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**Lettres de Byblos**  
**Letters from Byblos**

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No. 16

**OMAR CHATAH AND RANDY NAHLE**  
With a Contribution by Peter Molt

**Exploring Factors  
Conducive to Democratic Conflict Regulation**

A Conference Report

Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme  
International Centre for Human Sciences

RES GERENDAE & Arnold Bergstraesser Institut &  
HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION

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## **Lettres de Byblos / Letters from Byblos**

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The following is a report of presentations given at the conference “Exploring Factors Conducive to Democratic Conflict Regulation” held between 10 to 14 November 2006 at the International Centre for Human Sciences. It was organised in cooperation with Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, AUB’s Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, Heinrich Böll Foundation and Forschungsstelle *RES GERENDAE*, and under the patronage of H. E. Dr. Tarek Mitri, Minister of Culture



# **PART I**

## **Interpreting the Nature of Conflicts**

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## Panel on Southern Africa

PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE (Chair)

PETER GASTROW

VALERIE MØLLER

BEATRICE SCHLEE

HERIBERT WEILAND

### South Africa

VALERIE MØLLER AND PETER GASTROW

In this first lecture Peter Gastrow and Valerie Møller presented a background of post-apartheid South Africa's political and economic history and analyzed their impact on current and potential conflict lines.

Gastrow began the lecture optimistically stating that 65% of the country feels that the country has generally moved in the right direction. Conflict lines were identified as both economic success and wealth gaps. The economic success of a relatively few number of blacks has fomented a sense of resentment among poor blacks that the newly rich black elites are benefiting at the poor's expense. Wealth gaps that have resulted from economic growth in recent years have added to tensions.

Gastrow noted that the economic growth in recent years has affected both whites' and blacks' prospects for the future of South Africa. Following the "honeymoon" period after the fall of apartheid, white optimism declined while blacks became more optimistic about the future. With economic growth in recent years the opposite has occurred. He cites that only 31% of blacks are satisfied with governments' efforts to bridge the economic gap, a 7% fall over the previous year.

Individuals, organizations, political parties, and religious groups are feeding off these divisions. The two mindsets that are competing today politically are those of Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki. Zuma represents the mindset of rural black South Africans while Mbeki represents a Western orientation, is program-driven, and envisions a modern, industrialized future for South Africa.

Gastrow believes that race in politics will become an increasing factor unless more sophisticated actors get involved. The African National Congress (ANC) made serious strategic mistakes in recent years among which alienated the majority colored groups. By shaping itself into a colored party with unsophisticated leadership it is feared that race will become a more important cleavage as it will be used politically.

Valerie Møller contends that South Africans have been obsessed with race for well over a decade and that in recent years the economic divide between rich and poor has trumped all other cleavages. In addition, voting patterns and party politics have become increasingly about material self-interest and loyalty to the group, rather than platform. In addition due to legal color coding, socioeconomic cleavages are increasingly imbued with race.

In a 2002 Democracy Study that Theodore Hanf conducted we asked people about major divisions in society. The result was that people are most concerned with the divide between rich and poor. This is great progress in a country previously under apartheid and that their democratic transition was peaceful. It appears that South Africans are indifferent whether the wealthy are white or black but that they can benefit from the spoils of democracy (e.g. housing, jobs, social security, infrastructure, water, and electricity).

Material self-interest has also become more prevalent in South African democracy as individuals are strategically voting for the party that will give them the spoils of winning office. Møller cites that 40% of South Africans would still vote for the ANC even if it performs the reverse of their will.

In recent years the GINI coefficient for South Africa has increased 20% from 0.53 to 0.64

Although South Africa portrays itself as a non-racial, non-sexist, and secular society, legal involvement of race in the workplace is frequent. A brief example was given by Møller where in her University a racial profile is required of its employees, which is submitted to the Department of Labor which makes judgments on whether the profile reflects South African demographics.

## Zimbabwe

BEATRICE SCHLEE

Schlee began her lecture stating that there are no real conflict lines in Zimbabwe and that the main instigator of social division is the ruling government of Robert Mugabe. The main conflict line that has emerged is between supporters of the ruling party and the general public. According to Schlee the general population blames the ruling government for economic decline which is fueling both political violence and social

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unrest. Economic decline is also disrupting the democratic process causing people to support any organization that ensures their personal interest as well as leading to social unrest. Institutions and Civil Society organizations have found this environment very difficult to operate in and are also in opposition to the ruling government.

Considering traditional conflict lines there is no reason for conflict in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, a net of conflict lines are emerging pitting the general population against the ruling party of Robert Mugabe. Political opponents of Mugabe are frequently assassinated and demonstrations are frequently broken up by force. Inter-party violence is also common leading to conflicts and splits between opposition parties. There is fear in Zimbabwe of the possibility of civil war.

According to Schlee, economic decline is fueling social tensions and doubts the extent to which the ruling government is trying to address economic decline. 80% of the population lives below the poverty line, 80% is unemployed, and there is near 1,000% inflation.

Schlee contends that these stark economic figures are disrupting democratic practice and creating social unrest in Zimbabwe. Indeed, inter-family conflicts are widespread, women are getting physically attacked, marital rape is common, and economic frustration is generally being vented out through family violence.

Institutions and civil society organizations have found this environment difficult to work in. In addition to social unrest, the Mugabe government is attempting to pass a law prohibiting foreign funding for human-rights civil society organizations.

In sum, Schlee contends that the Zimbabwean government is the main actor and producer of fault lines. Economic decline whether intended or deliberately ignored, is fueling political violence and social unrest. Consequently Zimbabwe faces fragmented political parties, people, and civil society.

## Namibia

HERIBERT WEILAND

Weiland's lecture on Namibia presented one of sub-Saharan Africa's more successful stories. He began with a brief background of Namibia's short history as an independent country, articulated three conflict lines in Namibian society, its relation to the international economy and donors, and analysis.

Namibia was granted independence in 1989 from South Africa. It had previously been part of South Africa as a 5<sup>th</sup> province. Namibian independence was also the starting point of reform for the rest of South Africa. Consequently the two countries share strong relations. It is a very territorially large country with a relatively small popu-

lation, which Weiland believes mitigates tension in society. Economically the Namibian economy is well relatively well-off exporting fish, gas, and jewelry. It is also a large recipient of foreign aid. The brief liberation war that brought Namibia into existence today was eventually solved by international interference, and yet today the country is peaceful.

Although Weiland contends that the process of nation-building was successful in Namibia, conflict lines are emerging.

### Race

The old colonial legacy of race-relations is still present in Namibia although a peaceful white-black arrangement exists. The Namibia Accord and United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 ensured that Namibia got a democratic constitution and what Weiland describes as the most democratic in Africa. The Namibia Accord was a compromise agreement that ensured whites keep their predominant economic position but ceded political power to blacks. The combination of both wide economic disparities with race relations bears resemblance to South Africa however it appears to be somewhat more benign in Namibia.

### Ethnic Groups

Weiland identified ethnic relations between others groups as another source of potential division. The Owambo ethnic category constitutes 60% of the population in Namibia. They have fought a liberation war in Angola. They also occupy 90% of all government positions. The Herero however constitute the rest of the population and are active in society because of the high educational level they received during the colonial period.

### Economic

Economic disparity is wide in Namibia due to the emergence of a new, black, bourgeoisie. Like South Africa, these black millionaires constitute a minority of the population (10~15% in Namibia) and this economic categorization has become divisive. Unlike South Africa however, Weiland pointed out that the economic disparity is softened by attention paid to each pensioner given that the country's population is so small. Weiland warns that this fault line can become more important in the future if extreme poverty continues to climb.

Nicknamed the “blue-eyed boy of the international donor community”, Namibia is a destination international donors like traveling to. Although Weiland concedes that the country is over-funded and over-aided, he also believes that it is for that reason conflict is not emerging in Namibia so intensively.

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In conclusion, Namibia is unlikely to face conflict in the near future because of a relatively well-off economy, relatively dormant or mild conflict lines, and a great deal of international assistance.

## Panel on Lebanon

SALIM NASR (Chair)

AHMAD BEYDOUN

BOUTROS LABAKI

RICHARD AUGUSTUS NORTON

FAWAZ TRABOULSI

SALIM NASR

Nasr opened the panel on Lebanon with a brief overview of where Lebanon stands today politically. At the time of his lecture the major Lebanese political actors were engaging in “national dialogue” talks which later showed to be fruitless. He identified several overlapping layers of conflict that are overarched by two larger conflicts: external conflict played out through Lebanon and conflict between Lebanese actors. A few of the overlapping layers Nasr identified were: Majoritarian versus consociational systems, tension between the State and “resistance”, Lebanon’s foreign policy, and a conflict of social values. He closed his lecture expressing the possibility of a package deal that will encompass all sides concerns’ or the possibility of an open crisis with no definite end in sight.

AHMAD BEYDOUN

“You [Lebanese] are in a situation of catastrophic equality.”  
*Regis Debray*

Beydoun began his description of Lebanon’s political development by stating that the country’s political order is the reverse of what is observed in other multicultural societies. While in other societies the idea is to impede discrimination against individuals due to race, in Lebanon there is systematic discrimination against the individual despite merit. Consensus among groups is mutually understood as a central part of Lebanon’s political system. Consequently Beydoun states that arbitration is a cultural

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prerequisite and that each community has developed ways to cope with sensitive issues that have been vetoed by other communities. His lecture focuses on how the cultural of arbitration and adaptations to community veto developed.

Consensus was practiced during the Ottoman *maqam* era. Two councils for each maqam had to take decisions consensually. If consensus was not possible an arbiter was named (typically the wali of Saida). In 1861, the mutassarrif replaced the maqam.

During the Mandate era, the French High commissioner (1926 - 1943) assumed the role of neutral arbiter. His exorbitant privileges gave him the power to suspend cabinet, parliament, and president. With the strength of the French armed forces backing him, he could put an end to conflict through draconian measures.

Post-independence Lebanon was the only period during 160 years of the consensual system where arbitration was internal. The President, a position granted to the Maronite Christian community, was given the role of highest arbiter between political actors. He designated ministers, Prime Minister (following parliamentary consultations), requested their resignations, and was considered the supreme commander of the Army.

The legal factors that granted the President the role of highest arbiter prior to 1975 were inherited from Mandate period and rule of the French High commissioner. At the time of independence, the Maronite community was the largest and most economically active community. The Shi'ites had not developed political or communal institutions representing them and therefore managed by personalities who were part of the establishment. It was these social factors that were the basis for granting the Presidency to the Maronite community to guard against Sunni challenges and maintain overall stability.

Beydoun described the post-Civil War era (1990-2005) as a system of “tutelage”. For 15 years Syria chose a representative in the country who was designed the role of highest arbiter. The powers of the President were scaled back, as he was no longer allowed to dissolve parliament. The speaker of Parliament and Parliament became coeval and conflicts were somewhat allowed to be played out locally with final word lay with Syria.

Today, no one person or community is given the role of arbiter. Beydoun described this system as one of “blockage”. No community today accepts being led by the representative of another or subordinate itself to the hegemony of another community. In conclusion, arbitration in Lebanon has developed to be between community representatives (instead of internal or external personalities) and community veto is widely practiced, resulting in the system of blockage that exists today.

### BOUTROS LABAKI

In his lecture Labaki argued that conflicts in Lebanon ultimately resulted in foreign-backed internal parties and that the civil war (1975-1990). Labaki characterized the civil war as a mixture of civil and proxy wars. He began his lecture by operationalizing conflict according to geography and identified three types: International, Regional, and Local conflict. He limited his historical scope to between 1965 and the present. 1965 was chosen because it marked the first PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) attack against Israel from Lebanese soil.

Conflict in Lebanon first ought to be put into its international context. The two sub-periods of conflict on the international arena between 1965-1990 was the period of Cold War (1965-1990) and US multilateralism (1990-present). While during the Cold War international powers took sides in internal Lebanese conflict, direct international intervention began in 1988 with the Murphy-Assad agreement. Later in 1990, the United States would grant a green light for Syria to control Lebanon. Only very recently has the international community pushed for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (USCR 1559, SALSA Act, USCR 1701, etc.).

Regional conflict was also taking place during this period. Conflict between Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt with the Baath Party, the PLO, and Jordan was rife between 1965 and his death. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and Iran entered the Lebanese political scene. In brief, prior to 1970 Lebanon was a support state in Nasser's regional framework, between 1970-1974 Lebanon became a confrontation state with the "West", and after 1974 it became the only confrontation state.

Locally, conflict was ripe for economic, political, and social reasons. Economic development was unbalanced and rapid during the period between 1965-1975 Political autonomy was effectively granted to each community especially regarding personal status laws, contributing to division in the country. Finally, the combined processes of economic growth, migration, urbanization, and state intervention into the economy tried to restructure and liberalize society which was dominated by confessional leaders and families dominating particular confessional groups.

Labaki credits the combination of these three processes for the reason Lebanon today is configured the way it is.

### RICHARD NORTON

Norton's lecture attempted to explain why sectarianism in Lebanon has become a heightened phenomenon during the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Lebanon. He outlines four reasons: the phenomenon of homogenization, economic stagnation, bloated government bureaucracy, and the role of foreign actors. He concluded by calling out urgently for a serious apparatus of national reconciliation if Lebanon is to continue to exist.

Prior to the civil war (1975-1990) religious heterogeneity was much more heightened than it is today. Different religious sects lived in the same neighborhoods in

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relative coexistence. During the period of the civil war and afterwards displacement led to the homogenization of neighborhoods and parts of the country resulting in the homogenous communities in which each sect lives in today. Norton gave the example of the Hamra neighborhood in Beirut, which was the cosmopolitan and economic hub of the city. Today it is a predominantly Sunni Muslim neighborhood with far less Christians than before.

Despite the brief boom following the civil war, low growth, high unemployment rate, and a huge debt has characterized the Lebanese economy over the past 16 years

Adding to this economic stagnation, government bureaucracy is bloated and shows no sign of serious adjustment. Norton noted during the lecture that from the pre-civil war period to now population has grown by 60% while the size of government has increased by 250%.

Foreign actors have had a tremendous impact on the level of sectarianism in the country in the form of creating different histories among different sects. Most recently the war between Hezbollah and Israel subjected predominantly Shi'ite Lebanese to the brunt of Israeli attack. While Israel spared most other Lebanese from destruction, Shi'ite areas south of Beirut and in the southern part of the country were subjected to continuous bombardment exacerbating their feeling of victimization and hatred towards Israel. In addition, for 15 years following the end of the civil war and before, Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics has continuously pitted groups against one another.

Today, Lebanon's disparate groups are continuously competing with one another and within themselves as well. Norton noted that in 1993 the director of Al Manar TV was fired because his moderate articles on the religious holiday of Ashoura threatened the position of Hassan Fadlallah, although their views were similar. For any of this conflict to end, Norton feels that a serious apparatus of national reconciliation must take place.

#### FAWAZ TRABOULSI

Fawaz Traboulsi contests that sectarianism in Lebanon is a recent phenomenon and that there are two general cleavages: social and sectarian. In Lebanon however, sectarian divisions are used in the reproduction of social and consequently economic cleavages.

Traboulsi contends that sectarianism, as a form of clientelism, interferes in the distribution of work and education. Resources are allocated according to sectarian considerations. As a result, the unwillingness to contend with economic and social problems (as in 1968 - 1975) has to do with the heightened sectarian tensions resulting from the displacement of people. Traboulsi gave the example of youth mi-

gration and other vital economic issues that are not being discussed by politicians, who are instead focused on exercising veto power in the executive (Cabinet). According to proponents of exercising veto power in the cabinet, Parliament is no longer a forum for discussion, rather the Cabinet.

According to Traboulsi, the notion of an external arbiter to balance political situations is an illusion. Rather, sectarianism itself is the generator of conflict. He contends that rather than institutionalizing sectarianism, it ought to be dealt with indirectly in order to promote more political and legal equality for Lebanese.

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## Panel on Sub-Saharan Africa

HERIBERT WEILAND (Chair)

HELGA DICKOW

KATHARINA HOFER

PETER MOLT

MANFRED ÖHM

### Chad

HELGA DICKOW:

"I would like to argue that Chad is a victim of its history as well as its location and that all cleavages which we encounter in present-day Chad derive from that," declared Helga Dickow at the start of her lecture, later exploring 5 related themes and periods of history.

### Arab Muslim North and African Christian South

Dickow pointed out that Chad is positioned at the border between the Arab and African world in Sub-Saharan Africa and that this cleavage played a dominant role even in pre-colonial times. The inhabitants of the North were composed of nomadic tribes or, at least, the ruling elites from the sultanates who had converted to Islam since the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> century, as well as migrants from the Arab peninsula. The Northerners made their living off of trade across the Sahara, and this included trading in slaves. The Northerners hunted for their goods in the South, inhabited by African sedentary farming tribes. Dickow told the audience of a custom, which the Southerners had developed, consisting of placing discs in women's mouths to make them look ugly. This would protect women against the slave hunters, and even today, some very old women still have discs in their mouths. Evidently, this historical cleavage has left a mark on the ethnic groups, which number around 200 in Chad.

## Colonial Rule

Dickow then discussed the effects of French colonialism, which started relatively late, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The French settled in the fertile South and grew cotton there, while developing the infrastructure. Due to the great richness of Southern Chad in both soil and human resources (used for labor and for war), the French called it "le Tchad utile". It was in this part of the country that the French school system was established and missionary activity among the ethnic groups was supported. Converting to Christianity, learning French, and undergoing the French school system were a way for indigenous groups to achieve a modest rise (success) in the colonial system. The ones to adapt best to this system were the Sara, who constituted the largest ethnic group in the South, and continue in the present day to be over-represented in the civil service and among people with a higher level of education. The North's hot climate and more militant Muslim population proved inhospitable to the French. The Northerners refused to introduce the French school system and held onto their "Koran schools". The French decided to leave them alone as long as they paid taxes and did not threaten colonial power. Thus, at the end of the colonial period, there was a developed South and an underdeveloped North. Dickow added that the label "South" also covered the West of the country, while "North" included the East.

## Independence until the Present Day

Dickow then described historical developments in Chad after it took its independence. In 1960, Ngarta Tombalbaye, a Sara from the South, became the first president of independent Chad. Muslim politicians were equally represented in parliament, but post-colonial democracy did not last for more than one year. Tombalbaye banned all political parties but his own party and arrested political leaders. Chad became a single-party state. The 1970's brought with it Tombalbaye's "cultural and social revolution", which he called "Chaditude", modeled on Mobutu's movement in Zaire. He forced all people to undergo the initiation rites of ethnic groups in the South. The Northerners, as well as some people from the South, opposed and tried to resist Tombalbaye's control. Chad subsequently fell into a civil war, which ended in the mid-1980s.

Tombalbaye was assassinated in 1975. Fighting took place between different factions of Northerners and Southerners, with coalitions changing and different neighbouring countries supporting various local actors for different interests, e.g. Libya's Qaddafi who supported the faction which ensured his access to the mineral-rich Azouzou strip at the Libya-Chad border. In 1982, Habré, a Muslim supported by Sudan, took power, while the French watched on tolerantly, and established a repressive regime. However, in 1990, Idriss Deby, Habré's former comrade, overthrew the government. Habré took flight, and France did not intervene. It must be remembered that France had and still has a military base in Chad.

Dickow remarked that hopes for democracy were high but were soon dashed, as Deby's initial drive towards a multi-party democracy abruptly halted with his pursuit of

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a 3<sup>rd</sup> term in office, following a constitutional amendment in 2005. He was re-elected in May 2006, and elections were said to be rigged. Deby continues to ensure his power by military oppression. The armed forces mainly consist of people close to him. Although Chad is ruled by a leader from the North, there are some ministers from the South, but they do not occupy top positions. Up to 2003, Deby even followed the principle of "geopolitics", i.e. if the President is from the North, the Prime Minister should be from the South. Civil society and opposition are weak, and most politicians were at one point or another co-opted by Deby so that there now remain hardly any credible political leaders. Dickow cited Ibni Oumar, from the North, as an exception.

Militia and rebel groups have thrived in the North, and their main goal is to weaken the present government. For this, they receive support from ex-presidents in exile. Until lately, they did not pose a real threat to Deby. However, in April 2006, a rebel group called the United Front for Democratic Change (FUC) marched as far as N'Djamena but was defeated by the Chadian army, with the logistic support of French troops. The rains stopped the fights, but in October, a cluster of different rebel groups conquered some cities in the East on the Sudanese border and then withdrew. It must be noted that rebel groups tend to be more and more organized along ethnic lines. Unlike other rebellions, the ones this year and an attempt at a palace revolution in May 2004 were staged by people close to him, former ministers or even people from his own family. Dickow concluded that a clear breakdown of the inner circle of power was taking place in Chad.

### Darfur

Dickow briefly touched upon the crisis in Darfur, because of the important role that this border region has always played in inner Chadian politics. Since 2002, the Janjawid militias, supported by the Sudanese government, launched a genocide against the sedentary ethnic groups in Darfur, on the border with Chad. The targeted ethnic group, Zaghawa, is also President Deby's ethnic group. Refugees flowed in, destabilizing the extremely deprived region. Then, opposition groups started using the area to launch attacks and thus threatened the regime in N'Djamena.

As the fighting drags on, the exchanged recriminations between the regimes of Chad and Sudan are getting more intense. Each government accuses the other of supporting the rebels on the other side of the border. It wasn't until August 2006 that both countries resumed normal diplomatic relations. The crisis in Darfur is of great importance, because it could lead to the destabilization of the whole region. Not only is it a humanitarian catastrophe, but it has major political implications due to the fact that it is located in an oil-rich zone, under strong international influence.

### **Oil, World Bank, and China**

Chad is a newcomer to oil politics. It became an oil-producing country in 2003, thanks to a loan from the World Bank, in exchange for a promise to use oil revenues to fight poverty and to increase education, development, and health. President Deby cancelled this commitment in December 2005. When the World Bank stopped its payments, Deby threatened to cut off the oil supply. It is said that the United States forced the World Bank to give in. Chad can now use its oil revenues to buy weapons. The international community, especially the United States, became more and more concerned and nervous about China's involvement in Africa. China has signed oil prospecting contracts with Sudan and also some in Chad. "And to pour oil into the water," Dickow said, "Deby has resigned long-term collaboration with Taiwan in August 2006 and reopened diplomatic relations with China! It is no longer only France that has a strategic interest in the country."

Dickow concluded: "we see in Chad an old North-South cleavage, which is manipulated by politicians, the cleavage between Arab and African ethnic groups, the cleavage between Christians and Muslims, between democrats and non-democrats, and between the political power and rebels who partly belonged to the present system. There is a fight for resources, mainly oil, both nationally and internationally, and a destabilizing civil war on both sides of the Sudanese border and - last but not least - a leader who is prepared to sacrifice the peace in his country, who knows very well how to use the international political split, the hunger for oil, in order to stay in power and who is supported by the former colonial power.

### **Nigeria**

KATHARINA HOFER

I will talk about central Nigeria, the so called Middle Belt of Nigeria, where I conducted field work on Christian-Muslim relations and their impact on economic integration. But today, I will talk about inter-communal conflicts in the area. Let me start with a few general remarks on Nigeria.

#### **History of military coups**

As you all know, Nigeria has a history of consecutive military coups. The current president, Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn into office in 1999, after he emerged as winner in the first democratic elections facilitated by the Abacha/Abubakar military regime (Obasanjo himself had participated in the Abacha military coup in 1993, following the annulment of the 1993 elections by the Nigerian armed forces - according to a number of domestic and foreign observers the only free and fair elections ever

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held in post-independence Nigeria); Obasanjo was confirmed as president in the 2003 national presidential elections which according to EU election observers showed significant irregularities; in 2006, former military leader and vice president Abdulsalami Abubakar took lead in averting a constitutional review allowing the current president to run for a third term. Nigeria is still in the midst of a transitional process and it is not clear at this stage whether a genuine democratic system can take root.

The long-term effects of decades of military rule have a practical dimension - a high number of demobilised soldiers and paramilitaries who were trained by local politicians and businessmen for personal protection, the prevalence of civil defence forces, the wide availability of small fire arms and of army and police uniforms; and a psychological dimension - high incidence of violent crimes, poor skills of social communication and of peaceful conflict resolution, and a tendency towards counter aggression as defence strategy. All of these factors contribute to make Nigeria vulnerable to violent conflicts.

### History of civil war and communal clashes

Nigeria has a history of internal violence, ranging from the Biafran civil war (1967-70) to the so called "communal clashes" that have become endemic in various parts the country. The international media has drawn attention to the Niger Delta, which is a permanent site of violent clashes among and between militant youth gangs and police over the Delta's share in Nigeria's oil wealth; and, in recent years, to clashes over the introduction of Sharia law in several northern states. The tensions between Nigerian Muslims and non-Muslims however predate the introduction of Sharia law in the year 2000.

### Shift from ethnic to religious conflicts

In the 1980s, religious conflicts occurred exclusively in urban areas and in conjunction with deliberate agitation: examples include the Maitatsine riots (Maitatsine is radical Islamic group that was responsible for violence within the Muslim community in the 1980s; today the name is associated with youth gangs); the Bonnke riots (Reinhard Bonnke is an int. Pentecostal preacher; violence erupted when local Christian groups began to promote his visit to Kano in a manner that was perceived as highly provocative by Muslims); the clashes following public testimonies of converts or symbolic acts of destruction etc. (mocking of Quran, destruction of cross in university chapel etc.); their spread coincides with the growth of religious reform movements, both Christian and Islamic.

Rural clashes were almost always related to disputes over water access and land, and usually involved Fulani herdsman and local farmers of Christian and animist backgrounds, it had no religious dimension whatsoever. Conflicts were primarily related to civil rights issues, namely the question of whether people belonged to an

indigenous tribe and therefore were legitimate landowners and thus rulers over the “law of the land”, or whether they were aliens who would be tolerated at their hosts’ discretion, yet without becoming public shareholders.

In recent years, communal clashes in rural areas have increasingly taken on a religious dimension. Since the mid to late 1980s, following growing incidences of urban riots along religious lines, retaliation has become a strong motivation to engage in violence even on the countryside (this mechanism draws on a pattern that emerged under military rule: alien intruders create chaos, then local leaders blame the attacks on their political enemies).

On the discursive level, ethnic or cultural factors, the lifestyles for instance of the traditionally semi-nomadic Hausa-Fulani are brought into a religious context: “the Hausas don’t know where they come from; if you ask them where their grandparents were born, they won’t know it. It is because they have no home that they spread all over the country and also that they have to link everything to their religion, because their religion is all they have.” (interview with a pastor, Jos, December 2005). (> The Hausa settlers in the Middle Belt would certainly agree that their primary identity is of a religious nature; in conjunction with the introduction of Sharia law, Hausa-Muslims would stress that Islam is a holistic religion, integrative of the whole person and rejecting any separation of religious and secular spheres).

## Conflict factors

### 1. Historical dimension

In the pre-colonial period, the southern neighbours of the northern Hausa states were targets of slave raids; this practice continued, actually increased in the 19th century, the era of the Sokoto Caliphate; in the colonial period, the British sought to establish indirect rule through the traditional system of Hausa polities (Emirates), and extended their sphere of power far to the south where Christian missionaries had not yet established any viable church structures and where local political organisation could not meet the administrative demands of a modern tin mining industry as in Plateau State; so again, the dominance of the north was felt in conjunction with economic exploitation.

Fear of domination and grievances are a major force behind the demands for a privileged treatment of local ethnicities in the Middle Belt region (Note: not only Hausa Northerners, but also Southerners, like the Ibo, Idoma or Tiv, most of whom are Christians, complain about discrimination in Central Nigeria; in Jos, few non-indigenes hold leadership positions in politics, in the administration, in church councils or businesses. However, violence along religious lines, as in Jos in the year 2001, has had the effect of translating general xenophobia and fear of northern domination into religious resentments).

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## 2. Traditional rulers

Traditional rulers are recognised by the constitution even though they are not democratically elected. It is unclear what political tasks traditional chiefs actually have, beyond that of symbolic representation of their tribes. There are no limitations to individuals holding parallel offices as democratically elected political representatives and as traditional chiefs (the governor of Plateau State, Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye, is a case in point). Politicians everywhere in Nigeria proudly present themselves in full gear as traditional chiefs not only at cultural festivals but also at local and national political events; it is part and parcel of securing popular support. Traditional rulers play a major role in the functioning of Nigerian politics along ethnic and religious lines.

## 3. Trimming of the state apparatus/anti-corruption policies

SAP measures implemented by the federal government arrived in central Nigeria in 2000 (i.e. one year after the President was sworn into office and one year before the crisis); the economy has been growing since, tax revenues have quadrupled since 1999; at the same time, unemployment reached an unprecedented level in 2000/01. Christians and Muslims held each other responsible for the job crisis, the Christians decrying the influx of “foreigners” that are stealing their jobs, and the Muslims complaining about discrimination in public employment policies. SAP was also accompanied by anti-corruption policies that targeted networks of corruption among the political, economic and religious elites, and thus brought local politicians and their ethnic and religious allies under pressure.

## Conclusion

The introduction of Sharia law in the North is not the trigger of current inter-religious tensions, but rather one of its manifestations. The following factors are contributing to the shift from ethnic to religious conflicts: Divisive religious agitation by leaders of Islamic and Christian reform and revival groups have been exploited by ill-equipped politicians to maintain control amidst political challenges and corruption charges; traditional rulers have been employed for the same purpose, a move that is being made possible by the ambiguity of constitutional provisions (NB constitutional loop-holes were also exploited for the introduction of Sharia in the North); decades of military rule held up necessary constitutional reforms, and are also responsible for the militarization of society at large; past victimization is successfully exploited to channel resentments in the direction of political rivals.

## Sudan: The Nature of the Conflicts

MANFRED ÖHM

Manfred Öhm characterised Sudan as a state of many peoples, with more than 100 ethnic groups and more than 100 language groups. The assumed population size is about 36 million, thereof 10-12 million South Sudanese, 6 million Darfuris. About 6 million people are Internally Displaced People (IDP); approximately 70% are living below the poverty line.

The economy can be described as a rent seeking economy, while the state is in many respects a fragile state. The post colonial state has never been accepted by the Sudanese.

Öhm asked rhetorically: Which conflict to talk about? About the predominant North - South Conflict in Sudan, the Darfur crises and the Western Sudanese conflict system or the Eastern Sudanese conflict which is linked to the Ethiopian Eritrean conflict, or about the crises of the political system and the rise of political Islam?

All the regional conflicts are linked to the crises of the political system, thus the main conflict lines should be identified. However, it will impossible to talk about the details of the different - recent and ongoing- peace processes of Sudan.

To understand the different conflicts of the Sudan, it is crucial to understand the nature of the Sudanese regime, Öhm explained. Since independence Sudan has been ruled by members of three Northern clans: the Sha'iqiyya, the Danaqla, and the Ja'aliyyin. Although there has been a debate, whether Sudan should have a secular or an Islamic constitution, there was no doubt that the ruling elite came from these clans and the ruling parties from the so called Islamic bloc, comprising the traditional sectarian parties of the Umma and the Khatmiyya, and the National Islamic Front that has been linked to the Muslim Brothers. Even during the short socialist period of Numeiri, the country has been ruled by Northerners.

All governments since independence were neglecting the provinces, particularly the South. Against that background, the current Sudanese regime is just a specific form of the Northern regimes since independence. Since independence there has never been any inclusive approach of nation-building, only exclusivist regimes. The current military regime that came to power in 1989 is simply the most brutal and ruthless of all, otherwise it continued the policies of divide and rule, and it has intensified the use of mercenaries and militias against regional resistance. It has come to power with the ideology of a salvation revolution. Because revolution has obviously failed, its only pillars of power that remain are the state security system and the enormous corruption.

When elaborating on the nature of the North - South conflict, Öhm made it clear, that South Sudan had been systematically excluded from economic and political development during the colonial era, and since independence. This is the main

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explanation for the extremely long civil war ('55-'72 and '83 to 2005). The North - South conflict is about religion, it is of course about the resources of oil and water, but it is mainly about cultural cleavages and race, and about different languages. While there are these different explanations and dimensions of conflict, when you ask a Southerner about a Northerner, he will refer to the Arabs or Jelaba, but not to the Muslim. In the same way, the Northerners refer to the Jenubin (Southerners), and not to the Christians.

Öhm went into some details to explain the Intra-Southern conflicts, which have been overlapping with the North - South conflict: The competition among different ethnic groups about the power in South Sudan, and the countless traditional raids for cattle, land and women that have become much stronger during the civil war.

The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) of 2005 provides many solutions for the different problems of the North - South conflict. It basically provides for a one country - two systems approach. However, there exist two different and competing political discourses: Northern Sudanese emphasize the need for a democratic transformation and political liberalisation, while Southerners emphasize the need for peace and the opportunity for separation from the North. A referendum about the status of South Sudan has been promised for 2011. Therefore the probable scenarios are either separation in 2011 or a new war, or both, and probably earlier than 2011.

Öhm went on to explain the recent developments of the Darfur crises (Western Sudan) and the nature of the conflict there. In Darfur, which has been an autonomous kingdom until 1916, there are countless overlapping conflicts. Significant are the inter- and intragroup conflicts that are mostly conflicts between nomads and agriculturalists. These conflicts intensified since the 1970s because of rapid desertification and subsequent migration from North to South Darfur.

Darfur, as a peripheral area, has been marginalized by the Sudanese centre economically and politically. Although many Darfuran elites have been attracted by the Islamist movement in Sudan, they remained excluded under the Islamist rule. Even more dramatic for the Darfuran elite, they were not brought on board of the North-South peace process in its final stage. That was the final element needed to bring the two rebel groups Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement - mainly divided along ethnic lines - to take up arms against the central government in 2003. The government responded by arming militias - generally known as Janjaweed - to fight the rebels and the civilian population of Darfur.

As of today, there are more than 8 rebel groups and militias fighting against each other in changing alliances - some of them simply as mercenaries. The rebels are mainly split along ethnic or tribal lines; their tribal identity has been reinforced by the war under the symbol of the AK47. The Afro-Arab dimension of the war does certainly exist, yet inside Darfur it does NOT play a major role. It is important rather on the regional level, as African and Arab organisations attempt to ensure the influence on Sudan and Darfur.

The Sudanese government seems to hope for a military solution of the war. The international community has failed to intervene in a successful manner. Despite the intensive international debate about Darfur the troops of the United Nations and the African Union have neither the willingness nor the capacity to end the war. Another significant aspect, according to Manfred Öhm, is the regional aspect of the crises. What started as a war inside one of Sudan's regions has now grown to a full scale regional cross-border crises, in which a war between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic cannot be ruled out anymore.

Öhm concluded by mentioning dimensions of the Sudanese conflicts that are largely overlooked by international observers. One dimension is the possible revival of political Islam in Sudan. Although the two traditional sects, the al Ansar and the al Khatmiyya are agents of a rather tolerant popular Islam, and despite the fact that the ruling salvation front's ideology is not taken serious anymore by the ordinary Sudanese, the government does support Wahabist groups that are also supported by Saudi Arabia. These groups that mainly attract young people must be regarded as spoilers in the Sudanese political system, as they have no interest in the democratic transformation and opening of the society and are well prepared for violent action.

Another dimension is the changing nature of the centre periphery conflicts. While the historical and recent wars of Sudan have been fought in the regions, the next war will probably be fought in Khartoum, where all main political agents have meanwhile their own armies or militias.

## Sub-Saharan Africa

PETER MOLT

In his presentation, Peter Molt explored the ethnic nature of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, without focusing on one country or conflict. He began by noting that it is the current political *topos* (orientation) to attribute African conflicts to the ethnical divisions of the Continent and that, similarly, it is the common understanding that only through nation-building and Western-style democracy can peace and progress be achieved. In a way, from the European and North-American perspective, ethnicity and ethnical groupings correspond to backwardness and are considered the main obstacle to democratic development. Unfortunately, Molt points out that all attempts at promoting a unitary democracy have not alleviated the ongoing ethnical conflicts or really reduced the danger of ethnical conflicts breaking out in a significant number of African countries.

Molt commented that, in spite of the progress made by ethnologists to unmask ethnicity as a constructed identity, Westerners and Africans alike have stuck to the old way of dividing African people into ethnic communities and ethnical networks and of

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considering these differences as essential. Naturally, one cannot ignore the many real and potential ethnic conflicts, but the question is which comes first: ethnicity or conflict. Molt described an interesting observation, "Whereas 30 years ago, the phenomenon of ethnicity was only ascribed to non-European regions - in Europe, existed nations, but no tribes and ethnical communities - today Europeans have discovered that there are more ethnical communities on their continent than they ever believed."

Molt gave the example of the ethnical conflicts in Germany and in Poland in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and how the ethnical problem in Eastern Prussia led to Max Weber's definition of ethnic identity as a construct - a thesis which 60 years later was taken up by Ernest Gellner, Erik Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson. Molt compared the situation in Poland and Eastern Prussia to the situation in many parts of Africa: people of different languages, religions, and cultures dwelling together in villages and towns. One of these ethnical groups, the Jewish, was bound tightly together by religion, while the other Germanic or Slavic-speaking people were characterized by shifting identities. One of the greatest scholars on the subject concluded that the common man had to a large extent an "ethnical identity in suspense", i.e. when forced to identify with one or the other side, people were ready to change and choose identities according to economic, political, and social opportunities. The fixations of ethnical identity were the result of public policy and political conflicts.

Molt deduced that the exacerbation of ethnical conflicts in Africa was therefore not specific to that continent but was part of a political and social process which is universal and has much to do with the extension of capitalism, trade, communications, and migration. This is the process that is called globalization and that began in Europe in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Under certain political, social, and economic conditions, ethnical identity - distinct from linguistic, religious, and cultural ties - becomes dominant. It is nothing else than an expression of political conflicts and an instrumentalization of power politics among elite segments. It is linked with the invention of history, ancestry, and cultural superiority - or, at least, otherness - and it is spread by group dynamics and mass mobilization. It can create its own dynamics, eventually leading to civil strife, discrimination, expulsion, mass murder, and terrorism. The process of civilization should control the transfer of group identification and group power structures to the larger collectives, and it is obviously very hard for politics to understand it.

Molt argued that solving or civilizing ethnical conflicts requires a deep frustration and fatigue of people, economical and social chances, and a political system suited to pacify emotions and developed in order to apply checks and balances. Even then, the German-Polish example shows us that the "old demons" continue to menace the entente.

Molt showed that in the case of Europe, supra-nationality and the institutionalization of the human rights of individuals and groups seem to guarantee a peaceful coexistence among and within nations, a weaker collective national and ethnical identification, and more tolerance among different ethnical, cultural, and religious

collectives. Africa is still far away from this point. To make matters worse, the “almost frantic efforts of ex-colonial states and the USA, the UN, and the EU to impose Western institutional models (e.g. constitutions, electoral processes, decentralization, etc.), subsumed under the term *good governance*, will lead to nowhere or aggravate the situation”. Molt remarked that political violence since the start of the process of democratization and good governance in the early 1990s has claimed the lives of over 10 million people - a much higher death toll than what was seen under the previous dictatorships and wars by procurement. Molt concluded that, from a humanitarian perspective, people were far better off under the undemocratic period than they are now. “Consequently,” he said, “the prestige of the model of democratic rule has deteriorated. Democracy is paid lip-service by ruling elites but very rarely taken seriously. For the mass of poor people, it has become a synonym for distress.”

Molt regretted the fact that social scientists had still not developed new models of regional and national regulations which could better serve the ends of peace, welfare, and dignity. Molt sees the constitutions and conventions proposed as “blueprints from the Western world”, ineffective in the African context.

In his closing remarks, Molt contended that the new models - such as the AU, the APRM, regional communities, political conditionality, the “big push” strategy of Jeffrey Sachs, as well as the costly execution of façade elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo - “reveal that international politics do not take into consideration the true nature of African politics and the motivations, compulsions, constraints, and interests of the ordinary people”.

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## Panel on South and South East Asia

NAWAF SALAM (Chair)

ADELE JONES

CLEMENS JÜRGENSEMAYER

JÜRGEN H. WOLFF

### Afghanistan

ADELE JONES

Adele Jones focused her presentation on Afghanistan, first giving an overview of the players in the current conflict there and then a summary of conflict research conducted in Badakhshan (north-eastern province) in 2003-2004. Her presentation also included a summary of the results of five opinion surveys/studies conducted in 2005 and 2006, measuring Afghan attitudes to state-building. Jones noted that it has become fashionable to refer to Afghanistan as a “post-conflict society”, though the country continues to be in “a state of near anarchy”, as articulated by the outgoing head of NATO in 2006.

### Insurgency

Jones began by pointing out that in contrast to what is often claimed, research and intelligence reports show that only 20% of violence is from the ideologically based Taliban. Their numbers have increased thanks to recruits - who have become disenchanted with the government - local leaders, and international actors, who are all part of the power game to reach their own ends.

Jones detects a misanalysis on the side of US/British government and media speaking of defeated Taliban forces. In fact, the Taliban have regrouped into battalions with leaders who have a strong grasp of guerilla warfare. A new level of conflict has been reached, with suicide bombings and attacks on ‘soft’ targets (e.g. schools, NGOs, etc.) increasing. In 2006, more than 2000 people were killed, up from 1600 in 2005, and double the 2004 number.

The strongest insurgent activity in Afghanistan is in the southern and the eastern provinces, largely Pashtun areas, but the conflict cannot be described as ethnic, unlike the violence seen after the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992. Tajik/Panshiri dominance of the interim government by Northern Alliance commanders was lessened by the 2005 elections - vital in addressing Pashtun resentment. Religious conflicts between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims have not developed the same dimensions as in Iraq or Pakistan.

### Role of Commanders/Warlords

Jones stated that warlords continue to derive power and authority from local conflicts. This is evident from both the government and US/NATO's co-optation of some of these warlords as allies. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) campaign has been counterbalanced by the rearmament of private militias working on behalf of US and NATO troops. This has the potential to explode and to be used in anti-government insurgency.

### Economy

Jones described Afghanistan as a "narco-economy", citing in 2006, that it was believed to produce 92 percent of the world's total opium. This is the highest production level ever recorded in Afghanistan. Revenue won from opium in 2006 will exceed \$6 billion. This has to do with the fact that illicit goods cost around four times what their more legal counterparts cost.

Jones pointed out that the source of income in Afghanistan is international aid, little of which is in the hands of the Afghan government itself. Of USD 82.5 billion spent over 5 years, most was for military operations. Of the USD 7.3 for reconstruction, most of it went towards salaries for Afghan national forces and counter-narcotics operations.

### State Bodies

Afghanistan has been described as having one of the most centralized administrations in the world. The continuing absence of an independent judiciary or official conflict resolution mechanisms challenges the central authority and allows anti-government elements or local power-holders to exploit conflict to their own advantage. Although the Afghan National Army is multi-ethnic and well-regarded, despite its being under-financed, the police force is seen as little more than corrupt private militias that constitute a part of the security problem and not the solution.

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## International Players

Pakistan is one of the several international players in Afghanistan and is accused of tacit complicity – gaining international support as an ally in the war on terror while harboring Taliban leaders or extremist political parties that support Taliban. It is seen as maintaining “fluid alliances of convenience”. To complicate things, India, the largest regional donor to Afghanistan, is viewed with suspicion by Pakistan.

In addition to Pakistan, the complex scenario of international players in Afghanistan includes external decision-making done in capitals of contributing nations to serve political interests. It includes the growing propaganda that is critical of the “foreign, inappropriate responses and tactics” used by US and NATO troops, especially the collateral damage of killed civilians. All this comes on the backdrop of a reaction from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005, with its formal communiqué calling the United States to set a timeline for withdrawing from military bases in Central Asia, suggesting that there was declining need for combat operations against the Taliban.

## Badakhshan

Jones described the situation in Badakhshan, one of the five top opium growing areas in Afghanistan, with a 77% percent increase in poppy cultivation from 2005 to 2006. Although international media focus on security problems in the south and east of the country, with the implication that the north (where the German troops are) is relatively secure, the situation has rapidly deteriorated there. NGOs have been attacked numerous times, schools burned down, and the drug trade has witnessed a surge. Conflicts have been over resources, religious issues (note that 28% of Badakhshan's inhabitants are Ismaili), and border conflicts near Tajikistan. Overall, conflicts seem greater in areas controlled by commanders.

In 2003-4, one of the largest NGOs operating in Badakhshan conducted research on conflict in the province. The gravest conflicts observed were linked to power struggles between rival warlords, and between commanders and religious leaders, especially in connection with drug trafficking or natural resources.

Jones decided to highlight three important sources of conflict for consideration: power, resources, and the opium trade.

## Conflict and Power

Conflicts over key positions are important in Badakhshan. Competitors have various resources and networks at their disposal, e.g. young men in the village, elders, and kinship links. Dense social networks with the ability to mobilize fighters or deliver social sanctions are critical prerequisites of violence. The provincial representative of the central government can be a referral point in conflicts where guns and power interests usually prevail.

Disputes over scarce resources can be mediated by a commander if there is no government representative in action. This has important implications because:

- a) Commanders charge mediation fees
- b) Mediation reinforces their influence
- c) Local conflicts open opportunities for attacking rival commanders

#### *Conflict over Resources*

When government representatives and the rule of law (e.g. property laws) are absent, conflict develops. Jones gave the example of Arab Kuchi nomads who owned pasture lands and who had to leave their property during the fighting in the 1990's. Commanders sold the land to locals, and when the Kuchi came back to reclaim their land, the locals refused to leave. Jones gave another example of a resource dispute over firewood between two villages, and how village elders mobilized groups of young men in the conflict.

#### *Conflict and the Opium Trade*

Commanders are involved in the opium trade. Conflict broke out when an important religious leader opposed a commander over the opium trade. Each campaigned against the other. The religious leader demoted the commander, and the commander imposed fines, in an attempt to gain influence. In the absence of government representation and a sustainable economy, rival leaders and narcotics have fuelled conflict potential. It must be noted that the division between commander and government representative is not always clear, as some commanders have been viewed as informal government representatives.

#### Afghan Perceptions 2005/6

The final section of Jones's presentation provided an overview of the findings from several surveys conducted with Afghan people in 2005 and 2006. One used qualitative methods, the others quantitative.

#### *Quantitative Opinion Polls*

The 2005 opinion polls showed that Afghanistan was moving in the right direction, according to 83 percent of those surveyed. Living conditions were seen as better than in late 2001 (85%). In 2006, 87% believed that things were better, although 65% in the south said that things were worse, and only 16% there said things were better. Polls in both years portrayed significant regional differences on the security issue, with an overall decreased satisfaction with security, especially in the south. In 2005, the biggest dangers to Afghanistan were identified to be the Taliban (41%), drug traffickers (28%), local commanders (22%), and the United States (4%). The central government received a 91% approval rating (55% very effective, 36% somewhat effective).

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President Karzai was considered very favorably by 68% in 2005, while local leaders were considered very effective by 21% and international agencies very effective by only 38%.

The rise in violence and the intensification of the conflict between NATO forces and insurgents when the southern survey was conducted in June-August 2006 obviously affected the results. However, they show that Afghans, regardless of religious belief (71% Sunnis; 94% Shiis) are still rather positive that Afghanistan is headed in the right direction.

*Qualitative Interviews (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project)*

Jones explained that the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which conducted the qualitative interviews in Afghanistan in 2005/6, focused on security, governance, justice, social well-being, and economic opportunity. The November results of the latest study indicate that the state-building mission has weakened and has slipped further into the 'danger ground'. Again, security has declined dramatically and is almost in the danger zone. Governance has fallen into the danger zone in 2006, with main problem areas noted as warlords, and corruption/nepotism within the government. The justice system, which had already been the worst-performing sector according to the previous year's survey, declined even further, as Afghans expressed a profound disenchantment with the justice system. Economic security has not changed much and remains a risk area, whereas the social well-being indicator appears to suggest that those surveyed feel their needs are being met more effectively than the year before. However, sustainability of services remains a problem, as many health clinics and schools have shut down.

Finally, Jones quoted the CSIS study's conclusion, stressing that all Afghani communities have different priorities and different levels of support for the government. Countrywide strategies should be tailored to match the diversity of needs and priorities if they are to be effective. As the big issues like security and economic development remain, "the international community should realize that Afghanistan is at a tipping point."

## India

CLEMENS JÜRGENMEYER

Clemens Jürgenmeyer explored the case of India. He began by highlighting the sheer size of the country and the heterogeneity of its 1.1 billion people. Therefore, he stated that it is impossible to speak about conflict lines that cut across all sections of Indian society. However, what comes very close to that is two bones of contention in today's India:

- 1- The question "Who is an Indian?" (Ethnic-religious cleavages)
- 2- Social justice (socio-economic cleavages).

"What I try to do here is not to analyze these two conflicts from my point of view, but to show how these conflicts are interpreted by various actors and policy makers," said Jürgenmeyer.

In India, there are Hindus, Muslims, and other minorities. Hindus make up 80% of the population, and the large Muslim community constitutes 13% of all Indians. "What makes an Indian an Indian?" asked Jürgenmeyer.

On the one hand, the diversity of this society is officially accepted. No minority is above the other. There is no difference between Hindus and Muslims. This, however, has been challenged by the Hindu nationalist perception of what a Hindu is. It excludes all other minorities from the Indian nation, especially Muslims and Christians. According to this perception, an Indian is automatically a Hindu, and a Hindu is an Indian. India is thus Hinduized, and Hinduism nationalized. Indian and Hindu are synonyms, because only the Hindus consider India their country and their holy land. The idea that Muslims and Christians do not belong to India, i. e. Hindustan, is strongly based on the fear that Hindus are becoming a minority in their own country and lack one important quality, and that is unity. They want to achieve this unity. To become a strong nation, Hindu nationalists orchestrate campaigns to demonstrate and strengthen the unity among the Hindus. The Hindu identity is built on constant opposition to others, mainly Muslims. The overarching goal is to make India a very prosperous and strong Hindu nation.

Jürgenmeyer presented the second point of contention as being related to the caste system which is based on varying levels of perceived purity, from Brahmins all the way down to untouchables. The Indian elite is the most successful elite in the world. This system has been challenged by many sections of the society by stating that inequality is inconsistent with democratic rule in India and should be abolished. All parties in India today subscribe to the idea of equality. In 1947, the caste system was officially abolished. Indian government policies follow the principle of affirmative action to cope with the still pervading problems of inequality and poverty.

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Jürgenmeyer concluded by noting that in the last 60 years since Independence the Indian democratic system has more or less successfully managed to contain or solve these manifold conflicts and that he has good reason to feel optimistic about the future of the largest democracy of the world.

## Malaysia

JÜRGEN H. WOLFF

Jürgen Wolff began by pointing out that Malaysia is a country where no violent conflict has taken place since 1969. The government is firmly in control of society, at the expense of liberties, and there is no violent conflict between ethnic groups. Furthermore, the various cleavage lines in society coincide.

Wolff described the presence of three main groups in Malaysia: Malays, Indians, and Chinese. Although they lack internal homogeneity, Wolff notes that self-identification is flexible, dependent on the social situation. When Indian, Chinese, and Malay meet on the street, they consider themselves to be members of one of the three groups, even though their groups are not internally homogeneous. The cleavage is most pronounced between the Bumi Putra (the original Malays) and the immigrants (Indian and Chinese). Culturally, the groups are very different from one other. The language, the customs, the music, the arts all differ. They understand each other with some difficulty.

Wolff then outlined the various positions of the communities on each of the religious, economic, and political levels.

On the religious plane, Malays are Muslims by constitution. One cannot be Malay without being Muslim. The Chinese are Buddhist, Confucian, or Christian. Indians are Hindu, Christian, or Muslim. Political or radical Islam has been experienced in Malaysia. There is currently an outbidding between the Malay leadership and a small radical group with better Islamic credentials.

On the economic level, the Chinese are dominant. The average Chinese household is twice as wealthy on average as the Malay household. The Indian population falls somewhere in between.

Politically, the Malays enjoy a special position which dates back to British colonial times. The Malays, who constitute 60% of the population, clearly dominate the system. They have a monopoly over state control and co-opt representatives of other groups in coalitions.

Wolff remarked that these conflict lines overlap and that this constituted a very dangerous recipe for unrest. The Malay leadership makes a clear distinction between

the Bumi Putra and the immigrants. Although the Malays are technically immigrants, as well, they do consider themselves indigenous because they arrived earlier. The non-Malay groups have been awarded citizenship since independence but are not treated as equals. The constitution enshrines special privileges to Malays. Any questioning of this system in public can get an MP jailed for treason. Furthermore, the Malay leadership is aware that the economic differences are dangerous for the system and have consequently introduced affirmative action in favor of the Malays.

With regards to the Chinese leadership, Wolff indicated that, by and large, there is a bitter resentment of the special position of the Malays. This is mitigated by the economic success that the Chinese have been able to achieve. They are not very interested in politics and ally themselves with moderate Malays against radical Islamists, within the context of religious conflict mentioned above.

Wolff concluded with the observation that there is a sense of shame in the Malay leadership over the 1969 riots, which took the lives of 700 people. According to Wolff, the Malay leaders are thus determined not to have ethnic warfare and will not push the non-Malays too far.



## **PART II**

**Factors Conducive to Democracy**  
**Presentation of selective empirical findings**

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## Case Study: South Africa

VALERIE MØLLER

### Assumption

Strong identities are a sound basis for democracy. people with a strong sense of identity and positive self-esteem can afford to be more tolerant of diversity in society.

*People in a country can be in different social groups at the same time. You can have a job, a religion, a language, a nationality, you live in a homestead, village or a town, you may belong to a political party - and all these things may be of different importance to you. If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself?*

	1 <sup>st</sup> response	3 responses
<i>Positive characteristic</i>	34	58
<i>Personality trait</i>	22	46
<i>Ethnicity</i>	9	19
<i>Religion</i>	8	23
<i>Gender</i>	8	18
<i>Race group</i>	3	6
<i>Language</i>	2	8
<i>Geographical region</i>	2	6
<i>Other</i>	10	31

### Findings

In the study, respondents were allowed up to three self-descriptions. Møller found that the majority of new South Africans prefer to present themselves as individuals rather than persons affiliated to a particular grouping in society. Just over a third of respondents described themselves in terms of a positive personal or universal characteristic and a further fifth in terms of a personality trait. In addition, personal descriptors tend to be mainly positive.

There were few mentions of belonging to a socially excluded group in society. This response pattern suggests that self-descriptions affirm a positive self-image.

Six in ten respondents identify themselves by a positive characteristic and almost half by a personality trait. Religious, ethnic and racial identities emerge mainly as second and third options.

Religion and ethnicity/race compete with each other as identities.

Gender is more important than geographical region.

Ethnicity as a “first descriptor” is more common among residents of former homelands and hostel dwellers, and lower socio-economic groups as defined in terms of income and education. Persons with no religious affiliation are more likely than others to identify themselves by their ethnic group.

Gender identities are more common among women than men.

Religious identity is above average among women, higher income groups, and Afrikaans speakers and among members of Dutch Reformed and charismatic churches and among Muslims.

### Combined Identities

The patterns of first, second and third self-descriptions are revealing.

1st Option		2nd & 3rd Options
Personality/Personal characteristics	56%	→ Positive characteristics & personality traits
Gender	8%	→ Personal/positive descriptors or religion
Religion	8%	→ Personal/ positive or ethnicity
Ethnicity	9%	→ Religion, language and gender descriptors
Race	3%	→ Range of options
Language	2%	→ Geographical region

*When you think about what you have achieved in life, with whom do you compare yourself most often?*

	%
Nobody	45
People like myself ten years ago	14
My neighbours	12
My school mates	11
People of other population groups in my country	7
People in other African countries	6
Rich people	3
Westerners	2

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## Potential for Harmony versus Conflict?

Møller asked the question if respondents felt that in the last ten years, the difference between rich and poor in this country increased, decreased or remained the same.

A majority of 60 percent think wealth differentials have increased.

*Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest one in South Africa?*

Difference between rich and poor	53
Difference between black and white	31
Difference between Christians and Muslims	9
Difference between big cities and the rest of the country	8

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Difference between	Race group				$\emptyset$
	Black	Colore d	Indian	White	
Rich and poor	53	64	56	40	53
Black and white	30	19	33	42	31
Christian and Muslim	8	13	9	12	9
Big cities and the rest of the country	9	5	2	6	8

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## Comment

In a society obsessed with race it is remarkable that the difference between rich and poor is perceived to be greater than racial difference. Under democracy the previously disadvantaged expect to catch up on the material advantages previously denied to them. On the other hand, income and race are still inextricably intertwined and rising unemployment in the new era may easily overshadow race issues.

*Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?*

A government that tries to make all people as equal as possible in wages, housing and education, even if incomes are heavily taxed.      70% agree

*Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most?*

Unfortunately, co-operation between different groups continues to be difficult. 53% agree

In spite of everything, co-operation between different groups works reasonably well. 47% agree

*'Co-operation between groups leaves much to be desired'*

Above-average agreement:

Urban blacks

Residents of metropolitan areas

Intermediate income groups and occupational ranks,  
Setswana, Afrikaans and English speakers.

### Multiculturalism: The 'Rainbow Nation' is Still an Ideal

Acceptance and respect for differences

*Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's rights. 81% agree*

90% Indian/Colored; 81% Black; 77% white

The above reflect above-average agreement with the statement. There was also a progressive increase with household income

*Skeptics*

Rural and tribal areas

Limpopo, Free State and KwaZuluNatal provinces

No religious affiliation

### Diversity as Strength

*Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting. 70% agree*

Ethnic diversity enriches

83% white, 82% Indian, 69% colored, 68% black (agree)

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The results above reflect above-average support for the statement that ethnic diversity is enriching. There was a progressive increase with household and personal income and in urban/metropolitan areas.

*Skeptics:*

Mpumalanga province that has been plagued by social tensions

**Political Violence is a No-No**

The South African miracle refers to the country's transition to democracy that avoided bloodshed. Political violence was rife before the settlement. In the New South Africa however, violence is not acceptable

*Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle. 67 % agree*

*Condemn violence and killing in the name of politics:*

85% Indians; 78% Whites; 71 Colored's; and 65 Africans.

The results above reflect above-average rejection of political violence. There was a progressive increase with education, and among Xhosa speakers/residents of the Eastern Cape, and members of the Hindu and Anglican faiths.

Below average supporters of the statement above included rural residents, unskilled workers, low income households, and residents of the northeastern part of the country.

**But more South Africans believe it is permissible to break the law**

*It is permissible to break the law if it is in the interest of my family. 66% disagree*

Higher proportions of respondents who felt it is **not permissible to break the law** are from the following social groups:

Town and metro areas  
Higher income brackets  
English speakers  
Hindu

Higher proportions of respondents who felt it is permissible to break the law are from the following social groups:

Students  
Younger people (progression from old to young)  
No-income households

### Basic Tenets of Democracy

What are the attitudes of respondents to statements about the basic tenets of democratic rule - a multiparty system, free elections, accountable government, freedom of the press and an independent judiciary?

*A president whose power is balanced by parliament*      First option: 71

Or:

*A president who can act without interference by members of parliament.*

*It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win.*      Disagree: 70

*Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity.*

Or:

*Newspapers free to criticize government and enjoy freedom of expression.*      Second option: 66

*One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future.*

Or:

*More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future.*      Second option: 56

*Judges who follow instructions given by the government.*

Or:

*Judges who apply the law whatever the government says.*      Second option: 53

Between 75 % - 80 % among whites agree compared to between 50% -70 % among blacks. - Colored and Indian voters fall somewhere in between.

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## **Focus on belief in independent judiciary and multiparty system**

### **Independent judiciary**

*53% Judges who apply the law whatever the government says*

South African courts have a long history of upholding justice in spite of restrictive laws. In the new era the constitutional court has overturned several government decisions that did not meet the principles underlying South Africa's new constitution.

Survey results suggest that an independent judiciary is more important in urban areas and among the higher socio-economic groups in terms of education, occupation and income. Unusually, Indians are least likely to agree with the statement that judges should be independent when applying the laws of the land.

### **Multiparty system**

*56% more than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future.*

All race groups have reservations regarding a multiparty system. Recent debates have showed up the fundamentally different understandings of the role of the opposition in a multiparty system. Critique of government is considered a threat to the new democracy that will undermine unity of purpose in meeting societal goals. In successive rounds of national, provincial and local government elections, the African National Congress has taken control of all the provinces and the majority of the municipalities to achieve its goals.

### Freedom of Expression / Individualism

	% Agree	% Disagree
<i>It is harmful for society if individuals or groups have different opinions and pursue different interests.</i>	55	45
<i>It is normal that people have different opinions and pursue different interests as long as they respect the rules.</i>	86	14
And:	% Agree	
<i>A state authority that controls particular interests and preserves social harmony.</i>	29	
Or:		
<i>Freedom for people to pursue different interests provided they respect the rules.</i>	71	

Veteran voters are more supportive of individual freedoms than new voters. Possibly collectivism and social harmony are valued above self-centered interests.

Up to 70 percent of Indian voters agree that differences in opinions and interests might harm society.

Those in favor of liberal options tend to be:

- Better educated
- Live in urban and metro areas
- Women
- Progression from conservatism to liberalism is according to old racial order.
- Blacks are most conservative, colored's somewhat less,
- Up to over 80% among Indians/whites

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## Political Regulation

*Which option do you feel is the best solution for our country?*

	Black	Colored	Indian	White	Ø
Majority rule	45	42	23	52	45
Joint government	33	39	68	28	34
Single party	9	8	4	4	8
Largest group rules	5	4	2	3	5
One group rules	6	3	2	1	5
Partition	3	5	2	12	4

The present solution is the most favored option across all groups.

The second most favored option is power sharing, the former arrangement.

Some 12 percent of whites would prefer partition, the most radical solution to preserving peace in a multicultural society. This is the solution that has been rejected by continuous oversight on the part of the ruling ANC government.

All other options of political regulation attract less than 10 percent of votes.

## Elected Government

*69% think local authorities should be elected rather than appointed by central government*

(84% white, 74% colored 68 Indian, 67% black)

A higher proportion of supporters of local authority are from:

Urban and metro areas  
Higher income groups

Those in favor of appointed leaders:

Rural  
Marginal urban groups such as squatters, hostel dwellers  
Zulu and Ndebele

## Strong Civil Society

*A government that is influenced by all sorts of organizations and movements and associations of ordinary private people. 70% agree*

A higher proportion of supporters of responsive government are from:

- Metropolitan areas
- Higher education
- Higher income
- Women

Those not in favor:

- Mainly rural dwellers
- No religious affiliation

## Criteria for appointing civil servants, business people, members of the cabinet

Appointment	Race				$\emptyset$
	Blacks	Colored	Indian	White	
Merit	<b>45-53</b>	57-58	62-68	<b>76-82</b>	50-56
Fair representation	28-29	29-34	23-28	10-14	27
Known and trusted	11-19	5-10	4-9	5-7	10-16
Member of own group	8-9	2-6	2	3-4	7-8

Those in favor of appointment on merit tend to be:

- Metropolitan dwellers
- Increases with age
- Increases with education
- Whites

Less in favor:

- Unemployed
- Economically inactive
- Blacks

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## Good Democrats?

### The Democracy Index

	Race				
	Black	Colored	Indian	White	Ø
Not democratic	7	4	2	1	6
A little democratic	15	7	10	7	13
Almost a democrat	27	18	21	18	25
Democratic	26	44	40	32	29
Very democratic	25	27	28	42	27

The items in the scale included support for a multiparty democracy rather than dominant or unopposed single party rule, support for a free press, group rights and ethnic diversity.

## Conclusion

Will the new black middle class be good democrats?

In new democracies people are more predisposed to judge the performance of the democratic system in terms of improving living standards rather than abstracts. Ordinary citizens expect democracy to deliver at least the basic necessities of life such as food, water, shelter and education.

A happy nation is the hallmark of a successful democracy. In South Africa, satisfaction with life and happiness is indeed strongly associated with better living conditions. If material living conditions improve, will South Africa become more democratic?

Since 1994, a black middle class has emerged. The new black economic elite scores higher on happiness and life satisfaction and is more optimistic about the future than any other group in South Africa. Interestingly, the political viewpoints of the new black economic elite appear to have shifted towards more liberal values. Will the black rank-and-file follow suit if democracy brings them happiness too? Will they become better democrats?

## Case Study: Lebanon 2006

THEODOR HANF

### Fear of the future, cautiousness, powerlessness

The psychological sensitivities of the Lebanese in 2006 give even fewer grounds for optimism than before. Four in five respondents are fearful of the future, extremely cautious and mistrustful. Half of the respondents fear that change will only worsen the situation. People's trust is restricted more than ever to their close circle of family and friends, and - with the notable exception of one's coreligionists, in whom trust is twice as widespread as in previous years - few others. Almost three quarters are still convinced that they can do little to change their lot.

### The crisis of entrepreneurship

Attitudes and opinions about the economy and society in 2006 were either little changed from those in the war years - or were more pessimistic. The majority of Lebanese would still like to be independent businessmen, but the proportion of people willing to accept the risks associated with entrepreneurial activity has declined. Although most people are convinced that achievement, education and experience are the main factors determining success in life, a substantial minority think religious beliefs are more important. Job and career satisfaction have dropped. People are even more pessimistic about their children's prospects than they were in the 1980s. Social differences have widened and social envy is almost as high.

### A nation of believers

Secularising moderation of religious convictions and less observance of religious practice is not part of the Lebanese agenda, not 20 years ago, and today even less so.

	1987	2002	2006
<i>"I believe in a life after death, in which the righteous will be rewarded and the wicked will be punished."</i>	71	85	94
<i>"I try to live by the teachings of my religion."</i>	75	80	90
<i>"I often visit a place of worship."</i>	38	60	63
<i>"I can be happy and enjoy life even if I don't believe in God."</i>	11	11	11

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The number of Lebanese who state that they are believers, try to live according to the teachings of their religion and visit mosques or churches has continued to rise. The only constant is the proportion of respondents - a good tenth - who state that they have nothing to do with religion.

Muslims and Christians visit cult places equally frequently. This practice rises noticeably with age; housewives, pensioners and farmers are particularly zealous visitors. More than half of the respondents pray regularly and another fifth frequently. As to be expected, Muslims are overrepresented among people who pray regularly, whereas Christians are more likely to pray often or sometimes.

The good tenth of respondents who are cheerful non-believers do not differ significantly by religious affiliation, age or community membership. One fifth of all respondents without any formal education are part of this group.

To summarise: the Lebanese, already pious during the long years of war, have become even more so. But there is little difference by socio-economic markers. There is no significant difference in the degree of religiosity of the different communities and the two major religious groups: the Lebanese are a nation of believers, the young as much as, if not a little more so than, their elders.

### **Kinship: Attitudes to family and society**

The strength of familialism is on the rise. In the war years, agreement with the saying: "My brother, right or wrong" rose from one quarter in 1981 to almost one half in 1984, where it still stood 15 years later. In 2006, it had risen to two thirds. Now as then, in conflicts between family and community interests respondents are more or less equally divided. No less than 43% of the respondents believe that one may break the law in the family's interest.

The replies to the following statements indicate the strength of community identity:

	1987	2002	2006
<i>"It doesn't matter whether they are rich or poor, I feel close to all members of my community."</i>	58	66	81
<i>"It is good if there are no conflicts between sons of the same community."</i>	91	78	91
<i>"One man says: 'It is not so important if my daughter marries a man with a different religion, as long as she loves him.'</i>			
<i>A second man says: 'Marriages between people of different religions are not good and are often unhappy. I don't want my daughter to marry someone with a different religion.'</i>			
Do you agree with the first or second statement?			
Agree with the first statement:	40	39	36
<i>"I prefer neighbours who have the same background as myself."</i>	55	48	59
<i>"If my colleagues are honest and cooperative, I don't mind what group they belong to."</i>	90	92	96
<i>"The identity and uniqueness of my community are more important to me than loyalty to my country."</i>	12	34	39

Agreement in %

Solidarity with one's religious community has continued to strengthen in postwar Lebanon: in 2002, two thirds expressed it; in 2006, four fifths. It is somewhat stronger among women than men. There are no differences by education or by community. Compared with the war years, the proportion of those that would prefer neighbours with the same background fell slightly in 2002, but had risen enormously by 2006, and is now higher than in the war years. Whether Christian or Muslim, almost three fifths of the respondents would like to live among people with a similar background. By contrast, in 2006, religion and community affiliation were even less relevant at the work place than in earlier years.

The hard core of community loyalists feel that their community is more important than the nation-state. In 2002, their proportion was almost three times that in 1987; in 2006, it has again risen markedly. There are no significant differences between Christians and Muslims, or by gender, age or education.

To summarise: both familialism and community loyalties have strengthened considerably not only by comparison with the war years, but also with 2002. In 2006, two in three Lebanese rank the family above all else, Four in five feel that they have very close ties with their community, three in five prefer people like themselves as neighbours, and two in five feel greater loyalty to the community than the state. But almost no one has problems working with members of other communities.

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## Strata, communities and identity

In the 2002 study, the connection between communal and religious affiliation on the one hand and income stratification on the other is statistically insignificant. In other words, although the distribution of income as a whole may have become more unequal, there are no longer rich communities and poor communities. In the 2006 survey, interviewees were less hesitant than previously about expressing opinions on religion and politics, but were far more reluctant than in any earlier surveys to provide details about income. While respondents were utterly indifferent to any form of political correctness, they seemed to be very much afraid of the tax authorities. In short: the income data in the 2006 survey provide no new insights into economic status in and between the individual communities.

How do Lebanese classify themselves socially?

*"Every society has social classes. Which class do you think you belong to?"*

The answers to this question correlate with the data on education as follows:

Education/ Class perception	Highest	Upper middle	Middle	Lower middle	Lowest	Educational level total
No formal education	<b>6</b>	5	40	<b>33</b>	<b>17</b>	5
Primary school	4	8	50	<b>29</b>	<b>9</b>	9
Brevet, occupational	2	7	54	<b>31</b>	<b>6</b>	18
Baccalauréat	3	<b>10</b>	<b>67</b>	18	2	28
University	4	<b>10</b>	<b>62</b>	22	2	40
Overall Estimate	3	9	60	24	4	100

The urge to be middle-class is very apparent. Not even one in twenty respondents view themselves as lower class. There is a significant correlation between educational status and social self-classification.

How do the members of different religious communities classify themselves by social status?

	Upper class	Upper middle class	Middle class	Lower middle class	Lower class	Community as a whole
Sunnites	3	<b>9</b>	58	26	4	26
Shiites	<b>4</b>	6	49	<b>36</b>	5	28
Druze	-	6	54	<b>36</b>	4	6
Maronites	<b>5</b>	8	<b>68</b>	17	2	24
Greek Orthodox	3	<b>10</b>	56	22	<b>9</b>	9
Greek Catholics	1	6	<b>61</b>	<b>30</b>	3	4
Armenians	-	<b>25</b>	46	25	4	1
Average Categorization	3	8	58	27	4	

Sunnites and Greek Orthodox self-categorization deviates least from the average. Shiites and Druze are more inclined than other groups to classify themselves as lower-middle class, while Maronites and Greek Catholics have fewest qualms about placing themselves in the middle class. One remarkable result is that only one in twenty Shiites regard themselves as lower class; in 2002 the proportion was twice as high.

How do the Lebanese perceive themselves over and above social classification?  
How do they define their identity?

*"Each of us belongs to several groups simultaneously: each person is either male or female, belongs to a religion or a community, is rural or urban and has a political viewpoint. And different people attach different importance to each factor.*

*If you were to be asked who you are, how would you describe yourself, first, second, and third?"*

	1st place	2nd place	3rd place
Lebanese	50	28	21
Personal	11	16	25
Normal person	7	3	2
Political adjective	7	5	9
Occupation	5	5	7
Arab	5	7	7
Muslim	5	9	7
Christian	3	10	7
Region, village	2	6	5
Other	5	11	10

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Compared to the 2002 survey, in 2006 the choice of “Lebanese” is higher in first, second and third place. Most respondents regard themselves as Lebanese, although priorities differ. The self-description using personal markers - “normal person”, occupation and other - has also risen across all three places compared with 2002. By contrast, the options of “Arab”, “Muslim” and “Christian” in first place are all slightly less popular; “Christian” is more common in second and third place than previously. A novelty in 2006 is the use of political adjectives, a clear reflection of greater polarisation among at least a minority of the respondents.

However, the full complexity of the identity patterns only becomes clear when the first, second and third choices are correlated.

1st place	2nd place	3rd place
Lebanese	23% Lebanese 16% Christian 14% Muslim 9% Arab	19% Lebanese 9% Political 9% Arab 9% Christian 7% Muslim
Arab	73% Lebanese 9% Muslim 5% Arab	40% Muslim 19% Lebanese
Muslim	36% Lebanese 30% Arab 6% Muslim	34% Lebanese 19% Arab 10% Political
Christian	47% Lebanese 28% Christian 9% Political	27% Lebanese 15% Political 15% Christians
Political adjective	28% Lebanese 20% Political	31% Lebanese 11% Political 9% Muslim

Figures in %, rounded

One immediate conclusion stands out: former national ideological cleavages, such as “Lebanese”, “Arab” and “Syrian” nationalism, no longer play a role in the self-perception of the Lebanese. Almost all see themselves as Lebanese, but with varying fervour and considerable nuances. Half of the respondents regard themselves as Lebanese who are simultaneously Muslims or Christians. One tenth view themselves as Muslims or Christians who are also Lebanese. One twentieth are Arabs who are also Lebanese (and for the most part Muslim).

*E pluribus unum?* The findings on identity can be interpreted in this way. Or have the nuances between the different forms of “Lebaneness” become so strong that the *pluribus* must now accommodate a *plurum* rather than an *unum*?

The first point to make is that the Lebanese society is strongly familialistic, as discussed above. Religiosity has increased markedly and communal bonds have strengthened. On the other hand, regardless of widening economic disparities, we could not identify any income-based economic distinctions between the communities. Communal differences in educational levels are minor. Allowing for nuances, there is an overwhelming tendency across all communities for people to categorise themselves socially as middle-class. The response to the question of an identity that transcends community, in so far as any political identity was articulated, was also, again allowing for nuances, unequivocal.

### Snapshots of a political system and political orientations

Whereas in 2002 only 15% of the respondents said they belonged to a political organisation - overwhelmingly Shiites and Druze - in 2006 no less than 30% did - including an above-average number of Christians. In 2002, only two thirds of party members were prepared to name the organisation, in 2006 almost all did so. In short: in 2006 a strong minority is not at all depoliticised, quite the contrary. Finally, many Christians no longer make any secret about their political convictions.

The willingness to support politicians unconditionally has more than doubled since 2002. The proportion of those who believe that their favoured politician enjoys widespread support has also soared. At the same time, the number of those who think that politicians have little influence in the present situation has also risen. Thus, respondents have few illusions, yet are far more prepared to identify with today's political elite than they were with the then leaders a few years ago.

Party membership - and the willingness to admit it - has increased dramatically since the 2002 survey. Party membership breaks down as follows:

Free Patriotic Movement (Michel Aoun)	25
Hezbollah (Hassan Nasrallah)	18
Lebanese Forces (Samir Geagea)	14
Amal (Nabih Berri)	12
Future Movement (Saad Hariri)	10
Marada (Sleiman Franjeh)	8
Progressive Socialist Party (Walid Jumblat)	6
Syrian National Socialist Party & Baas	3
Communist Party	2
Other	2

Figures in %, rounded

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Like the support for popular politicians, the overwhelming portion of larger parties' membership comes from specific communities.

Despite some Muslim members, FPM is a predominantly Christian party. The same is true of the FL and the Marada. Hezbollah is exclusively Muslim and predominantly Shiite. Amal includes some Druze and Christians, but is also primarily a Shiite party. Future is the main Sunnite organisation and the PSP largely Druze. Only the pro-Syrian and the Communist parties cannot be assigned to a particular community.

At the risk of oversimplifying, one could say that Lebanon has a Christian three-party system consisting of the FPM, FL and Marada, a Shiite two-party system made up of Hezbollah and Amal, and one-party dominance among the Sunnites and Druze: Future and PSP, respectively.

In summary: in 2006, the Lebanese expressed clear preferences for a limited number of political leaders, and these preferences are based primarily on communal membership. Compared with 2002, the Lebanese are far more politicised, as reflected in a doubling of party membership and the much greater willingness to openly admit it. As previously, if not more so, party membership is drawn from particular communities: the Lebanese respondents feel not only close social and religious, but also political ties with their respective communities.

How do respondents assess the influence of the international environment on Lebanon?

The only point of foreign policy on which the Lebanese agreed at the beginning of 2006 was the rejection of Israel. Apart from that, they were deeply divided in their views of friend and foe. For Druze, Sunnites and Christians, and in particular for the followers of the respective most popular politicians in these communities, the influence of France (and of the Vatican, the UN and the EU) is positive, a view not shared, however, by the Shiites. Saudi Arabia is viewed as a friend by the Sunnites and in particular by the supporters of Hariri and Siniora. Whereas Druze, Sunnites and Christians regard Iranian and especially Syrian influence in Lebanon as negative, the Shiites take a positive view of Iran and, to a lesser degree, of Syria. The religious communities part ways in particular over their opinions about Syria. In short: in their opinion on foreign preferences and disapproval the cleavage is not between Muslims and Christians, but between Shiites and others, and more specifically between Nasrallah's and Berri's followers and all other Lebanese.

### **Democrats by conviction and even more so by necessity**

*"Think of a country in which you would like to live. Which do you think is best for that country?"*

	2002	2006
<i>One party that unites the country or Several parties that citizens are free to choose between.</i>	57	68
<i>Judges that follow directives from the government or Judges that only follow the laws without listening to the government.</i>	80	72
<i>Press censorship to prevent propaganda that causes strife or A free press that can criticize politicians as it likes.</i>	70	68

Figures in %

As in 2002, in 2006 more than two thirds of the respondents hold democratic views, but a substantial minority do not. Agreement with a multiparty system has risen sharply, while support for an independent judiciary has decreased. Who are the supporters of a one-party system? They are overrepresented among women and pensioners and more common among older than younger respondents. They constitute 35% of Muslims and 27% of Christians. An obedient judiciary is favoured most strongly by civil servants and the armed forces (44%), small businessmen (42%), farmers (39%) and unemployed persons (38%), older and less educated people. There are no significant differences by religion or community affiliation. Press censorship finds least sympathy among the young and correlates inversely with education. It is supported by 34% of the Muslims and 29% of the Christians - most strongly by Shiites (42%) and least strongly by Druze (15%).

In short: a little less than one third of the respondents lack democratic convictions.

Lebanon has always been a byword for laissez-faire economics. Yet in 2002, only 51% of the working population favoured private ownership of the means of production. This figure had risen to 58% in 2006. Nonetheless, 42% would like the state to take charge of the economy. The fact the latter figure includes an above-average proportion of the youngest age group will hardly please market economists. Education is a statistically insignificant factor. But there is a clear distinction between Muslims and Christians: 62% of the latter favour a market economy as against 53% of the Muslims.

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A three quarter majority favours economic and social policies that promote equality.

*"What is best for the country in which you would like to live:*

*A policy that aims to create as much equality as possible between salaries, living conditions and study opportunities,*

*or*

*A policy that allows people who work hard to earn more and live better than others?"*

In 2006, as already in 2002, 75% chose the first option. Among them, unemployed person (83%) and small businessmen are overrepresented, as are pensioners, farmers, civil servants, even professionals and self-employed persons. By community affiliation, support for equality is strongest among the Druze (89%) and Shiites (84%).

The economic crisis has obviously undermined the belief in the superiority of a free-market system and in the wisdom of laissez-faire policies. Naturally, this also influences people's choice of government.

*"Which would you prefer:*

*An honest and clean government that rules with a firm hand,*

*or*

*A government that is perhaps a bit corrupt but respects civil freedoms?"*

Already in 2002, two thirds of the respondents had come out in favour of clean, firm government; in 2006, 85% shared this view. Only 15% want more freedom even if a bit of corruption is inevitable. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that indignation about perceived injustice and corruption is challenging the liberal convictions of Lebanese society. This indignation is found without any significant differences across all educational and income levels in all communities; it is significantly higher only among the Shiites. The choice of clean government with an iron fist correlates directly with the level of education.

Against this background what are the opinions and attitudes about the current Lebanese system of government and possible alternatives?

Asked for the best solution, the replies broke down as follows:

	2002	2006
Partition	4	4
Domination by the strongest group	1	1
Domination by the largest group	2	2
Extreme domination of one group	2	1
One-party system	9	17
Majority democracy	2	17
Consociational democracy (proportional representation)	35	44
Majority democracy or proportional representation	4	-
Other double responses	4	-
No reply	18	14

Six in ten respondents in 2002 and 2006 think one of the democratic options is the best solution. Among the non-democratic options, support for a one-party system almost doubled. In Lebanon there is a solid, but by no means overwhelming, majority in favour of democracy. More respondents favour proportional representation than majority democracy as the most suitable solution.

Age plays a role in these preferences. The preference for a one-party system correlates directly with age. Majority democracy finds greatest support in the 25 - 34 age group. Agreement with a form of democracy that gives all groups a share of power correlates inversely with age and finds a clear majority among respondents younger than 35. The Lebanese system is the preoccupation not of those already on the stage, but of those entering it.

Besides age, community affiliation is also a significant determinant of government preference.

	One-party system	Majority democracy	Power sharing
Sunnites	18	22	50
Shiites	18	17	56
Druze	30	24	38
Maronites	17	24	51
Greek Orthodox	26	13	49
Greek Catholic	16	18	52
Armenians	33	5	62
Average	19	20	52

Figures in %, rounded

Power sharing finds greatest acceptance in all large communities. Except for the Druze, about half the respondents in all groups find this the best solution, and among the Shiites 56%. Almost a quarter of the Maronites and Druze and one fifth of the Sunnis prefer simple majority democracy. Somewhat less than one third of the Druze

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and less than a quarter of the Sunnites, the Shiites and the Maronites - i.e., the communities that have parties with claims to leadership - think a one-party system is the best solution.

The responses to the following statements indicate that there is a plurality in favour of sharing power for reasons of necessity rather than conviction:

	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
<i>"Because of the nature of Lebanese society, important decisions need the agreement of all large communities."</i>	*	*	*	80	77	90
<i>"Lebanon won't have a strong and united government until authentic representatives of the communities have a share in power."</i>	67	79	73	66	72	86

Agreement in %, rounded. \* Between 70% and 80%

Social characteristics are statistically insignificant in the first of these statements. In 2006, no fewer than nine in ten respondents agreed; agreement was equally strong among Muslims and Christians, and an above-average 94% among Shiites. Between 1981 and 1987 at least two thirds of the respondents agreed with the second statement, and in 2006 more than four fifths. This is higher than the level of support for proportional representation - let alone the percentage that regard it as the best solution - and higher than the percentage of respondents who, through their support for multi-party democracy and freedom of the press, showed themselves to be true democrats.

In short: the Lebanese are in favour of a system of democratic power sharing because they do not see any alternative. A majority are democrats by conviction, and a larger majority by necessity.

### Perspectives of coexistence

*"Do you think it is possible to change a system accepted for reasons of necessity?"*

	1987	2002	2006
<i>"Perhaps it doesn't look like it, but it is possible that the political system can be changed in the near future."</i>	35	50	77
<i>"The strength of the different communities makes fundamental long-term change in the political system impossible."</i>	52	62	71

Agreement in %, rounded

The statements contradict each other to some extent: the first expresses a desire, the second an insight. Agreement with both has increased since 2002, but for the first time the desire is stronger than the insight by a few percent.

Respondents are similarly ambivalent in their responses to the following statements, which were presented for the first time in 2006:

<i>"The system has been flawed since its inception because it institutionalises the separation of the various communities. For this reason it should be replaced by a system more appropriate for a country aspiring to modernity."</i>	83
<i>"The Lebanese have reached a level of maturity that helps them get past sectarian isolation and we will be able to build a new political system in the near future."</i>	78
<i>"Come what may, our communities are rooted in society and are not going to disappear. In the long run their power and resilience will stand in the way of important changes."</i>	76
<i>"Considering the reality of Lebanese society, this system is acceptable, and if correctly applied, it can work."</i>	75

Agreement in %, rounded

The desire for a change of system (laced with positive rationalisations such as modernity and maturity) and the belief in its possibility finds agreement among four fifths of the respondents. But three in four are aware of the social realities of the system - and just as many view the Lebanese system as acceptable, if its rules are respected.

How do Lebanese view the relationship between religion and politics?

	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
<i>"One should not mix religion and politics."</i>	84	84	87	93	78	79
<i>"The best solution to Lebanon's present dilemma is a completely secular state and society."</i>	*	75	52	63	57	65
<i>"Every Lebanese should have the right to join a secularized community that has the same rights as the other communities - personal status law, political representation, etc."</i>	*	*	*	50	54	70
<i>"It doesn't matter what anyone wants, secularization doesn't seem to have a chance in Lebanon. Community membership is a reality you have to accept."</i>	*	*	*	54	64	69

Agreement in %. \* Not asked

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This general formulation on the desirability of separating religion and politics draws strong support. Agreement among the Shiites is a below average 71%, still a majority, but faced with a strong minority that sees no problem in treating religion and politics as a unity.

There is less support for precise concepts of full secularisation of state and society that go beyond the general desire to separate religion and politics. But there is greater agreement in 2006 than in 2002: almost two in three respondents are in favour. Support is stronger among Christians (69%) than Muslims and above average among Druze (85%), Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics (74% each), Shiites (70%) and Maronites (68%), but well below among Sunnites (46%).

The attitudes towards the creation of a secular community, with the same rights as the religious communities, which people can opt to join voluntarily, are particularly interesting. This proposal does not go as far as the call for a fully secular state, but makes membership of a religious community optional - freedom of choice for every individual and the opportunity for a gradual transition for society as a whole. Support for this proposal has risen sharply since 2002; for the first time, a clear majority of 70% is in favour. Druze (80%) and Greek Orthodox (77%) are strongly and Maronites and Greek Catholics barely overrepresented, Shiites slightly and Sunnites (63%) strongly underrepresented, though this is still a clear majority.

Although all religious authorities in Lebanon have always unanimously rejected this proposal for a first concrete step towards secularisation, it appears capable of winning a majority among Lebanese citizens. This also holds for the members of the leading political parties: agreement among Amal and FPM members is 81 %, PSP 74%, Future 68%, Marada 63% and FL 61%; among Hezbollah it is 54 %, a narrower majority, but still a majority.

Notwithstanding, two thirds of the respondents are resigned, regardless of personal choice, to accepting community affiliation with all its consequences as a fact of life. But how do the Lebanese view coexistence between these communities, the reality of whose differences they believe that they have to live with?

	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
<i>"In recent years, horrible things have happened. I fear that this has made coexistence between the communities very difficult."</i>	48	44	21	43	47
<i>"In spite of the recent terrible events, I believe that coexistence between the communities is still possible."</i>	82	79	86	80	89

Agreement in %

Remarkably, in 2006 as many respondents as in the worst years of the war, 1984 and 1986, think coexistence has become more difficult. This view is held by an above average 52% of the Shiites. The question of between which communities relations are perceived as difficult must remain open. Despite this, nine in ten respondents believe that coexistence is possible in the future.

What do people think about the balance of power, militancy and peaceful resignation?

	1987	2002	2006
<i>"In the struggle between the different communities in our country we're all losers."</i>	77	83	82
<i>"In the present situation, given the strength of the different communities, it is necessary to search for a compromise and come to some agreement."</i>	92	80	87

Agreement in %

The findings of 2006, and of 2002 before that, show that the great majority have learnt from the war. More than four in five respondents agree that everybody loses when the communities fight against one another. The awareness of the need to compromise is not as strong as it was in the war years, but still accepted by somewhat less than nine in ten Lebanese.

Finally, we look at a few opinions and attitudes that are fundamental for coexistence between different communities and groups.

	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
<i>"Whether we like it or not: when different language, religious, ethnic or racial groups live in the same country, they must either dominate or be dominated."</i>	*	*	*	53	60	59
<i>"Very different religious, ethnic, language or racial groups can live together in the same country, accept one another and respect each other's rights."</i>	*	*	*	70	86	89
<i>"A country with groups with different traditions is wealthier for it and its society benefits."</i>	*	*	*	64	80	88
<i>"The monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam believe in the same God and teach similar ethical and social principles."</i>	92	82	88	91	81	77
<i>"A good friend is a good friend, whether he is called Georges or Muhammed."</i>	96	96	96	98	92	96

Agreement in %. \* Not asked

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The conviction that people must either dominate or be dominated has grown in post-war Lebanon and stabilised at around 60% in the past five years. It is particularly strong among Christians (65%), but also shared by a majority of Muslims (55%). Between 2002 and 2006 the view that different groups could come to accept and respect one another made some headway. The proportion of those who are convinced that cultural diversity enriches a country has risen substantially.

In 2006, fewer respondents than in 2002, and fewer than in the war years, agreed that Islam and Christianity had a lot in common. That said, more than three quarters are still convinced of this. More respondents than in 2002 think friendship across religious barriers is possible: 96% of all respondents - and 98% of the Shiites - believe that Muhammad can have a friend called Georges, and vice versa.

To summarise: almost four in five Lebanese believe that another political system is in fact possible, but almost as many believe this will never come about. Almost four fifths favour - economic - decentralisation and almost half would like separate regions for each community. Practically all want to maintain the country's economic unity.

Four fifths favour the separation of politics and religion, and two thirds prefer a secular state and society. Seven in ten respondents - a remarkable increase over previous findings - support the creation of an optional secular community. But almost as many are resigned to the inevitability of membership of a religious community.

About half of the respondents believe that coexistence between these communities has become more difficult - but nine in ten still think such coexistence is possible. People have learnt from the war: eight in ten respondents are convinced that in the event of conflict between the communities everybody would lose. Hence, nine in ten are convinced that compromise is inevitable.

Cultural tolerance is high and diversity is regarded as a treasure. A large majority recognise the common ground between Islam and Christianity, and an even larger majority agree that friendship is possible across religious barriers.

*E pluribus unum?* The findings on individuals' ties with their communities and to the political opinions rooted in these suggest that although the Lebanese nation is an *unum* - for reasons of political conviction and more so of necessity - at the same time it remains a *plurum*.

## **Case Study: Congo**

BEATRICE SCHLEE

### **Abstract**

This study, conducted on the perceptions and cultures of Kinshasa, illustrates five findings that have consistently depicted themselves within the research. The first main finding demonstrates the optimistic beliefs held by nationals for the future of Kinshasa. Despite the brutality of the war, people are generally optimistic and hopeful of the future. Secondly, and elaborated thoroughly in the findings, is the high level of conviviality, or the hospitality and friendliness, held within the social arena of the locals. A third main feature highlighted in this report is the high level of identification with religion, more than any other marker. Ethnicity, on the other hand, doesn't seem to matter within the boundaries of the capital. A fourth, and equally important point, lies in the risk of violence from the East Kashia area. This risk, as explained in the research, arises specifically from supporters of Etienne Tshisekedi. Finally, this study established a solid match between election results in 2002 and election results in 2006.

### **Languages Spoken**


It is found that within the linguistic framework of Kinshasa there are four main dialects, all of which have been linked demographically to a population. The most dominant dialect is Kikongo- speakers, who make up forty one percent of the population. Three quarters of the Kikongo speakers come from the Bas Congo area, while seventeen percent come from Congo. The second largest speaking group is the Lingala speakers, who comprise twenty percent of the Kinshasa population. Approximately sixty percent of the Lingala speakers are from Equateur. The third group that makes up thirteen percent of the population is the Chiluba speakers. The Chiluba speakers come from the areas of east Kasia and Luba. Up to ninety percent can be traced to east Kasia, and only thirteen percent are from Luba. The final linguistic group that holds its reigns in the cultural forum of Kinshasa is the Swahili speakers. It is not recorded within the findings where the Swahili speakers originate from, but it is estimated that seven percent make up the speaking population. Although all the results depict verbal communication factors being attributed to four dominating dialects, a solid eighteen percent lay within the realm of 'others'. Having established this, the research illustrates that language, which is demographically based, is intricately linked with many other social markers, of which are demarcated by social markers.


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## Origins of people

As mentioned above the social conscience of the population within Kinshasa has been tightly linked to their demographic origins. The research findings reveal that the four main regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo are represented within the populace of the capital city. The four regions include bas-Congo, Bandundu, East Kasai, and Equateur. Kinshasa inhabitants that originate from the Bas Congo region compromise up to forty percent of the capital population. Bas Congo makes up forty percent of the population. Those that come from the Bandundu region frame a solid twenty four percent of the citizens of Kinshasa, while those that come from East Kasai make up sixteen percent. It has also been found within the frames of this study just up to nine percent of the Kinshasa citizenry originate from the Equateur region of Congo. Although these four areas are dominate, other provinces compromise twelve percent of the population. These provinces have not been specified within the findings of this report.

**Region Origins**






### Identification with Ethnic Group


Data within this study reveals the way in which a majority of Kinshasa inhabitants, regardless of the province of origin, identified with their religious group as opposed to their country, or Ethnic group. Almost half of the population identified themselves with their denomination, whereby nineteen percent recognize themselves as first and foremost Congolese. A main indicate within this study depicts the way in which a mere minority of people define themselves through an ethnic consciousness. This Ethnic group represents government officials, and farmers.

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### Identification:



### Trust in:



Moving along, the data expressed the overriding relationship between the populace of Kinshasa and their confessional consciousness. When asked which affiliation is trusted most; Religious group, family, Congolese, or ethnic group, it was not surprising

to find that a sold eighty percent of the population held their trust in a religious group. Trust in family drew close to that of religious group by holding seventy six percent of the population. The third strongest affiliation lies within the Congolese identifier whereby just a little above sixty percent of the population claim that they hold trust in the Congolese national unity. Lastly, trust in ethnic group is just under sixty percent. This translates into the apparent and relative lack of trust in governmental institutions. Those that did compose of the fifty nine percent who held trust in an Ethnic group are characterized by less educated and higher age groups.

### **People from the Bas Congo Region**

Established within the realms of this study through an elaborate use of methodologies, those that originate from the Bas Congo region are less educated, have less income, and are more catholic and Kimbanguist. The social markers are attributed to the ethnic groups. There attribution to ethnicity holds a positive correlation to less development, less arrogance, and more modesty.

- Less educated
- Less income than other groups
- Catholics and Kimbanguist

### **People from the Equateur Area**

Research shows that those that originate from the Equateur high unemployment, up to forty percent. Moreover, most of the male migrants come from this province. Religion has been illustrated in the findings to be more important than politics, and ethnicity isn't a social markers. On the contrary, there appears to be open marriage with other ethnic groups. Self perception is highly regarded as arrogant, and feared. When the researcher asked other Kinshasa groups of perception of Equateur people, figures were low in respect, modesty, and weakness.

- High unemployment
- Religion as dominating marker
- Arrogant, feared

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## **Swahilian Speakers**

As illustrated within the findings, the Swahilian speakers seem to be places in a more favourable light. Of the many traits attributed to this segment of the population include better education, high income, jobs within the government as officials, a strong interest in politics, and well read. Perceptions of the Swahilian by others appear to be seen in a positive light and have relatively strong representation. The cutting differences are Muslim Christian differences.

- High income
- Better education
- Jobs with government
- Perceived by others in a positive light

## **Chaluba Speakers**

- Young, secondary students
- High income earners (20%), good accommodation
- Follow political news
- Education less important to success
- Less open to marry s.b. from different religious group
- Main differences regional
- Politically organised (20%)
- Attributes: self perception: better, as good as others, others envy them, feared by others, arrogant

## **Politics**

Of the various divisions within Kinshasa, only eleven percent are organised in political parties (two thirds not organised at all). Seventy five percent are in favour of government of national unity (Majority rule: Swahili, Lingala-Speakers), however there is an apparent lack of trust in politicians. An interesting point shows that violence seems to be slightly more accepted by people from Bandundu.

- Only 11% organised in political parties (two thirds not organised at all)
  - 75% in favour of government of national unity (Majority rule: Swahili, Lingala-Speakers)
  - Don't trust politicians
  - Violence slightly more accepted by people from Bandundu
- 

### Conviviality

Through the subjective and objective methods of reports, interviews, and surveys it was found that:

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
- Conviviality: 84% yes
  - Ethnic diversity makes country richer: 60%
  - Ethnic and religious diversity: either dominated or dominate (almost 50% yes)
  - VIOLENCE
    - Never justified: only 46% yes (not supportive 60% of younger generation below 25 years - educated?/ Churches: 70% Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodists, 60% reawakening)
    - Political violence: accepted by 22% (younger generation)
- 

### Democrats

- Independent judges or to obey/government, independent press, parliament controls
- Swahili and Luba are more democratic
- Lingala/Equateur and Bandundu/"Kongo" least democratic

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### Elections in percentile



### Concluding notes

- Conviviality is high in times of war, as long as enemy is perceived to be external
- What happens when allocation of resources is starting, will have to be seen
- 90% perceive their ethnic group as better compared to others
- 50% believe their ethnic group is feared by others
- Studies in various provinces are needed

### Important finding:

High levels of education are conducive to stronger political interest and to less identification with ethnic groups.

## Case Study: Zimbabwe\*

HELGA DICKOW

This paper focuses on the perception of ethnicity, religiosity, conviviality of the different ethnic groups in Zimbabwe and the correlation between education and democracy.

### Principal Ethnic Groups

Shona	71%
Ndau	09%
Ndebele	08%
Tonga	06%
Other	06%

### Differences in Level of Education of the different Ethnic Groups

	Shona	Ndau	Ndebele	Tonga	Other
No formal education	53*	<b>17</b>	5	12	<b>14</b>
Primary school	61	<b>16</b>	7	11	6
Junior secondary school uncompleted	66	8	<b>10</b>	8	<b>8</b>
Junior secondary school completed, Senior secondary, School not completed	<b>80</b>	7	5	4	5
Senior secondary school completed	<b>80</b>	6	7	2	4
Vocational school, College, pre-University	67	1	<b>17</b>	7	<b>8</b>
University	66	2	<b>26</b>	0	6
Ø	71	9	8	6	6

\* All figures in this table and the following tables are in percent.

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\* In December 2005, The Conrad Adenauer Foundation and the Centre de Science de l'Homme in Byblos carried out a survey in six of ten provinces in Zimbabwe in conjunction with the Mass Public Opinion Institute in Harare.

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Ndebele are over-represented in the university and college categories, Shona in secondary school, and Ndau and Tonga in the “no formal education” or “primary school”. Income reflects these findings: Ndau and Tonga are over-represented in the lowest income bracket, Shona and Ndebele in the highest.

### Religion and Ethnicity

	Shona	Ndau	Ndebele	Tonga	Other	Ø
African Independent Churches	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>	12	13	8	21
Pentecostal	21	<b>26</b>	18	18	23	21
Protestant	<b>20</b>	13	16	12	16	19
Catholic	<b>22</b>	0	18	15	<b>24</b>	20
Traditional	4	18	6	<b>38</b>	8	7
Seventh Day Adventist	5	1	<b>17</b>	2	3	6
Other	3	0	<b>9</b>	2	<b>16</b>	4
None	3	<b>5</b>	4	0	2	3

Ndau are over-presented in the African Independent Churches and the Pentecostal Church, Shona in the Catholic Church, Tonga in the Traditional Churches, and the Ndebele in the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

### **Religion and Region**

Religious Affiliation	Harare	Mashona-land West	Manica-land	Masvingo	Bulawayo	Matabele-land North	Ø
African Indian Churches	14	18	31	35	9	9	21
Pentecostal	25	20	24	15	18	20	21
Catholic	23	23	5	25	23	26	20
Protestant	20	21	20	15	14	17	19
Traditional	3	5	11	2	9	23	7
7 <sup>th</sup> Day Adventist	6	4	5	4	14	2	6
Other	3	4	1	3	10	3	4
None	4	6	3	1	2	0	3

### **Attitudes of Conflictuality and Conviviality**

What do Zimbabweans think about the opportunities, problems, and possibilities of coexistence between the different groups in their country? Are peace and cooperation possible or impossible?

*"Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most?"*

*I fear that peace and cooperation between ethnic groups in our country may have become impossible* 29%

*In spite of everything, peace and cooperation can still be achieved* 71%

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	<i>I fear that peace and cooperation between ethnic groups in our country may have become impossible</i>	<i>In spite of everything, peace and cooperation can still be achieved</i>
Shona	25	75
Ndau	26	74
Ndebele	50	50
Tonga	53	47
Ø	29	71

The ethnic groups near the political power, Shona and Ndau, are above average confident, whereas the Ndebele and Tonga who had suffered under ethnic persecution are far more convinced that peace between ethnic groups has become impossible.

What do respondents think about the need for peace and cooperation?

*"Open conflict between groups in our society would cause everyone to lose in the long run"* 88%

*"Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle"* 83%

Two findings are striking: Residents of Harare are more prone to disagree with the above statements and those without formal education or who are followers of the African Independent Churches are a bit less militant than others.

Does the rejection of violence also mean that respondents are ready to make compromises to preserve peace and thereby reduce conflict potential?

*"In the present conflicts of country, all sides concerned should seek compromises and try to find agreement"* 94%

The same level of agreement one finds the following statement:

*"Even ordinary people can make progress if they help one another"* 94%

The high level of agreement with this statement - 94% - demonstrates that sense of solidarity is alive among ordinary people: they are convinced that by working together

they can change their situation. There are no significant distinctions according to social characteristics.

### Compromises

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*In the present conflicts of our country, all sides concerned should seek compromises and try to find agreements.*

---

Shona	95
Ndau	99
Ndebele	89
Tonga	88
Ø	94

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94% of all respondents agree with this statement, but Ndebele and Tonga to a lesser degree.

### Trust

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*One must be very cautious with people; you cannot trust the people you live and work with.*

---

Shona	88
Ndau	87
Ndebele	91
Tonga	97
Ø	89

---

89% of all respondents agree with this statement, but Ndebele and Tonga show a higher level of social distrust than Shona.

### Feeling of closeness

*"People feel closer to some people than to others. For each of the following groups, please tell us whether or not you feel close to or trust them."*

---

The results in descending order of frequency are as follows:

	Trust or closeness
Family	90
People of my religion	76
People of my own ethnic group	62
Friends	61
People with the same living and working conditions	56
People from my village/town/home district	55
Neighbors	54
People from my province	38
All citizens of Zimbabwe	36

Like in most countries people put their family in first place and their co-religionists in third place. In Zimbabwe, “people of my own ethnic group” comes in third and “all citizens of Zimbabwe” last. Following the responses crossed with level of education and ethnic group:

	Trust, closeness to ethnic group	Trust, closeness to all citizens of Zimbabwe
No formal education	77	52
Primary School	75	48
Junior Secondary School uncompleted	61	36
Junior Secondary School completed, Senior Secondary School uncompleted	56	33
Senior Secondary School completed	61	34
Vocational School, College, Pre- University	49	21
University	54	22
Ø	62	36

It's worth mentioning that respondents of the lowest level of education felt close to their ethnic group and all Zimbabweans. In Chad, we had the same finding.

**By ethnic group:**

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*Close to my own ethnic group*

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Shona	59
Ndau	71
Ndebele	66
Tonga	80
Ø	62

---

The two smaller ethnic groups show a higher feeling of closeness than Shona (below average) and the Ndebele (above) average.

To summarize: Past experiences seems to leave their mark: Ethnic groups who had suffered persecution and have no share of the political power seem to show more distrust and feel closer to their own ethnic groups.

**Perception of ethnic and cultural diversity**

In addition to the regulation of conflict and conflict potential, the perception of ethnic and cultural diversity has a role to play in coexistence.

*"A good friend is a good friend whether he is called [Shona, Ndebele, or English name]."* 97%

*"Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting."* 88%

*"I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they loved each other."* 87%

*"Whether one likes it or not, when groups of different ethnic origin and different religion live in one country, a group will either control others or be controlled."* 82%

---

*"Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each others' mutual rights."*

80%

Following the responses crossed with ethnic group.

---

*Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting.*

---

Shona	85
Ndau	94
Ndebele	91
Tonga	98
Ø	88

---

The smaller ethnic groups agree above average; the majority group to a lesser extent.

---

*I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they loved each other.*

---

Shona	86
Ndau	95
Ndebele	80
Tonga	97
Ø	87

---

Here the smaller group show a higher tolerance, Ndebele tend to prefer marriages among their own ethnic group.

Concerning the statement about "control of one group over another" there is no significant difference between the ethnic groups.

---

*Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights.*

---

Shona	81
Ndau	94
Ndebele	71
Tonga	63
Ø	80

---

Eight in ten respondents are of the opinion that different groups in a country can live together and respect their mutual rights, but Ndebele and Tonga believe this to a far lesser extent. Is this a reflection of the past experiences as well?

To summarize: Perception of ethnic and cultural diversity shows an interesting finding: Ndebele seem to be positively aware of ethnic differences as long as they concern their inner-ethnic affairs. They are not so sure that others respect the differences to the same extent as they do.

## Democracy

We take a look at militancy: How do people express their criticism of the government and political opponents?

*"Think of a situation in which many people are dissatisfied with the government and want to change it. Which of the following do you consider appropriate?"*

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

<i>Peaceful meetings and protests</i>	88%
<i>Waiting for the next elections</i>	78%
<i>Violent action</i>	10%

---

Following the responses crossed with level of education:

	<i>Waiting for next elections</i>	<i>Violent action</i>
No formal education	<b>86</b>	3
Primary School	<b>86</b>	5
Junior Secondary School uncompleted	<b>85</b>	8
Junior Secondary School completed, Senior Secondary School uncompleted	<b>79</b>	<b>14</b>
Senior Secondary School completed	73	9
Vocational School, College, Pre- University	64	<b>15</b>
University	59	<b>20</b>
Ø	78	10

The higher the level of education the more the respondents are prepared for violent action, or the other way: Respondents with a lower level of education are more willing to wait for next elections.

Following the responses crossed with ethnic group:

	<i>Waiting for next elections</i>
Shona	<b>79</b>
Ndau	<b>90</b>
Ndebele	73
Tonga	74
Ø	78

Ndebele and Tonga show slightly higher tendency towards militancy as they seem to be less prepared to wait for the next elections.

Diversity of Opinions and Interests:

Do respondents appreciate diversity of opinions and interests?

*"It is harmful for society that individuals or groups have different opinions and pursue different interests."* 28% agree

*"It is normal that people have different opinions and pursue different interests as long as they respect the rules."* 93% agree

Around 30% of respondents reject diversity of opinions and interests. More than 70% accept one of the fundamental prerequisites of democracy. If one adds the following question, the trend is even more obvious: 93% of the respondents agree to democratic principles, diversity of opinions and acceptance of the law.

The following question polarizes the question of state authority versus diversity of interests:

*"A state authority which controls particular interests and preserves social harmony."* 23% agree

Or:

*"Freedom for people to pursue different interests, provided they respect the rules."* 77% agree

Following the responses crossed with ethnic group:

---

*Freedom for people to pursue different interests, provided they respect the rules.*

---

Shona	76
Ndau	63
Ndebele	<b>88</b>
Tonga	<b>95</b>
Ø	79

---

Here the tendency is quite clear: Tonga and Ndebele agree above average with different interest as long as people respect the rules. Thus, they would be protected against persecution.

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Following the responses crossed with level of education:

---

*Freedom for people to pursue different interests, provided they respect the rules.*

---

No formal education	62
Primary School	72
Junior Secondary School uncompleted	<b>79</b>
Junior Secondary School completed;	75
Senior Secondary School uncompleted	
Senior Secondary School completed	<b>81</b>
Vocational School, College, Pre-University	<b>91</b>
University	<b>89</b>
Ø	77

---

The higher the level of education the higher is the acceptance of respondents with this statement.

#### Education Level and Democracy:

There is a high correlation with four questions concerning multi-party system, independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and pluralism of interest groups. Thus an index of democrats can be formed. Using this index, one can see how level of education correlates with democratic sentiment.

The responses break down as follows:

Not democratic (0, 1 items)	19%
Democratic (2, 3 items)	36%
Very democratic (all 4 items)	45%

Following the responses crossed with level of education:

	Not democratic	Democratic	Very democratic
No formal education	<b>47</b>	32	21
Primary School	<b>27</b>	<b>43</b>	30
Junior Secondary School uncompleted	17	<b>38</b>	45
Junior Secondary School completed; Senior Secondary School uncompleted	15	35	<b>49</b>
Senior Secondary School completed	17	34	<b>49</b>
Vocational School, College, Pre- University	1	<b>38</b>	<b>61</b>
University	4	17	<b>79</b>
Ø	19	36	45

This data table shows that the higher the level of education of the respondents the more democratic they tend to be.

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## Case Study: Chad\*

HELGA DICKOW

This paper tries to show the correlation with one's level of identification - be it based on ethnicity or religion - in regard towards society, conviviality and democracy.

### Ethnic Groups

Differences in Chad between the ethnic groups are due to history:

- Sara, the biggest ethnic group, is the best-educated group, but fear of the future is more common among them.
- Trade is under the control of ethnic groups from the North.
- There is a small militant group among Protestants in the South but also among the ethnic group of Hadjarai in the center of Chad (all Muslims).
- Muslims show more trust than Christians.
- High level of religiosity and tolerance among all groups.
- Concerning democracy items, there was no significant difference among the ethnic groups or most of the social variables

Identity:

One may observe an interesting trend in Chad: a high level of identification with ethnic group and/or religion.

The following questions were asked:

*"In any society, each person belongs to a number of social groups at the same time. You are either a man or a woman; you have a job; you speak a language; you are (or are not) a member of a religious group, a community and a nationality; you live in a village, town or city; you have political views - and for each person each of these distinctions has a different significance.*

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\* A representative survey was conducted in the cities of N'Djamena, Abeche, Sarh and Mongo at the end of 2004 by the Centre International des Sciences d'Homme in collaboration with the Laboratoire de Recherches Vétérinaires et Zootechniques in N'Djamena.

*If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself?"*

*"I feel very close to people of my own religion regardless of their education, wealth or political views."*

*"I feel very close to people of my own language group, regardless of their education, wealth, or political views."*

Out of questions concerning identity, we created two groups:

- A. High level of identification (67%)
- B. Low level of identification (33%)

Who are the respondents?

Following the two groups of identification crossed with city:

	Low identification	High identification
N'Djamena	<b>58*</b>	42
Sarah	25	<b>75</b>
Mongo	25	<b>75</b>
Abeche	27	<b>73</b>
Ø	33	67

\* All figures in this table and the following tables in percent

Following the two groups of identification crossed with religion:

	Low identification	High identification
Muslims	28	<b>72</b>
Catholics	<b>41</b>	59
Other Christians	<b>42</b>	58
Ø	33	67

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Low identification is more widespread in the capital, among Catholics and others Christians, younger respondents and respondents with a higher level of education

High identification is more widespread in the three other cities, among Muslims, respondents who are 50+ years old, those who are former Koran school pupils, or those with only primary education or less.

One could call it a traditional and a modernity effect.

### **Psycho-social attitudes and economy**

Are respondents prepared to take risks?

*"If you start to change things, you usually make them worse."*

	Low identification	High identification
Agree	30	<b>70</b>
Disagree	<b>46</b>	54
Ø	33	67

Respondents with a low identification seem to be more prepared to accept changes.

On the other hand, those with low identification doubt that they can do much to improve people's lives or believe less than respondents with a high identification that even ordinary people can make progress if they help each other.

Respondents with a high identification believe that the biggest difference in Chad is between rich and poor, regardless of where they are from.

### **Attitudes towards religion and ethnicity**

Results show that the more religious the respondent, the higher the level of identification tends to be. In order to explore the Religious fundamentalism versus conviviality the following question was asked:

*"Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society."*

Agreement is high among respondents with a high identification and especially among Muslims.

But if one looks at the following question concerning conviviality, one discovers another picture:

*"Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other and respect each other's mutual rights."*

	Low identification	High identification
Agree	31	<b>69</b>
Disagree	<b>49</b>	51
Ø	33	67

Agreement is slightly above average among the respondents with high identification.

*"Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting."*

	Low identification	High identification
Agree	31	<b>69</b>
Disagree	<b>47</b>	53
Ø	33	67

Respondents with high identification agree slightly above average. However, they are equally afraid that one group might either dominate or be dominated. Is this why they like to look for compromises?

*"Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most?"*

*"I fear that peace and cooperation between ethnic groups in our country may have become impossible."*

Or:

*"In spite of everything, peace and cooperation can still be achieved."*

	Low identification	High identification
Peace and cooperation impossible	<b>49</b>	51
Peace and cooperation possible	31	<b>69</b>
Ø	33	67

Again respondents with low identification must have doubts.

It is interesting that in both negative answers we find ethnic groups who have suffered during the civil war: in the first question, it is the Hadjarai, an ethnic group in the center of the country who paid a high blood tribute. In the second question it is the Sara who had lost power and don't seem to have a lot of confidence in peaceful cooperation.

*"Given the strength of the different groups in our society, it is necessary to search for compromise and come to some agreement."*

	Low identification	High identification
Agree	29	<b>71</b>
Disagree	<b>45</b>	55
Ø	33	67

#### Political Decisions

What are respondents' attitudes about the politics of their country and their political leaders?

*"In general, I think that our government is doing the right thing."*

	Low identification	High identification
Agree	21	<b>79</b>
Disagree	<b>40</b>	60
Ø	33	67

High identification corresponds with high trust in government.

### **Party Preference**

Respondents were asked which party they would vote for.

Following the two groups of identification crossed with party\*\* preference:

	Low identification	High identification
MPS	21	<b>79</b>
FAR	40	60
URD	40	60
PLD	<b>46</b>	54
Ø	33	67

We found out that in Chad, ethnicity influences party preference more than any other social variable. Muslims and ethnic groups from the North prefer Idriss Deby or his opponent Ibni Oumar. Groups from the South - depending on region of origin - prefer either Kamougué or Yorongar.

In this case, we find the strongest opposition among the respondents with low identification. They would vote for PLD or Ibni Oumar or other opposition. Real opposition comes from the ranks of those who are not bound by religion or ethnicity.

On the other hand, respondents with a high identification seem to be better equipped for compromises. They show more solidarity, have got more trust but also fear changes. Respondents with low identification show less trust in people around them and are more open concerning risks and changes even in the political set-up.

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\*\* The important political parties in Chad : MPS = Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (party in power under Deby) ; PLD = Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement (opposition party in the North; Muslim leader, Ibni Oumar, is also leader of an opposition coalition) ; FAR = Fédération, Action pour la République (opposition party in the based in the South; leader from the South, Yorongar); URD = Union pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie (party from the South; its leader, Kamougué, had a prominent role during the civil war).

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## Democracy scale and education

Ten items were taken to form a democracy index.

The responses break down as follows:

Undemocratic	(0 - 4 items)	7
Partially democratic	(5 - 7 items)	33
Democratic	(8, 9 items)	43
Very democratic	(all 10 items)	17

The break-down on the democracy scale according to level education is as follows:

Education	Democracy scale			
	Un-democratic	Partially democratic	Democratic	Very democratic
No formal education	10	43	35	11
Koran school, can read	13	31	45	10
Primary school	9	32	45	14
Secondary school, vocational training	5	37	44	14
Senior Secondary graduate	3	22	46	29
University graduate	4	16	38	41
Average	7	33	17	17

## Conclusion

Traditionalists may be beneficial with respect to conviviality but a modern democracy needs education to succeed.

## Case Study: Sri Lanka

RAINER HAMPEL

### Survey

The survey of Sri Lanka was conducted in 2006. The sample of 2000 respondents was representative, drawing people above 18 years of age from all over the island. A small under-representation exists with respect to respondents from the Northern Province due to armed conflict. The results of the Northeastern Province are weighted for statistical analysis.

### Ethnicity and Religion

Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.

Ethnicity	% of Population
Sinhalese	74.0%
Sri Lankan Tamils	12.7%
Sri Lankan Moors	7.0%
Indian Tamils	5.5%


Religions	% of Population
Buddhism	69.3%
Hinduism	15.5%
Islam	7.6%
Christianity	7.6%

**Sinhalese:** 94 % Buddhists; 5% Christians

**Tamils:** 88 % Hindus; 10% Roman Catholics

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## Geographical Distribution



### Dividing Lines - Perceived Group Differences

A "Sinhala Only" policy has been followed since 1956. In the past, under British rule, Tamils were favored for civil service positions. Their readiness to learn English gave them access to jobs and education. In 1969, Tamils (who constituted 11% of the population) held 50% of all university positions in medicine, science, and engineering.

Today, there is discrimination against Tamils in the public service, constituting only 8% of government employees. In 2005, a new policy was introduced to make Tamil the 2<sup>nd</sup> national language. It is only taught in secondary school.

*Which of the following would you consider to be the biggest difference in Sri Lanka?*

	Sinhalese	Tamils	Total
<i>Rich and poor</i>	<b>66%</b>	42%	61%
<i>Sinhalese and Tamils</i>	30%	<b>52%</b>	35%
<i>Buddhists and Hindus</i>	2%	2%	2%
<i>Buddhists and Christians</i>	2%	2%	2%
<i>Hindus and Christians</i>	0%	2%	0%

It is very important to note that economic and ethnic differences are cited the most. Very little significance is given to religious differences. This shows that the conflict is economic and ethnic and not religious.

---

## Dividing Lines - Poverty and Education

### *Average Monthly Income*

Tamils	\$36
Sinhalese	\$66
North East	\$24
Other provinces	\$65

### *Unemployment*

North East	37%
Other provinces	26%

### *Secondary/Higer Education*

Tamils	28%
Sinhalese	56%
Muslims	57%

### *Higher Education*

North East	6%
Other provinces	20%

## Dividing Lines - Treatment in Public Institutions

### *Where do you feel you have a good chance of getting fair and just treatment?*

	Sinhalese	Tamils	LTTE areas *
<i>in court</i>	65%	82%	87%
<i>in university entrance exams</i>	75%	49%	32%
<i>in a police investigation</i>	24%	32%	32%

\* LTTE = Liberation Tamil Tigers Ealam

### Dividing Lines - Trust of People

*"I trust or feel close to..."*

- My family, friends, neighbours: > 70 %
- People of my ethnic/religious group: > 70 %
- All citizens of Sri Lanka: 26 %
  - Muslims = 43 % feel close to all citizens of Sri Lanka
  - Tamils = 39 %
  - Sinhalese = 21 %

The results show that national identity is low and that the Sinhalese score is low. One must recall here the words of Dahl, "Political trust favors democracy".

### Dividing Lines - Ethno-nationalism

*"People can have different roles at the same time... If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself?"*

<i>In the first place, I am...</i>	Sinhalese	Muslim	Tamil
nation/religion	25%	<b>45%</b>	<b>54%</b>
citizen of SL	25%	24%	15%
villager/city dweller	4%	13%	8%
Occupation	15%	7%	13%
name/roles	15%	6%	7%
personal qualities	14%	3%	14%
language/pol. Party	1%	2%	0%


Note that Muslims and Tamil have a high level of identification with religion and nation.

## Political Perceptions

*'What is the most serious political problem confronting our country today which the government should urgently address?'*

	Sinhalese	Muslims	Tamils	LTTE areas
War	51%	46%	43%	11%
Disunity/ ethnic conflict	38%	49%	53%	89%
Other political problems	11%	6%	4%	0%

## Consequences of Armed Conflict



### Attitudes Towards Democracy

The chart below gauges support within each ethnic and religious group for each of the following signs of democracy: an independent judiciary, rejection of rule by one single group, freedom of the press, a multi-party system, an executive controlled by Parliament, rejection of a system without opposition.

	Total	Sinhalese	Muslims	Tamils	LTTE areas
An independent judiciary	84%	86	85	50	48
Rejection of rule by one single group	82	85	68	61	90
Freedom of press	77	78	71	67	86
A multi-party system	63	62	68	70	62
An executive controlled by parliament	57	55	65	72	86
Rejection of a system without opposition	25	23	29	37	52

The next chart lays out the degree of support for democracy within each group, according to the democracy index, composed of the six items in the chart above:

	Total	Sinhalese	Muslims	Tamils	LTTE areas
Not democratic	6%	6%	8%	13%	2%
Partly democratic	74%	74%	72%	72%	73%
Democratic	20%	20%	21%	15%	26%

The results show that most Sri Lankans are in favor of democracy and that differences between ethnic groups are insignificant.

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Topics	Range	Results for Sri Lanka
World Democracy Audit overall ranking	1-150	70
Political Rights	1-7	3
Civil Liberties	1-7	3
Press Freedom	0-100	86
Corruption	0-100	67


According to the World Democracy Audit, Sri Lanka is “partly democratic”. According to the Freedom House Index, Sri Lanka is “partly free”.

### **Authoritarian Syndrome**

Taking the following indicators, one can diagnose whether an “authoritarian syndrome” exists in a particular group of the population:

- People of my group live in less favorable conditions than others.
- I approve prohibiting political activities of the opposition
- I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living.
- I feel uncertain and fearful about my future.
- It is permissible to falsify election results...
- If you try to change things you usually make them worse.
- Sri Lankan Muslims should try hard to practice Islam as Arab Muslims.
- One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.
- There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country.
- It is permissible to break the law if it is in the interest of your family.
- Women should stay at home and look after their children and family.
- Whatever my personal efforts, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to.
- I approve censorship or ban of newspapers
- I approve introducing martial law

The results are laid out in the diagram below.



### Factors Conducive to Democracy

	<i>Non-Democrats</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Differences</i>
Gender (male)	40	58	+18%
Education (high)	12	26	+14%
Income (household)	\$172	\$224	+\$52
Income (personal)	\$50	\$90	+\$40
Conservatism* (low)	45	64	+19%
Efficacy** (high)	26	44	+18%
Religious practice (low)	30	41	+11%

\* Item: *Women should stay at home and look after their children and family - Disagree*

\*\* Item: *There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country - Disagree*

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## **Best Political Solution**

When survey participants were asked what they considered to be the best political solution for Sri Lanka, the respondents answered as follows (by grouping):

### **Sinhalese**


31% favor a multi-party system; 31% favor undemocratic solutions.

Solution	%
Multi-party system + Winning party rules	31
Division of country + groups form their own states	20
Single party rule, no opposition allowed	19
Joint government with quotas for major groups	18
Most numerous group rules, other groups accept decisions	11
Authoritarian regime	1

### **Tamils**

Solution	%
Division of country + groups form their own states	68 *
Multi-party system + Winning party rules	22
Joint government with quotas for major groups	7
Single party rule, no opposition allowed	3


\* NE province = 95%



### Muslims

35% prefer a quota-based power-sharing government; 25% favor non-democratic solutions.

Solution	%
Joint government with quotas for major groups	35
Multi-party system + Winning party rules	24
Division of country + groups form their own states	16
Single party rule, no opposition allowed	14
Most numerous group rules, other groups accept decisions	8
Authoritarian regime	3



## Conclusion

- Ethnic cleavages are deep.
- Armed conflict not winnable for either side.
- GoSL will have to give some form of autonomy for the NE.
- LTTE's desire for full-scale independence is unfeasible.
- International community could solve the conflict.

## **PART III**

### **Exploring the Added Value of Comparison**

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## **Exploring the Added Value of Comparison**

BEATRICE SCHLEE (Chair)

The discussion in this part was limited to experts and did not follow a rigid structure. It developed spontaneously, and the discussants set their own agenda and time program. The main issue discussed was what to be done next in comparative studies.

Theodor Hanf started off the session by pointing out that studies on 15 countries were made, and 26 data sets exist. We should do something with them: there is a chance for gaining added value by systematic comparison. What are the correlations and causal links detected in individual case studies that will stand the test of generalization?

Hanf suggested examining several questions. How to use our qualitative data, e.g. elite interviews, in addition to quantitative ones? What is the best methodological approach to compare the quantitative data? Considering conviviality and pro-democracy attitudes as target variables, what independent variables should be selected? Is there a need to add other case studies, e.g. an example of a competitive, pluralistic democracy to make the comparison more meaningful?

The debate focused the following points:

### **Elite Interviews**

The participants agreed that the elite interviews should definitely be used in comparative exercises because they give valuable additional perspectives. It was suggested to construct a matrix with reference to historical background (on wars, conflicts, etc.), to the discourses of ethnic entrepreneurs ("beating the tribal drums") and, alternatively, statements conducive to coexistence. The interview results would be put into the matrix.

As to the question over whether the interviews conducted were standardized and hence comparison was possible, Hanf clarified that the interviews were semi-structured and that they all covered the same subjects. The selection of interviewees was done through a reputation sample. This makes comparison possible.

### **Classifying background conditions**

One participant suggested that for purposes of quantitative comparison, each case study should get a number as well as each group within the country, allowing for comparison between groups in similar conditions and the detection of group differences. The most important differentiation would be between different positions of power. Each group should be weighed according to its own power and its relation to the power

of other groups. It was pointed out that groups sometimes have internal differences, and that it might be significant to factor this in. It was agreed that the standard deviation within a group was very important in order to detect group cohesiveness and to gauge the significance of intra-communal rifts.

One expert asked whether it would be useful to qualify whether groups had lost power or not. After a discussion on the issue of adding qualifications and variables, it was agreed that independent variables should be kept at a minimum. It was suggested that different charts with different lists and variables could be presented with the analysis. This way, the matrix would remain very simple, and the information within it could be regrouped according to different criteria. The suggestion found unanimous approval.

Other participants warned against concentrating too much on preconceived theories because this would colour the conclusions, and one would run the risk of becoming selective with data. Hanf cautioned against introducing too many new variables into the analysis because they are necessarily artificial, i.e. constructed by the researcher, and not empirically detected opinions or attitudes.

### **Indices/Scales/Profiles**

The idea of creating a joint database of all case study results was proposed and debated. Hanf pointed out that the more cases are available, the greater the chance that scales can be produced, not just indices. Scales would be constructible because all individual survey-takers would be counted in it. Then one can get answers to cross-case questions of significance.

The need to weight the variables was debated, and it was agreed that the need for weighting depended on the unit of analysis used. If the unit of analysis is the individual (e.g. as a world citizen), then there would be no need to weight the data to take into account differences in population between one country and another. On the other hand, if the unit of analysis is the state, then the data ought to be weighted.

### **Additional Surveys**

Should new case studies added to the list of surveys already conducted? India was suggested, because it was a competitive, plural democracy that could constitute an effective contrast to the other countries in the survey pool. It was then pointed out that more than one stable democratic system should be examined in order to control for Indian particularities. Some cases were proposed and debated: Cyprus, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Turkey, Ireland, Belgium, and Switzerland. Hanf noted that budget considerations should be taken into account when choosing the additional countries to be surveyed. The same field research costs more in some countries than in others. No conclusive decision was taken.

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It was also suggested that surveys be repeated in countries where only one survey was taken, in order to permit over-time comparison, particularly in countries submitted to rapid political change.

## Comparing Cultures and Conflicts

PETER MOLT

*Speech in honour of Theodor Hanf on the occasion of his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday and the presentation of the Festschrift "Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich - Comparing Cultures and Conflicts" edited by Peter Molt and Helga Dickow (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007)".*

When Theodor Hanf started working at the recently founded "Arbeitsstelle für Kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung" (Center for Cultural Research), forerunner of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, in the early 1960s, his first research projects were on the educational systems of Rwanda and Lebanon. This brought home to him the fact that educational systems can play a role in social tension - and he spent the next 45 years of scientific endeavour examining cultural, linguistic and religious identity, colour, social, and political coexistence. "Do they facilitate conflict, and if so, how? And how can they be regulated on the basis of consensus?" Theodor Hanf is a sociologist in the Weberian tradition, i.e. his approach is that of the broad school embracing political science, economics, and the history of ideas. Well before his peers, he underscored the relevance of socio-cultural determinants, factors most social scientists long ignored in favour of socioeconomic interpretations. Yet, he never succumbed to the allure of a purely culturalist paradigm. Theodor Hanf's synoptic approach draws on another defining feature of his research. No matter the subject, he is first and foremost an empirical and comparative scientist. Hence, the title of this volume: "Comparing Cultures and Conflicts."

More than 70 colleagues, associates, friends, and students from all over the world have come together in this volume to honour Theodor Hanf on the occasion of his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday; this symbolic number is concrete manifest of the global recognition he enjoys. As an expression of thanks not only for his scientific dedication, but also for the encouragement and inspiration imparted in innumerable conversations and through the reading of his writings, each author tackles from his or her unique view and experience the question of how cultures shape peoples and societies, why culturally imprinted conflicts arise, how different identity groups can coexist and collaborate in state and society notwithstanding different values, and what role educational systems play in vertical conflicts. The questions that Theodor Hanf has raised in his academic life may sound easy, but they are devilishly difficult to answer. The contributions in this volume are representative of the many facets to the answer.



Peter Molt presenting the Festschrift

It has been a bitter lesson for people from the four corners of the globe that the deepest and most murderous conflicts at the turn of the millennium are those between communities with different cultural, ethnic, and religious identities. The search for reasons yields very different answers, if only because it is difficult to say exactly what determines identity and what it signifies. We surmise that identity has to do with view of history and Weltanschauung, with education and economic situations and with historical events. The obvious course is to turn for explanations to the history of thought, or psychology, or genetics, to deductions and definitions, systematic, and structural interpretations. From the start, Theodor Hanf deliberately chose another path. He sought to determine the essence of ethnic, cultural and religious identity using long-term empirical surveys and extensive longitudinal comparisons. Is there another social scientist in the world who has devoted no fewer than 20 years - half of his academic career - to empirical surveys and thousands of conversations and on-the-spot meetings in Africa and Asia to gain a better understanding of cultural conflicts and compare them with one another?

The particular focus of Theodor Hanf's research is conflicted societies of the Middle East, Indonesia, Georgia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and South Africa. His investigations extended over long periods of time, giving them the time dimension other conflict analysis lack. His analyses stand on extraordinarily broad, empirically substantiated foundations, reinforced with the insights gained in innumerable meetings on the subject of conflict with many crucial decision makers, and

in Hanf's collaboration with leading social scientists in the countries concerned. But the empirical element is only one aspect of his investigations. In some cases, he went into the historical background in great detail. The rewards of this method are apparent in his major study of the conflict in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990. Descriptions of the constitutive characteristics of state and society in the small crisis-wracked country and the course of the civil war are complemented by interviews with leading politicians of all persuasions and a sample of gainfully employed Lebanese. The analysis of the war and the surveys together form an impressive synopsis. In reading the account, one is struck by Hanf's cautious use of generalizations. As a result, the conclusions of this - in every respect - saturated approach are all the more reliable and convincing.

Theodor Hanf joined Arnold Bergstraesser's "Forschungsgruppe Entwicklungsländer" in 1959 and was for many years co-director with Dieter Oberndörfer of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. But he is successor to his sociological and political mentor not only in a formal sense, but also in his methods, and that in two ways. Like Arnold Bergstraesser, Theodor Hanf is a hands-on political scientist who seeks to turn the results of his research into directives for concrete political action and to tangibly influence decision-making processes. An example of this was his exceptional and influential commitment to transformation in South Africa. At the methodological level, he substantially expanded and deepened Arnold Bergstraesser's very general theoretical concept of the synoptic analysis of countries and their cultures.

Chronologically, as a research professor for sociology and the German Institute for International Educational Research in Frankfurt am Main, Theodor Hanf initially focused on educational systems in developing countries. Already as a student he took part in research projects on educational planning and the importance of educational systems in Africa and Asia. His doctoral thesis, published in 1969, was on the Lebanese educational system. Since then he has written no fewer than 30 works on this topic. As early as 1975 he co-authored an article titled "Education: an Obstacle to Development?" In 1980, he distilled two decades of experience into a critique: in many African and Asian countries the educational system is an obstacle rather than an aid to development. Necessary reforms were not implemented because privileged economic and political elites saw in them a threat to their privileges. And where they were forced to bow people's demands for better educational opportunities, the solutions introduced were often minimal or a charade. The consequence was inefficient and often costly educational systems that did little or nothing for development, but did preserve the privileges of the elites. According to Hanf, quantitatively expanding the educational system without simultaneous root-and-branch reforms neither enhanced social equality nor improved economic performance. His studies of the reactions to this stock-taking show that politicians paid little heed to his warnings. Little changed in the quarter century since then: his recommendations for better, and better adapted, primary, secondary, and tertiary education were largely ignored. This finding is particularly significant today, as achieving universal primary education is one of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals and hence supposed to be a fundamental focus of international development.



Already in his early studies Hanf established that the structure of the educational system facilitated the emergence of the postcolonial oligarchies and the protection of their acquired rights. An unbalanced educational system can generate social and ethnic tensions and undermine political coexistence between different population groups. Even when historically disadvantaged communities, such as the Shi'ites in Lebanon succeeded in narrowing the education gap, the earlier sense of disadvantage can perpetuate a sense of inferiority that is fatal for relations between ethnic and religious communities. Hence, an educational system that offers all groups in society reasonably equal access to job opportunities is not only important for economic development but also for inestimable relevance for political stability and the political orientation of future generations.

Decades later, this early insight into the importance of education for a democratic and peaceful political order prompted Theodor Hanf, now Director of the UNESCO International Centre for Human Sciences in Byblos, Lebanon, since his retirement in Frankfurt, to focus the Centre's research activities on empirical studies on the interaction between individual cultures, on the one hand, and democracy as a universal system of government on the other. Hanf is convinced that empirical surveys of "ordinary" people from different cultures or religions tell us more about the possibilities of democracy than so many investigations based on normative or deductive definitions. The evaluation of this research shows time and again that the essentialistic definitions of culture and religion are untenable with respect to democracy. The only valid relationship is that between education and democracy, whereby this relationship de-

pends not on what people are taught, but on their belief that what they are taught will improve their chances of survival.

Theodor Hanf is convinced that responsible politicians with suitable concepts can bring about democratic transformation in countries with a non-western culture. Economic backwardness, religion, and multi-ethnicity are not insurmountable obstacles in a constitutional order that is normatively superior in respect of human and civil rights, the rule of law, the state's monopoly on the use of force, checks and balances, and the peaceful change of government through elections. In Hanf's view, once a society has reached a certain level of education, it is rare for undemocratic rule to endure. His survey results show that as a level of education rises so does the proportions of the population that views democracy as the political system that, relatively speaking, offers them the greatest opportunities.

At the end of the 1970s, the Scientific Commission of the German Section of Justia et Pax asked Theodor Hanf to lead a research group on the possibilities of peaceful change in the Republic of South Africa. Hanf worked on the premise that in a multi-ethnic society it was fairly unlikely that in the long run power could be exercised without the consent of the majority. The longer the dominant group exercised powers to its advantage without the consent of others, the greater the probability that a change of power, when it came, would be violent. There are more cases in history of privileged minorities stubbornly clinging to their privileges and defending them literally to the last man than of minorities coming to the insight that it is better to sacrifice a lot than to lose everything. The research group decided to empirically survey the attitudes of the white and black population groups on the possibility of finding an acceptable solution. Although ending the apartheid system would depend on the unpredictable decision-making of the white elite and on external political factors in particular, an inquiry into the opinions of the general population would give some idea of what solutions, if any, were viable. The study provided evidence that the real obstacle to system change was not the loss of economic privileges or differences in group identity, but the question of power. A potential compromise in such circumstances was a consociational system such as practiced in Switzerland, Belgium, or the Netherlands. The survey demonstrated for the first time that, contrary to all expectations, a compromise was possible.

Reading the study again more than 25 years later, one is impressed by the clarity and conviction of the empirically substantiated arguments. At the time, it was generally thought improbable that the apartheid regime would soon end. The study shares this assessment. Although it errs in this point, as an analysis of apartheid at its peak, it remains a historical document. Even today, the empirical surveys, the first of their kind in South Africa, are an important reference for the development of opinions in the broad population. The forecast that the behavior of the white elites was the key to reform also proved correct. The study undoubtedly encouraged this process, and even though the country did not adopt a consociational system, influenced to some degree the agreement on power-sharing during the transition period. The result is a series of checks and balances in respect of power that has done much to reduce the fears of the

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white minority. This study by Hanf and his colleagues revealed which attitudes of the majority and the minorities and their respective elites, which sociocultural conditions and which economic prerequisites and developments would need to coincide with foreign political constellations to facilitate the miracle of democratic transformation in a plural society. This process may be exceptional, yet South Africa - a new nation unique in its social diversity - is extraordinary confirmation of Hanf's assumptions about the possibility of transcending deep social cleavages and embracing multi-ethnic democracy.



Theodor Hanf thanking Peter Molt, Helga Dickow and all contributors to the Festschrift.

Given Hanf's advocacy for reform and conflict solution in South Africa, his study was followed by his close involvement in election observation of the first universal elections in 1994. These were crucial for a successful change of the system. Success could not be taken for granted, as radical groups had the potential to disrupt the elections and provoke a civil-war-like situation. In the process of change, elections are the critical moment at which the success of efforts for democratic transformation cannot be taken for granted. South Africa is unique, inasmuch as the leadership of the victorious ANC probably, as Hanf hinted on his return to Germany, sought to neutralize the effect of disturbances during voting on the validity of the final results by amending them to a percentage below that needed for a two-thirds majority, and thereby formally giving force to the concessions negotiated for the formerly dominant white group for the duration of the first term of the new government. This was a statesmanlike, confidence-building measure for the first order. Precisely because of these positive experi-

ences, Hanf cautioned against jumping to conclusions and attaching too much significance to the effectiveness of election observation missions in future processes of reform and conflict solution. Elections are the final step in a long process, and election observation is meaningful only if it serves to create confidence. Hanf used his South African experiences to develop principles for goal-oriented election observation.

The South African case is not only an example of political science in practice. Together with investigations in Lebanon, it inspired Hanf to fine-tune his method of country analysis and comparative conflict research. Hanf views comparatistics as the silver bullet of conflict analysis because it is the only way of producing reasonably reliable forecasts. But here, too, he warns against excessive optimism. Specific comparative questions are not a reliable basis for forecasts, and there is no such thing as a perfect analogy. What comparatistics can do, though, is help to formulate relevant questions.

Conflict in ethnically and culturally heterogeneous states are always multidimensional, i.e. they reflect horizontal and vertical cleavages, socio-economic stratification and cultural, linguistic, and religious divisions. What makes them so virulent is the struggle between elites over power and privileges. Hanf's writings and reports contain many insights into the nature and course of such conflicts. The power of defining normative goals is usually in the hands of people with very concrete interests. Therefore, it is essential to know what the population thinks about cultural conflict. In the final analysis, culture is what a population in a certain place and time takes culture to be and how it expresses it. Surveys of members of the different groups reveal that their opinions can diverge from the normative codes. It is probable that the culture expressed and desired by the majority of people is far more syncretistic and far less adversarial than the narrow normative cultural stereotypes would have us believe. The empirical studies show that even in deeply divided societies the great majority of the population has a very clear idea of where their real interests lie, i.e., in general they are willing to accept coexistence in which everybody has equal rights. Their attitudes are shaped by social attitudes and psychosocial sensitivities, perceptions of economic opportunity, identity, and political orientation. Knowledge of these attitudes is an important element in any attempt to solve conflict, particularly if it involves democratic elections. Based on his experiences in Lebanon and South Africa, Hanf developed a survey method that has now been tested in case studies in 15 countries. Any profound political analysis must include questions on the history of the conflict, the current distribution of power and privileges, the interest of the rival elites and on people's attitudes and whether they are democratic or undemocratic, tolerant or intolerant.

Theodor Hanf's theoretical contribution goes far beyond the methodology of cultural analysis. He raises the fundamental question of the significance of ethnic and cultural conflicts in and for the international community of states. He has written many articles to this topic, although, unfortunately none to date summarize his thinking. It is increasingly apparent that the crucial question of international politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century revolves around a legacy from the 20<sup>th</sup>: the principle that the international community

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of states is a community of nation-states. The break-up of the great historical empires such as the Habsburg empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Colonial empires of the western power, the Soviet Union, and down a notch, Yugoslavia, gave rise to a myriad of nation-states, each ostensibly the embodiment of the will of its unified citizens. Is the world much more stable for being divided into about 200 nation-states? Hanf doubts it, and expresses these doubts in memorable phrases: the order of the international community resembles Metternich's, and will probably not last much longer; or; a few large imperial jails have been replaced by dozens of small national prisons. Whereas in western countries nations emerged within the framework of existing states, in the new states this process has occurred in considerably more testing circumstances, not least on account of economic and social shortcomings in development. In many places ethnicity, i.e., the politicization of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities, is today more virulent than before independence. In most of these states, the struggle for survival is intensified by poverty and population explosion. As a result, instead of breaking down existing cleavages, modernization, globalization, urbanization and education have exacerbated and underscored them. As a rule, political, economic, and social competition is not perceived as an individual matter, but as the concern of the group as a whole and acted on as such. Hence, tradition, ethnicity, language or religion is a more immediate bases for solidarity than stratum or class. Hanf distinguishes six ideal types of strategy to homogenize or integrate a citizenry: expulsion and genocide, separation, domination by one ethnic group, assimilation, consociation, and syncretistic nationalism. He defines consociation as equal rights of permanent grand coalition, and syncretistic national as the depoliticization of ethnicity by granting ethnic, linguistic and religious groups a maximum of cultural autonomy. As mentioned above, cultural autonomy must include education, because of this factor's significance in political equality, social advancement, and the preservation of cultural identity. Cultural autonomy alone facilitates political models of other policy areas independent of ethnic concerns. By contrast, models of political integration that exclude cultural autonomy are less attractive and are seldom successful.

Supported by the results of empirical research, Theodor Hanf is convinced that an indispensable condition for multicultural states susceptible to ethnic conflict is a democratic constitution that includes a guarantee of cultural autonomy. The success of nation-building and of linguistic and cultural integration in immigrant countries can be attributed to religious tolerance. Moreover; immigrants are generally open to changing their linguistic and cultural identity and are not predisposed to banding together with people with similar interest to pursue political power. Not surprisingly, a concept of nation-building based on these particular experiences does not apply in states with pre-existing plural societies. Hence, nation-building was largely a failure because the new dominant elites treated it as an administrative measure to create not only a state, but also a society and an economy, and imported institutions of state that ignored existing social units.

However, economic development and the effectiveness of foreign economic aid are also undermined by the weakness of the new state and the inner conflicts of its so-

society. For a long time, the political dimension of development policy was overlooked or suppressed. Theodor Hanf was among the first development theorists in Germany to demand a politically focused, democracy-oriented Third-World policy. For decades the view prevailed that development aid had to be apolitical, that regardless of the system of government aid would improve the living conditions of the poor, and that capital, a free-market economic, technical know-how and an educational system based on these three factors would bring progress. Hanf held that this view was not only wrong, but counterproductive. Development aid, whatever its shape, is a form of intervention. Apolitical, technocratic development aid has very political consequences. It entrenches the status quo, which in the existing circumstances is by no means optimal for economic development, often detrimental to social development and at best ineffective with respect to political participation and the recognition of human rights. For many years, Theodor Hanf promoted his conviction in the Third World Working Group of the German Foreign Office, a body he headed. In the meantime this view has become common wisdom, even if in the current difficult international environment the path to implementation is strewn with obstacles.



Helga Dickow and Theodor Hanf distributing copies  
of "Comparing Cultures and Conflicts"

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This appreciation of Theodore Hanf's scientific achievements is written at a time in which unhappy Lebanon is again confronted by chaos. Hanf hoped that as Director of the Institute in Byblos and professor at the American University in Beirut he would be able to continue to contribute to the political and cultural dialogue in country to which he devoted a large part of his scientific and practical political endeavour. However, consociational systems like Lebanon are fragile entities; historically as the examples of Switzerland and Belgium attest, such entities have been able to develop only when neighbouring powers have allowed them the neutrality, space, and scope to do so. This has not been Lebanon's lot. The 16-year old civil war that broke out in 1975 was a domestic conflict, but also an international proxy war over Palestine. A precarious peace was established in 1991: it may have been all quiet on the domestic front, but the independence of the Lebanese state was not re-established and its fate lay in the hands of external powers. The worldwide preoccupation with international terrorism since 11 September 2001 casts a particularly dark shadow over this small country. The backdrop of renewed warfare in the region is the unresolved conflict between the irreconcilable ideologies of Zionist and Arab nationalism, now overlaid to some extent by the fundamentalist current in Islam.

According to Hanf, the effort of the major powers to preserve a neo-Metternichian order in the Middle East has little chance of success, because the USA and its European allies have demonstrated that they lack the power needed to intervene in its support. The policy of concentrating efforts for peace and stability on individual countries is not a viable approach to a lasting, durable peace because of the inter-dependence between policies of the states concerned and their inability to contain ideologies. Conflict-solving strategies inevitably take a rational and secular approach. In a critical article written in 1986, Theodor Hanf pointed out that this was arguably the wrong approach and that in the Middle East in particular increasingly bitter conflicts were resorting to forms of terrorism that even far superior conventional military machines would not be able to defeat. At the time, Hanf expressed the fear that developing powers motivated by religious ideology could try to acquire nuclear weapons. He also surmised that religiously inspired political ideologies and movements could have more staying power than secularized Western politicians were willing to accept, and that such ideologies and movements would not shrink from militant policies and permanent conflict. What can happen does not have to. But the possibility remains that the only way of preserving peace could be to accept ideological frameworks supported by developing countries, even if the West did not approve of such frameworks. In analyzing these conflicts, social scientist should resist the ethnocentric prejudice that the progress of rationalization and secularization is inexorable and religion-based political ideologies are simply a reflection of a cultural awareness that lags behind modern technical and economic forms of existence. Rather, they should approach alien ideologies and movement with openness and understanding.

Objectivity and respect for the otherness of other cultures is characteristic of Theodor Hanf as a social scientist. For him, this is a prerequisite for dialogue and

understanding across all forms of separation; without it there is no possibility for finding a common basis for peaceful coexistence. The path to world peace lies not in the dominance of the western way of life, but in consociation between the cultures and religions.

It goes beyond the bounds of this appreciation these words of recognition to mention many other topics that have aroused Theodor Hanf's scientific curiosity. What motivates a scientist's interest in such a broad range of places and topics? Biographies of intellectuals are a popular field of research for contemporary young historians. But in Theodor Hanf's case, it is too early for that. Firstly, his friends and students would not believe that he has run out of ink. And secondly, in an era that worships youth it is easy to forget that a great number of remarkable scientific works are products of age. Hence, as far as the intellectual biography is concerned we shall have to rely on conjecture a while longer. Hans-Peter Schwartz's contribution provides a good opening with Theodor Hanf's Rhineland heritage. Rhinelanders are proud of combining cultures. In the intellectual landscape that shapes the Rhineland, people are beholden to the French heritage of the Enlightenment, to democracy and human rights and, not least, to a liberal interpretation of Catholicism. In Theodor Hanf we see this not only in his work, but also in his love of Alsace, that area that prior to two catastrophic world wars was linguistically part of the German culture and politically part of the French nation.

It is also part of Rhinelander's make-up that, politically and culturally, he feels disadvantaged by the specifically Prussian nature of the German nation-state - he smarted, as Karl Simrock lamented in 1838, under the rule of the Slav and Avar countries to which he has brought civilization and education. A Rhinelander who is aware of the history of his region knows only too well that foreign government, the rule of dominating elites, cultural and religious discrimination, resistance against pressure to assimilate, and religious discord among neighbours means. In a short, commendable text, Theodor Hanf reminds readers that for centuries German society segmented and divided, that it was a country in which regional and confessional distinctness was mutually reinforced. And then praises the conflict regulation imposed by the Peace of Westphalia, which after 30 murderous years of war created a mode of coexistence by intersegmentary equilibrium. This example illuminates one direction in plural societies can find inner peace. The intellectual formation of people of Theodor Hanf's generation was conditioned by the experience of where fanatic intolerance and cleansing nationalism taken to its extremes can lead. He spent his youth a Federal Republic that opened up to Europe and warmed to the idea of being the western republic, as symbolized by Konrad Adenauer, a Rhinelander. This is the milieu that generated and nurtured Theodor Hanf's eminently characteristic avowal of tolerance and democracy, as well as his interest in segmentation, in cultural, linguistic, and religious divisions and schisms, which for him are not manifestation so backward Oriental, Asiatic or African societies, but a universal phenomenon which has to be approached with openness and understanding.

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Editors and authors, friends, colleagues, and students are grateful to Theodor Hanf for sharing his wealth of knowledge and endless flow of reflections. We thank him for his commitment to peace and democracy and wish him many more rewarding years of work, and the leisure to enjoy them.

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