is also another tool for discrimination. Furthermore, in spite of the government's efforts to manage the natural resources of the country, mismanagement is apparent. Let us also keep in mind the legacy of state repression and reliance on coercion during the Suharto's era which has still vibrant traces.

Systemic and systematic corruption remains deeply anchored in the political system. The lack of democratic experience is another important factor which undermines the process of democratisation.

Many short and long-term challenges, mainly related to the economic, political, and social fields, await the process of decentralization. Thus, economic recovery should be stimulated and stable foundations for sustainable growth should be built. Furthermore, the necessity to have free elections and develop democratic culture has to become a priority. Ethnic conflicts have to be minimized, for social peace and stability are preconditions for successful decentralization.

The transition process that started in 1998 involves many dimensions, actors, and phases. It is in fact difficult to come up with a general assessment. Nevertheless, many positive innovations can be signalled. One cannot ignore the active role of the NGOs and the considerable efforts of the civil society that introduced significant changes. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments from 1998 to 2002 are efficient guarantees of reform. The 1999 elections were relatively free and fair and the 2004 elections are also expected to be so. There are well-intentioned initiatives to solve regional conflicts in the case of Aceh, Poso, the North of Malacas and West Kalimantan. In a nutshell, decentralization has been incorporated in the constitution as well as in the democratic process.

After the tragic Indonesian experiences under the Suharto regime, during which economic losses, crimes, unemployment, and human rights violations became intol-
erable, the current political decentralization has opened up new horizons and hopes. Power has been delegated within a legislative framework. Regional decentralization is also accompanied by a distribution of finances and resources. The centre holds real power, but the regions of Aceh and West Papua have received special autonomy under the constitution.

The process of decentralization has been partially successful in defusing conflicts and reducing inequities. Many problematic issues are still pending:

1 - Issues on human resources are still monopolized by the local and district levels
2 - The implementation of the law which is related to the distribution of power under the unitary state is different from that under the federal state.
3 - Parliamentary challenges exist between the local governmental acts and the national governmental acts
4 - Problems relating to public services and coordination among departments are still not cleared up.
5 - The status of Aceh and West Papua has not been finally settled. Military operations, for instance, continue in Aceh
6 - The issue of justice remains open in some regions. The question that arises is how to enforce justice in regions such as Aceh where large-scale human rights violations are still reported
7 - An important current debate is which national strategic interests should be given to the central government
8 - Electoral mechanisms operating without violence should become the norms and not the exception in Indonesia
9 - Strong time constraints hinder the process of decentralization. Some politicians' major objective is to win the 2004 elections instead of focusing on the long-term battle.

Decentralization in Indonesia is a way to solve the conflict by distributing power and public services, but the process is still hampered by the novelty of the experience. More time is needed to consolidate decentralization, and internalise democratic rules. In fact, it is a long road that demands at least 20 to 25 years.

The 2004 elections are considered as a big challenge, for they will introduce new structural changes in the electoral, administrative, and political processes. For the first time, Indonesia might have proportional representation combined with open lists. The Upper House will be introduced in the parliament and four senators will govern on the provincial level.
In this constant struggle against conflict and inequity, the mission and vision of rational leaders in Indonesia are of prime importance. The new electoral process is already a first important departure from old norms to democracy.

Alternatives to power-sharing systems:  
Belgium's experience of combining power-sharing with federalism

Dr. Tamara Kovziridze  
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The Belgian case has proven to be one of the best examples of power-sharing. This federated entity has in fact managed to reconcile cultural differences and divergences within a consociational framework based on consensus and compromise. Kovziridze outlines the specificities and particularities of the Belgian power-sharing experience. She namely investigates the reasons why Belgium became a federal state, the types of Belgian institutional structures and finally the current impact of Europe on Belgium.

This country which has 10 million inhabitants and two main linguistic communities, the Francophone and the Flemish, has devised a power-sharing formula based on segmental autonomy and decentralization. Demographic structures have deeply affected the Belgian federal structure which is an expression of societal patterns.

Federalism emerged from a gradual process.

Decentralization was followed by federalization in 1993. Since then, many federal reforms have been added. The 2001 federal reforms foreshadow further measures of decentralization.

Federation was the outcome of the spirit of compromise among the two main groups. Whereas the Flemish policy was active, the Francophone policy was reactive. Compromises necessitated a deep consensus which had to be institutionalised in consociational structures. When there was no agreement, policy paralysis resulted. Communities were pushed to make package deals.

The Flemish National Movement emerged after world war II to emancipate Flanders both linguistically and economically from the Belgian state. Thus, the strife for linguistic and cultural autonomy necessitated the existence of federated entities. The
first steps of decentralization were undertaken in the sixties. Linguistic borders were also determined. As a result of these reforms, four regions were established: the Flemish, German, French regions, and the Brussels area which remains bilingual. Political parties were also split along linguistic frontiers.

One notices that the creation of the federal Belgian structure was indeed a reaction to the Flemish demand. The Dutch community asked first for decentralized socio-economic competences. The Walloons were fearful that the Flemish autonomy might compromise their own autonomy. They asked consequently for their own segmental space. Brussels posed first a problem, for it was an enclave situated in Flanders yet mainly French speaking. Growing demands insisted on transforming this area into a federated entity which possesses the same competences as the other entities.

Various distinct features constitute the special make up of the Belgian federation. Federal structures avoid any type of hierarchy between the two major linguistic groups. On the federal level, institutions are based on parity. In the court of arbitration as well, 6 judges are Flemish and 6 are French-speaking.

Political compromise between the Flemish and the Francophone constitute the cornerstone of the federal pact. In Brussels, for example, the head of the government is French-speaking; however, two ministers are Flemish and two others are Francophone. These intergovernmental institutions function on consensus. Unanimity rule remains decisive.

Furthermore, each participant is endowed with veto power. The absence of hierarchy is also found at the legal level. A federal law cannot overrule a law stipulated by the federal entity.

The challenge is to regulate conflicts that might arise in case laws turn out to be contradictory. In order to avoid this impasse, the court of arbitration has the mission of reviewing the laws in compliance with the constitution. The council of states has consequently ex-ante and ex-post control of laws. Whereas all the laws are called decrees, they are called "ordonnances" in Brussels.

Surprisingly enough, no federal law has ever overruled an "ordonnance" in the federal area of Brussels. Should this be the case, the conflict would be solved by the court of arbitration before it gets out of control. Thus, preventive control is another important foundation for the Belgian federation.

The trend in Belgium is to give more and more competences to the federated entities rather than to the federal unity. The federal government has in fact less competences than the federal smaller units. The latter have segmental autonomy in various fields such as energy, employment, infrastructure, regional transport, language, culture, education ...

The division of competences is thus based on the principle of exclusivity, yet this does not deny the fact that some competences are also shared on the vertical level.
Communities and regions have to coordinate together in order to create laws and administer them.

It is true that the majority of competences remains exclusive. Nevertheless, if we take a closer look, we notice a distribution of competences along vertical lines and between the federal level and the Belgian units.

Predetermination is another feature of the Belgian federation. The Senate, for example, does not really represent the federalized entities. However, the coming federal reforms might possibly change the structure of the Senate.

Foreign policy is reserved to the federal level. The king conducts foreign relations, but federalized entities have also the right to conduct foreign relations within the field of their competences. For instance, communities can sign international treaties that pertain to education. On the other hand, the federal level is denied the right to sign any international treaty in the field of culture.

A final important consideration is the present relation between the European Union and the federal Belgian state. Although Belgium was a founding member of the EU, the process of decentralization happened independently from the European integration. Nevertheless, as a result of the increasing networks created by the European entity, there is a growing interdependence among the Belgian units. This interdependence necessitates a strong coordination between the communities and the regions in order to represent the federal entity at the European level. The necessity to have one Belgian voice in the European Union has imposed the need for a stronger coordination in Belgium. Despite the deeply-rooted process of decentralization, entities have become very interrelated, because each entity may block the other's decision. The right of concurrent majority presupposes further coordination to avoid a stalemate.

The most important question that arises is whether Belgium will still exist in 20 years. What are the elements that hold Belgium together? Is it just the football team and the king?

If the leaders decide to split the country, one fundamental problem remains: the Brussels area which possesses a double status as the capital of Belgium and the capital of Flanders.

Although the Belgium federation is considered to be one of the most successful models of power-sharing, certain shortcomings can be detected. Belgium is an asymmetric bipolar and centrifugal federation which is also founded to a certain extent on pre-determination. Thus, asymmetry and pre-determination are obvious in several aspects. For instance, in the field of transport, education, preventive healthcare, energy and economy, decisions made by the French-speaking Walloons apply also to the German-speaking community in this area. The latter has no choice but to comply with the laws of the French speaking federal entity.
Alternatives to power-sharing systems:
Depoliticising ethnicity in South Africa

Professor Dr. Valerie Møller
Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown
and CISH

Professor Dr. Lawrence Schlemmer
Managing Director, MarkData, Cape Town

In the first part of the presentation, Møller presents empirical data on South Africa collected with Theodor Hanf in 2002 under the auspices of the International Centre of Human Sciences in Byblos (Lebanon).

This study sheds light on ethnic groups in South Africa and the coexistence between the white and black groups in the mould of a power-sharing framework. It raises many perspectives and questions. Is South Africa a beacon of hope? How successful were the first elections in 1994? Are communities able to live together after a civil war? Are they happy? Do they see a future for their coexistence?

The real challenge of democracy in South Africa is not only freedom but also a better economic life.

During the Mandela presidency (1994-1999), open elections for a government of national unity after Apartheid and oppression became possible. Euphoria was tangible among the population, and a unique phenomenon of satisfaction and happiness was reported. However, the challenge was that freedom would finally find a material basis.

The post-Apartheid era is divided into main periods: the process of reunification and reconciliation that took place under Mandela, and the phase of service delivery under the Mbeki presidency.

This remarkable process of success remedied to a certain extent to a faltering economy. In fact, positive social indicators ascertain that income is increasing, and living standards are improving. Yet, to what extent did economic improvements deepen democracy? Did this post-discrimination era forge common values?

To reach reliable results, the empirical data took into consideration all official divided groups: white, Indian Asian, coloured and black.

The main focus of the study centred on the emerging black elites, and its hallmarks revolved around the happiness and content of the citizens.
Interestingly enough, the majority expressed satisfaction. Thus, the South African quality of life trends in the post-election era denotes a phenomenon of happiness. It is important to mention the varying degrees of happiness. Whites have higher levels of happiness while blacks remain at the bottom. The Indians and the coloured are in between.

A study on the perceived quality of life indicators has shown that black elites are better off than the black Rank and File. Black elites affirm that their lives improved and have a deep conviction that the projected future quality of life is positive. In other words, their future perspectives reflect an optimistic view.

In this new happiness phenomenon, a reduced "cross-over effect" is evident. In fact, the differences between the present and future qualities of life are gradually softening and diminishing. People who are happy in the present expect to remain happy in the future.

A third question focuses on whether the black elites have adopted new identities and whether they see themselves differently. The study found that black elites see themselves as solidly middle class and make comparisons with their past conditions and feel that they will have better chances in the future. What is striking is that they do not make comparisons with other ethnic groups. In fact, invidious comparisons are rather related to the past rather than to other communities. One notices the emergence of a new consciousness.

Regarding socio-political identities, only 6% identify themselves with race or ethnicity whereas the rest tends to identify with religion. The latter remains stronger than ethnicity in defining social identity. In addition, the majority refers to personal rather than collective characteristics. Despite this new consciousness, there are still South Africans who are strongly conscious of their ethnic image.

The study has thus asserted that coexistence is possible. Approval of marriage across racial lines is also a new feature of this consciousness. While whites still have difficulties with accepting mixed marriages, black elites are more tolerant of this phenomenon.

In sum, racial differences are softening; friendships along linguistic and ethnic lines are desirable. Intermarriages which were once unthinkable have now become acceptable.

The problems that are hindering the development of democracy are not ethnic issues but economic problems. The major shift in the post-discrimination era revolves around the disparities between rich and poor.

Regarding the profile of the ideal democratic state, the study indicates a greater tolerance and a disapproval of cheating at the polls. However, there is less consensus when it comes to freedom of the press, independence of the judicial system, and whether a multiparty system really represents the South Africans.
After a long struggle, South Africa has become a real success story. The peaceful settlement of the conflict has become a way of life ingrained in the concept of a "Rainbow Nation".

The second part of the presentation deals with the viability of the multiparty democracy in South Africa. Schlemmer describes the transition as a miracle of reconciliation and stability. Nonetheless, many constraints still impede this pluralistic democracy.

The post-Apartheid government can be described as a firmly unitary state. South Africa has become in fact syncretistic inasmuch as it is trying to incorporate a number of elements in a package. It is also a revolutionary government insofar as it has set the task of transformation.

Other features of the post-discrimination government are the Washington consensus in economic policy and regulated labour markets. The sophisticated centralism or "democratic Leninism" shows that input is mainly guided from the centre. Political correctness is prevalent. In fact, there is a strict observance of democratic formalities and constitutionalism. In a nutshell, the system is a complex mixture between democratic and heavy centralist tendencies.

The process of depoliticising ethnicity has been rather successful. Majorities in all groups accept the legitimacy of the state. Furthermore, the National Party of the Apartheid has coalesced with the central government.

Although racial tension is still detectable mainly among new elites, the post-Apartheid era announced the relaxation of racial interaction.

Moreover, major religions have opened up and have achieved a remarkable process of integration. Dutch churches, for instance, have dismantled in their approach racial components.

This is not to deny the existence of constraints that retard racial re-engineering and democratic transition. Various difficulties still hinder democratic pluralism. To people’s dismay, there is a visible deterioration of public administration and socioeconomic development. Rural development is quasi non-existent and the peasant economy is marginal. Second, civil disobedience and the decay of the social fabric are prominent factors in the South African society. For instance, many citizens do not want to pay for water or housing although 40% of these people have the capacity to pay. Consequently, the local government debts are rising and the extension of services is constrained.

It is noteworthy that crime and corruption are stabilizing at very high levels. Despite the fact that South Africa is rated as an emerging economy, the fixed investment remains low. South Africa has the third highest recorded unemployment. Income inequality is widening. Since 1991, emigration has tremendously risen. The rate of emigration is three times higher than the rate of immigration.
This reflects in fact a generalized problem of confidence in the country. Although citizens are well-intentioned and politically correct, they are still confronted with many uncertainties.

Another controversial problem is the growing neglect of the indigenous language which makes of South Africa "an Afro-Saxon State." This neglect can be interpreted as a mixture of "gentle Jacobinism and a well-intentioned destruction of Afrikaans."

Widening party cleavages pose another challenge. The political polarization reflected in the party system is still flagrant, for racial support for certain parties has not been altered.

The main question is whether South Africa is heading towards a one-party dominant form. When the ANC, for example, reaps the majority of votes, democratic consciousness is seriously questioned. People still doubt whether elections and minority voices have a purpose.

Thus, the challenge of South Africa is to transcend the downplaying centrifugal tendencies of the failing state. An open democracy with checks and balances is the best guarantee for the consolidation of the democracy process. Decentralization and safeguards for a unitary multi-party system might prove to be very beneficial. The most appropriate political system should be aimed at absorbing political shocks and forging a lasting political consciousness in support of democracy. Although South Africa has gone far in this direction, more needs to be done. In fact, a system of devolution to local areas and power-sharing arrangements at the local level are a necessity. For a liberation government, it is hard to manage consociation, yet compensating at the local level should remain a priority.
Part Five: Simulation Exercises

Conflict regulation in Kosovo

Dr. Karin Kneissl
(Moderator)

The first session that preceded the simulation exercise was based on a thorough exploration of the situation in Kosovo and the neighbouring countries. Kneissl described the stages of the conflict by presenting a chronological timeline of key events since 1999. The protectorate's precarious position in the European and international arenas, the role of international organizations (EU, NATO, OSCE, UNMIK) in Kosovo, and future prospects were also deeply discussed.

The simulation exercise revolved around a crisis situation in which the two antagonistic parties, Serbians and Albanians, were heavily fighting. Resolution 1244 of the Security Council, was at stake. The role of international organizations, mainly UNMIK, was jeopardized. In sum, there was a general fear that the crisis would irreversibly degenerate. Internal and external parties apprehended a replay of tragic confrontations and large-scale killings.

The aim of the simulated negotiations was to come up with an agreement among conflicting parties under international auspices. The agreement should presumably end terror and draw the premises of an eventual road map.

The negotiations included representatives from the following parties: the government of Serbia and Montenegro, the government of Kosovo (Ibrahim Rugova), the Russian federation, the American government, the hosting German government, UNMIK, EU, NATO, and OSCE.

After two hours of intense negotiations, a final agreement was reached. The contracting parties agreed on an immediate cease-fire involving all paramilitary forces in Kosovo and neighbouring countries. Security measures were ensured by NATO, KFOR, and the EU task force. The parties also agreed to ban all KLA forces both in Kosovo and surrounding countries. A federation encompassing three federal equal entities (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo) would be established. It was proposed that the federation adopts the Belgian model. An interim period of six months would pave the way for the new state's "Serious Self-rule." Specific provisions and details would be worked out by the parliaments in cooperation with experts from Belgium and other federations such as Switzerland.
The three organizations, EU, UNMIK, and OSCE, declared to be fully in support of the proposed road map, which should ultimately bring about stability and sovereignty. The UN-SC resolution 1244(1999) was considered to be the main legal framework for the division of labour among the involved international parties. NATO and EU perspectives for the federation would be thoroughly elaborated within a feasibility study to be conducted under the auspices of these organizations.

Moreover, the contracting parties stressed the vital return of refugees and internally displaced persons. This process would be enhanced and speeded up under the supervision of OSCE and UNMIK. Last, perspectives of economic consolidation in the region would be carried as foreseen by the South European Stability Pact.

UN conference on the conflict in Cyprus: integration or separation

Dr. Heribert Weiland
Associate professor, University of Freiburg, and Executive Secretary, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute
(Moderator)

The introductory session highlighted the multidimensional ethnic conflict in Cyprus, the history of partition, the political landscape of the conflict, the Greek Cypriots' and Turkish Cypriots' perspectives and expectations. Then, the involvement of the European Union, and the plan of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan which proposes to revive power-sharing in Cyprus were thoroughly discussed.

Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of the consociational model in Cyprus, and the prospects of international relations were tackled. An important consideration is whether it is possible to introduce a strictly consociational model when a balance of power between the two groups is inexistential. While the Greek Cypriots represent 80% of the population, the Cypriot Turks have the status of a minority.

The main theme of the simulation exercise was to negotiate whether a federation or a confederation would be the most suitable model for Cyprus.

The simulated UN conference on the Cypriot conflict included the following international representatives: Kofi Annan (UN Secretary General), Günter Verheugen (EU commissioner for the EU enlargement), Abdullah Gül (Turkish Foreign Minister),
Georgios Papandreaou (Greek Foreign Minister), Condoleezza Rice (US National Security Advisor), and Jack Straw (British Foreign Minister).

Cypriot representatives were divided into two categories:

- The Greek-Cypriot representatives including Tassos Papadopoulos (President of the Republic Cyprus), Glafcos Klerides (Former President of Cyprus and advisor of the current President), and Konstatinos karamanlis (Opposition Leader)

- The Turkish-Cypriot representatives including Rauf Denktas (President of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus), Mehmet Ali Talat (Opposition leader of the Republican Turkish party), and Ali Erel (Chairman of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and Leader of the Solution and EU party-SEUP).

For more than two hours, the participants have discussed the prospects for integration or separation in Cyprus. In-depth negotiations tackled the chances of success and failure of the two proposed models. The representatives of Northern Cyprus (Mehmet Ali Talat and Ali Erel) supported the Annan Plan while the Greek Cypriots namely President Tassos Papadopoulos were very reluctant in accepting consociational privileges for the Turkish minority.

At the end of the negotiations, the President of the Turkish Republic, Rauf Denktas, refused categorically the plan. He expressed his total opposition to any federal model, and argued that history had proven that confederation would be the most suitable political arrangement for a conflict-free Cyprus.
Epilogue

Evaluation session

Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf
(Moderator)

After this quasi-global survey of conflicts, what lessons could be drawn?

The Autumn School studied a wide spectrum of ethnic conflicts with different connotations and outcomes. Thus, there are the unmitigated conflicts as in Sri Lanka, the frozen conflicts as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, conflicts which foreshadow a positive development (India, Indonesia ...). History also demonstrates that formerly embattled regions can become ideal examples of cross-border cooperation (Germany and France). The Belgian case can be regarded as one of the best cases of power-sharing tackled in the "Autumn School."

The conference also dealt with examples of power-sharing with controversial results. The pre-war power-sharing system in Lebanon, for instance, performed well until external threats hastened the breakdown of the state.

Furthermore, the conference tackled a number of conflicts which have been managed in the framework of open democracies. These cases can be interpreted from different angles. Thus, the Namibian and the South African cases have both negative and positive implications. The Latin American example remains an inimitable exception.

After this survey of ethnic conflicts, is it possible to infer some possible recommendations or conclusions?

We must be careful in drawing normative conclusions. All sorts of conflict-regulating techniques remain frail. The possibility of breakdown is always present. Any ethnic group can be transformed into "a bloody machine." One also remarks that conflicts involving emigrants are difficult to be solved. Nevertheless, positive cases remind us that chances of success remain indeed considerable.

Power-sharing is not the panacea for every conflict. Imposed power-sharing agreements like Dayton involve many risks and delay a real settlement.

Various cases have shown that conflict-regulation is possible within the mould of an open democracy. A unitary government with decentralized competences may mitigate the conflict and promote chances of peace and stability.
Indicators also show that conflict-regulation is easier if the environment is friendly and not hostile. Conflict regulation seems also easier when the entity is large and can swallow and defuse ethno-religious conflicts. Concerning the origins of conflicts, it is noticeable that the majority of cases could be related to the dislocation of empires.

Conflict-regulation recounts various experiences ranging from democratic multiculturalism based on bargain, trade-offs, to step-by-step processes.

Although these results are not new, the scholarly challenge is to collect more empirical cases to confirm or reject hypotheses.

Several normative questions can be asked and pondered on.

- What is the relation between individual rights, and the rights of difference within ethnic groups?
- How well can a system which guarantees human rights and cultural associations perform? Is it sufficient to create a system which prevents the outbreak of ethnic conflicts?
- Are new rights needed when human rights prove to be insufficient?

In the future, globalisation is likely to lead to more plurality. The next world order is thus doomed to an ever-increasing multiculturalism. Can we come to grips with higher degrees of plurality without creating new complementary measures?

The 20th century clearly unveiled the negative connotations that lurk beneath the concept of the nation. This ideal of a group of people of the same breed, does it really stand?

In fact, what we need is not nation-building but effective state-building. We are faced with the necessity of organizing coexistence of groups within coexisting frameworks, and the necessity of rescuing the concept of the state from "zoological" definitions of citizenship.

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