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Letters from Byblos

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Translated by John Richardson

Democrats without Democracy?
Attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad

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Attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad

HELGA DICKOW

Forty-four years of struggle for power and unity
Remarks on Chad's history and political system

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world:¹ 80% of its population lives below the poverty line. Since independence, it has known virtually only authoritarian government and civil war. Apart from the occasional negative headline, such as the three-year captivity of Françoise Claustre, a French archaeologist held in the Tibesti Mountains in the mid-1970s, the world paid little attention to Chad. Until October 2003, that is, when it started producing oil and – almost simultaneously – found itself hosting thousands of refugees fleeing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan.

¹ According to the UNDP’s Human Development Index, Chad ranks 167th out of 177 countries.
In such circumstances, what do people think about democracy and peaceful co-existence between religious and ethnic groups? Is there a Chadian identity? What kind of government do Chadians want and how do they view their future and that of their country?

A representative survey conducted in the cities of N'djamena, Abeche, Sarh und Mongo at the end of 2004 in collaboration with the Laboratoire de Recherches Vétérinaires et Zootechniques in N'djamena seeks to provide answers to these questions. In addition, leading politicians of the opposition and representatives of civil society were interviewed about the situation in Chad.

Moslems make up a good half of the population, Christians somewhat more than a third, and practitioners of traditional and other religions account for about seven percent each. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants in the north and east are largely influenced by Arab Muslim culture and those in the south are predominantly African and Christian. More than 200 ethnic and linguistic groups live together in this country - of between eight and nine million people. The largest ethnic groups (with their various subgroups) are the Sara, Moundang and Massa in the south and the Arabs, Goran, Kanem-Bomo and Ouaddai in the north.

Tensions between the different regions pre-dated the colonial period. The kingdoms and sultanates in the north and northeast of present-day Chad were centres of trade - including slavery - between Central Africa and Europe on the one hand and the Islamic centres of the Orient on the other. They hunted their human wares primarily in the south and southeast of the modern state. This has not been forgotten.

Though memories of pre-colonial history persist, their influence is not as strong as that of the short period of French colonialisation.
French colony and independence

Chad was added to French Equatorial Africa only in 1910, became part of the French Overseas Territories in 1946, an autonomous republic in the French Community in 1958 and was granted independence in 1960. The colonial administration was interested mainly in the south, the part of Chad they called “productive Chad” - in contrast to the north, "cattle-breeding Chad" or "nomadic Chad". The south was not only fertile - in the 1920s the colonial administration started cultivating cotton for export\(^6\) - but the colony was also a reservoir of forced labour: workers to build the Central African railway lines and fight as soldiers in World War II. Infrastructure and the school system were concentrated in the south,\(^7\) and most of the local recruits for the colonial administration came from there, too.

Missionary activity started in Chad later than in most French colonies. This is partly due to the secular and openly anticlerical attitudes of many colonial officials, but also to fears that missionaries could influence people in favour of other European states.\(^8\) Eventually the churches gained a foothold in Chad, although a number of more or less covert animist traditions survive. The Protestant churches were active in the south and west of the country from the 1920s; the Catholic missionary orders started working primarily in the centre and east in the 1930s. Health care and schooling went hand in hand with the missions.\(^9\) The Muslim inhabitants of the north, many of whom were nomads, not only resisted all efforts to missionise them, but also to impose the French educational system. Although the first French school was opened in Mao, in Kanem,

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\(^6\) Cf. Ulrich Stürzinger, Der Baumwollanbau im Tschad: Zur Problematik landwirtschaftlicher Exportproduktion in der Dritten Welt, Freiburg: Atlantis, 1980, pp. 11ff. and 27ff. Stürzinger demonstrates how the production of cotton was forced at the expense of cereal production and posed a threat to the subsistence economy. The cotton industry has remained one of Chad’s most important economic activities, together the export of cattle from the north of the country.


most Muslims continued to attend their Koran schools.\textsuperscript{10} For all intents and purposes, the sparsely populated north, which Europeans found unbearable hot in summer, was left to itself during the colonial period, provided that people paid their taxes and did not provoke the colonial administration.\textsuperscript{11} In short: in northern Chad colonial rule resembled the English model of indirect rule. The south, on the other hand, experienced direct French rule, French administration and pressure to assimilate.

The northern ruling elites and traders in Kanem, around Lake Chad and along the caravan routes had started converting to Islam by the end of the eleventh century. From the sixteenth century, nomads from the Arabian peninsula and traders brought Islam to Barguirmi, and by the seventeenth century it was already established in the sultanate of Wadai.\textsuperscript{12} Later, a Sultan of Abeche enforced in his territory the political-religious ideas of Islamic community taught by the Sanusi Brotherhood, a movement founded by the reformer Mohammad Ali al-Sanusi.\textsuperscript{13} Islam continued to gain ground during the colonial period and, in particular, immediately after independence during the FROLINAT uprising in the prefecture of Guera.\textsuperscript{14} West African traders and nomads, the Hausa and Peul, brought from Senegal via Nigeria to southwestern Chad an "African" brand of Islam compatible with animist traditions. For some time now, another phenomenon has been observed in the south. More Muslim traders are moving to the south with their families and Muslim civil servants and military personnel are being transferred there. Thus, in the south state authority is increasingly identified with Islam. Accordingly, apart from religious conviction, animists, and also individual family members in Christian ethnic groups, may convert to Islam for other, very pragmatic social and economic reasons. Another significant Islamic influence is Saudi Arabia. As is its policy in other moderate Muslim countries, e.g. Indonesia, the kingdom is sponsoring the construction of mosques in predominantly Christian rural areas in southern Chad. There is also perceptible Sudanese, Libyan and Pakistani influence in as much as most publications in Arabic, especially religious texts, are imported from these countries.

\textsuperscript{12} On the conversion of Ouaddai to Islam, cf. Issa Khayer (1976), pp. 36ff.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Chapelle (1986), pp. 146ff.
Short-lived democracy and civil wars

In 1956, the Parti Progressiste Tchadien, which had been founded ten years earlier by Francois Ngarta Tombalbaye, a southern Sara, and Gabriel Lisette, a French civil servant from the Antilles, won the first elections held in the country. When Chad was proclaimed a republic within the French Community in 1958, Lisette formed the first government, which was reshuffled several times in a very short period. A year later he was replaced by Tombalbaye. In 1960, Chad, like many other French colonies, gained its independence, and Tombalbaye became its first president. Post-independence democracy in Chad lasted one year.

In January 1962, Tombalbaye banned all parties except his own. Opposition political leaders were arrested, in particular Muslim politicians, who until then had enjoyed equal representation in parliament, and Lisette was sent into exile. The Parti Progressiste Tchadien became the country's single official political party.

The north resisted Tombalbaye's rule and southern domination. In 1966, political elites in the north and east, some political opponents of Tombalbaye's in the south and various other opposition groups joined together in Sudan to form the Front de libération nationale (FROLINAT). FROLINAT's objectives were the overthrow of Tombalbaye, the end of southern predominance, the formation of a democratic government of national unity and the withdrawal of French troops. FROLINAT's manifesto and rhetoric were clearly influenced by the socialist-Nasserite ideas of the times.

A popular uprising in Guera, the geographical centre of the country, triggered by excessive government taxes, began to spread. Fighting between rival groups in the centre, the army and FROLINAT degenerated into civil war, which Tombalbaye astutely exploited to maintain his hold on power. At the request of the president, France intervened in its former colony for the first time in 1969. Thanks to this support, and his skill at playing off his political opponents and the rebels against one another, Tombalbaye held on to power until 1975. Breakaway groups weakened FROLINAT. The Toubou in the north formed the "Second Army". Goukouni Oueddei, a Tedagada, formed the Forces armées populaires (FAP), which received support from Muammar Qaddafi, the new Libyan leader. Hissène Habré, a Dazagada, which, like the Tedagada, is part of the Goran ethnic group, founded the Forces armées du Nord (FAN) with Sudanese support. Libya was interested mainly in the Aouzou Strip in northern

Chad: Tombalbaye had offered this mineral-rich region to Qaddafi in exchange for his agreement not to support the rebels. The resulting border conflict ended only in 1994 when the International Court of Justice at The Hague ruled that Libya had no claim to the Aouzou Strip.\(^{18}\)

As an ideological response to the rebellions in the south, Tombalbaye proclaimed a "cultural and social revolution" under the name "Chaditude" in 1972. Modelled on the "authenticité" of President Mobutu of Zaire, it was an attempt to forge a national identity and unity for the country. To achieve this, Tombalbaye, following the Congolese example, sought to instrumentalise African tradition - or his version of it: Christian names had to be replaced by African names.\(^{19}\) Initiation rites - though of only one particular ethnic group - became mandatory.\(^{20}\) Adult men found themselves in the woods again, participating in a ritual meant for adolescents. Initially only Christian, but subsequently also Muslim civil servants from the south had to take part in this "Yondo", \(^{21}\) otherwise they would not be paid. The large cities were also renamed: Fort Lamy became N'djamena and Fort Archambault Sarh. But this was not enough to create a national identity. Chadians in the south saw "Chaditude" as an expression of Tombalbaye's hold on power and Muslims saw this demonstration of southern unity as another attempt to reinforce southern hegemony.

This attempt ended in a military coup in 1975, in which Tombalbaye was shot dead. Felix Malloum, a southern general, took power. But FROLINAT refused to join the new government and continued fighting. Once again, its advance could only be stopped with the help of France. However, FROLINAT continued to disintegrate into groups that attempted to enforce their rival claims to power by military means. But none was strong enough to do so. Habré outmanoeuvred his competitors by signing a conciliatory agreement with Malloum: in 1978 he became prime minister under Malloum. This alliance also failed, precipitating the "first battle of N'djamena"\(^{22}\) between Habré's and Malloum's troops in February 1979. Habré won with the support of Goukouni Oueddei. Malloum and many inhabitants of N'djamena from southern ethnic groups fled back to their regions of origin. The situation was explosive, with random killing of southerners in N'djamena and Muslims in the south.\(^{23}\) Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué,

\(^{18}\) The conflict over the strip has a long history: France ceded the Aouzou Strip to Italy under Mussolini in the 1930s; however, this agreement was never ratified.

\(^{19}\) Tombalbaye gave the lead, calling himself henceforth Ngarta instead of François.

\(^{20}\) Initiation rites are very widespread in southern Chad; each ethnic group has its own rites, which are kept secret from strangers and outsiders that have not taken part in them.


\(^{22}\) It started as a fight between pupils at two secondary schools.

a general of police, and the remnants of the regular army, the Forces Armées Tchadiennes, established a quasi-independent area of five prefectures centred on Moundou. For more than two years, until mid-1982, the Comité Permanent du Sud (CPS) governed this region, which financed its activities from taxes and the proceeds of cotton exports.

Pressured by neighbouring countries, in particular Nigeria, peace negotiations between the parties to the conflict were held in Lagos and Kano. A first government of national unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition, GUNT) under Lol Mahamat Choua collapsed immediately. A second government under Oueddei, with Kamougué as prime minister and Habré as minister of defence, survived less than six months. The "second battle of N'djamena" broke out on 21 March 1980. Many of the inhabitants fled again, this time mainly to neighbouring countries. In nine months of static warfare between the troops of Oueddei, Habré and other smaller groups the city was almost completely destroyed. After reconstruction, the many ethnically mixed residential areas were "demixed", since when N'djamena has been divided into south and north by ethnicity.

Despite massive Libyan support for Oueddei, Habré, under the tolerant eyes of the French, prevailed in 1982. He marched into N'djamena and declared himself president. The country was once again divided in two: Oueddei, with Libyan support, controlled the area north of the 15th parallel until 1987, when Habré, again with French support, succeeded in driving him out and uniting Chad under a single government. Oueddei fled to Algeria. Border wars with Libya over the Aouzou Strip resumed from 1987 to 1989. Habré could rule only through massive repression of the opposition. According to estimates of human rights organisations, 40,000 people disappeared while Habré was in office.

In early 1990, Habré held a referendum on a new constitution; with its acceptance he was automatically elected as president for a seven-year term, following the French example. Although the government of national unity (GUNT), which Habré had overthrown, called for a boycott of the referendum, it was ignored. By the end of that year Habré was in military difficulties. Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa, former companion in arms and commander under Habré, had played a crucial role in taking N'djamena. In 1989, he gathered his troops in the western Sudan and united a number of opposition groups under his leadership to form the Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS). On 1 December 1990, he entered N'djamena. He was able to do this because the French troops stationed in N'djamena and Abeche refused to intervene on behalf of the Habré government on the grounds that no foreign troops were involved in Déby's coup. The French still have a military presence in the country. Indeed, since the closure of the

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24 Kano I in March 1979, Kano II in April 1979.
25 He lives in exile in Senegal; human rights movements continue to try to bring him to trial.
French base in the Central African Republic in 1998, Chad has become strategically even more important for the rapid deployment of French troops in Central and West Africa.

The democratic face of monocracy

People in Chad and abroad pinned great hopes on the new ruler in N'djamena. The Cold War divisions were disappearing and the third democratic wave was gathering speed. In 1990 in La Baule, President Mitterrand had called for more democracy in the former French colonies and tied development aid to successful democratisation in the individual states.

Initially, these hopes appeared to be fulfilled by Déby's promises of open, democratic government.26 In 1991, he allowed the formation of political parties; even former rebel leaders took advantage of the new political freedoms, and by 1992, 15 parties had been officially recognised. Déby's trips abroad took him to Paris and Tripoli. Paris agreed to provide further military aid for Chad and assist it in transforming Déby's predominantly Goran-based forces into a national army.

However, the country was not yet at peace. In the transitional period before the first election armed conflicts broke out between Déby's forces and various rebel groups in the south, north and east of the country, some supported by troops of former Presidents Oueddei27 and Habré. Troops of the French Foreign Legion came to Déby's assistance.

After numerous delays, French pressure and financial support finally forced Déby to convene a conference on national sovereignty (Conference Nationale Souveraine) in January 1993. It was in the "round table" tradition, a political instrument frequently used to introduce democracy in African states. The conference was attended by more than 800 representatives of political groups, the opposition and civil society.28 The most influential parties to the conflict were already acquainted with one another from previous peace negotiations in Chad, Lagos and Kano.29 For other groups it was a new experience. For three months they discussed and worked together - in a country


27 Oueddei was still supported by Libya.


with a 20-year history of civil war. The national conference produced a transitional parliament, the Conseil supérieur de la transition. It also passed a preliminary constitution. It was announced that a referendum on the constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections, would be held the following year. Fidel Moungar, a southerner and education minister in the transitional government, was appointed prime minister. President Déby confirmed that he was willing to work with him. Moungar’s appointment followed an “unwritten law” observed since the Malloum - Habré government of 1978: if the president was a northerner, the prime minister would be a southerner, and vice versa. This “geopolitics” ensured that by allotting key government posts to representatives from both regions their vital interests would not be ignored.

However, differences soon arose between President Déby and Premier Moungar, particularly over ministerial appointments. Déby sought to include opposition politicians in the government - and after the peace talks rebel leaders, too - with the aim of weakening them. After just seven months in office Premier Moungar was dismissed in November 1993 and replaced by Kassire Koumakoye.

The harmony that came with the sense of a new era did not last long. Not only were there attempted coups by opposition leaders in the south and north of the country, but also reports that army units fighting rebels in the south had attacked civilians.

Rebel and separatist movements sprang up in response to the Déby government's human rights violations in the south, e.g. the murder of the vice-president of the Chad Human Rights League in 1992. Another serious source of conflict was oil production in the Doba Basin, i.e. in the south of the country. Where should the pipeline run? How could environmental destruction be prevented? Would the northern-dominated national government alone decide what to do with the revenues from oil production in the south of the country?

In 1994, the High Transitional Council presented a timetable for the referendum on the constitution and the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the ballots were repeatedly postponed. The necessary census and voter registration were finally completed in December 1995 and January 1996. In the meantime, human rights violations and attacks upon the freedom of the press were increasing. In 1995, Saleh Kebzabo, a politician and publisher of N’djamena Hebdo, a liberal newspaper, was arrested and his newspaper briefly banned. This can be the lot of any critical reporter, newspaper or radio station. By 1995, it was apparent that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press existed only on paper.

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31 Cf. article in Le Monde, 10 September 2005: Le gouvernement tchadien met au pas la presse d’opposition.
The referendum on the constitution eventually took place on 31 March 1996. The people of Chad voted for a centralised unitary state on the French model. In the south, however, a majority voted for a federal system. When the constitution entered into force on 14 April 1996, Chad became a presidential republic with a multiparty system. The president is head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Legislative power lies with a bicameral parliament composed of the National Assembly and the Senate. The latter body never convened and subsequently abolished in a referendum on a constitutional amendment in 2005. The National Assembly has 125 deputies. Executive powers are exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by a prime minister appointed by the president.

After the new constitution entered into force, Déby decided that the presidential election would take place before the parliamentary elections.\(^{32}\) Political activity increased, as did harassment of supporters of Déby's opponents. The registration papers of some opponents were not approved; one of them, Delwa Kassire Koumakoye, had to run his election campaign from prison. On 2 June 1996, voters could choose between 15 candidates. In the first round, Déby, the incumbent president in the transitional government, and Abdelkader Kamougué, former general, police chief and leader of the autonomous south Chad, received the most votes. Observers and the opposition complained about irregularities. Nevertheless, the second round was held as planned, and Déby won. He appointed a government in which the MPS held the most important ministries. Opposition politicians who had moved closer to the government were co-opted, which further weakened the opposition as a whole. The most prominent of these was Saleh Kebzabo, who shortly before had been detained for critical remarks about the regime. He was rewarded with the foreign ministry.

In the parliamentary elections in early 1997, the MPS won 63 of the 125 seats; the remainder were shared by the Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau, lead by the new foreign minister, and the Union pour la Renouveau et la Démocratie, whose chairman, Kamougué, Déby's opponent in the presidential elections, was appointed speaker of parliament.\(^{33}\)

In the following years, the government went to great pains to present Chad to the outside world as a pacified country in the hope of attracting international assistance for the country's reconstruction and, in particular, so as not to jeopardise the negotiations with the World Bank on finance for the oil pipeline.\(^{34}\) Both Chad and the international


community hoped that the country, which had suffered from high inflation and the loss of purchasing power following the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 and the implementation of structural adjustment measures, would start to recover economically. In February 1995, i.e. before the elections, the governments of Chad and Cameroon signed an agreement on oil production with three companies, Exxon, Shell and Elf-Aquitaine. Under the terms of the agreement, Chadian crude will flow through a pipeline to Kribi in Cameroon, where it will be refined and then shipped. The government's development plans depend on future oil revenues to finance infrastructure, education and health. Whereas the country may have been at peace militarily, politically it was not. Human rights violations continued. And the government was repeatedly reshuffled to the advantage of the ruling MPS.

In June 2000, the World Bank approved construction of the pipeline. The government in N'djamena had to undertake to invest most of the revenues in education, development and health; ten percent would be paid into an account for future generations; a further ten percent would be at the government's disposal. However, the first installment of the World Bank loan in 2001 was used to buy helicopters to fight rebels in the northeast of the country. Construction of the pipeline began in 2001; the first oil was pumped in July 2003, and in the pipeline between Chad and Kribi in Cameroon was officially inaugurated in October 2003. So far, however, the hopes placed in oil production have not been fulfilled. Gross national product may have risen statistically, but the population has hardly benefited from the oil boom at all. On the contrary: there were few jobs for the local population; most of the work was done by American, Malaysian and other foreign specialists on short-term contracts. The foreign workers' buying power drove up prices. At the same time, the security situation deteriorated around the oil fields and in N'djamena. It gradually dawned on the local population that Chad, in whose territory the oil wells lie, was deriving far less benefit from them than the consortium of oil companies and Cameroon. A particular object of growing criticism in Chad is the low oil price used as the basis of calculations. These disappointed hopes are a potential source of social tension in the long term.

In the north, another rebel movement was organised in 1999 under the leadership of Youssouf Togoimi with the support of the exiled politicians Oueddei and, apparently, Habré. Their declared goal was to fight government corruption. The Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad constituted a serious military threat to the government. After the death of Togoimi, Déby persuaded his successor to sign a peace agreement in Tripoli in January 2002.

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It is unclear to what extent the current military conflict in Darfur, which has also encroached on Chad's territory, had influenced the security situation and the balance of power in Chad. Since 2002, the persecution of the settled population in Darfur, an action obviously controlled from Khartoum, has sent a stream of refugees into Chad. The largest of the ethnic groups straddling the border is the Zaghawa, to which President Déby belongs.

From the second elections to constitutional reform

The second presidential elections were held in May 2001. According to the official results, Déby received 67 percent of the votes in the first ballot. The most popular of the other six candidates was Ngarlej Yorongar, a southerner who opposed the construction of the oil pipeline. The speaker of parliament, Abdelkader Kamougué, received just five percent of the votes cast. Once again, there were reports of electoral fraud. During the marches protesting against the results opposition politicians were arrested and a demonstrator was shot dead. The opposition tried in vain to get the French government to issue a statement. Turn-out for the April 2002 parliamentary elections was low. The ruling MPS won 112 of the 155 seats; Yorongar's Fédération Action pour la République came second. Twenty parties hold seats in parliament. The Rassemblement National pour le Développement et le Progrès led by Kassire Koumakoye agreed to join the government.

France made an effort to bolster Déby's position. For the first time in 20 years a French president visited Chad: on 31 August 2002 Jacques Chirac paid a half-day state visit to N'djamena and announced a strengthening of bilateral relations, above all in the oil and military spheres.

Political tension has been rising since summer 2003. On 26 June 2003, Déby reshuffled the government, dismissing Premier Haroun Kabadi and appointing his nephew Moussa Faki Mahamat in his stead. In doing so, Déby contravened the unwritten pact of Chadian "geopolitics". His action led to conjectures that president wanted to position his nephew to succeed him. The security situation in N'djamena continued to deteriorate. At the end of July, the French CEO of the cigarette factory was held up in his office and the general secretary of a Sudanese oil company was shot dead in broad daylight. The business community in the city called a strike and closed their businesses for a day. Rumours started circulating that the president, in Paris for political talks, was dying or already dead. They died down after he held a press conference, but flare up intermittently.

In October 2003, the MPS proposed at its party congress that the president's term of office be extended. According to the constitution, a president may serve for only two terms; in other words, Déby could not stand for re-election in 2006. Idriss Déby, who had always emphasized in interviews that he would serve only two terms, as provided for in the constitution, did not respond to the proposal at first. When he did, his language had
changed: he would, of course, bow to the will of the people. Whereupon the Rassemblement National pour le Développement et le Progrès withdrew from the ruling coalition.

On 18 May 2004, a state of emergency was declared in N’Djamena. Apparently some troops at the presidential palace had mutinied. No details leaked out, but a year later a growing number of reports indicated that there had been a shoot-out in the palace between rival groups within Déby’s own family. Others speculate that the supposed revolt was a pretext, coming as it did immediately before the session of parliament on constitutional change to justify an evening curfew and a ban on demonstrations. The military presence at strategically important locations and at all exits from the city and the shutdown of the cellular telephony network at the order of the security forces continued until the parliamentary session called to debate the proposal of the MPS. The opposition called for a general strike on this day and many residents of N’Djamena stayed home for security reasons.

On 26 May 2004, parliament passed the MPS motion to amend the constitutional. The way was open for a further term in office for Déby – provided that parliament’s decision was ratified by a referendum.37 France welcomed the decision: both Xavier Darcos, minister with special responsibility for cooperation, who visited N’Djamena in June 2004, and the French ambassador to Chad, Jean-Pierre Berço, publicly confirmed that Chad and its president had observed the rules of democracy.

A group of about 30 opposition parties formed the Coalition pour la Défense de la Démocratie et des Droits Constitutionnels under the leadership of Ibni Oumar. For a long time the opposition’s position on the pending referendum was unclear, especially in the light of the government’s growing tendency to respond to public criticism with repression. A liberal radio station in N’Djamena was shut down for months after reading statements against the constitutional amendment.

The Chadian opposition in exile, led by the MPS member and former ambassador to the USA, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane – he had resigned in protest against the planned constitutional amendment – invited all Chadian opposition parties, groups and organisations to a meeting in Paris over Easter 2005 to discuss the constitutional amendment and the future of the country and decide on joint action.

This prospect alarmed the Chadian government. Déby tried, in vain, to persuade Paris to ban the conference. But the French government did refuse to issue a visa to the man behind the conference, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane. He had to participate by video from the USA. The Chadian authorities prevented two other prominent members of the opposition from attending by confiscating their passports at N’Djamena

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37 According to the constitution, parliament must approve a constitutional amendment with a two-thirds majority; in the following referendum only an absolute majority is required.
airport on the eve of the conference.\textsuperscript{38} The Paris conference passed a resolution calling for a boycott of the referendum. Furthermore, it appealed to the French government to discontinue its support for the Chadian president.\textsuperscript{39}

The referendum campaign in Chad took place in April and May. As in France at the same time - before the referendum on the European constitution - N'djamena was plastered with posters and banners - with the difference that in the latter all called for people to vote Yes on the constitutional amendment. Despite an enormous government effort - every minister campaigned for a Yes vote in his home region - the opposition call for a "day of mourning" on 6 June 2005, the day of the referendum, appeared to be successful. Although the government declared a national holiday on 6 June to enable a high turn-out, long lines at the polling stations failed to materialise. According to observers, most Chadians stayed at home.\textsuperscript{40} But the official referendum result published by the independent electoral commission (Commission électorale nationale indépendante CENI) on 21 June 2005 does not reflect observers' impressions: turn-out: 71.6%; votes against the constitutional amendment: 22.2%; votes for the constitutional amendment: 77.8%.\textsuperscript{41} The opposition called for a national strike on 27 June 2005, but it was largely ignored. The Constitutional Council subsequently corrected the results to take account of a large number of spoilt ballot papers, including all of those cast abroad; the final results are as follows: turn out: 57.81%; votes for: 65.75%; votes against 34.25%.\textsuperscript{42} This correction does not change the result of the referendum: it is generally assumed that President Déby will stand again in 2006.

In post-independence Chad, as in many other African states, the new rulers have paid less attention to building a democratic state than to maximising the profits of their families and clans. To this end they employed military force and instrumentalised ethnicity, religion and the north-south divide, and grew increasingly adept at creating pseudo-democratic appearances. The international community sat on the sidelines and watched. The states that exercised the greatest influence in Chad were interested in preserving their zones of power and - later - access to the country's oil. Hence they tried - sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly - to maintain their influence. As a rule,
they turned a blind eye, and in other instances intervened in favour of those they thought most likely to gain or hold on to power, or most pliable. Their actions have not helped to make Chad a more democratic state.
Power as seen by those who do not have it
Perceptions of political and civil society elites outside the inner circle

Two series of qualitative one-on-one interviews were conducted in N'djamena between 26 October and 1 November 2004 and 23 February and 8 March 2005. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to interview a comprehensive sample of the entire political elite. Representatives of the ruling party were generally unavailable, and we decided against interviewing members of the military forces. Consequently, the opinions in this section are those of opposition politicians and civil society activists (journalists, intellectuals, human rights advocates, ex-politicians, etc.) rather than those of the elite in positions of power. However, all of the active and retired politicians interviewed were at some stage members of the government under Déby or Habré.

The interviewees were asked for their assessments of the current political situation in Chad, the background and circumstances that enable President Déby to retain power, the outlook for a change of power, ideas about a new political order and the chances of regulating the conflict in Chad. The interviewer never addressed the question of interviewees' personal safety, but it inevitably cropped up in the course of discussions.

Members of the ruling party, the MPS, were prepared to speak only on the condition of complete anonymity. Opposition leaders, on the other hand, agreed to publication of their names. Accordingly, in the following text we have mentioned names where permitted; otherwise, quotations are anonymous.43

Chad - a democracy?

Do the interviewees regard the current political system in their country as democratic?

Democracy is an interrelated entity: the state is in charge, the people demand something from the state, the courts do their work, the press is free, etc. Here in Chad there are three problems: the army, the wealth of the state and the lack of separation between the civil service and politics. (U44)

43 For the most part, personal details on the background and career of each interlocutor were learned in personal conversation. For further information, cf. Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1997.

After this low-key, but clear criticism, the same interlocutor conceded...

... that one must acknowledge that the press in Chad is free.

Another interviewee at pains to present a differentiated picture also emphasized the freedom of the press:

One can't say that everything is bad. Within limits the press is able to write what it wants. Progress in the country is slow. (T45)

A journalist takes a different view:

Yes, the press is fairly free; however, I am often persecuted and threatened. But even in the presidential palace there are people who tip me off. Up to now I have always been able to hide. But I am not afraid. This is the path I have chosen; journalism is all I have learnt. (Sy Koumbo Singa Gali46)

Numerous respondents talk about their disappointed hopes for democracy. When Déby succeeded in driving the dictator Habré into exile in Senegal, he presented himself as a reformer. People still quote his first address to the people of Chad, in which he promised the citizens neither gold nor silver, but democracy.47

Many of Habré’s opponents who had lived in exile during his years in power returned home full of confidence to participate in rebuilding Chad. Today they see their hopes dashed.

I left Chad in 1975. Only under Déby did I return. I really believed in the new democracy. Most people believed that Déby would liberate them. After all, 40,000–50,000 people were killed under Habré. But today we are bringing up our children so that they can also make a career for themselves overseas – if they can find something. (U)

People here are no longer interested in politics because they no longer believe in democracy. Everything is a farce. The party draws up lists of those who can get jobs (teachers’ training colleges, law courts, etc.). In other words, they are awarded by the head of state. Democracy has become meaningless.

45  T (anon): a university professor who holds other high office at the University of N’djamena; member of the MPS. Interview: 7 March 2005.

46  Sy Koumbo Singa Gali: founder and editor-in-chief of Observateur since 1997. In August 2005 she was sentenced to a year in prison for publishing articles on the connections between the government of Chad and the conflicts in Darfur, but was released in September 2005 after international intervention. Interview 4 March 2005.

Our constitution isn’t bad, if only it were applied .... All this produces fatalism: Things will change in God’s own time. (Z)

Almost all interviewees complain about corruption and clientelism:

In Chad, politics is only a way of making money. I am not politically active; it would not change anything anyway. (U)

Here only mediocre people get jobs, because they have family connections. There are enough competent people, but they get passed over. What we have here is a system of clientelism. (Z)

For a system of clientelism to function, it takes those with something to offer as well as those that can use what is on offer, e.g. many intellectuals.

The intellectuals are the real scourge in Chad. They join the ruling party to get a post. In the 1980s Chadians were proud; everybody did their work properly. Today nobody works properly anymore. They are only interested in filling their own stomachs and not the stomachs of others. There is no solidarity anymore. (Z)

At the heart of this system most interlocutors identify a clan that controls the army and with its help dominates others. The replies are almost identical:

There is no national army. Those that have guns are all Déby’s kin. (U)

There is no national army, only the army of the clan. The police and customs officers are all thieves who persecute and rob people every day. (T)

There is no national army, only a militia that defends their boss. (Mhamat Djarma)

The need for a national army made up of members from all ethnic groups is stressed again and again. It is true that among the high-ranking officers in the army there are a few southerners. But care is taken to ensure that they have no opportunity to threaten the clan’s supremacy:


49 Mhamat Djarma: former member of FROLINAT and former mayor of N’djamena; at the Conference of National Sovereignty played a decisive role in drafting the constitution; founder and vice-president of the Union Nationale, which is part of the MPS coalition; no longer in politics. Interview: 25 February 2005.
The southerners in the army have no weapons. (X)

Like the army, the administration of justice is assumed to be in the hands of the government:

The law has absolutely no power over the government. Let me give you an example: one of Déby’s bodyguards was sent to Sarh as commanding officer. There he shot a trader dead. He was put in prison and was able to escape to the Central African Republic on a motorcycle. Have you ever heard of anything like it? (Y)

The assessments of the governing party are more or less unanimous.

The party is a single unity party, although in fact it is just decoration. One boss decides everything. That is Idriss Déby. He appoints the holders of office, and all the party branches and congresses are window-dressing for the outside world. The national congress and who is chosen for which office is all manipulated and decided in advance. Déby decides and forces his decision on parliament. The best example is the constitutional amendment. Lots of people are opposed to it, but Déby wants it and nobody resists.

We do not have a functioning democracy here. There is no will for democracy, and just as little will for change.

There is no party programme; party members have no overarching vision for the country’s future. In a real political party the party leader would be the executive organ in charge of carrying out the party programme decided by the basis. Here it is antitypical, precisely the reverse.

How does the party attract members?

Visit the party offices and take a good look around. The members there are people off the street, thieves. They are not people who think about things carefully. Basically, they have just as little education as Déby. No one is interested in their opinion. And should they say anything they are shown the door.

There is no right to criticism here. Anyone who says anything has to go abroad or is put in detention. This is a dictatorship, but nobody calls it that. (T)

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50 X (anon.): a prominent member of different groups during the civil war and opponent of Tombalbaye’s and Habré’s; championed the cause of national reconciliation between the south and north; member of the government of national unity (GUNT). Interview: 23 February 2005.

51 Y (anon): FROLINAT supporter; member of the government under Habré; held various posts as minister under Déby between 1990 and 1996, former member of the MPS, no longer politically active. Interview: 2 March 2005.
The impotence of the opposition

In these circumstances, the possibilities of those who do not support the ruling system are extremely circumscribed. Some interviewees take the trouble to explain their political abstinence:

_There is no freedom here. Nor is there an intellectual circle that discusses politics. That is too dangerous. In our group we only work on culture and history, but we don't express any views on current politics._ (T)

The same respondent also made disparaging remarks about the organised opposition:

_And the opposition does not say anything, either. Indeed, it does not do anything at all._ (T)

Another has a similar opinion, but tries to give it a more positive twist:

_On paper we have an opposition. But whether it can actually change anything? I doubt it. Still, an opposition is better than no opposition._ (U)

Some of the criticism is harsher:

_The opposition is also divided. Basically, it is also only interested in power._ (Z)

One interlocutor, who refuses to remain anonymous, gives a clear analysis of the reasons for the opposition's ineffectiveness:

_There is no real opposition for two reasons: In a democracy in the original sense of the word opposition means that the majority rule and the minority are in the opposition. But the minority can become the majority. In Chad that is not possible. The minority are kept under control by violence and electoral fraud. Hence, there is no opposition in the democratic sense. Similarly, there are no possibilities of political expression. Sit-ins, demonstrations - none of that exists here. And if people do take to the streets, they are beaten up. People aren't even allowed to demonstrate._ (Mhamat Djarma)

Interviewees who officially described themselves as members of the opposition see things differently. Although many are members of former coalition partners of Déby, they still criticise his despotism. But under the circumstances they view the activities of the political parties - and in particular their own, of course - as meaningful.

_The party is also a means of struggle. Without a party in Chad one cannot take a stand against all the crime that is taking place. Founding a party_
should also be seen as a contribution to democracy. (Mbailou Naimbaye Lossimian\textsuperscript{52})

Those who hold power here believe that all power comes out of the barrel of a gun. They talk about democracy only to get funding. We want to contribute to something other than war: to open and fair elections and a Chad that breaks the cycle of war. (Jean-Bawoyeu Alingué\textsuperscript{53})

Elections in Chad are not free and fair; but to avoid a war, 29 parties came together under my leadership in 2001 in an “accord for an alliance”. We wanted to give Déby one more chance. I had my deputy join the cabinet. But Déby could never keep an agreement; he didn’t respect our pact. Therefore at the MPS party conference in 2003 I unilaterally broke the accord. In front of Déby I publicly stated that Déby was not governing the country well. As a result, he wanted to destabilise my party and for this purpose he made use of members of my own party. I noticed what was going on and expelled them from the party. Lawsuits are still being fought on this account. But I no longer work together with Déby.

Elections would be an appropriate way to bring about change, but here it is very difficult to achieve transition through elections.

Eighty percent of the people in Chad oppose the MPS, but it holds power. It has money and uses intimidation and corruption to keep its hold on power.

Déby is the MPS; he controls the army and the public finances and is able to give people jobs. (Lol Mahamat Choua\textsuperscript{54})

Notwithstanding his continued commitment, Lol Mahamat Choua has few illusions, and fears that dangers will only increase in the near future:

\begin{quote}
We are suffocating here. Yet the international community has still not condemned the practices associated with Déby’s exercise of power. They do not believe in democracy in this country. You cannot fight elections against Déby in the hope of winning. You have no chance. The only language Déby
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} Mbailou Naimbaye Lossimian: Founder and of the ARD (Action pour la République, la Démocratie et le Développement), has held various cabinet posts under Habré and Déby; independent presidential candidate in 1996. Interview: 29 October 2004.

\textsuperscript{53} Jean-Bawoyeu Alingué: from Tandjile, ambassador in France, the USA and other states in the 1970s; played a leading role in drafting the 1989 constitution; prime minister under Déby (1991-92); chairman of the UDR (Union pour la Démocratie et la République). Interviews: 29 October 2004 and 28 February 2005.

\textsuperscript{54} Lol Mahamat Choua: from Mao, president of Chad in 1979 (government of national unity); mayor of N'djamena until 1992; founder and chairman of the RDP (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès), a coalition partner in the government until autumn 2003. Interview: 28 October 2004.
understands is the language of force. And what he says goes. We do have freedom of the press and freedom of expression, but that is the only good thing that can be said.

However, the population will soon rise up against him. As I said on Radio France International on 10 September 2004, people will be dying in the streets. And if that is the case, well, then so be it. (Lol Mahamat Choua)

A lawyer comes to the sobering conclusion:

The opposition does not have any legal means of opposing the government at all. The courts cannot help them, as they do the bidding of the head of state. Basically, this means that there is no real opposition. In the mid-1990s we all enthusiastically set about establishing the institutions of a civil society. Now we stop for a breath and realise: all that work was for nothing. It hasn’t changed a thing.

Whenever we approach institutional agencies, they always comment that Chad is a democratic country with political parties and freedom of expression. But nobody takes a closer look. (W55)

Party financing is a huge problem for the opposition. According to the constitution, all registered parties (i.e. recognised as legal) are entitled to state funding. As a rule, though, they get nothing. Either party leaders are very wealthy and can afford to finance their political activities themselves, or they find other sources of income, or they are forced now and again to accept a lucrative political job just so that they can remain politically active.

The parties in this country have no funding. That is one of their problems. The party leaders sacrifice their wealth for the party; most members do not pay their dues. (Lol Mahamat Choua)

During the discussion in Lagos on multiparty government I realised that to cover your needs and to be independent you have to have money. That is what democracy in Chad suffers from. When you see the large number of parties here you always believe that Chad really is a democracy. In reality they are just leaders with lots of inactive members, but they are registered as legal parties. That's enough for appearances. But to build up a party you need money. (Mahamat Djarma)

The state is supposed to give us the means to exist. All traders support the MPS because if they don't the state will take away their licences. When Lol goes on his trips he makes an appeal and collects donations. I finance my party myself, and the government in power draws on the public purse. That

Democrats without Democracy?

"retards the development of democracy in Africa." (Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué)

Political parties have two problems: either they are not recognised, or they are recognised, but receive no state support. However, that is laid down in the law on political parties. The new prime minister has said that he will change this. But where will he get the money to do it? (W)

Dependent loyalty

Interviewees agree that a crucial factor in Déby's hold on power is the economic dependence of his opponents, most of whom have no other alternative. In Chad, as in many poor countries, the state is the largest and most important employer. Even if salaries are not always paid on time, civil servants can count on a fairly regular income. As a rule, a family member with a regular income supports not only the nuclear family, but also parents and unemployed siblings and those still at school, parents' siblings - also so-called parents -, and kin in the village from which the extended family comes. The loss of a job can threaten the existence of up to 100 people.

Pressure on us and our party has been growing since 2001. The government is trying to destroy us. Some civil servants have also left the party because of this. It is understandable if people are afraid of losing their job. This is also the reason why pressure is being applied: these people can't get another job.

I was appointed a minister in 1994; because of this I resigned from the civil service, although I wasn't a minister for long. I have been working for international organisations for some years now, and am thus independent. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

This kind of intimidation - and the carrying out of threats - affect all groups and strata, be they ministers ...

56 Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué: born in Gabon; army officer, played a crucial role in the overthrow of Tombalbaye's; after the fall of N'djamena was leader of South Chad (Comité Permanent du Sud – CPS); founder and chairman of the URD (Union pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie); presidential candidate in 1996, speaker of parliament 1996–2003. Interview: 28 October 2004.

57 Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh: from Biltine, secretary-general of the PLD (Parti pour les libertés et le développement) and candidate in the 2001 presidential elections; spokesman of the CPDC (Coordination des parties politiques pour la défense de la Constitution), a coalition of opposition parties formed to oppose the proposed constitutional amendment in the 2005 referendum; held various cabinet posts under Habré and Déby until 1991. Interview: 26 October 2004.
My European friends don't understand it, but even cabinet ministers do not necessarily agree with Déby. But they are afraid. If they were to resign it would be too dangerous for them. If you are offered a job you have to accept it. After all, you want to survive, and you need an income.

Corruption and all that is taking place here at present would stop. If the government sets a good example, people will change again. We have to introduce sanctions again. Anybody who doesn't work must be punished. At present some people don't even go to work and their salary still gets paid. Chadians have to feel responsible for their state. (Saleh Kebzabo58)

... politicians ...

We are a poor country, one wants to live, one needs a job and the party even throws in a car. (T)

... members of the opposition ...

Politically active people do not get civil service jobs. You have to be a member of the MPS. Otherwise you have no chance of getting ahead. Therefore, to support themselves and their families people support the MPS. ... The situation can be characterised as follows: We are ruled by a power made up of clan and family structures. Idriss Déby and a small circle around him exercise power. And they run the state as though it were their own property. An illustration of this is, e.g. civil servants' salaries. Once again they haven't been paid. ... They maintain power through repression. Nor should you forget our history of civil war. People are still traumatised. They know that they can be shot in the back at any time. They have seen too much blood. And those of us who are still active are running out of energy and resources. (W)

... self-employed ...

Civil servants are in a difficult position: they have to cooperate with those in power; otherwise they are left to starve. I know somebody who was a member of the opposition PLD. He opened a consultancy, but didn't get a single contract from the state. Now he is a member of the MPS. (Sy Koumbo Singa Gali)

58 Saleh Kebzabo: from Léré, chairman of the UNDR (Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau); founder of the newspaper N'djamena Hebo, foreign minister under Déby in 1996. Interview: 23 February 2005.
... and students:

All those in the opposition today have worked with Déby at some time or other. It is always a question of money, not democracy. ... Déby rang me up in 1990. But I told him I would not help him. He forced me out of my job. I went to Paris on a French development aid scholarship. He then put pressure on the French government to cancel the scholarship. But I was saved by the Americans. A religious group supported me. This is the way in which Déby works. He takes away people's social support. (X)

Déby has also used religious authorities to put pressure on political opponents:

I come from the north and was myself a cabinet minister once and, if I may say so, people regard me as a man of integrity. Hence, as another candidate from the north I was real competition for Déby. The imam of N'djamena even issued a fatwa against me. At the same time there were other Muslim candidates. Of the seven, four were Muslim. To defend myself I made a point of saying that the other two, i.e. besides Déby and myself, were not true Muslims. But it simply shows how dangerous I was for Déby. At that time the stadium was as packed at our election meetings as at Déby's. The only difference was that he has money and power and can bring in people from everywhere. People came to hear us because they wanted to. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

Elections and referendums

The basic criterion of a functioning democracy is free and fair elections and referendums. According to the interlocutors, electoral fraud was committed on a large scale in the 1996 and 2001 elections. In the run-up to the referendum on the constitutional amendment on 6 June 2005 there was already evidence of irregularities.

In the 1996 elections it was already clear beforehand that Déby would win with 50.14% of the vote. Therefore, I lead a high-ranking delegation to a meeting with the French ambassador. Whereupon a second round of elections took place. Déby cannot win any elections in Chad without help. He knows that, which is why he uses the army and local authorities.

Most of the members of the CENI (the electoral commission) act in Déby's interest. Ballot papers don't even turn up or disappear again; at the count a zero is simply added, etc. Most of the electoral fraud takes place at the centre where the results are typed up.

Otherwise Déby would never win. We appeal to all democracies to convince France of the need for greater transparency. We really want to know who the best player is, as in football. And we don't want to take up arms; instead we
want transparency and democracy in our country. (Mbailou Naimbaye Los-simian)

In 2001 we won the elections, but that was not what France wanted. I was arrested and tortured even before the results were announced. They surrounded my house with 50 vehicles packed with soldiers and arrested me at 5 o’clock in the morning. I had invited the press to a conference at 9 o’clock. The government wanted to prevent that. I was to be killed. It is only thanks to the intervention of James Wolfenson, head of the World Bank, that I am alive today. Then when I was in France having my injuries treated Déby declared that he had won the elections. He then formed a government with Kebzabo, Aliingué, Kassiré and Ibni Oumar. Only Kamougué refused to take part. The others would rather carry on eating than lose their posts as a result of good governance. (Ngarlejy Yorongar59)

Since 2001 our membership has been increasing. According to the ballots, we should have been the largest party in N’djamena, I still have the lists of results from some polling stations, but the CENI put us in third or fourth place. That was electoral fraud. … At midday on election day the military ordered our observers to leave the polling stations. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

The respondents do not expect the referendum on the constitutional amendment to be much better.

Now they are changing the constitution. Basically you don’t have any chance at all. (U)

Fifteen million ballot papers have already been printed for the referendum - for about 4,000,000 registered voters. (X)

We were against changing the constitution. Some people already rejected the current constitution in 1996. However, what the government wants now is not to improve the constitution, but to change it completely, so that it can stay in power indefinitely. Voter registration should take place in a public place, not in people’s houses. They have entered the names of children in the electoral list. We pointed out that elections are a public act. Therefore people should register. One needs this card to vote. And one should make use of this right, even if the circumstances are not the best. Now we learn that 5,000,000 voters were registered, in a country with a very young

59 Ngarlejy Yorongar: born near Doba, coordinator of the FAR (Fédération, Action pour la République); fellow-traveller of Déby, turned down all offers of ministerial posts, imprisoned and tortured; candidate in the 2001 presidential elections, which he is said to have won; active campaigner for people’s rights and against the environmental destruction caused by oil fields in the Doba Basin. Interview: 1 November 2004.
population and a population of 7,000,000. This means that they have already begun to manipulate the voting. (Sy Koumbo Singa Gali)

People will let it happen. We will vote No, but that won’t make any difference. We will defend the constitution, but our votes will not be counted properly in any case. There will be widespread electoral fraud again. (Saleh Kebzabo)

The "Déby System"

Déby’s system of domination is a mixture of clan system and clientelism. Déby is surrounded by members of his family and his ethnic group, the Zaghawa. Apparently his bodyguard is made up solely of relatives. From the conversations it became clear that the outside world knows very little of what goes on in the inner circle of power.

Only one interviewee, who had once been an advisor to the president, was able to describe the power structures in any detail:

To understand Africa you have to know that the family is always right, not the individual. Not even the president can free himself from this. In addition, society here is organised completely along ethnic lines. When I was in prison I saw that even there everything is organised along ethnic lines.

The Déby System functions as follows. There are two kinds of state: the official and the unofficial. The first is the image of the state with fine words, flags, embassies, sirens, etc. That is all decoration, but not the reality of power.

The real state consists of ethnic alliances. Idriss is very astute in the way he directs the clans that dominate the army. Seventy-five percent of them are Zaghawa, 15% are made up of Goran and Arabs, and the rest of all sorts of people. The Zaghawa hold military power. As a result they are also successful in business and also let the other groups have a little bit.

There is a real danger of civil war when Déby is no longer around. In the civil society we are doing all we can to get a national army for Chad. It would be neutral and could save us.

Fortunately, we have the example of Togo at present. If the world had reacted differently, Déby’s son would soon be his father’s successor. There will be a fight to succeed Déby. It was always like that here, one ethnic group in power, then after a power struggle the next, and then another after that, etc.

To function, the Déby System uses violence and corruption. One does not have many options: either one leaves Chad or one leaves politics or one lets oneself be corrupted. We have a saying: a full mouth does not speak. ... The parties are nothing more than decoration. They have absolutely nothing to do with the circle of power. Like many in Africa, they believed in the power of

Déby is intelligent; he had developed a very complex system. The nomads function as a group. He must find a balance between his individual interests and those of the group. Do you remember the coup d’état of 16 May 2004? Whenever he fails to do things properly, he receives a warning shot from his people. He is in a dilemma.

I always told him that he should not trust only one group but all Chadians.

The opposition doesn't have any idea of what goes on in the inner circle of power, unless they are allowed to take part. But as a serious opposition they are thoroughly discredited because every now and again they have taken part in power. (Ali Abdel-Rhaman Haggar60)

Basically, the situation in which we find ourselves today gets worse from day to day in the sense of an on-going reduction of freedoms. One wonders whether the political parties still exist and whether anything is happening at all. (W)

Chances of changing the system?

How do interlocutors rate the chances of changing the political system?

There will not be any change. On this score I am very pessimistic. We are being held hostage by a clan. The president wants to stay in power, like all leaders in Africa. He is grooming his son as his successor. Perhaps they will appoint him speaker of parliament. That is the only post that is still vacant. It is not surprising that so far there has been no comment in Chad about the events in Togo. It bothers them because that is their plan, too. It is also possible that after Déby's death violence will spiral out of control again. (T)

Expectations that the change of power and transition to democracy will be peaceful are muted. Most of the interlocutors fear a grab for power in the form of either armed conflict or a clash within the ruling ethnic group.

The recent events in Togo, which played out during the interviews in February, have kindled fears that Déby, who is in poor health, will also attempt to appoint his son as his successor.

60 Ali Abdel-Rhaman Haggar: university professor, novelist, and advisor to President Déby for many years; founder of various NGOs and a school director. Interview: 25 February 2005.
At the moment there is no movement at all. The people are suffering; there is no alternative to Déby. He blocks any change; even within his family there are now problems.

A war is probably unavoidable. Many people are already armed, people have nothing to lose. We ourselves have chosen the political route, but the situation can no longer be controlled. If there's no other choice, there'll be war. I'm not one of those who preach war, but neither am I one of those who say that war is bad. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

There is an opposition outside Chad; it will meet in Paris shortly. The opposition outside and inside Chad will come together bit by bit.

Social conditions play a huge role. Chad does not need Déby. There is enough energy for an uprising.

As for the opposition in Chad, everybody wants to take power. Déby wants his son to succeed him - as in Togo.

We are waiting for an explosion, but we don't know what the spark will be. But one should be in a position to control it. Numerically the north is in the minority; but the south will want to take charge of the government. The north will resist this.

A democracy is possible only with pressure from abroad, e.g. from France. (X)

Fortunately, the system already carries in it the germ of its own destruction. Not a month passes without a serious crisis. I don't believe that elections can bring about change. The results are already in the computer before voting starts. ... There are armed opposition groups everywhere. We are too old to take up arms. But we do not condemn those that do. It is lawful to take up arms. It is different where you come from. There violence is not justified. But over the centuries you have developed a culture of dialogue. We don't have that here; there is no dialogue in the midst of violence.

In short, there will not be any transition to democracy. The proof: Déby is grooming his son to succeed him. This is brought home to us by the example of Togo. None of the other African states object because they are in a similar position.

In other words, Chad will either self-destruct or there will be a military putsch. Even people in Déby's own party are dissatisfied. Even the people who were supposed to conduct the census in preparation for the constitutional amendment resorted to passive resistance: they simply did not carry it out.

An explosion is not far off. That can also be an opportunity, though we could pay dearly for it. We are currently 7,000,000 people; perhaps 5,000,000 will survive. But then that is the price. (Mahamat Djarma)

Because the ruling ethnic group has all arms under their control, there is said to be little danger of armed conflict:
The people of Chad are frustrated, but also resigned. To cause the situation here to explode one has to have the means. And those are in the hands of the ruling group. Thus, any explosion must be triggered off in the small circle that holds power. And that is very possible; when they see that the succession and the continued domination of their clan is not secure, they could attempt to keep it within the clan and pass it on among themselves. Change can come only from there.

Otherwise I only see signs of resignation. People are waiting to see what happens. (V61)

Only one interviewee is optimistic about the end of Déby's rule and that the current opposition will act in accordance with the rules of democracy.

I believe that all these presidents that we have are accidents of history. The presidents that we have had have absolutely no vision; they live from day to day, intent only on their own advantage and that of people who have no liking for democracy, but not that of the country.

As far as history is concerned, I believe that such presidents, and especially the current one will simply disappear. That is part of development. Take a simple comparison, the development of mobile telephony. That is something you cannot stop. Or look at Togo. The international world is not happy with developments there. Everybody has said No, and now they are going to introduce a constitutional amendment. Togo is a precedent. The AU is not going to put up with that, and when Déby dies they will also intervene here. Everything will take its course.

It would be enough if the new president just lets the prime minister do his job. He is a good, competent man who is not interested in enriching himself.

But one should not overlook the army that Déby has built up around him. It is recruited from his clan. But in Chad there are also sub-clans, etc. They will also look to their own interests when Déby disappears, and not only defend Déby's son. ... There may be chaos after Déby, but the other party leaders and I will stick to the rules of democracy. The constitution explicitly states that the speaker of the national assembly becomes the interim president. After that there will be elections. And the international world will organise them for us. (Saleh Kebzabo)

One of the female interviewees thinks that the country's hopes lie with its women and that change is conceivable only through them.

Actually, I count only on the women; they will organise themselves. What I see now during the "Women's Week" is extremely encouraging. They cannot

61 V (anon.): director of an NGO. Interview: 3 March 2005.
Democrats without Democracy?

speak French and Arabic well, but they express themselves. They are not afraid. Change in Chad will come about only through women. You can't use men to change anything anymore. They calculate too much. The women think with their hearts and are not afraid. They will take the lead and the men will follow them.

Yes, Chad will have a democratic future. Thanks to modern means of communication there is no way of stopping it. Why should there be democracy, everywhere else, but not in Chad? (Sy Koumbo Singa Gali)

Views of the political order after a change of power

Following the example of other transition processes in Africa, after the change in power in 1990, a "round table" was convened in 1993. People are again contemplating this model of organising procedures of transition. At the same time, none of the interviewees would mention any names of those they thought should take their places at this round table.

In the CAD (Convention pour l’alternative de la Démocratie\textsuperscript{62}) we are already thinking about the alternatives after Déby and about an alternative system. Everything should be transparent. We want round table negotiations without any taboos. For that to take place, we have to talk openly about the conflicts in our country. … A lot of what is said at present is propaganda, e.g.: the south was in power, now if the people in the north want to maintain power they have to defend it well.

In any case, to reach a political solution in our country you have to listen to the people. Many are in favour of a federal solution, including even two of the eight parties in CAD. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

One new form of political order that cropped up repeatedly in conversation was a federation, to be achieved by gradually decentralising the centralised state.

We have to look for another political order, e.g. a federation. We have to address the question of sharing power, which is currently held by the north.

We want national unity, integration; we have to converse with one another.

Déby does not want a round table, but if pressure is put on him he will have to accept it. We have to end the war. We need a transition process in which all the institutions of state will be changed, the national assembly, all of them.

\textsuperscript{62} The CAD is a grouping of eight opposition parties: the PLD, UDR, UFD-PR, MSDT, RDT, UNCT and PDI.
We need outside mediators. As I have said again and again, do the German and French taxpayers really want to see their money just drain away here? Our people abroad have contacts; they will help us to organise funding.

My vision for Chad? Reconciliation, renewed brotherliness, development.

It would be possible to start with a centralised state and when everything is functioning to decentralise it and later transform it into a federation.

Representatives at the round table? Oh, we know one another. We know who we need to invite. We don't want any people who want to tell us stories but people with experience. After all, we've been independent for 40 years. (Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué)

Federalism is our ideology, we do not want partition, but a federal state on the German model. That should be possible with good rulers. At present they are concerned only with their own interests.

Form of government: We have a problem with language. The official languages are French and local Arabic. They want to introduce High Arabic, which nobody understands here. In a federation each state could make their own decision. Why not introduce English and German as foreign languages, languages that the whole world understands? We should introduce what the people understand. (Mbailou Naimbaye Lossimian)

Our goal is a federal republic. At first we were the only ones in favour of federalism; today more parties support it. In our opinion, federalism is the only way to solve Chad's problems. I have studied the US, Canadian, German and Swiss systems. We want to take elements from all of them, with the US system as our basic orientation. There the head of state cannot simply do whatever he wants.

French Jacobinism has only worsened the situation in Chad.

In addition, our goal is good governance. Without it there can be no development. I dream of the rule of law in which the states have their own laws as in Germany.

There would be four federal regions in Chad based on the climate zones (Desert, Sahel, Sudan and Savannah) and the federal district of N'Djamena. (Ngarlejy Yorongar)

Another interviewee is more cautious on the topic of federalism, but would also prefer a different political system to the one based on the French model.

In a Chad without Déby the first thing is to reconstruct the crucial institutions of state and the security forces. Déby has not done that up to now. Then we have to focus on development, on education and healthcare. We will use the oil revenues to rebuild our state.
Development cannot take place if there is chaos, which is why we give priority to the organs of state.

Model for Chad: We are a multicultural and multiconfessional state. Therefore I look to South Africa, but also to Switzerland, but without confederation. We shall remain a unitary state that could be decentralised in the long run.

We must create homogeneous groups, draw up a development plan and then create a centralized state with a lot of powers for the regions.

I am still not convinced that we should elect the president directly. The members of parliament should do that, everyone knows them. We have simply taken too much from France: direct elections for the president, and a president that is not accountable to parliament. The prime ministers has no power, he only organises what the president wants.

We need a political order that is also adapted to the African mentality: a president who represents everybody. We should abolish the post of prime minister and replace it with the post of vice-president.

To summarise: an indirectly elected president and his deputy are accountable to the government. We don’t need a prime minister. This system would adapt democracy to our needs, and in 30 years our children could perhaps decide to elect the president directly. We must develop democracy at our own pace. (Jean-Bawoyeu Alingué)

Another interviewee who is against a federal state favours decentralising decision-making down to local authorities and villages, although he does not go into detail.

In principle our goals are the same as those of all other parties. However, in contrast to other parties, we put a lot of store by participation and personal responsibility of each and every citizen. They have to regulate their affairs themselves. We believe in decentralisation, but in real decentralisation down to the village level. We also want elected rural committees. Thus people would have to assume responsibility themselves and would not expect the state to provide everything.

Naturally, the state would still be responsible for education, healthcare, infrastructure and water, security, justice and finances. The rural committees, on the other hand, would have to decide what their responsibilities would be. (Saleh Kebzabo)

Some voices also refuse to make any concrete statements about a political order after Déby. They deny having any plans because of the danger that they would create a bad impression.

There are no ideas, plans for policies after Déby. One could be punished for that. No, one simply refuses to carry on thinking. But one day we’ll wake up and they will be standing there with revolvers drawn.
Yes, I am very pessimistic. Where you live, one chancellor follows the next, but here one never knows what is about to happen. (Ali Abdel-Rhaman Haggar)

The responsibility of the outside world

Many respondents agree that foreign influence is the cause of some of Chad's problems.

If a president were to try to change anything, France would be immediately be there to reverse the changes. (U)

The colonial power France is behind everything. And then for good measure it still praises Déby. (Z)

And France will always say that Chad is unstable. In this way they defend a gangster. (Mhamat Djarma)

In the past ten years France has invested more money in Chad than it did in the entire colonial period. And where has that money gone? What has it achieved? The corruption here is unbelievable. A small group gets all the proceeds.

The elections are manipulated even when foreign observers are present. They simply endorse the results. After all, France pursues its own interests in Chad and wants things to continue as they always have. For this reason France restrains everybody. It is an open secret that France regularly dispenses visas and "envelopes" to ensure that everything remains as it is. (T)

Concerning Chad, the other European states take their cue from France:

And the rest of the outside world has not helped, either. The EU has adopted France's policies on Africa. They could say that two terms in office are enough, and support the opposition. But no, the French foreign minister has to come and support Déby's policies. (U)

They reproach Chad's foreign donors:

If one makes loans one must also see that they are used properly. But the international donors don't do that. They need to monitor things more. Change has to come from the outside. (Z)

But there is enormous scepticism that the outside world can usher in change:

Things will only change in Chad when France changes its policies. But the French have their own interests in Chad, and they support Déby. (Ngarlej Yorongar)
Perceptions of conflict

In public discussions in Chad and in the debate about Chad conflicts play an enormous role: between Christians and Muslims, between the south and the north, between farmers and livestock-breeders and between the different ethnic groups.

Asked about the conflicts in the country, the responses were complex. But the interviewees agree that many conflicts, in particular that between Christians and Muslims, can only be explained in terms of their political instrumentalisation.

*When we were young, in other words in the 1960s, we were not even aware of who was Christian and who was Muslim. Everybody played with everybody and we all went to the same school. The conflicts and differences appeared only later and were stirred up by politicians.* (U)

*These are bogus conflicts that the party leaders exploit to get their messages across. I am a Muslim, by background, tradition, culture and education. But I can live together with Christians and people of other religions. When we were at secondary school in the 1950s Naimbaye (= Mbailou Naimbaye Lossimian of the ARD) and I studied together. In the evening he read his catechism!*

*The south-north problem is more of a geographical problem. Of course there are people from the south or from the north who have got something against one another. But it tends to be civil servants that propagate this. It earns them money. The people from the south are peaceful. The people in Chad must show mutual respect for one another. We need a good civil service, equality of opportunity and security. Justice has to be restored.* (Lol Mahamat Choua)

*I come from Moundou, but when I finished my studies I started to work in Abeche as a veterinary surgeon. I know the north. At that time there was no conflict between the south and the north. It was clear that in the south the people were Christian and in the north they were Muslim. As contacts increased some people in the south were converted to Islam, in my family as well, but there was no conflict. Conflict was brought in by politics, by the FROLINAT. With the FROLINAT the south-north conflict worsened. The French supported Tombalbaye and the south. But it is also true that the north had shut itself off from western education. The development in Chad under the French was a disappointment, but they did not want to waste money where it would not have been productive. The conditions of production are better in the south; the French founded the brewery in Moundou, the Sonasud in Sarh, etc. People invest where it pays. I myself saw how an oil mill was built in Abeche. It was operated for just one year; no oil has been pressed in Abeche since.*
Suddenly in 1982 it was said that the north had to take revenge on the south because it had been neglected for so long. The politicians exploited this. When I was a cabinet minister all people from all regions worked together without any difficulty.

One can overcome that through education, but the others (northerners) are full of hate. If a room in Abeche costs 5,000 CFA francs, when a southerner appears it suddenly costs 20,000 CFA francs. Here we are far more open, among us a woman can choose her husband herself, the family only makes sure that he comes from an honest family. Just as the man’s family makes enquiries about the woman. But women are not allowed to do that in the north. (Mbailou Naimbaye Lossimian)

In Chad there are not really any religious and ethnic conflicts. It is always a question of power. How else could Déby (Goran and Muslim) drive out Goukouni Oueddei (also Goran and Muslim)? The conflicts are instrumentalised by political leaders for their purposes.

...The Goran behave so aggressively because the man at the top is a Goran. They tell themselves, I am in power.

Chadians see themselves first and foremost as Chadians. My daughter married an Arab. Now I have three grandchildren at home who speak Arabic and are now just starting to learn Ngambaye. (Ngarlejy Yorongar)

A lot of things were taboo and always presented only as conflict between the south and the north. I think e.g. of the conflict between the sedentary and the non-sedentary. This conflict has always existed in Biltine, in other places also. But now it is presented as a conflict between Muslims and Christians; that brings in money from international sources. But even among Arabs there were and are problems between the sedentary and the non-sedentary. (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

Another interlocutor, however, points to the historical roots of the conflict between Christians and Muslims and analyses the history of Chad as follows:

The conflict in Chad? I tend to call it a social conflict between Islam and non-Islam.

One of the historical reasons for this is the pre-colonial states in Chad. Kanem Bo had been a Muslim state since the sixteenth century, Barguirmi since the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century and Wadai since the seventeenth century. The revenues of these states came from the trans-Saharan trade in slaves, ivory and ostrich feathers. The kingdoms grew wealthy through conflicts and wars; they raided their neighbours. The practice of these states of enriching themselves at their neighbours’ expense continued into the twentieth century. Because Islam taught that a Muslim may not be enslaved, the slave trade exacerbated the conflict between
Christians and Muslims, or to put it another way: the conflict between the south and the north.

Second, the origins of the entire conflict are cultural. It was the nomads of the Sahara that parked themselves in the towns and cities of the sedentary. They continued to practise their type of robbery, of raids and pastoralism. I.e., it is also a conflict between the sedentary and the nomads. As the nomads move around, the conflict spread to the south. But it is also a conflict between Muslim nomads and settled Muslims.

The Arab kingdoms were ruled by desots in the manner of the caliphate. Islam did not know any other form of government. Nomads ruled cities on the basis that the man in charge was simultaneously political, religious and military leader. The sultanates in the north were hereditary despotisms. They have never respected the individual. The archaic system developed there. This explains why Chad has divergent social values. However, there are also very similar mechanisms in the south.

As one sees in the west, the state is the real transformer of social conflicts. Europe also practised the slave trade. For the powerful here, however, human beings were only commodities which one sold to earn money. From the tenth to the twentieth century the Arab Muslim states lived from this trade and not off the land, as the European states did.

He sees the consequences of this history for contemporary Chadian society as follows:

In a country in which there has always been slavery, people are subservient and cannot offer resistance. At best they drop to their knees to make themselves less visible. Civil society has not yet taken root here; one is caught in a trap. Here one just replaces one regime with another. The opposition is a mimicry of the government. If it were in power, it would do exactly what the government is doing. They still practise clientelism and are not prepared to pay the price for a modern state or to create a new state. Nothing has changed since independence. There has not been one group that was really interested in creating a different Chad. The party leaders have no vision of the future. They talk about more justice or something, but basically they are all blind.

There are two reasons for this:

The intellectuals and elites in the north are all sons of sultans or heads of cantons, etc. They reproduce this archaic despotism. As long as the sultanate functions, the north is blocked. Why else don’t the trade unions and the human rights organisations go there? Furthermore: the elite in the south lost power in 1978/79. The north corrupts the intellectuals who are prepared to collaborate with it. And the rest are left behind in a wretched state. That is clientelism. The political struggle is not about ideas, but about clients. Here the state is the only opportunity of getting an income. That is why opposition leaders sometimes go along with it and sometimes oppose it. They too need
money at regular intervals. Basically, there is no difference between those in power and those in the opposition. That is also one of the reasons why people are so apathetic. The people think that the party leaders march to the tune of those in power. I think that the trade unions and the human rights organisations do so as well.

Hence, he is extremely sceptical about the country's future:

Nobody has any idea of what the future will bring for Chad. When people here talk about change everybody immediately understands this to mean the violent overthrow of the government. Such people are not responsible political leaders. Déby, too, only believes in violence. After all, he came to power by violence. He has no political concepts.

Changing Chad will be a gigantic task, but I don’t even know where to start.

Every ethnic group in Chad has its warlike elements. At present two ethnic groups are in power because the others aren't able to organise themselves or are unarmed. One has simply never searched for peaceful solutions and exhausted all the possibilities to this end.

Hate is so widespread in our society.

The coup in May was carried out by a group in the inner circle of power. Although they get their fair share of the fruits of power, they do not want to lose everything should Déby suddenly die. Therefore they moved against him.

Déby's stance is either me or nothing. It is the clan reproducing itself. In the process they fail to see that others are growing poorer and poorer.

The state and its functions are all back to front. Instead of a national army, every clan chief recruits his own people, who only obey him. The state does not have an arsenal as such. It is distributed around the premises and houses of the commanders. It is the same with vehicles. It is a private army, not a national army.

Déby's death may be followed by an explosion and anarchy, because then nobody will have an ally at the top.

What could one do to prevent an explosion?

The party leaders should speak out in favour of real change, for real reform of the army and the judiciary. They believe that when they get rid of Déby everything will change. In reality one man will just replace another, that's all.

The situation is terrible and everyone has a duty to find a peaceful solution. But all of them are interested only in short-term solutions, as all of them want to enjoy their benefits as long as they can. This cuts across all social classes.

I always say that France is the fifth ethnic group in Chad, after the south, north, east and west. But they don't like to hear that.
He, too, blames France for Chad’s present position:

- *My views were shaped in post-1968 France, and I still cannot believe how France behaves in Chad.*
- *Since Déby came to power France has spent billions on reforming the army. And there is nothing to show for it.*
- *France prolongs despotism in Chad by giving it democratic legitimacy.*

But the Chadians are also responsible:

*Chad is not prepared to learn from history and past mistakes.* (Y)

**Fear**

Many of the interviewees feel that they are personally threatened and take precautionary measures: they stay home at night and do not travel very far in the country. Their passports are often confiscated to prevent them going overseas. Or their visa applications are turned down by the French embassy in N’Djamena, which is also the authority responsible for issuing visas for countries that have signed the Schengen agreement. International fame gives opposition politicians a certain degree of protection. Yorongar in particular maintains intensive contacts with human rights organisations abroad and has his own homepage to provide information about political developments in Chad.

*I don’t have a bodyguard. My protection is the international community; I am linked with more than 300 organisations. The woman who was just on the phone works for one of them. She rang from England to find out how I am. If anything happens to me, faxes and emails start flying. That is my protection.* (Ngarléjy Yorongar)

*I myself do not have any difficulties directly, but I know that I am in danger. I no longer travel to the north, but only in the vicinity of N’Djamena. You never know who will waylay you in the street, ostensibly to rob you. I seldom go out at night and I will be able to defend myself in my house.* (Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh)

*No, I am not in much danger. If he had me killed, there would be an uprising. I am too well known. But a politician always has to be aware of danger. One works in the interest of the country.* (Lol Mahamat Choua)

A few prominent people among the interviewees simply feel insecure and make comparisons with earlier dictatorships:
Under Tombalbaye one at least had a sense that there was a state. But now? Anarchy and insecurity. One is not safe anywhere. I cannot go for a stroll at night. (U)

Finally, one of them observes:

If I said in public what I have just told you, I would lose my job and suffer other threats. I am already out on a limb. They know me well, and my opinion, but I cannot express it. (T)

Another respondent provides a more general formulation of the dangers facing all critics, whether they are politicians or members of the civil society:

Many party leaders were arrested and tortured (Kebzabo, Yorongar, etc.). We receive telephone threats every day or stones are thrown through our windows, etc. And now and again a political activist is simply bumped off. ... Journalists, civil society representatives, all of them are in just as much danger as politicians. (W)

Dissident Muslims in the north and east of the country are in a particularly difficult situation. Whereas southerners accuse them of supporting the government, the government takes criticism from no one and views them with distrust.

Here at the university we at least still have some freedoms. Party politics are not allowed. As researchers we have a certain degree of liberty. Yes, our situation is comparable in a number of ways with that of intellectuals during the Third Reich. We have withdrawn into an inner exile. We are hostages here in Chad. We have no security. After work we go home and stay there. Time and again people disappear or are killed. Afterwards we are told that they were victims of criminal elements. Only in exceptional cases do we go out at night.

The conflicts are fomented. Our brothers from the south are freer in this respect. In the southerners' residential districts there is life and music until late at night. They are much freer than we are. We have enemies on all sides. At one time we did not even know who was Muslim and who was Christian. Today the southerners are of the opinion that we support the government. And our religious leaders explain to us that we have to support the government. (T)

Too soon for democracy?

A well-known journalist vehemently rejects a popular argument, and one often heard in the industrialised countries, that Africa is not yet ready for democracy:
Democracy is a universal right. I talk to a lot of visitors from abroad, with ambassadors, etc. They tell me that Chad is not yet ready for democracy. But they should let us try. Europe wasn't always democratic. Let Africa also participate in democracy. I fight for this everywhere. (Sy Koumbo Singa Gali)

Summary

We were unable to interview members of the inner circle of power. But according to those members of the Chadian elite we did interview Chad is not a democracy at present. The press is - with some restrictions - free, but otherwise there are hardly any functioning democratic institutions and mechanisms. The hopes of true democracy that were associated with Déby's coming to power have proved illusory. In our interlocutors' opinions, the army and the judiciary are instruments of a government that, in the final analysis, is dominated by one clan; the ruling party has no official programme and is only show; the crucial mechanism of power is a corrupt system of clientelism and the opposition has no influence and no goals besides coming to power. The official leaders of the opposition we interviewed sought to justify their role and complained about the lack of state funding for their parties. Other interviewees pointed out that many opposition leaders were open to participating in the existing system whenever they were given the opportunity. On the other hand, one interviewed politician in particular was trying to unite the opposition and, by getting it to make statements on topical issues, help it to gain credibility and to offer the country other political alternatives. The interlocutors largely agree that people who are loyal to the government are usually in the government's pocket. They are also unanimous in the view that elections are neither free nor fair and that the official results are false.

One interlocutor analysed the "Déby System", something he was obviously well-grounded in. In his view the state with its official institutions and symbols was little more than a façade. Real power lies in the hands of an ethnic alliance dominated by the Zaghawa and supported by the Goran and the Arabs. Their hold on power is maintained by a system of violence and corruption. The interviewee is extremely pessimistic about the chances of changing the system. By contrast, many respondents fear an armed conflict within the dominant ethnic group if they thought they were in danger of losing power.

The interlocutors do not have very precise views on the type of new political order they would like to see. They would like another "round table" for a transition phase. Some propose a federal state, while others would be satisfied with a decentralisation of political power.

Our interlocutors are also unanimous in attributing much of the responsibility for the current state of affairs to foreign, i.e. above all French, influence. The majority believe that the social conflicts in Chad - between Muslims and Christians and north and south
- did not arise from real differences between the respective groups but were primarily the result of their instrumentalisation for political purposes. One of the interviewees takes a different view. He attributes them to the historical cleavage between the Muslim slave-trading states and the other societies in Chad. In his view, the roots of the present system of clan rule and the subservience of the majority can be traced back to traditional clientelism.

As is evident from the desire of most interlocutors to remain anonymous, a common thread running through most of the statements is a fear of expressing themselves freely in public. The view that Chad is not yet ready for democracy is vigorously rejected by a courageous journalist.
Unsharp social cleavages
Chadian attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics

From the above it is clear that the people of Chad have never known a freely and democratically elected government. What they do know well is despotism and violent power struggles between military leaders who, after taking power, hang up their uniforms and put on suits to create the impression of responsible politicians. They know that their rulers enjoy the support of France and - since the discovery of oil and changes in the balance of power in Africa - also the USA. They know that government opponents are routinely persecuted and have learnt to keep quiet. Above all, they know the everyday arbitrariness of army, police, militias and customs officers who in broad daylight seek to top up their salaries by robbing ordinary citizens. The number of road blocks at junctions is particularly high before weekends and public holidays. There is no escaping them, unless one is a soldier or has diplomatic number plates. A routine example of the omnipotence of the state is the so-called red carpet: before the president travels from one place to another, even from his palace to the airport or parliament, soldiers hermetically seal off all streets, alleys and tracks along his route. It is impossible to pass the roadblocks and there are no detours; those who object are beaten up. The capital comes to a standstill for hours.

The following data must be read against this background: people's political powerlessness, the daily persecution and legal uncertainty, the economic privation of the great majority, and the lack of hope that at least their children will have better opportunities in life.

A survey in four cities: N'djamena, Sarh, Abeche and Mongo

For logistical reasons, it was impossible to conduct a representative survey of the whole of Chad. However, the survey of four cities (N = 1199) is large enough to permit statistically reliable comparisons between attitudes and opinions of different population groups and religious communities, on the one hand, and of different occupations and levels of education and income, on the other, in and between the four cities and the regions around them. The survey was conducted in the cities of N'djamena, Sarh, Abeche and Mongo in November and December 2004.63

63 The interviewers had instructions to interview 150 men and women in each city who were representatively selected by city districts. The survey data were processed and analysed using SPSS.


**N’djamena** was founded by the French as Fort Lamy in 1900 and has been the country’s capital since colonial times. Today it has a population of 1.3-1.5 million64 inhabitants that, since the reconstruction in the early 1980s, live for the most part in ethnically and religiously segregated districts. The city is the political and economic centre of the country and has the most developed infrastructure. It is also the only place where the state-controlled television service can be received. N’djamena’s inhabitants are drawn from all population groups and religions; most foreigners in Chad also live here: French development experts, embassy personnel, missionaries and - predominantly Libyan - businessmen. Unlike other West African countries, Chad does not have a large Lebanese presence. The US community has grown since construction began on the pipeline in southern Chad; the Peace Corps has also returned. France maintains a military base with about 1,000 troops in N’djamena.

**Sarh**, a former French administrative centre in Moyen Chari and capital of the prefecture of Bahr Koh since the administrative reform, has a population of about 100,000, most of whom are Christian. Sarh was once the largest trading centre in Chad, initially due to shipping on the Shari - long gone as the river no longer carries enough water - and later as a station on the cotton route between the Congo, the Central African Republic and Cameroon. Today, agriculture is the most important economic activity. In recent years, a number of factories have closed, in particular those involved in processing cotton. The city is the see of a Catholic bishop who oversees a substantial mission.

Since northerners have held the presidency, Sarh’s importance has diminished; there has been no new investment in infrastructure, for example. In addition, since the start of the oil boom, part of the population has moved to the oil fields in the often fruitless quest for jobs. However, we decided against using Doba or Koumra for the survey, as it is not the object of this study to map changes in the oil fields.

**Abeche**, capital of the prefecture of Ouaddai and residence of the eponymous sultanate and former kingdom, lies on the border with Sudan and is the only large centre in the east of the country. The vast majority of its 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants are Muslim. The city survives on trade with Libya, Sudan and the Arab Emirates. The sultanate has a long political history. Although he was not born there, President Déby has fostered the building of universities and other educational institutions in the city. He often withdraws to Abeche for political talks. France has a small military base and airport. In the rainy season the city is almost inaccessible by road. The arrival of international organisations to help the refugees fleeing the crisis in Darfur has resulted in an economic boom and the integration of the city into the country’s air network.

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64 The last census in Chad was held in 1993. All subsequent figures are projections that differ to varying degrees.
Both Sarh and Abeche are old administrative and trading centres located at strategic points in the country. Situated in rural environments, their principal activity is trade; both also have large schools and universities. The only salaried employees are civil servants and teachers. They were chosen for the survey as comparable cities in the south and northeast of the country.

Mongo, the capital of the prefecture of Guera, is the smallest of the four cities in the survey. It has about 30,000 inhabitants, most of whom are farmers or micro-traders. In earlier times the sultans in the north and east used to make incursions into Guera to hunt for slaves; to avoid this fate, people sought sanctuary in mountain caves. Until Jesuits started a mission here in 1948, most of the inhabitants were animists. Guera suffered terribly during the civil war and the advance of FROLINA; in this time a majority of the local population converted to Islam. Since the reorganisation of the archdiocese of N’Djamena in December 2001, Mongo has been the seat of the apostolic prefect of the apostolic prefecture of Mongo. The city lies on the route between N’djamena and Abeche. As a result, it profits indirectly from the war in Darfur because all aid convoys to Abeche have to pass through the city.

In the judgment of local experts, Islamic groups are trying to turn Mongo into a centre of radical Islam, which threatens to trigger an endemic crisis in the region.

Chadian society as reflected in the sample

As pointed out above, about 200 ethnic groups live in Chad. They are more or less sharply distinguished from one another by language. Many of these languages are closely enough related for the members of these linguist groups to understand one another. Otherwise, the lingua franca of Chad is Chadian Arabic, a form of Arabic with many local peculiarities. Hence, a Chadian Arabic-speaking Goran from the north of the country will probably have difficulty communicating with a Chadian Arabic-speaking Moundang from the south. In N’djamena, by contrast, most of the inhabitants can communicate in Chadian Arabic. In the south and the centre many people speak Sara and - at least in the cities - French. In the North the Arab influence is stronger; there only the educated elite has a command of French.

The ethnic groups can be divided into 11 main groups. In the interests of statistically relevant results, each interviewee was allocated to one of these groups on
the basis of the response to the question about ethnic affiliation. Thus, the Goran include the Zaghawa, the Sara, the Ngambaye, etc. Hence, in the following section "the Goran", "the Arabs", etc. refer only to the respondents in the sample.

The break-down of the ethnic groups by sample city is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage in the sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N'djamena</td>
<td>Sarh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barguimi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanem-Borno</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitri-Batha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjarai</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandjile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peul and others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo-Kebbi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreigners</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All figures in this table and in the following tables and lists are given in percent, rounded to the nearest whole number. * denotes figures below 0.5%; figures strikingly above average are shown in bold type.

The Chadian interviewees live for the most part in their regions of origin: most Sara live in Sarh, most Hadjarai in Mongo and most Ouaddai in Abeche. By contrast, at first glance the capital may appear to be an ethnic melting pot. However, as pointed out above, since the civil war the different groups have lived in separate parts of the capital, segregated by ethnic group and religion: the Sara and other southern ethnic groups live in the southern quarters of the city and the Arabs, Ouaddai and other northern and eastern ethnic groups in the centre around the main mosque and the market and in the northern quarters. With its subgroups, the Sara are the largest single ethnic group both in N'djamena and in the country as a whole.

According to its constitution, Chad is a secular country. Religions and religious practices are respected; both Christian and Muslim religious holidays are celebrated.
Democrats without Democracy?

By religion, the sample breaks down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N'djamena</td>
<td>Sarh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the sample the ratio of Christians to Muslims is 1:1.5. Most Muslims live in Abeche andMongo and fewest in Sarh.

"Other Christians" include Protestants, Baptists, adherents of the free churches and evangelical sects, which in Chad, too, are becoming increasingly popular. In these groups women are slightly overrepresented. Animists are not statistically relevant in the sample.68

All or well over 90% of the members of the following ethnic groups are Muslim: Goran, Arabs, Ouaddai, Kanem-Borno, Barguirmi, Fitri-Batha and Peul. Of the Hadjarai respondents, 4% are Catholic and 2% "other Christian".

Among the Sara respondents 45% are Catholic, 46% "other Christian" and 9% Muslim; among the Tandjile 40% are Catholic, 51% "other Christian" and 9% Muslim; and among the Mayo-Kebbi 23% are Catholic, 61% "other Christian" and 16% Muslim. Conversion to Islam is fairly common. An extended family may have members of different major religions.

The respondents are equally divided between men and women.69 The break-down of the four age groups in the sample is as follows: almost half of the respondents are younger than 25 years of age (48%), one quarter is between 25 and 34 (24%), one fifth between 35 and 49 (19%), and 9% are older than 50 years of age. The sample mirrors the situation in Chad: it is a young country; more than half the population is under 25 years of age.70 The average life expectancy of women is 45.7 years and of men 43.5 years.71

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68 Only two of the respondents declared that they were animists.
69 The interviewers were instructed to interview a man of up to 24 years of age, then a woman of up to 24 years, followed by a man of 25 years or older and finally a woman of 25 or older.
70 According to information of the Institut National des Statistique et des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques (INSEE) in N’djamena, Chad had a population of 8,986,100 in 2004, of...
In N'djamena the two younger age groups are somewhat overrepresented. This is not surprising, given that most educational institutions and jobs are in the capital. Mongo and Sarh are the "older" cities in the sample: over 40 and 38%, respectively, of the respondents are older than 50 years of age.

By level of education, the sample breaks down as follows: 11% of the respondents have no formal schooling; 15% have attended a Koran school or at least state that they can read; 17% have attended primary school and 37% secondary school or received vocational training; 13% are secondary school graduates and 6% university graduates.

In Mongo, the numbers at each level of education are particularly low. Fifty-one percent of respondents with no formal schooling live here and only 7% of secondary school graduates. The proportion of secondary school graduates in the trading and university city of Abeche is above average (30%). The inhabitants of the capital are the best educated group: whereas 59% of the university graduates and 46% of the secondary school graduates live here, people with either no formal schooling, only Koran school, reading ability or primary school education are underrepresented.

By ethnic group, the best educated are the Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjile und Sara. The educational level of the Goran, Arabs, Ouaddai, Kanem-Borno, Fitri-Batha and Hadjara is below average. The proportion of former Koran school pupils is high among these predominantly Muslim ethnic groups.72

In the Chadian context it is not surprising that educational standards are much lower among women than men. Among those with no formal schooling, 75% are women. On the other hand, more than a third (36%) of secondary school graduates and more than a quarter (26%) of all university graduates are women.73

which 5,027,109, i.e. 56%, were younger than 26 years of age. Of the total population, 48.5% are men and 51.5% are women.


72 Of the respondents who gave as their highest level of education the category "Koran school, catechism school, reading ability", 97% are Muslim.

The break-down by occupation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students at school and university(^{74})</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-traders</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers/livestock-breeders(^{75})</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders/merchants</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, mechanics, etc.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/retired</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar workers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed workers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labourers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil servants and white-collar workers are overrepresented among the Sara (28% and 33%, respectively), Arabs (18% and 8%), Hadjarai (14% each) and Ouaddai (11% and 12%). Trade is largely in the hands of the Goran, Arabs, Ouaddai and Hadjarai. Secondary school and university students are underrepresented among the Sara (42%). An above-average proportion of the Ouaddai, Arabs and Sara are unemployed or retired.

There are four times as many women as men in small businesses and trading. Women also make up 39% of the civil service and 37% of the office employees. The proportion among secondary school and university students is similar. The proportion of unemployed or retired women is above average (66%).

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\(^{74}\) Owing to frequent cancellation of a school year for no fault of the students ("année blanche"), Chadians may finish school only at the age of 22 or 23.

\(^{75}\) Livestock-breeders and nomads are underrepresented in the survey, because as a rule they visit cities only on market days. The interviewers, however, were instructed to collect data in the residential districts on the basis of a pre-defined key and not to approach shoppers in the market place or people in the street.
The break-down by monthly household income in the four cities is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>N’djamena</th>
<th>Sarh</th>
<th>Mongo</th>
<th>Abeche</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under €50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€50 - 100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€100 - 150</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€150 - 300</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over €300</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost 60% of the respondents have a monthly family income of less than €100 per month. Half of those in the lowest income group live in Mongo. Most of the well-off live in N’djamena and Abeche. Income in Sarh is about average. N’djamena, the capital, is the most expensive city in Chad; prices are many times higher than in rural areas. The oil boom and the associated demand for food have fuelled price increases in N’djamena and the refugee crisis in Darfur those in Abeche.

As in most societies, there is a close correlation between income and education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under €50</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€50 - 100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€100 - 150</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€150 - 300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over €300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Muslims are slightly underrepresented in the lowest and highest income groups. Forty-two percent of the Catholics are in the second lowest income category.

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76 The appropriate measure in the Chadian context is household income, not individual income.
Income distribution by ethnic group is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under €50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goran</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouaddai</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barguirmi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanem-Borno</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitri-Batha</td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjarai</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tandjile</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peul and others</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo-Kebbi</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified, foreigners</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining the two highest and the two lowest income groups gives a clear picture: the Hadjarai have the highest proportion in the lowest income group, and the Mayo-Kebbi, Goran and Arabs the largest proportions of high earners. The Tandjile and the Goran are overrepresented in the middle income group. The Sara are about average across all income groups.
There is a direct correlation between family income and the respondent's occupation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under €50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar workers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed workers</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, mechanics, etc.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders, merchants</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-traders</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers/Livestock-breeders</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labourers</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils, students</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, retired persons</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A disproportionate number of the poorest families in the sample are farmers and casual labourers. Micro-traders and casual labourers are also overrepresented in the lowest income groups. Civil servants, white-collar workers and traders and merchants predominate in the two highest income groups. Civil servants, teachers and artisans are most common in the middle income groups.

To summarise: In terms of religion and ethnicity, Chad is a pluralistic society. The ethnic groups in the north and east are predominantly Muslim, those in the south, with the exception of the Barguirmi, mainly Christian. In the sample, the level of education tends to decrease from south to north: respondents in the south are better educated; this applies particularly to the Sara. The Hadjarai are the least educated ethnic group. The proportion in the highest income group, on the other hand, tends to decrease from north to south. In none of the ethnic or religious groups, however, are all the members well off or poor.
Fear of the future, trust, caution and powerlessness: psychosocial attitudes

Yet people's perceptions of their environment, society and politics depend on more than gender, age, occupation, ethnic group, language, income and religion. Subjective factors also play a role. These include trust in one's social environment, fear or confidence, openness to or fear of change, confidence in one's own potential to change things or sense of powerlessness.

This section will examine a selection of psychosocial factors that have revealed a high degree of stability in other sociocultural studies.77

"When I think of the future, I feel uncertain and afraid." 60

Sixty percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative. Differences by gender, age and occupation are insignificant. The proportion of university graduates who agree with the statement is disproportionately high (66%), as is that of Catholics (65%) and "other Christians" (68%). Protestants in particular are afraid and uncertain about the future. The picture by household income is as follows: the lower one's household income, the more one fears the future.78

Particularly striking is the above-average level of fear among the Sara (66%) and the very low level among the Goran (45%). There may be a historical and political explanation for this result. The current president of Chad and his two predecessors come from the Goran or affiliated groups. Is political power in the hands of one's own ethnic group enough to generate an optimistic view of the future? The Sara, still the largest ethnic group in Chad, lost political power in the 1970s, since when they have been dominated by a northern government. Does this account for their fear of the future? Or is their uncertainty a result of their civil-war experiences - the expulsion from N'djamena and the cleansing of the southern political and intellectual elites under Habré?

"One must be very cautious with people; you cannot trust the people you live and work with." 74


78  Linear from the lowest to the highest income group: 63 - 64 - 59 - 56 - 54.
Three quarters of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In other words: only a good quarter trust their social environment. It is clear that the heterogeneous co-existence in the capital does not necessarily foster trust between fellow-citizens. Social mistrust is particularly strong in N’djamena (80%), but also in Mongo (79%), an ethnically very homogeneous city strongly influenced by its rural environment. On the other hand, the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s was most violent in N’djamena and the prefecture of Guera. Is present-day mistrust fuelled by recollections of past experience? "Other Christians" tend to be slightly less trusting than average of people around them (66%). There are no significant differences between Muslims and Catholics, or by background, age, education, occupation or income.

If mistrust is so high in this society, who do respondents trust most?

"People feel closer to some people than to others. For each of the following groups, please tell us whether or not you feel close to or trust them."

The results in descending order of frequency are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust or closeness</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of my religion</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who speak my language</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with the same living and working conditions</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from my village</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim clerics</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian clerics</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from my part of town</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chadians</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The family is the repository of trust. This is true of most societies. However, in Chad not even the family is immune to the general mistrust. Eighty-six of the respondents\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{79} The comparable figures for Kosovo and the Congo were 97% and 76%, respectively. Cf. Theodor Hanf, Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics in Kosovo. An Empirical Survey, Byblos: Centre International des Sciences de l’Homme, 2005, p. 12, and
trust the family above anybody else. Ethnic affiliation and origin are less important than a common religion and friendship. The respondents also trust clerics. It is noteworthy that Christian clergymen also enjoy substantial trust among Muslims.  

"All Chadians" enjoy least trust, particularly in N'djamena (21%); their rating is highest in Mongo (50%). In this case, the lack of or very little formal schooling appears to be a positive influence on trust: 54% of those without and formal schooling and 46% of those who can read or attended a Koran school trust all Chadians. 

Muslims exhibit a lot of trust in all groups. The Sara are the ethnic group with the greatest mistrust.

The correlation between the responses on "trust" is high enough to construct a statistical scale of "trust". The break-down of the responses is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No trust (0, 1 items)</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little trust (2, 3 items)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average trust (4, 5 items)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High trust (6, 7 items)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete trust (8, 9 items)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complete trust in others is expressed by a good third of the respondents, one tenth have no trust in others, and each of the categories in between accounts for about one fifth of the respondents.

People with little or no trust are overrepresented among the inhabitants of N'djamena and Sarh, and those with high or complete trust among the inhabitants of Mongo and Abeche.

This break down is reflected among the ethnic groups: a disproportionate number of Sara and Tandjile have little or no trust, whereas complete trust is above average


80 Forty-four percent of Muslim respondents trust Christian clergymen, but only 23% of the Catholics and 15% or "other Christians" trust Muslim clergymen.

81 To compare: In a survey in the Congolese capital, Kinshasa in 2002, a full 62% of the respondents stated that they trusted all Congolese. In 2004, 53% of the respondents in Kosovo trust all Kosovars. Cf. Schlee, p. 20, and Hanf (2005), p. 12.

82 Alpha = .8627.

83 In constructing the scale, the two questions on trust in Muslim and Christian clerics were omitted. The correlations of the responses to these questions are contradictory. Moreover, only by omitting them is it possible to construct a scale that is neutral with respect to religion.

84 In Mongo 50% expressed complete trust.
among the Fitri-Batha, Hadjarai, Arabs and Ouaddai. Complete trust is more common among men than women, among respondents in the age group 35-49 and particularly among the oldest respondents. Only 4% of respondents over the age of 50 have no trust in others. If we look at the level of education, education appears to correlate inversely with trust: complete trust is particularly noticeable among respondents with no formal education or who have attended only a Koran school or primary school. A disproportionate number of respondents who had not completed secondary school, people with a vocational training and secondary school and university graduates have little trust in others. Respondents with complete trust are overrepresented among farmers, employed workers, artisans and housewives; those with no trust among white-collar workers, teachers and the unemployed; and those with little trust among civil servants. An above-average proportion of respondents in the lowest household income group have complete trust; little or no trust is particularly pronounced in the upper income categories. Trust is particularly common among Muslims (44%). A disproportionate number of "other Christians" (19%) have no trust; Catholics are overrepresented among those with little trust (28%).

There are striking differences between the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the north and east and the predominantly Christian groups in the south. Muslims are overrepresented among respondents with complete trust and Christians among those with little or no trust. Overall, Muslims in Chad appear to feel more secure and at ease in their environment than Christians.

Agreement with or rejection of the following statement is a measure of social conservatism:

"One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it." 88

Almost nine in ten respondents agreed with the statement. There are no significant differences between men and women in their willingness to take risks, or by age, occupation or income. However, risk aversion correlates directly with income: the more educated people are, the less willing they are to take risks. The inhabitants of Sarh, the Sara and Christians are the most cautious.85

"If you start to change things, you usually make them worse." 58

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85 Sarh 96%, Sara 94%, Catholics 94% and "other Christians" 95%.
This statement measures conservative resistance to and aversion to change. Fifty-eight percent responded in the affirmative. In other words, well over half the respondents fear change. Resistance to change is strongest in Mongo: more than two thirds of its inhabitants, and three in five Muslims, are afraid it will only make things worse. Fear of change correlates inversely with the level of education.\textsuperscript{86}

An above-average proportion of traders and casual labourers, 52\% and 54\%, respectively, are open to change. Here the nature of the occupation obviously plays a role: traders have to be ready to take risks, and casual labourers have no other choice but to grasp every opportunity that offers itself. Farmers and civil servants and white-collar workers express greatest reservations: three quarters of the first group and somewhat more than half of the last two agree with the statement. Farmers are a conservative group in most societies; civil servants and white-collar workers, on the other hand, obviously fear the loss of their privileges. The Sara have more gain than lose through change: support among them is slightly above average.

The next statement measures self-perception of people's social effectiveness. Do people feel powerless or do they believe that they can influence the fate of their fellow human beings?

"There is little a person like me can do to improve people's lives." \textsuperscript{45}

Forty-five percent of the respondents tend to feel powerless; this sense is slightly more prevalent among women than men (48\% vs 42\%). Here, too, there is a north-side divide: the inhabitants of Abeche and Mongo feel more powerless than those of Sarh, only one third of whom agreed with the statement. The same holds for the results by ethnic group and religion: powerlessness is slightly above-average among the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the north and a little below average among the majority Christian ethnic groups in the south.\textsuperscript{87} Powerlessness correlates inversely with the level of education: the lower the level of education, the greater the sense of powerlessness is. There are no significant differences in responses by age, income or occupation. Teachers are less convinced than any other group that their actions can make a difference: only 29\% of them agree with the statement.

"Even ordinary people can make progress if they help one another." \textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{86} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 69 - 57 - 58 - 60 - 49 - 46.

\textsuperscript{87} This is also true of the religious groups: whereas half of the Muslims feel that they are powerless, only a good third of the two Christian groups do.
The high level of agreement with this statement - 93% - demonstrates that the sense of solidarity is alive among ordinary people: they are convinced that by working together they can change their situation. Apart from a direct correlation with the level of education, there are no significant distinctions by social characteristics.

To summarise: The psychosocial sensitivities of the Chadian respondents are pessimistic on balance. Well over half are afraid of the future, almost three quarters are extremely cautious and almost two thirds fear change. Trust in others is limited to a close circle of kin and coreligionists. Muslims express a greater degree of trust than do Christians. Almost half of the respondents feel powerless and do not believe that they can do much to bring about change. A low level of education and a sense of powerlessness go hand in hand.

Although southern respondents and Christians are more worried about the future, they are also somewhat less averse to risk and feel less powerless. Although they are distrustful and cautious, at the same time they appear to be more dynamic. Can their distrust be a prerequisite for action? Muslims, by contrast, have greater trust in their immediate environment, but less in their own abilities.

Social and economic perceptions

In a poor society dependent mainly on agriculture and trade how do people perceive their chances of economic success and social advancement?

"In your opinion, which of the following factors is the most important one for achieving success in life?"

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard work</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working together with others as a team</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luck</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What your parents taught you</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connections / regional affiliations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88 The more educated people are, the less inclined they are to agree with the statement.
The perception of success factors breaks down as follows: one quarter of all respondents think hard work is the crucial factor for success in life and just short of one quarter education. Together with team work (15%), experience (11%) and what people learnt from their parents (5%), four fifths of the respondents regard their own activities, experience and learning as decisive for success in life. Luck, beliefs and connections find little support. The low ranking of connections astonishes, given that in Chad the network of connections plays a major role in finding jobs, obtaining support in everyday life and in politics.

People who regard hard work as the "key to success" are substantially over-represented among the inhabitants of Sarh, among the Sara and Tandjile as well as the Barguirmi, among men, the over-50s, university graduates, farmers and livestock-breeders, employed workers and teachers and among Catholics. This conviction correlates inversely with income.89

The view that education is the leading factor for success in life is disproportionately common in Sarh, among people who have either attended secondary school or are still being educated, i.e. the under-25s and secondary school and university students, among white-collar workers as well as the Ouaddai. Unexpectedly, support is only average among teachers, the mediators of education.

Teamwork is mentioned more frequently in N'djamena than in other cities. Furthermore, the Kanem-Borno, the Tandjile, the over-50s, university graduates, civil servants and teachers regard this factor as crucial for success in life.

Experience is favoured particularly in Abeche, and, hence, among the Ouaddai, and among employed workers and traders. It finds surprisingly little support among the lowest income group,90 Catholics and the group that should have it but obviously finds no use for it: the oldest age group.

Those that choose luck are found most frequently in Mongo and among Arabs, Hadjarai, Barguirmi and Peul, among women rather than men, and less among the better educated than the uneducated. A higher proportion of traders than people in other occupations believe in luck. A successful business depends not only on ability but also on making hay while the sun shines. Christians are less likely to believe in luck than Muslims.

Religious beliefs are held to be the key to success disproportionately often in Sarh and among "other Christians".

The following question measures the preferences for investment and consumption:

89 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 29 - 26 - 23 - 24 - 18.
90 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 7 - 10 - 12 - 14 - 14.
"Imagine you were lucky enough to win a large amount of money in the lottery. What is the first thing you would do with it?"

- **Buy land**
- **Start my own business**
- **Spend on my family**
- **Invest the money with a bank**
- **Make home improvements**
- **Buy cattle**
- **Organise a "tontine"**

More than one quarter of all respondents would buy land, one quarter invest in their own business and a little under one fifth spend money on the family. One tenth each would invest the money with a bank or use it for home improvements. Six percent would buy cattle and just 2% organise a "tontine". Only a good third of respondents give precedence to investment,\(^\text{92}\) and somewhat less than one fifth could be classified as consumption-oriented because they would spend the winnings on the family. Still, close on one half think in terms of security: land, cattle and home improvements are investments in one's own property.

The desire for one's own piece of land, from which one cannot, as a rule, be driven by some landowner and on which one can grow food, is particularly high in Sarh (48%) and a little above average in N'djamena (30%). Two local reasons may have contributed to this result in Sarh. On the one hand, it is customary among the southern ethnic groups for a man to build a house for his wife, which then becomes hers as a form of security for her old age. In addition, inhabitants in Sarh are well-informed about the profits to be made from selling property or letting houses in the Doba oil fields. Last year, promising oil prospecting began in the Moyen Chari region. Inhabitants of Sarh may also be hoping for an oil boom. Respondents with an average education, micro-traders, secondary school and university students and an above-average proportion of Christians\(^\text{93}\) would also buy a piece of land with their lottery winnings.

Those who would invest in cattle are found predominantly in rural Mongo, among traditional cattle-breeding ethnic groups such as the Fitri-Batha, Hadjarai, Kanem-Borno and Goran, hence among Muslims rather than Christians, among farmers and

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\(^{91}\) As a rule, a "tontine" is arranged by one person or interest group as a sort of social neighbourhood get-together. Food and drink is sold, and the organiser keeps any profits.

\(^{92}\) By comparison: In Lebanon in 1987 51% of the respondents wanted to found a business and 26% put the money in the bank, i.e. 77% of respondents. Hanf (1993), p. 464.

\(^{93}\) Forty-two percent of the Catholics and 46% of the "other Christians".
livestock-breeders, employed workers and the oldest age group. The upper income groups have grown away from their rural origins: the view of cattle as an investment correlates inversely with income.

A pro-investment and pro-risk attitude - the wish to invest potential lottery winnings in one's own business - is overrepresented in N'djamena, among the Goran, Ouaddai and Peul, the better educated and - unsurprisingly - traders and merchants. The willingness to invest in a business rises with the level of family income.

Respondents' trust in banks is not particularly strong: the willingness to put money in a bank investment is above average only among Goran and teachers.

The inhabitants of Abeche, i.e. mainly Ouaddai, Muslims and former Koran school pupils, would spend their winnings on the family, as would the oldest age group, casual labourers and civil servants. The reasons, though, vary from group to group: whereas civil servants, as a rule, although not always in Chad, receive a regular salary that covers expenses such as school fees, etc., the income of casual labourers is anything but regular. Any extra money must be used to cover the family's needs.

"Tontines" are particularly popular in Mongo, and among housewives and artisans. This kind of event is often the only way for low earners to make a little money.

"What kind of work would you prefer?
A job with an organisation or firm with an average, but regular salary? 49
or:
Your own business where you can make a lot, but also lose a lot?" 51

About one half of the respondents opted for a secure job with a regular income and the other half for the risk associated with running their own business. At first sight this is an astonishing result. In studies in other countries a wide margin in favour of the second option is usually symptomatic of economic crisis. 94 If the odds of losing are already very high, people often put all their eggs in one basket in the hope that if they win, they will make a killing.

In Sarh, the number of respondents prepared to accept the risk of running their own business is above average (60%). The inhabitants of Abeche, by contrast, generally prefer a safe, salaried office job. Unsurprisingly, most white-collar workers share the latter view (63%), while the self-employed, already accustomed to risk, are more

prepared to take risks and hence are overrepresented among those who opt for the second option: traders and merchants (66%), micro-traders (61%) and artisans and mechanics (58%). Similarly, almost two thirds of those over 50 would like to start their own business.

How satisfied are respondents with their jobs and working situation? The answers to the following questions provide information on this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Of course people always like to earn more, but I am satisfied with my current income.&quot;</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;If I had the choice, I would prefer to do some other kind of work.&quot;</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;No matter what workers do, they can never win again the bosses.&quot;</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A university degree counts for more than any amount of practical experience.&quot;</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Practical experience counts for more than schooling.&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than three quarters of the respondents are happy with their current income. In the Chadian context this result is astonishing. The comparable figure in Kosovo was 40%\(^95\) and in Lebanon in 1986 just 24%\(^96\). Comparing the four cities, satisfaction with income is much higher in Abeche (91%) and Mongo (86%) than in Sarh (63%) and N'Djamena (68%). Agreement with this statement is above-average among the ethnic groups that live in Abeche and Mongo and among the Peul, former Koran school pupils and Muslims. There are no significant differences in terms of the other variables.

It is difficult to explain this high level of satisfaction. In Chad people are always short of money, whether it is for a telephone card, food, medical treatment, funerals or just a relative who is down on his luck. It is usual for people to get an advance on their salaries, as their money seldom lasts until the end of the month. The high agreement in rural regions in particular may indicate that respondents lack opportunities for real comparisons. When everybody's income is low, people are satisfied with what they have. Another explanation could be the situation in Abeche and Mongo at the time of the survey, when there were clear signs of an economic upturn. The huge amount of international support for the Sudanese refugees from Darfur raised hopes among the local population that they would also benefit - often in vain. As a rule, the presence of

\(^{95}\) Hanf (2005), p. 16.

international groups tends to lead to higher prices and further reduce the share of already scarce resources available to the local inhabitants.

Just short of three quarters of all respondents are unsatisfied with their work - in particular people with little or no formal schooling. Job satisfaction correlates directly with household income. Hence, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction is particularly pronounced among casual labourers, the unemployed, retired persons, housewives and micro-traders - in short: people without a regular income. But the disproportionately large number of teachers and civil servants in this group was unexpected. There may well be a simple explanation for this phenomenon: teaching is not very well paid in Chad, and, owing to financial difficulties, the government often fails to pay the salaries of teachers and civil servants for months on end.

Two thirds of respondents believe that they can undertake nothing against their bosses. This sense of powerlessness is most widespread among people in Mongo, whereas the inhabitants of N'djamena are least likely to agree with this statement. A feeling of powerlessness is most pronounced among the Kanem-Borno and Hadjarai, while an above-average proportion of southern ethnic groups and Christians appear to feel that they can achieve something. Muslims are below average. The higher level of agreement among Muslim ethnic groups in Mongo is symptomatic of the influence of traditional society, in which opposition to superiors or people of higher rank is frowned upon. Gender, age, education and occupation are statistically insignificant in this respect.

Seventy percent of respondents regard a university degree as more important than practical training. This result is interesting in that this statement draws above-average support from social groups that, as a rule, are not university graduates: inhabitants of Mongo, Arabs, artisans, housewives and Muslims. In their view, a university degree is a job guarantee (in Chad a university degree is a requirement for a post in the civil service). Agreement is inversely correlated with education and household income. As a rule, better educated groups - the Sara and Tandjile, civil servants, white-collar workers and teachers - tend to regard a university degree as the norm rather than particularly desirable. Or perhaps they are precisely the people who are aware that a degree is not a guarantee of employment.

More than one third of the respondents think practical training is more important than a degree. People in practical occupations are slightly overrepresented: farmers, casual labourers, employed workers and artisans. Surprisingly, the number of teachers who take this view is also above average. Do they really believe that practical training is often more useful than formal schooling in the Chadian context? Or are they disillusioned by the fact that one can buy diplomas in Chad, or that even people with a diploma often cannot find work? Agreement with this statement is lowest among

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97 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 80 - 72 - 74 - 65 - 55.
respondents with higher education and household income - as a rule, the two groups with a majority of people with secondary school or university diplomas and little practical training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The young people in my language group have a fairly good chance of achieving their goals in life.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Poor people have only themselves to blame for their situation&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;No matter how much I try, I will never get the education and job that I really deserve.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I am afraid that our children's standard of living will probably not be as high as ours.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two thirds of the respondents are optimistic about the outlook for the future of the younger generation in their own group.\(^{98}\) Such optimism is highest among the respondents in Abeche, predominantly Muslim ethnic groups - except for the Kanem-Borno and Fitri-Batha - and traders. It correlates inversely with the level of education.\(^{99}\)

Given the lack of training opportunities in Chad, intellectuals in particular expressed the hope of providing a future for their children by having them train or study abroad. Respondents in N'djamena, the predominantly Christian ethnic groups of the Sara, Tandjile and Mayo-Kebbi, Christians and civil servants and white-collar workers are less confident. Their views appear to be coloured by the balance of political power and ethnic affiliation: a disproportionately large number of civil servants and white-collar workers are Sara. They are concerned about their children's future. The northern ethnic groups, who currently hold political power, are more optimistic.

A good three fifths of the respondents think that the poor are responsible for their situation.\(^{100}\) It is striking that in Mongo - the city with the largest proportion of people in the lowest household income group - agreement with this statement is above average, whereas in Abeche it is below average. Support for this view is particularly prevalent among housewives, and relatively seldom among casual labourers. The latter are acquainted with the hard reality of everyday life, in which it is not so easy to find a job. Agreement declines slightly with rising household income. The poor themselves are more inclined to blame themselves for their situation.

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\(^{98}\) By comparison: the figure in Kosovo was 71%. Hanf (2005), p. 16.

\(^{99}\) Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 75 - 72 - 67 - 68 - 64 - 34.

\(^{100}\) By comparison: in the Congo in 2002 only 29% of the respondents agreed with this statement. Schlee, p. 29.
Fifty-nine percent share the view that they do not get a fair deal in respect of education and job opportunities. This feeling is particularly strong among respondents in Mongo (82%) and, hence, among the Hadjarai and among farmers. It is least pronounced among the inhabitants of the capital (47%) - which, after all, is where most of the educational and training institutions and job opportunities are. Agreement correlates directly with age. Obviously with hindsight there is an element of disillusionment or disappointment over missed or non-existent opportunities. Agreement correlates inversely with education and income. It would be surprising if that were not the case. “Other Christians” feel least deprived.

Well over half of the respondents fear that their children will have a lower standard of living - a view held regardless of social variable. There are no significant differences by ethnic group, gender, age, education, occupation or religious affiliation. The only significant variable is household income, with which it correlates inversely. According to this, better-off respondents are somewhat more certain that their children will also be better off.

“When I see how the rich live, I am envious and feel that I should have the same.”

Fifty-six percent of the respondents agree with this statement; agreement is above average in N'djamena - where the gap between poverty and wealth is most extreme. Social envy is more pronounced among men than women and declines with age, but increases with the level of household income. Hence, according to our survey, social envy appears to be a problem of the privileged and the better off rather than of the really poor. Relative deprivation is only possible when one knows what one does not have!

How do respondents perceive social changes that have taken place in the past two years?

“In the past two years has the gap between poor and rich
- increased
- decreased
- remained the same?”

101 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 75 - 65 - 68 - 57 - 42 - 35.
102 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 72 - 61 - 53 - 47 - 45.
103 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 52 - 55 - 59 - 60 - 64.
More than 60% of the respondents are of the opinion that social inequality has increased. Three quarters of the inhabitants of N'djamena share this view, as do two thirds of the male respondents and two thirds of each of the Christian groups. An above-average proportion of women think the situation has remained unchanged. Agreement correlated almost directly with education.\textsuperscript{104} By contrast, a disproportionately large number of respondents in Mongo and Abeche - and among Muslims - think that inequality has decreased or remained the same.

"The most important differences in this country are between rich and poor, regardless of region." \textsuperscript{81}

Four fifths of the respondents feel that the gap between rich and poor is more important than the ethnic affiliations of their fellow citizens. Inhabitants of Sarh, teachers and housewives are overrepresented among the majority view. Agreement correlates inversely with income, falling to just 65% in the highest income group. The influence of other variables - ethnic affiliation, gender, age, education, occupation and religious affiliation - is statistically insignificant.

Here are two descriptions of social differences in Chad. Which one do you agree with?

A small minority has most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of people. \textsuperscript{24}

or:

The majority of people are neither rich nor poor; only a few are very rich or very poor. \textsuperscript{76}

Given the enormous poverty in the country and the fact that each ruling group has garnered great wealth, the overwhelming agreement with the second statement is extraordinary. It appears that most respondents either do not or do not want to notice the cleavages. Support for the first statement was above average only in Sarh (35%) - as in the previous question - and among the Sara (31%) and Catholics (36%). There were no other significant differences by social variable.

Above-average agreement with the first option among the Sara is not surprising. In the colonial period and under the first post-independence president the Sara were the favoured group, ran most of the civil service and even today are one of the better

\textsuperscript{104} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 52 - 57 - 56 - 60 - 75 - 78.
educated groups with favourable career prospects. Under the current balance of power, however, they feel disadvantaged and are aware of the loss of the relative advantage that access to political power brings with it.

The other groups appear to be less aware of poverty and are, hence, more content with their situation. This is borne out by the next question.

How do people perceive the development of their personal economic situation?

"Compared with two years ago is your financial situation

- better 28
- much the same 34
- worse?" 38

More than a third of the respondents feel that on balance they are worse off than two years ago. Whereas people in Sarh and the Christians paint the gloomiest picture, an above-average proportion of those surveyed in Abeche take a positive view of things. The predominantly Muslim ethnic groups appear to have enjoyed relative prosperity in the past two years. While older respondents appear to be worse off, the youngest age group feels it is better off on balance. Is this just youthful optimism, or does it reflect a lack of experience and comparison?

Seen in conjunction with figures for household income, an interesting picture emerges: the positive view rises with the level of income; almost half of those in the highest income group feel better off. The lowest income group, by contrast, feels that its financial situation has deteriorated.

In practice this means that the income of civil servants, white-collar workers and traders has risen in the past two years and that of employed workers, artisans and unemployed has fallen. An above-average 47% of teachers state that their financial situation has remained much the same.

"In all societies people are divided into different groups according to their level of income; these groups are also known as classes. Which level would you say you belong to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle class</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class?</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In most societies the majority of respondents define themselves as middle class, and a smaller group as upper class. In Chad a full 22% define themselves as upper class and only 38% as middle class, with 20% in each of the lower middle class and the lower class.

A surprising result is that an above-average proportion of respondents in Mongo define themselves as upper class (33%), as, hence, do the Hadjarai (29%) and, similarly, primary school graduates (17%), artisans (22%), farmers (21%) and people in the lowest income group (15%).\textsuperscript{105} It is difficult to explain these results. Obviously other variables of self-perception in addition to those used in the survey must play a role in Chad. As we shall see in the next chapter, religiosity and the concomitant sense of being a "religious elite" may influence views in Mongo. Apart from these surprises, by group most respondents classified themselves in line with established social patterns: graduates at higher levels of education categorise themselves as middle class, as do civil servants, white-collar workers, teachers and members of the two highest income groups. Thirty percent of the respondents in Sarh and disproportionate numbers of Barguirmi and Sara, older respondents, people with no formal schooling, employed workers and farmers and people in the lowest income groups classify themselves as lower class. Twenty-nine percent of Catholics also place themselves in this group.

Of those that define themselves as upper class or upper middle class, almost a third and a good quarter, respectively, view their own ethnic group as better than others or well respected.\textsuperscript{106}

In this connection we looked at the question of what social policy respondents would prefer:

"What kind of government would you prefer?"

\begin{itemize}
\item A government that tries to keep wages, housing and education as equal as possible, even if this means high taxes. 58
\item or:
\item A government that allows people who are clever and work hard to earn more than others." 42
\end{itemize}

Fifty-eight percent of respondents would prefer a government that pursues social equality for all and 42% think people who work had should be paid accordingly.

\textsuperscript{105} Sixteen percent of Muslims define themselves as upper class.

\textsuperscript{106} Three percent of respondents felt they were "better" or "respected".
The only significant variables in these responses are city, ethnic group and religion. Respondents in Mongo, predominantly Muslim ethnic groups and, hence, Muslims, are overrepresented among those that want equal treatment for all. An above-average proportion of the inhabitants of Sarh and N'djamena, the Sara and the Mayo-Kebbi, and Christian groups are in favour of people receiving good pay for hard work.

These responses confirm the result of the first question in this section concerning the factors that make for success in life: Above all the Sara view hard work as one of the most important determinants of success in life. Besides a Protestant work ethic, this attitude reflects the experience of recent decades: the inhabitants of the south know that hard work and in particular education are the keys to their success and advancement. Connections no longer play a role since the northern, predominantly Muslim ethnic groups took power.

To summarise: Christians tend to rely on their own efforts to achieve economic success. Muslims in Abeche and Mongo regard themselves economically as better off and are more optimistic about their children's futures than Christian respondents. On the other hand, Muslims have a stronger sense than Christians of living in a hierarchical situation in which they are powerless; they also express a preference for an egalitarian state with social equality for all. The feeling of belonging to the politically dominant group gives them a sense of security on the one hand, but fuels the desire for a policy of equalisation on the other, to enable them to enjoy the benefits of power.

Religion, ethnicity and identity

In the first two sections we have referred several times to significant differences between Muslims and Christians in their responses to various statements and questions. In this section we shall take a closer look at differences in respect of religion and identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| "I believe in a life after death, in which good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished."
| 90        |
| "I try to live my life according to the teachings of my religion."
| 85        |
| "Whatever people say, there are supernatural forces for good and evil that can help or harm me."
| 62        |
| "I am convinced that my religion is the only true one."
| 55        |
| "I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God."
| 13        |
People differ least on the question of life after death - one of the central tenets of the religions of the Book. Ninety percent of the respondents share this belief; agreement is highest is N’Djamena and among “other Christians” (95%) and lowest among Catholics (86%). A belief in life after death correlates with household income.\textsuperscript{107}

Whether Christian or Muslim, the vast majority of respondents try to live according to the teachings of their religion. Agreement rises with the level of education and correlates directly with income.\textsuperscript{108} Civil servants (92%) and housewives (95%) make the greatest effort to follow the teachings of their religion, and casual labourers the least (32%).

Sixty-two percent, with no distinction between Christians and Muslims, believe in the existence of supernatural powers of good and evil, which can include witchcraft. This opinion is overrepresented among respondents in Sarh (74%) and Mongo (72%) and among the Barguirmi (70%) and Fitr-Batha (81%). The Ouaddai, Tandjile and Peul are least inclined to believe in supernatural powers, and housewives (82%), farmers (75%) and employed workers (70%) most likely. Older people and those with a higher level of education\textsuperscript{109} and income are more likely to doubt the existence of supernatural powers.

More than half of the respondents are convinced that their religion is the only true one.\textsuperscript{110} This conviction is stronger, however, among Muslims than Christians: 70% agree - as do all the groups in which Muslims are overrepresented: the inhabitants of Mongo and Abeche, the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, former Koran school pupils and farmers. Catholics and “other Christians” appear to be more tolerant than Muslims in respect of coexistence between different religions: less than one third of each of the two Christian groups view their religion as the only true one.

Just somewhat more than one in ten respondents can imagine a happy life without God. In Mongo 19% responded in the affirmative. The low level of agreement among civil servants (1%) is particularly noteworthy. Age, education and income also play a role: the older, better educated and better off respondents are, the more difficult they find it to imagine being happy without believing in God.\textsuperscript{111} “Other Christians” are least

\textsuperscript{107} The other social variables were statistically insignificant. It is worth mentioning that every Kanem-Borno respondent believes in a life after death.
\textsuperscript{108} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 81 - 79 - 85 - 86 - 92 - 89. Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 83 - 83 - 87 - 87 - 94.
\textsuperscript{109} Eight-one percent of respondents with no formal education believe in supernatural forces, but only 52% and 47%, respectively, of university and secondary school graduates.
\textsuperscript{110} By comparison: in Kosovo 78% agreed with this statement. Hanf (2005), p. 24.
\textsuperscript{111} Twenty-three percent of workers, 22% of farmers and 19% of housewives can imagine a happy life without God. However, 95% of housewives try to live according to the teachings of
likely to imagine a life without God (6%); there is no significant difference between Catholics and Muslims.

To summarise: The vast majority of Chadians are very religious; secularisation has not made any serious inroads into Chad. In contrast to European countries, religiousness does not decline with rising education or income. Muslim and Christian respondents differ significantly only on the question of the true religion.

People are religious; but do they also practise their religion?

"How often do you pray?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never or never</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than four fifths of the respondents pray regularly, and one tenth each often and sometimes. Praying five times a day is a fundamental teaching of Islam. Ninety-two percent of the Muslim respondents observe this rule. This is expressed in various social variables: the people who pray most regularly live in Mongo (96%), are members of predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, former Koran school pupils, traders and farmers. Regular prayer correlates inversely with level of education. Regular prayer is not a rule for Christians. Those who pray "sometimes" are overrepresented among Catholics and other Christians,\(^{112}\) the inhabitants of Sarh, the Sara and Tandjile, civil servants and casual labourers.

"Do you attend services in your place of worship (mosque, church)?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, once a week</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, sometimes</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance, the social profile of those who go to mosque or church once a week is similar to those who pray regularly. The inhabitants of Mongo visit the mosque most frequently, as do farmers. But teachers are also seen frequently in places of worship.

\(^{112}\) The two Christian groups are also overrepresented in the category "often".

...their religion. Twenty-eight percent of respondents without formal schooling feel they can be happy without believing in God.
Men are far more likely than women to visit them.\footnote{113} As in the case of regular prayer, attendance in places of worship declines with age. But it rises (not declines!) with the level of education. In this case, the group with no formal schooling is heavily underrepresented at just 64%. The significance of personal attendance at church or mosque appears to be different from the personal talk with God. Compared to Christians, predominantly Muslim ethnic groups and, hence, Muslims as a group, are heavily underrepresented in the categories "once a week" and "sometimes". Thirteen percent of Muslim respondents state that they never visit a mosque.

The seven questions on religion\footnote{114} were used to construct an index of religiousness:\footnote{115}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious (0, 1, 2 items)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat religious (3, 4 items)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious (5, 6 items)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very religious (all 7 items)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The index confirms what was already signalled by the replies to the individual questions: almost one fifth of the respondents are very religious,\footnote{116} well over half are religious,\footnote{117} one fifth are somewhat religious\footnote{118} and only 4% are non-religious\footnote{119}.

\footnote{113} Eighty-one percent of men, but only 63\% of women. In the category "never" 16\% are women, of whom 98\% are Muslim.

\footnote{114} The following statements and questions were used to construct the index: "I believe in a life after death, in which good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished," yes; "I try to live my life according to the teachings of my religion," yes; "Whatever people say, there are supernatural forces for good and evil that can help or harm me," yes; "I am convinced that my religion is the only true one," yes; "I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God," no; "How often do you pray," regularly; "Do you attend services in your place of worship (mosque, church)?" yes, once a week.

\footnote{115} As a rule, the responses in most countries can be used to construct a scale of "religiousness". However, a reliability analysis of the responses in this survey did not provide the desired results; the overall correlations are too weak to construct a scale.

\footnote{116} All seven questions were answered as defined by us for the index.

\footnote{117} Five or six questions were answered as defined by us for the index.

\footnote{118} Three or four questions were answered as defined by us for the index.

\footnote{119} None of the respondents gave a negative answer to all the questions as we defined them, and only 11 respondents gave a negative response to one of the seven questions.
The non-religious tend to be found in Sarh, among the Sara and Peul, and among teachers and Catholics. Not one respondent in the highest household income group is non-religious. The somewhat religious are, as before, found in Sarh, among the Sara and Tandjile, the youngest age group, casual labourers, unemployed and white-collar workers, and among Catholics and "other Christians". The proportion of religious is above-average in N'djamena, among the Fitri-Batha, Mayo-Kebbi, Kanem-Borno and Arabs, among women, teachers, housewives 120 and white-collar workers, among respondents in the three highest household income groups and "other Christians". The very religious are most frequent among the inhabitants of Mongo (32%) and Abeche (23%), predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, men, the oldest age group, farmers and employed workers, respondents in the lowest household income group and Muslims.

To summarise: Chad as a whole is very religious; Muslims, particularly in Mongo, are more religious than Christians; and both the lowest and highest income groups are religious or very religious. The level of education is not significant for this index.

Taking the index of religiousness and the scale of trust\textsuperscript{121} together we get the following result:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of trust</th>
<th>Index of religiousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No trust</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little trust</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average trust</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High trust</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete trust</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The non- and somewhat religious are overrepresented among those with little or no trust, religious people among those with average trust and the very religious among those with high or complete trust.

How do people perceive their own ethno-linguistic group and how do they think other groups perceive them?

\textsuperscript{120} Muslim women who pray regularly, but do not go to mosque are overrepresented in this category.

\textsuperscript{121} The scale of trust excludes the questions about religious leaders; see n. 83 above.
"In your opinion, which of the following best describe the people in your language group?"

"What do other groups think of your language group?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-perception</th>
<th>Perception of others' perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respected</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As good as the others</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envious</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feared by others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People's perception of their own group is positive: in their assessment of their own group, three quarters of all respondents select one of the first three categories. The Goran and Kanem-Borno in particular have very positive perceptions of themselves. The inhabitants of Sarh and the Sara are overrepresented among those that view themselves as modest, as are the Barguirmi.122

Two thirds believe that other groups also have a positive perception of them. This result is not significantly different from people’s self-perception. However, it is worth noting that 10% of the Goran (the current president of Chad is a Zaghawa, a subgroup of the Goran ethnic group) believe that others see them as feared by others (self-perception: 4%), and 14% of the Hadjarai that others see them as less developed (self-perception: 10%).

The assumption that other groups perceive one’s own group as better correlated inversely with the level of income and education.

"Unfortunately, living conditions for people from my region are worse than for others."

122 This is also true by religion: 18% of each of the two Christian groups assess themselves as modest, whereas just 5% of the Muslims do. Muslims regard themselves as better, as do an above-average proportion (31%) of former Koran school pupils. By contrast, the best educated are overrepresented in the category Modest.
More than half of all respondents agreed with this statement, and men more often than women. Agreement correlates inversely with age, and is particularly high among farmers and white-collar workers, and lowest among students at school and university. Otherwise there are no significant differences.

How much solidarity is there between the different ethno-linguistic and religious groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I prefer to be with people who speak my own language.&quot;</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I feel very close to people of my language group, regardless of their education, wealth or political views.&quot;</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I would agree to my daughter marrying someone from a different language group if they love each other.&quot;</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of the respondents prefer the company of people from their own language group. Of those that agree, the inhabitants of Mongo (68%) and the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups of the Hadjarai and Peul (each 64%), Arabs (60%), Fitri-Batha (57%) and Goran (55%) are heavily overrepresented, the inhabitants of Sarh (33%), the Sara (34%) and Catholics (30%) heavily underrepresented, and "other Christians" (39%) below average. Agreement declines significantly as the level of education rises.123

Asked about the sense of loyalty to one's own language group, agreement rises to 77%. The break-down by group is the same as the company of people from the same language group. Agreement among Muslims is 82%, among Catholics 71% and among "other Christians" 69%. It is notable that agreement in N'djamena - as in the previous question - is well below average (63%). Language obviously plays less of a role in the multilingual capital. This is reflected in the fact that in N'djamena 92% (and in Sarh 94%) of the respondents have no problem with mixed marriages across ethno-linguistic lines. Generally, acceptance of mixed marriages is high at 86% - above average among Catholics (95%) and "other Christians" (91%) and below average among Arabs (77%) and Goran (74%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I feel very close to people of my own religion, regardless of their education, wealth or political views.&quot;</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I would agree to one of my children marrying someone from a different religion if they loved each other.&quot;</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solidarity with people of one's own religion is just 2% higher than solidarity with the language group. This loyalty is stronger in Abeche (86%) and among the Arabs (89%) and Kanem-Borno and weaker in N'djamena (72%). Agreement among Muslims is 83%, among Catholics 77% and among "other Christians" 72%. This corresponds to the results for language group preference seen above.

Acceptance of marriages across religious boundaries is almost one fifth lower than that across ethnic boundaries. That said, the acceptance of religious mixed marriages is very high.\textsuperscript{124} The inhabitants of Sarh (85%) and N'djamena (74%) are particularly open in this respect. The dividing line runs between the major religions: whereas 57% of Muslims accept mixed marriages, 80% of "other Christians" do, and 88% of Catholics.

What roles do religion, ethnicity and other factors play in people's cultural identity? The following question has proved useful in exploring people's views of themselves:

"In any society each person belongs to a number of social groups at the same time. You are either a man or a women; you have a job; you speak a language; you are (or are not) a member of a religious group, a community and a nationality; you live in a village, town or city; you have political views - and for each person each of these distinctions has a different significance.

If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself?"

The responses in descending order of first choice are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st choice</th>
<th>2nd choice</th>
<th>3rd choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chadian</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic affiliation*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal attributes***</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Information on ethnic group and regional affiliation were added together.
**This included items on religion in general as well as defining characteristics for Christians and Muslims.
***Personal attributes include information such as name, "father/mother of ...", wife of ..., "human being", characteristics, etc.

\textsuperscript{124} By comparison: agreement in Lebanon in 1987 was 40%. Hanf (1993), p. 486.
More than two fifths of all respondents define themselves primarily as Chadian\textsuperscript{125} and somewhat more than one fifth in terms of their ethnic and regional affiliation. More than one tenth choose religious affiliation as their primary identity. Interestingly, the proportion of Christians and Muslims selecting this attribute as their first, second or third choice is almost identical.\textsuperscript{126} A good tenth of the respondents each choose occupation and personal attributes as their identification of choice.

Chadian is less popular as second choice; here respondents choose to identify themselves in terms of ethnic group, occupation and religion.

Treating the question on identity as a multiple choice question changes the result somewhat, but confirms the underlying trend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic affiliation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadian</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal attributes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than one quarter of the respondents define themselves in terms of ethnic and regional affiliation, a little less than one quarter in terms of occupation, one fifth each in terms of nationality or religion and one tenth in terms of personal attributes.

To summarise: A very high proportion of respondents accept their identity as Chadian - as a first choice. Taken together, the replies show that ethnic and regional components still play an important role in people's self-perception.

How do respondents' first choices break down by social variable?

Identification as Chadian is above average among the inhabitants of Mongo (63%) and N'djamena (56%) and lowest - far below average - among the inhabitants of Sarh (4%). The Hadjarai (62%), Goran (60%), Mayo-Kebbi (58%), Peul (55%) and Tandjile (50%) are more likely to feel that they are Chadian than the Sara (27%) and the


\textsuperscript{126} In both cases, 5.4% of each religion choose Christian or Muslim as their preferred identity, and 2.2% name religion in general as their primary identity. As second choice, 9.0% choose Christian, 8.1% Muslim and 2.2% religion and as third choice 13% Christian, 12.2% Muslim and 1.3% religion.
Kanem-Borno (24%). National identity is the first choice for former Koran school pupils (54%) and university graduates (52%) and for employed workers (63%), casual labourers (54%) and traders (52%). Housewives (35%) and unemployed (32%) are least likely to identify themselves as Chadian. Half of the surveyed Muslims define themselves as Chadian, but only a good third of the Catholics (36%) and a good quarter of the "other Christians" (28%).

Ethnic and regional affiliation is most important for respondents in Sarh (36%), for the Fitri-Batha (33%), Sara (29%) and Peul (27%) and least important for the inhabitants of N'djamena (14%) and Mongo (12%) and the Goran and Hadjarai (11% each).

The importance of ethnicity and regional components declines with higher education, in particular a university degree. The survey results by occupation confirm this: housewives (31%) and unemployed and retired persons (29%) identify themselves most frequently by ethnicity or region, and teachers (9%) and civil servants (11%) least frequently. The figure for pupils and students, on the other hand, is the sample average, as is the figure for farmers (21%). An above-average proportion of "other Christians" (27%) identify themselves by ethnic group; the proportion of Catholics (23%) is slightly above average and that of Muslims (17%) slightly below.

The use of religion as identification factor is above average in Sarh (27%) and among the Sara (18%), primary school graduates (19%), unemployed (22%) and "other Christians" (20%). The Hadjarai (5%), employed workers (5%) and teachers (6%) are underrepresented among those who choose religion as their primary identifier. At first sight, this result appears to contradict the index of religiousness, according to which "other Christians" tend to be "less religious" and the Hadjarai "very religious". However, in the case of identification, people were asked to name the social group they identify with most closely; in this context the Hadjarai tend to see themselves as Chadians, and "other Christians" view themselves primarily within the context of their coreligionists.

Identification by occupation is above average among respondents in Sarh (23%), the Kanem-Borno (24%), Barguirmi and Sara (17% each), pupils and students (20%) and secondary school and university graduates (19% each), and far above average among teachers (33%). It is lowest among the respondents in Abeche (7%) and Mongo (8%), the Mayo-Kebbi (4%), Peul (5%) and Ouaddai (7%), former Koran school pupils (4%), people with no formal schooling (7%), farmers (4%), housewives (6%) and employed workers (7%). Christians are slightly overrepresented among those who identify themselves by occupation and Muslims slightly underrepresented.

---

127 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 24 - 20 - 22 - 23 - 17 - 7.
128 Catholics (17%), too, are above the average of 13%.
Identification by personal attributes are more likely in Abeche (17%) and among white-collar workers (20%) and farmers (19%) and less common among teachers (3%), artisans and unemployed (7% each). There is little difference between the responses of Christians and Muslims.

Differences by gender, age and income are also statistically insignificant.

Correlating the first, second and third choices, we obtain the following picture of identity patterns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st place</th>
<th>2nd place</th>
<th>3rd place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chadian (43%)</td>
<td>43% Ethnic affiliation</td>
<td>34% Ethnic affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32% Occupation</td>
<td>31% Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18% Religion</td>
<td>28% Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7% Personal attributes</td>
<td>7% Personal attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic affiliation (21%)</td>
<td>36% Occupation</td>
<td>42% Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29% Religion</td>
<td>20% Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17% Chadian</td>
<td>15% Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% Personal attributes</td>
<td>11% Personal attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (13%)</td>
<td>37% Ethnic affiliation</td>
<td>38% Ethnic affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30% Occupation</td>
<td>26% Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23% Chadian</td>
<td>20% Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8% Personal attributes</td>
<td>15% Personal attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (13%)</td>
<td>25% Religion</td>
<td>31% Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21% Personal attributes</td>
<td>29% Ethnic affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18% Chadian</td>
<td>17% Personal attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14% Ethnic affiliation</td>
<td>10% Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal attributes (11%)</td>
<td>23% Religion</td>
<td>27% Ethnic affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% Ethnic affiliation</td>
<td>26% Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% Chadian</td>
<td>18% Chadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19% Occupation</td>
<td>15% Religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen above, more than two fifths of the respondents regard themselves primarily as Chadians. Of those who define themselves first by national identity, the second choice of a good two fifths and the third choice of a good third is ethnic or regional. Almost one third each choose occupation for their second and third choices, in both cases ahead of religion and personal attributes.

Of respondents who identify themselves primarily by ethnic or regional affiliations, occupation is the most popular second choice, followed by religion, and as third choice religion followed by occupation.
Where religion is the prime identifier, the second and third choices are both ethnic affiliation, in both instances ahead of occupation and national identity.

Respondents who identify themselves first by occupation tend to attach less importance to ethnic and regional affiliations and national identity. In respect particularly of national identity the same is true of respondents who define themselves primarily by personal attributes.

The results on the identity of the respondents in the survey can be summarised as follows: Ethnic and regional affiliation as well as religion play important roles - even if a relatively large proportion of the respondents define themselves primarily by national identity. Definition by Chadian identity tends to decline as definition by ethnic and regional affiliations and religion rises. Even respondents who mentioned occupation or personal attributes first tended to prefer religion and ethnic and regional affiliations as their second and third choices rather than a Chadian identity. In short: ethnic and regional affiliations as well as religion are determining factors of identity in Chad.

How tolerant are the Chadian respondents in questions of religion?

"It does not matter what people believes as long as they lead responsible lives and are good human beings."

The Chadian respondents are tolerant: nine in ten agree with this statement; support is strongest in Abeche (96%) and weakest in Mongo (86%). Education appears to promote tolerance: the better educated people are, the more likely they are to agree with the statement. Otherwise there were no statistically significant differences.

As seen above, Chadians are very religious, regardless of confession. Chad, however, is a secular country on the French model. To what extent does Chadians' religiousness influence their political views?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Religion is more important than politics.&quot;</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society.&quot;</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Obviously there are differences between the religions in our country, but they should be kept out of politics.&quot;</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Obviously there are differences between the people in our country, but they should be kept out of politics.&quot;</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

129 All the teachers and 97% of the civil servants agreed with the statement.
More than nine in ten respondents think religion is more important than politics. Agreement is high across all groups, and slightly higher among Christians than Muslims.

More than eight in ten approve of the demand of religious fundamentalists everywhere: all aspects of state and society must be subordinate to religion. In this respect, Christians, and in particular “other Christians” (89%), are more fundamentalist than Muslims (80%). Agreement is above average in Sarh (90%) and among the Sara (89%) and below among the Barguirmi (70%), Goran (74%), Hadjarai (78%) and respondents in Mongo (77%). Agreement rises with age.

Acceptance of differences between religions and people is about equal. Agreement that religious differences should play no role in politics is below average in Mongo. Otherwise the variables are statistically insignificant. Agreement among the Peul was 95%; by occupation agreement was above average among teachers (97%), civil servants (89%) and housewives (88%) and lowest among artisans (75%).

Women are more likely than men to want to keep ethnic differences out of politics (84%); other groups overrepresented on this point include people with no formal schooling (90%) and university graduates (85%), employed workers (91%), white-collar workers (88%), housewives (87%) and micro-traders (86%).

To summarise: National identity, ethnic and regional affiliations and religious affiliation are the most important factors defining cultural identity. Chadian society, however, combines religiousness with a high degree of tolerance. That said, most respondents feel that their strongest bonds are with members of the same ethnicity and the same religion. Nonetheless, there is widespread acceptance of mixed marriages across these divides. Muslims are more likely than Christians to feel that theirs is the only true religion.

Religiousness influences views on religion and politics: more than two fifths of the respondents feel that religion should influence politics. At the same time, almost as many respondents favour keeping religious and ethnic differences out of politics.

Political orientations

As mentioned above, the ban on political parties in Chad was lifted in 1991. Many former military leaders immediately took the opportunity to form their own parties. Thus, Chad does not have a long tradition of democratic party politics. The contents and formulations of party manifestos - to the extent that they exist - are virtually

130 Agreement among the Peul was 95%; by occupation agreement was above average among teachers (97%), civil servants (89%) and housewives (88%) and lowest among artisans (75%).

131 Agreement correlates directly with household income: 76 - 81 - 81 - 84 - 84.
indistinguishable. Which parties would the Chadians in our survey vote for? The survey was conducted a good six months before the referendum on a constitutional amendment to allow the president to run again; hence the results of our survey may be more than academic.

How do respondents get their information about political events in Chad? More than three quarters listen to the radio, a good quarter read newspapers, and a good tenth each get their information from relatives or at the market. More people listen to the radio in N'djamena and Sarh than in Abeche and Mongo, where fewer stations can be received. A number of stations, including some critical of government, can be heard in N'djamena. The Catholic mission also runs a radio station in Sarh. Newspaper readers are also more common in these two cities. In N'djamena 50% of the respondents said they read a newspaper, compared with 11% in Mongo. More respondents in N'djamena than elsewhere said they received political information from relatives, whereas Mongo had the highest proportion that picked up information at the market. People in the capital make much more intensive use of information sources than respondents in the predominantly rural environment of Mongo, where people are more likely to have time for a political discussion at the market place - and where, as a rule, the local radio station broadcasts no news at all!

To summarise: By ethnic group the most regular radio listeners are the Tandjile (92%), Sara and Kanem-Borno (84% each) and Arabs (81%). Newspaper readers are overrepresented among the Tandjile (56%), Mayo-Kebbi (46%), Kanem-Borno (40%) and Sara (36%). The ethnic groups that rely on family members for their information are primarily the Barguirmi (26%), Tandjile (25%) and Peul (23%). The Fitri-Batha (33%), Hadjarai (17%) and Ouaddai (15%) are most likely to pick up political information in the market place.

The two younger age groups, i.e. people under 35 years of age, listen to the radio more often than the two older age groups; less educated people do not hear as much radio as the better educated. Least likely to receive political information via the radio are farmers, the lowest income group and Muslims. Listening to the radio is, after all, a luxury: it is not only a question of buying a radio, but also of affording the batteries to run it.

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132 More than one answer is possible.
133 Radio stations broadcast in local languages, French and Arabic. Television was not included in the study as very few people have a set. State television can be received only in the capital. The daily news is broadcast first in French and then in Arabic. Very few people can afford satellite dishes, which can pick up French and, in particular, Arab television stations.
134 The newspapers and magazines available in the capital are all French. They are either not available in the “province” or only with considerable delay.
135 Eighteen percent of the respondents in Mongo use this means, compared to just 3% in Sarh.
Family members are a likely source of information for respondents with no formal schooling and primary school graduates, casual labourers, micro-traders, housewives, unemployed and Catholics.

Men, respondents under 35, secondary school and university graduates, teachers, white-collar workers, civil servants, secondary school and university students, people in the upper two income groups and Christians are more likely to read a newspaper, whereas women, respondents 35 and over, those without formal schooling, former Koran school pupils, farmers, merchants, traders and micro-traders - who perforce spend most of their time at the market - casual labourers, people in the lowest income group and Muslims are more likely to pick up news at the market.

"In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing for the country, the one the government should tackle first?"

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

Security 25
Politics 20
Economy 19
Public sector 19
Payment of salaries 17

Security, or the lack of it, is a priority for one quarter of the respondents. This is the largest category. All other problems have more or less equal, but lower, priority: one fifth regards political problems as the most urgent and just under one fifth each the economy, public sector and the payment of salaries.

Security or the lack of it is the major problem for respondents in Abeche (44%) and N’djamena (33%); it is far less serious in Sarh (5%). Concern in Mongo is slightly below average. This result is reflected among the ethnic groups: the predominantly Muslim groups in the north and east (Arabs 42%, Goran and Ouaddai 40% each) are

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136 Politics includes the responses to the following categories: peace (5%), state/politics (7%) and conflicts (8%).

137 Economy includes the responses to the following categories: agriculture (3%), food aid (3%), employment (4%), business (9%).

138 The public sector includes the responses to the following categories: education (6%), infrastructure (8%) and health (5%).
overrepresented among those who view security as the major problem, whereas the predominantly Christian groups in the south, with the exception of the Mayo-Kebbi, are underrepresented; as a problem security is least urgent among the Sara (14%). The ethnic groups of the Fitri-Batha and Hadjarai (19% each), most of whom were surveyed in Mongo, are also underrepresented. The two middle age groups, former Koran school pupils, secondary school and university graduates, white-collar workers, (43%), traders (41%), casual labourers (38%) and teachers (32%) as well as respondents with an average household income are give security above-average priority. Security is not as important for Christians139 as for Muslims (31%).

Two factors need to be taken into account in evaluating these results: The survey was conducted at the height of the Darfur crisis. Abeche and the area bordering on Sudan were regularly affected by troop movements, streams of refugees and military attacks. Consequently, it is not surprising that security should be such a concern in Abeche. In N'djamena people feel more threatened by crime and by police and military abuses. By contrast, the inhabitants of Sarh appear to view their city as very safe - as do those of Mongo, although to a lesser degree.

Politics appears to be a problem for respondents in the south: the inhabitants of Sarh (28%), university graduates (25%), retired persons and unemployed (27%), civil servants (23%) and Catholics (28%). By contrast, respondents in Mongo (9%), the Fitri-Batha (5%) and Hadjarai (10%), primary school graduates (15%) teachers (9%) and Muslims (16%) attach relatively little importance to politics.

The economy is a problem particularly for people in Mongo (28%), those with no formal schooling (35%), farmers (41%), employed workers (32%), housewives (29%) and respondents in the lowest income group (28%). There is almost no difference between the responses of Christians and Muslims. This complex affects in particular respondents who named agriculture as the most serious problem. The respondents in Mongo include the largest number of farmers and members of the lowest income group. It is not surprising that they are overrepresented alongside other respondents who face an uncertain economic existence.

Similarly, public sector responsibilities are viewed as important primarily by those who are unable themselves to cope with or pay for the costs of health, their children's education and similar burdens: the respondents in Mongo (34%) and the local ethnic groups, i.e. the Fitri-Batha (38%) and Hadjarai (31%), casual labourers (27%), respondents in the lowest income group as well as those in the highest. The latter may well have a more comprehensive understanding of the state's responsibilities and obligations towards its citizens.

Owing to an empty or looted treasury, it is not unusual in Chad for civil servants to receive no salary for months on end. The road to Sarh appears to be particularly

139 Catholics 15% and "other Christians" 16%. 

90
hazardous: 32% of the local respondents name the payment of salaries as the most pressing problem. By contrast, in Abeche, another city with many civil servants and educational institutions, only 4% of the respondents chose this point, and 11% in Mongo. By occupation it is clear who is affected: teachers (26%), civil servants and school and university students (21% each). It is not surprising to find students over-represented: in the final analysis they suffer most when teachers and lecturers go on strike for their salaries. If the strikes last too long, the entire school year is declared an “année blanche”, i.e. cancelled, and the year has to be repeated. This means that schoolchildren and students have to spend more time - and their families more money - on their education. Education is at least one of the sectors supposed to benefit from oil revenues.

The different perceptions in the four cities of the most urgent problems highlight the security situation in Abeche, the special political status and the exclusion of Sarh, and the economic and infrastructural problems of the rural environment of Mongo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Payment of salaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N’Djamena</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abeche</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against the background of this problem complex, how do the respondents perceive the distribution of political and economic power and influence? Given this situation, do they have clear political perceptions?

"Which of the following groups do you think play an important or unimportant role in our country?"
The important groups in descending order of importance are as follows:

- Directors of large companies: 91
- Large merchants: 90
- Directors of large banks: 89
- Heads of cantons: 89
- Prefects: 85
- Members of parliament: 84
- Cattle owners: 83
- Muslim religious leaders: 82
- Christian religious leaders: 81
- Ministers: 81
- Military leaders: 77
- Chairmen of the political parties: 77

It is striking that the first three groups by rank - directors of large companies, large merchants and directors of large banks - are representatives of the business world. The next choices are local representatives, i.e. representatives that people are, as a rule, familiar with: heads of cantons, prefects and members of parliament. Cattle owners - in the Chadian context also representatives of the business world - are held to be slightly more important than religious leaders. Muslim and Christian religious leaders have virtually the same standing. The least important group is the political and military elite: ministers, military leaders and chairmen of the political parties. It should be pointed out that the ranking of all these groups of persons is very high.140

With only two exceptions, the ranking of all these groups is above average in Mongo and Abeche, as well as among respondents in the lowest income group, housewives and Muslims. The ranking of holders of political office is considerably below average among Christians, e.g. ministers receive 73% from Catholics and 62% from "other Christians". This is not particularly surprising: there are, after all, very few Christian ministers in the government.

In Mongo respondents think bank directors are less important than they do in Abeche and Sarh. This is hardly surprising given the fact that there is no bank in Mongo, and even if there were, most of the local respondents would not benefit from it as in our survey Mongo’s inhabitants include the largest number of people with low household incomes.

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140 In Kosovo the highest frequency was 88% and the lowest 70%. Cf. Hanf (2005), p. 34.
Religious leaders enjoy wide respect among members of all faiths. Of course, Muslims are even more respectful of Muslim leaders and Christians of Christian.141

"Things being what they are, in which of the following situations are you most likely to be treated properly and fairly."

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In court</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a job in the private sector</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At a police hearing</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a job in the public sector</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost 60% are convinced that they will be properly and fairly treated in court, one fifth in getting a job in the private sector, a good tenth at a police hearing and less than one tenth in getting a job in the public sector. These figures express a deep distrust of objective treatment in the public and private sectors.

Respondents in Mongo (75%), the Hadjarai (73%) and Kanem-Borno (67%) are most confident of being treated fairly in court, whereas respondents in Sarh (45%), the Peul and others (38%), Mayo-Kebbi (49%) and Sara (51%) are least confident. Confidence correlates inversely with education and household income. Confidence in the courts is above average among farmers (72%), teachers and civil servants (68% each), casual labourers and employed workers (66% and 65%, respectively) and Muslims (65%) - groups that probably have little experience of the courts. Only 50% of the Christians believe in fair treatment in court. Here, the confidence that treatment in court will be more proper and fair than in other institutions is probably based on hope rather than experience. One may take it that few of the respondents have ever been charged in court; petty offences are not referred to N’Djamena, but dealt with by the local police.

The inhabitants of N’Djamena (28%) and Sarh (27%) are most sanguine about the chances that the playing field for jobs in the private sector is level, as are the Fitr-Batha (32%), Peul (29%), Sara (28%) and Mayo-Kebbi (27%). Men are more

141 Muslims give Muslim leaders a 95% ranking and Christian leaders an impressive 74%. Catholics and other Christians give Muslim leaders only a 61% and 60% ranking, respectively, as compared to 90% and 94% rankings, respectively, for Christian leaders. The lowest income group, which is overrepresented among Muslims with 68%, gives Christian leaders a below average 75% ranking.
optimistic than women. Optimism rises with the level of education and household income. Artisans (35%), white-collar workers and employed workers (27% each) and unemployed and retired persons (26%) share this opinion, as do "other Christians" (34%). Are these views based on experience or are they influenced by the desire and hope for a job?

Only the respondents in Abeche express an above-average confidence in correct treatment at a police hearing (21%); confidence in fair treatment is very low in Mongo (6%) and N'djamena (7%). The arbitrariness of the police in N'djamena was described in the previous section. The last result reflects the negative experience of respondents; in Mongo it is obviously similar. Confidence in the police is above-average among the Peul (24%), Goran (22%) and Ouaddai (19%), and among women. These figures appear to be coloured by the self-assurance of the northern ethnic groups and the certainty of meeting some family member at a hearing or of knowing somebody who has influence. Traders (21%) and casual labourers (17%) also believe that they will be treated properly at a police hearing; members of the lowest income group (6%) and "other Christians" are least likely to share this view.

Expectations that jobs in the public sector are awarded on the basis of fairness are well above average among respondents in Sarh (19%), and thus the southern ethnic groups, and lowest in Abeche (4%). Former Koran school pupils do not believe that they will be treated fairly if they seek a job in the public sector. On the other hand, given their lack of qualifications, they also have the least chance of appointment through regular channels. Farmers (14%) and housewives (13%), on the other hand, have large hopes, although for them it is idealistic rather than realistic. Interestingly, only 5% of civil servants believe that the correct procedures are following in filling vacancies in the public sector. Are they aware of other factors that play a role in appointments? Confidence is very low among people with high incomes. Whereas an above-average proportion of Catholics are convinced of proper treatment (18%), the opposite is the case with Muslims (6%).

To summarise: "Other Christians" mistrust public institutions the most, but place great hopes in the private sector. Although Muslims do not believe in fairness in public sector appointments, they have greater confidence in state institutions such as the police and the courts.

The extended family is the central point of reference for all Chadians; few can escape its demands. One of the reasons why many people with a regular income fail

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142 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 15 - 13 - 19 - 24 - 27 - 27.
143 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 16 - 19 - 21 - 25 - 38.
144 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 11 - 11 - 9 - 5 - 2.
to achieve even modest prosperity is the duty to help other family members in need. Anybody who resists this unwritten law risks being expelled from the family community. He would then lose the security of support from these same family members if he were in need. How do people react if there is a clash between family interests and fairness?

"Where the interests of my family are concerned, I have the right to break the law." 47

Almost half the respondents would consider breaking the law in the interests of their family. Agreement is above average in Mongo (59%) and Abeche (54%), among the predominantly Muslim Goran (60%), Peul (59%), Hadjarai (56%) and Ouaddai (55%), among people with a low level of education145 and, hence, among Muslims (54%). Agreement in the youngest age group is slightly above average (51%). By city, the respondents in N'djamena (34%) are least inclined to break the law in the interests of the family; the Tandjile and Sara (33% and 37%, respectively) and Catholics and "other Christians" (36% and 39%, respectively) are similarly reluctant. It is possible that tradition and a rural environment play a stronger role among predominantly Muslim ethnic groups. Gender, occupation and income are statistically insignificant in respect of this statement.

How do respondents feel about becoming politically involved?

"If you keep out of politics you have peace and quiet and a clear conscience." 89

Almost nine in ten respondents agree with this statement. Agreement is slightly above average among respondents in Sarh (93%) and women (92%). In the capital N'djamena interest in political involvement is naturally a little higher than elsewhere (85%). All other social variables are statistically irrelevant.

At first glance the high level of depoliticisation is surprising. It is understandable in Sarh. Yet, people in the other cities, too, do not expect much good to come of political involvement. They are also fed up with politics. The respondents appear to seek satisfaction in private life rather than in politics. Do the respondents think politics is a dirty business?

Almost three quarters of all respondents doubt that you can have elections without fraud. In this view, the respondents in Sarh are heavily overrepresented (87%), while those in N’djamena (62%) and Abeche (66%) are underrepresented. Older respondents, people with no formal education (77%) and primary school graduates (77%) and respondents in the lowest household income group (76%) are more likely to believe in electoral fraud than the 25-34 year olds (66%), former Koran school pupils (64%) and university graduates (63%) and respondents in the second highest household income group (62%). In other words, the respondents at the “top” and the “bottom” are the most sceptical. Ethnic group, gender, occupation and religion are statistically insignificant for this question.

Do people trust political leaders? And how far does support go? The answers to the following questions provide information on this:

“At present political leaders cannot do much to improve the situation.” 58

“Even if my political leader acts in a way I don’t like, I will still vote for him at the next elections.” 28

Almost six in ten respondents believe that political leaders cannot do much to improve things. No social variables are statistically relevant. There is widespread political dissatisfaction and little confidence in the ability or will of political leaders and a general sense of powerlessness.

Fewer than three in ten respondents are prepared to support their political leader if he acts in a way they do not like. Unconditional support for any political leader is astonishingly low,147 which indicates general acceptance of democratic principles. A good third of the respondents (34%) in Mongo give their leader unconditional support; in N’djamena only a good fifth do (21%). Women (31%) are somewhat less critical of their political leaders than men (25%). Agreement with this statement falls very rapidly with rising education148 and also correlates inversely with household income.149 Agreement with this statement is above average among housewives (39%), farmers (36%)

146 35 - 49 years: 77%; 50 years and above: 81%.
147 In Kosovo 54% agreed with this statement. Cf. Hanf (2005), p. 38.
149 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 37 - 25 - 21 - 30 - 20.
and artisans (34%) and below average among teachers (6%), white-collar workers (16%) and civil servants (20%).

Ethnic group, age and religious affiliation are statistically irrelevant for this statement. The better educated and better off tend to be fairly critical of their leaders.

Is this also reflected in respondents’ voting preferences? Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in Chad in 2006. The questionnaire included the following questions:

"Which politician do you prefer?"
"Elections will be held soon. Which party will you vote for?"\(^{150}\)
"If you could vote for two parties, which other party would you vote for?"
"Think about the people in your district or village. Which party will most of them vote for?"\(^{151}\)

Chadians’ preferred politicians in descending order of popularity are as follows:\(^{152}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politician</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idriss Déby</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorongar Ngarlejy</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibni Oumar Saheh</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh Kebzabo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassire Koumakoye</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two fifths of the respondents named President Déby as their politician of choice and one quarter Yorongar. Kamougué and Ibni Oumar each drew the support of 7%. In a poll of the most unpopular politician, Déby got almost as many votes.

In Chad political parties are closely tied to the person of the political leader. A cross table of party preferences and political leaders produced a high correlation.\(^{153}\) With just

\(^{150}\) Nine percent of respondents did not answer this question.

\(^{151}\) Six percent of the respondents explicitly gave "no party" as their first choice; the analysis takes this into account. Twenty-six percent and 22%, respectively, either gave no reply or did not name a party for the second choice and their neighbours’ voting preferences.

\(^{152}\) Fifteen percent of respondents did not answer this question.
one exception, more than 90% of a politician's supporters also voted for "his" party. Hence, the following analysis focuses solely on the political parties.

By party preference, the respondents in the survey would vote as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1st choice</th>
<th>2nd choice</th>
<th>People in same district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR (Fédération, Action pour la République) and allies</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD (Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD (Union pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies of the MPS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDR (Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUS (Action Tchadienne pour l'Unité et le Socialisme) and UDR (Union pour la Démocratie et la République)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA RNDP (Rassemblement National pour le Développement et le Progrès)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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153 Ninety-six percent of Déby's supporters voted for the MPS, 95% of Yorongar's supporters for the FAR, 77% of Kamougué’s supporters for the URD, 92% of Ibni Oumar's supporters for the PLD, 91% of Kebzabo's supporters for the UNDR and 92% of Koumakoye's supporters for the VIVA RNDP.

154 These include: ARD (Action pour la République et la Démocratie), MORENAT (Mouvement pour la Redressement Nationale du Tchad) and PDI (Parti pour la Démocratie et l'Indépendance intégrale).

155 These include the following parties: AND (Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement), LINGUI, MDST (Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme au Tchad), MPDT (Mouvement pour le Progrès et la Démocratie au Tchad), PLUS (Parti Libéral pour l’Unité et Socialisme), PUR (Parti pour l’Unité et Socialisme), RNDT (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie au Tchad), UDT (Union Démocratique Tchadienne) and UN (Union Nationale).
Democrats without Democracy?

MPS, the ruling party of President Déby, draws more than one third of the votes. Taking the votes for the MPS and its allies together, the government receives 41%.\(^{156}\)

One quarter of the votes go to the FAR of Yorongar Ngarlejy, Déby’s strongest opponent in the 2001 elections. Yorongar comes from Logone Oriental, not far from Doba. He gained national and international recognition for his open criticism of the government and the oil project, his fight against the destruction of the environment and for a more equitable distribution of oil profits. Because of his criticism, Yorongar has been repeatedly detained for lengthy periods without trial. The PLD, the party of Ibni Oumar, an Abeche politician and speaker of the united opposition parties (Coordination des partis politiques pour la défense de la Constitution, CPDC), drew 7% of the votes, the URD, led by Kamougué, a former general of police, leader of the movement for an independent South Chad (Comité Permanent du Sud) and speaker of parliament,\(^ {157}\) 6% and Saleh Kebzabo’s UNDR 3%. The remaining parties drew 3% of the votes or less.

Who votes for which party?

The MPS draws strongest support in Mongo (60%) and Abeche (53%) and least in N’Djamena (22%) and Sarh (11%). More women (40%) than men (35%) support the ruling party. Respondents with no formal schooling (59%) and former Koran school pupils (60%) are also overrepresented among MPS supporters, as are farmers (59%), traders (48%), housewives (47%) and mechanics (46%), people in the lowest and highest household income groups (46% and 44%, respectively) and Muslims (55%). Only about 10% of the Christians voted for the ruling party.

FAR supporters are overrepresented in Sarh (51%) and N’Djamena (31%) and heavily underrepresented in Mongo (6%) and Abeche (11%). The party draws above-average support from the 25-34 year olds (29%), secondary school and university graduates (33% and 32%, respectively), casual labourers (33%) and students (32%), the second lowest income group (29%) and Catholics (51%) and “other Christians” (48%).

Support for the PLD is strongest in Abeche (14%) and N’Djamena (10%), among university (15%) and secondary school graduates (12%) and former Koran school pupils (11%), teachers (21%), civil servants and white-collar workers (15% each) and the second highest income group (13%). Only 3% of Catholics vote PLD.

URD supporters are found principally in Sarh (18%), among the over-50s (14%), primary school graduates (10%), micro-traders (9%) and Christians (12% each).

A look at voting behaviour by ethnic group clarifies the picture: most of the respondents in Chad vote along ethnic lines.

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\(^{156}\) The constitutional amendment pushed by the MPS passed with 65.75% of the votes cast.

\(^{157}\) Kamougué was speaker of parliament until 2002.
The party of Déby, a Zaghawa, draws above-average support from the Goran (71%) and Arabs (67%), the FAR of Yorongar, a Gambaye - a sub-group of the Sara - from die Sara (53%) and Tandjile (34%), the PLD of Ibni Oumar from Abeche from the Ouaddai (24%), the URD of Kamougué, a Mbaye - another sub-group of the Sara - from the Barguirmi (18%) and Sara (14%), the UNDR of Kebzabo from Léré in Mayo-Kebbi from the Mayo-Kebbi (29%) and the RDP of Mahamat Lol, a Kanem-Borno, from the Kanem-Borno (21%).

The ethnicity of political leaders influences voting behaviour more strongly than any other social variable. A question about second preferences revealed greater support for opposition parties. In an electoral system using a transferable vote, the MPS and its allies would not win the elections!

A cross table of first and second votes is revealing about political affinities and alliances:\footnote{158}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
2nd choice & MPS & MPS allies & FAR & allies & PLD & RDP & UNDR & URD & VIVA & ACTUS & RNDP & UDR Other \\
\hline
MPS & 2 & 14 & 15 & 10 & 13 & 13 & 5 & 10 & 4 & 15 & \\
MPS allies & 14 & 10 & 38 & 14 & 7 & 10 & 2 & 2 & - & 2 & \\
FAR & allies & 9 & 2 & 6 & 15 & 3 & 9 & 39 & 6 & 11 & 1 \\
PLD & 16 & 17 & 30 & - & 10 & 11 & 4 & 7 & 4 & - & \\
RDP & 46 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 4 & 8 & 4 & 17 & 4 & - & \\
UNDR & 3 & 3 & 25 & 19 & 6 & 6 & 3 & 9 & 13 & 13 & \\
URD & 5 & 2 & 67 & 4 & - & 5 & 2 & 4 & 12 & - & \\
VIVA & 28 & 4 & 16 & 16 & 12 & 4 & - & 4 & 8 & 8 & \\
RNDP & - & 9 & 47 & 18 & 3 & - & 9 & 6 & 6 & 3 & \\
ACTUS & - & - & 18 & 3 & - & 9 & 6 & 6 & 3 & 7 & \\
UDR & - & - & 18 & 3 & - & 9 & 6 & 6 & 3 & 7 & \\
Other & 29 & 13 & 15 & 12 & 10 & 10 & 2 & 2 & - & 2 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Cross table of first and second votes.}
\end{table}

Apart from its allies, the ruling party draws greatest support from FAR, RDP, VIVA RNDP and UNDR voters and supporters of other (very small) parties. These results

\footnote{158 Figures in bold show the highest number of second preferences.}
highlight the different political coalitions. Both the RDP and VIVA RNDP were part of the government; however, Lol’s RDP withdrew from the coalition in October 2003.

As one would expect, MPS voters give their second votes to their party’s allies. On the other hand, a surprisingly high proportion of supporters of MPS allies transfer their second vote to the FAR. Most supporters of the UNDR, URD and ACTUS also give their second votes to the FAR. PLD voters, most of them Arabs and Ouaddai, transfer their second vote across ethnic lines to a party with a leader from a southern ethnic group. Similarly, those whose first choice is the UNDR and ACTUS give their second vote to the PLD. FAR voters tend to give their second vote to the URD. With the exception of PLD, UNDR and ACTUS voters, respondents also cast their second vote along ethnic lines. A northern party is not a real alternative for a southerner, and vice versa.

Asked how they think people in their district vote, most respondents say their neighbours vote the same way they do. At the same time, 47% of the respondents say that their fellow-citizens would vote MPS - compared with 37% of the first votes. Do they think others are more likely to support the government than they are?

"Which party do you not want to see in the government?"159

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Description</th>
<th>1st Choice</th>
<th>Not in the government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR (Fédération, Action pour la République) and allies</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD (Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD (Union pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS allies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDR (Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUS (Action Tchadienne pour l’Unité et le Socialisme) and UDR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA RNDP (Rassemblement National pour le Développement et le Progrès)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

159 One quarter of the respondents did not answer this question.
The MPS and its allies draw the most support, but also the most opposition. Almost half of the respondents do not want them in the government. Almost one fifth of the respondents disapprove of government participation of the FAR and its allies. More people oppose the URD and VIVA RNDP than support them.

A cross table of first party preferences and party rejection illustrates political cleavages:160

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st choice</th>
<th>Party not in government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS allies</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR &amp; allies</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDR</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVA RNDP</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUS UDR</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political fronts are clear: one third of MPS voters and just under one third of RDP and VIVA RNDP voters, respectively, do not want to see the FAR in the government. The majority of the supporters of the other parties (including the VIVA RNDP) are against MPS involvement in the government. A surprisingly large percentage of voters of the MPS allies obviously support the alliance for reasons of opportunism rather than political conviction. Two thirds of those who would not give any party their first vote

160 Bold figures highlight strongest rejection.
also withhold their vote here. However, almost one quarter of this group reject government participation by the MPS.

Twenty-four percent of respondents state that they are members of the MPS, 5% of the FAR, 3% of the PLD and 2% of the URD. The ruling party is extremely effective at mobilising support, which suggests that some respondents are members not only by political conviction, but also for other reasons.

How do Chadians view the impact of other states on their country? For this question respondents were shown a list of countries with which Chad has relations.

"Relations with other countries have influenced our country in the past and will do so in the future. Please tell us whether you think the impact of each of the following countries on Chad is generally positive or negative."

The answers in descending order of frequency of positive impact are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Generally positive impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first sight the most surprising fact is that all countries in the list, including France, the former colonial power, are held to have a very positive impact on Chad. How does this positive assessment break down?

Nigeria, Chad’s largest trading partner, is seen as having the greatest impact (87%), particularly by respondents in Abeche (93%) and secondary school (91%) and university graduates (96%), but less so in Mongo (78%) and, hence, among the Hadjarai (77%).
Respondents in Mongo (78%) take a somewhat less positive view of the USA's impact than people in the other cities.\textsuperscript{161} Respondents with no formal schooling and those with a higher level of education are more positive than those in the intermediate educational groups. "Other Christians" (89%), which include members of US-based born-again movements, take a more positive attitude than most.

Germany, whose impact is approved of by about four fifths of the respondents, is viewed most positively in Abeche (95%). This may have a very simple explanation: Germany has long been active in development projects in Ouaddai. An aid project of the GTZ, a German government aid agency, was behind the city's water supply. Today, German development aid focuses on rural development and, more recently, aid for refugees from Darfur.

The influence of the neighbouring state of Cameroon is viewed particularly highly in N'djamena and Abeche (84% each) and Sarh (80%), but considerably less so in Mongo (59%) and, thus, among the ethnic groups in that region. Christians (82%) and secondary school graduates (87%) are overrepresented among those that view Cameroon's impact as positive.

Views about Saudi Arabia are mixed. An above-average number of respondents in Mongo (94%) and Abeche (93%) take a positive view, whereas the view in Sarh is basically negative (37%). This break down is reflected among the ethnic groups: the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the north take a positive view of Saudi Arabia's influence, as do Muslims (94%) and former Koran school pupils (92%) - Saudi Arabia is after all guardian of the holy places of Islam - and farmers (93%). In addition, Saudi Arabia supports NGOs in Mongo and funds the teaching of the Koran.\textsuperscript{162} By contrast, the Sara (46%), Catholics (47%) and "other Christians" (46%), teachers (62%) and secondary school and university students (68%) take a dimmer view of Saudi influence.

There is also a difference of opinion about France. Those that view its influence as positive are slightly overrepresented in Mongo (77%) and Abeche (75%), and hence among the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, and slightly underrepresented in N'djamena (67%) and Sarh (66%), and thus among the predominantly Christian ethnic groups. Women view France's impact more positively than men (77% vs 66%); a positive view of France correlates inversely with education.\textsuperscript{163} Muslims (76%) take a more positive view of France's influence than Catholics (66%) and "other Christians" (63%). This is not surprising in the light of recent Chadian history: France initially supported the south, but subsequently switched to the north and is now a firm ally of President Déby and his policies.

\textsuperscript{161} The Barguirmi are most positive (91%) about US influence and the Fitri-Batha least (67%).


\textsuperscript{163} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 81 - 74 - 71 - 71 - 68 - 60.
Two thirds of the respondents regard Libya, Chad's northern neighbour, as influential; support is strongest in Abeche (81%), among the Goran and Arabs (81% each) and Ouaddai (78%) and among Muslims (74%) and weakest in Sarh (48%), among the Mayo-Kebbi (49%) and Sara (53%) and among Catholics (55%) and "other Christians" (51%).

Respondents in Sarh (67%) and Abeche (68%) take a generally positive view of the Central African Republic's impact, as do women, Catholics (69%) and "other Christians" (65%). The assessment among respondents in Mongo (52%) and Muslims (60%) is slightly less positive than the average.

Niger's impact is held to be a good thing by respondents in Abeche (76%) and Sarh (64%), whereas opinions in N'djamena (54%) and Mongo (48%) are less positive.

The impact of Sudan (overall approval: 54%), Chad's eastern neighbour, is generally viewed more positively among respondents in Abeche (73%) and Mongo (63%), among the Peul (77%), Kanem-Borno (76%), Ouaddai (72%) and Arabs (70%), among women (58%), among housewives (71%) casual labourers (68%) and farmers (66%) as well as Muslims than among respondents in N'djamena (41%) and Sarh (37%), among the Mayo-Kebbi (27%), Sara (38%) and Tandjile (39%), among white-collar workers (41%) and civil servants (45%) and "other Christians" and Catholics (35% and 36%, respectively). Agreement falls as the level of education rises.164

Muslims take a more positive view than Christians of the influence of the Islamic states - Saudi Arabia, Libya and the Sudan - and of France. By contrast, Christian opinion on the influence of Cameroon and the Central African Republic is more positive.

Nigeria and Cameroon enjoy above-average support among the inhabitants of N'djamena, and the USA, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Niger among those of Sarh. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, France and the Sudan, the inhabitants of Mongo have a more negative view than average of all states, whereas the positive view of all ten states is above average among the inhabitants of Abeche.

Which country do respondents see as a model?

"In your opinion, which country is an ideal country, the one that other countries should take as a model?"

164 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 69 - 66 - 49 - 50 - 51 - 37.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North African and Arab states</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger and the Central African Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African states</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other states</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The USA is the ideal of mainly urban, male, young, better educated, higher income respondents.

Neighbouring Cameroon is a model for respondents in Sarh, for women, primary school graduates, micro-traders, the second lowest income group and Catholics and "other Christians".

Urban Muslim respondents, primarily in Abeche, former Koran school pupils, casual labourers and micro-traders tend to take the North African and Arab states as their models.

Muslims in towns and villages tend to look to Nigeria: respondents in Mongo, women rather than men, the 35-49 age group, former Koran school pupils and traders and housewives.

Sudan and Libya appear to be the model for poor Muslims in the lowest income group in Abeche and Mongo, for women, respondents with no formal schooling and former Koran school pupils, farmers, traders and employed workers.

France enjoys above-average appeal in Sarh among predominantly urban, young Christians, secondary school graduates as well as secondary school and university students.

Other European states are the ideal of the urban, Christian, male educated elite, teachers and white-collar workers, and Niger and the Central African Republic of the rural, uneducated respondents in the lowest income group. Chad itself found above-average favour only in Sarh and Abeche among respondents with a low income and no formal schooling.

"Other African states" tend to be a model for respondents in N'djamena and Sarh, for men, for the 35-49 age group, secondary school and university graduates, white-collar workers, civil servants, teachers, respondents in the highest income group and Christians. It is possible that these are the countries that respondents have visited for educational purposes or on business trips.
Various social factors and personal experience - education, income and religion - appear to influence the choice of a specific country as model. As a generalisation: the younger and more educated the respondents, the more distant the model state. Among respondents with a job, Christians look to African states south of the Sahara and Muslims to Muslim states. The lower the level of education, the greater the tendency to choose neighbouring states.

To summarise: Respondents view security, or the lack of it, as the country's most pressing problem. Business elites are generally held to be more important than political elites. Nine in ten respondents think it is better to stay out of politics and seven in ten believe that there is no such thing as elections without electoral fraud. They do not have much confidence in the abilities of their political leaders and tend to feel powerless to do anything about it.

Political leaders' ethnic affiliations are more important for voting behaviour than party manifestos.

With the exception of the USA, countries viewed as models are either African or predominantly Muslim states.

Opinions on the political order

Chapter One described how Chad's political history since independence is largely a tale of civil war, power shifts and questionable elections. In these circumstances can the population develop democratic attitudes? Which political order would they prefer? Do they believe in democratic mechanisms and the possibility of a peaceful change of power? Do they have any confidence in the government of the country?

How satisfied are the respondents in our survey with the government and its policies?

"In general I think that our government is doing the right thing." 36

Almost two thirds of the respondents, and four fifths of those in N'djamena and Sarh, do not agree with this statement. The government's policies find strongest support among respondents in Mongo (56%) and Abeche (48%), and hence also among the predominantly Muslim ethnic groups. Agreement is highest among the Goran (60%), the ethnic group of the current president. Agreement correlates inversely with
Artisans and farmers approve of the government’s policies, while disapproval is above average among white-collar workers, teachers and civil servants. These are groups with a disproportionately large percentage of Sara.

Whereas almost half of the Muslims are convinced that the government is on the right path, more than four fifths of the Christians do not share this view.

As the referendum on the constitutional amendment was held six months after this survey, we can compare the response to the question above with the official voting results. On 6 June 2005, the Chadian voters approved a constitutional amendment that removes the limit on the number of terms a president may serve. The referendum result is almost the exact opposite of the responses to the statement above: according to the electoral office, 65.75% of the voters approved and 34.25% rejected the constitutional amendment.

What policies do respondents think the government should be pursuing? How democratic are they? Do they have any idea of the political order they want?

"It is not good for a country when individuals and groups have divergent opinions and pursue divergent interests." 60

"It is normal for people to have divergent opinions and pursue different interests as long as they obey the law." 90

Sixty percent of the respondents reject diversity of opinions and interests. Or put another way: only 40% of the respondents accept one of the fundamental prerequisites of democracy. On the other hand, if the question is slightly modified to link diversity of opinion and interests with respect for the law, it gets 90% agreement. This is not a contradiction. After all, the pursuit of opposite opinions and different interests has not done much for Chad. The civil war and armed conflict since independence between different ethnic groups and parties seeking influence and power have left their mark. Chad has never experienced a peaceful change of government. The potential for violence is also present in everyday life. The immediate reaction of most respondents to the first question was negative. Once the qualification "as long as they obey the law" was added, it became clear that nine in ten respondents do accept

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165 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 52 - 53 - 36 - 31 - 24 - 13.
166 There is a modest increase in approval in the highest income group.
167 Cf. www.alwihdainfo.com, 9 July 2005. The opposition's call to boycott the referendum was not followed by all registered voters.
diversity of opinions and interests. In other words, they are more democratic that may appear at first sight.169

That said, the experience of the civil war has left its scars. Asked to choose between the following two statements:

"The government controls certain interests to preserve social harmony." 17

or:

"Citizens should be free to pursue their own interests, as long as they respect the law." 83

only 17% favour government enforced social harmony. A good four fifths of the respondents voted for people's freedom to pursue their own interests. Agreement with the second choice is above average among the inhabitants of Sarh (89%) and N'Djamena (85%). Agreement with the second statement correlates strongly with the level of education;170 Catholics (84%) and "other Christians" (89%) also give it above-average support. By contrast, Muslims (19%) are slightly overrepresented among those who favour government control in order to preserve social harmony.

The following statement reveals further evidence of undemocratic convictions:

"It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win." 28

More than one quarter of the respondents take the opinion that election results can be "corrected" if it is in the interest of the country. This view finds above-average support among the inhabitants of Mongo (43%), among the Hadjarai (40%), women (31%), the less educated, housewives (49%), farmers (39%), people in the lowest income

169 There are few statistically significant differences by social variable. Ninety-six percent of the inhabitants of N'Djamena agreed with the second statement; they suffered most during the civil war, and since then have, thanks to the international media and organisations, become acquainted with the rules of democracy.

170 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 76 - 79 - 82 - 84 - 89 - 92.
group and Muslims (32%). Electoral fraud is condoned least among civil servants (11%) and teachers (18%).

Other measures of democratic attitudes include the approval or rejection of the independence of the courts, the separation of powers, controls on power, the freedom of expression and a multiparty system. To examine these, respondents were asked the following questions:

"Here is a list of statements on different ways of governing a country like ours with different regional, language and religious groups. Please tell us which one of each pair of statements you agree with."

The responses are in order of descending support for the democratic option:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement 1</th>
<th>Statement 2</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The president must come from the largest ethnic group. or: It does not matter which ethnic group the president is from, as long as he is competent.&quot;</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A government that listens to the opinions of all freely constituted organisations, movements and associations. or: A government that listens only to the organisations that support it.&quot;</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A government controlled by a parliament elected by the people. or: A government that can act as it wishes without parliament interfering.&quot;</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A government that controls the press, radio and television in order to prevent discord. or: A government that allows the press, radio and television to criticise it and accepts the freedom of the press.&quot;</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Judges who follow the directives of the government. or: Truly independent judges who apply the law no matter what the government says.&quot;</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A government in which the strongest party appoints all the cabinet ministers and is thus able to realise this party's political programme. or: A government in which all the major parties name some cabinet ministers, which means that they have to make compromises.&quot;</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agreement declines linearly from the lowest to the highest household income group: 41 - 25 - 24 - 24 - 17.
"A government that allows the councils elected by the prefectures and communes to regulate their own affairs."

or:

A centralised government that regulates the affairs of the entire country."

"Only one political party with a single plan for the country's future."

or:

Several political parties, each with its own plan for the country's future."

"Factories and trade owned by private people who will work hard for the benefit of the country."

or:

Factories and trade owned by a government elected by the people."

"One official language

or

Everybody has the right to use his own language on official business, whether in a government office or in court or in parliament."

Nine in ten respondents object to having the president come only from the ethnic majority, and favour a strong civil society, the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature and freedom of the press. Eight in ten respondents favour independent courts and a grand coalition. Seven in ten want decentralised government and a multiparty system. Six in ten respondents are in favour of free competition. Four in ten voted for multilingual public services.

The break down by social variable reveals that many of them are statistically insignificant for most questions. In general, the major distinctions are between the cities: as far as democratic awareness is concerned, N'djamena and Sarh are above average, Abeche just above or average and Mongo below average. As surveys in other countries have established, democratic attitudes correlate directly with the level of education. It is no different here: the higher the level of education, the more democratic attitudes are. By income, democratic attitudes rise with household income, until the highest category, when they fall slightly. In Chad, a high income often goes hand in hand with privileges; greater democracy could well mean the loss of some of them.

172 Only 6% of the Sara, the largest ethnic group, which would benefit from such a rule, voted for choosing the president from the largest ethnic group. Obviously, they think that competence is more important than ethnicity for this office. By contrast, the Goran (15%), Hadjarai (15%) and Fitri-Batha (14%) are all disproportionately in favour of a president from the largest ethnic group, although they would not benefit.
By religious affiliation, the major differences are between Muslims and Christians, even if "other Christians" are often more democratic than Catholics.

Two striking results for the inhabitants of Sarh are their high vote against independent courts (28%) and for a grand coalition that requires compromises from all the ruling parties (87%).

Approval for decentralisation is strongest in N'djamena and Sarh, below average in Mongo and well below average in Abeche. As a political topic, decentralisation is of interest only in the capital. It is possible that people associated this question with the conventional slogans currently bandied about in many development aid projects.

In multilingual Chad, in which French and (Chadian) Arabic are the two official languages, the language question is a recurring source of conflict potential. The inhabitants of N'djamena were heavily overrepresented (89%) among those who voted for one official language, as were the Tandjile (86%) and Mayo-Kebbi (84%) ethnic groups, similarly men (68%), employed workers (75%) and teachers (74%), but also secondary school and university students (72%), Agreement correlates directly with household income. The language meant in this case is almost certainly French. Among the Arab-speaking groups (including former Koran school pupils) agreement is average or slightly below.

In N'djamena the proportion of those in favour of the private ownership of factories and rewarding people for hard work is far above the average at 71%. Agreement correlates directly with education and household income. "Other Christians" in particular (65%) appear to have taken the Protestant work ethic to heart; approval among the Muslims is below average (54%). Ethnic group, gender, age and occupation are statistically insignificant for this question.

Which groups are very democratic, democratic, partially democratic and undemocratic? To establish this we constructed a democracy scale.

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173 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 55 - 63 - 66 - 71 - 84.
175 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 50 - 56 - 60 - 61 - 70.
176 Agreement among teachers is 76%.
177 Alpha = .5901. As none of the respondents chose the undemocratic option for all of the items, but 200 respondents (= 17%) chose the democratic option for all of the items, a different break-down was used for the scale.
178 The following questions were used to construct the democracy scale: "Only one political party with a single plan for the country's future." or "Several political parties, each with its own plan for the country's future." (second option); or "A single party open to everyone governs without opposition." (rejection); "Judges who follow the directives of the government." or "Truly independent judges who apply the law no matter what the government..."
The responses break down as follows:

- undemocratic (0 - 4 items) 7
- partially democratic (5 - 7 items) 33
- democratic (8, 9 items) 43
- very democratic (all 10 items) 17

 Whereas two fifths of the respondents are undemocratic and partially democratic, three fifths are democratic and very democratic.

 Twenty-five percent of the respondents in N’djamena are very democratic; residents of the capital are also overrepresented among the democratic respondents. Respondents in Mongo are partially democratic; 13% are undemocratic.

 The break down by ethnic group is as follows: Very democratic respondents are overrepresented among the Sara (20%) and the Arabs, Ouaddai and Tandjile (19% each).\(^{179}\) The Fitri-Batha (57%), Goran (53%) and Hadjarai (47%) are partially or undemocratic (40%). Men are more democratic than women; age is statistically insignificant.

\(^{179}\) Not a single Peul was very democratic. However, 68% of the Peul respondents are democratic, which is well above average.
The break down on the democracy scale by highest level of education completed is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Undemocratic</th>
<th>Partially democratic</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Very democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koran school, can read</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school, vocational training</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school graduate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University graduate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The polarity between high and low levels of education is striking: the higher the level of education, the more democratic attitudes are. Forty-one percent of university graduates and 29% of secondary school graduates are very democratic; 13% of former Koran school pupils and 10% of the respondents with no formal education are undemocratic.

An above-average proportion of farmers and housewives are undemocratic (12% and 9%, respectively) or partially democratic (44% and 40%, respectively). Democrats are overrepresented among civil servants and casual labourers (54% each) and micro-traders (48%). In particular teachers (41%), white-collar workers (33%), civil servants (24%) and employed workers (23%) are very democratic. This is reflected in the results by household income: Above-average proportions of the lowest income group are undemocratic (10%) and partially democratic (42%). The two highest income groups, by contrast are very democratic (20% and 26%, respectively).

Muslims (10%) are slightly overrepresented among undemocratic respondents; "other Christians" on the other hand are more democratic (50%) than Catholics (44%) and Muslims (41%). Christians are slightly overrepresented in the category "very democratic".

180 Partially democratic results from the lowest to the highest income group: 42 - 34 - 28 - 24 - 22.
How religious are democrats in Chad? A cross table of the democracy scale and the index of religiousness is revealing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index of religiousness</th>
<th>Democracy scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undemocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat religious</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very religious</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Undemocratic respondents are not or somewhat religious. By contrast, democratic and very democratic attitudes are overrepresented among religious and very religious respondents.

How do people express their criticism of the government and political opponents?

"What means of political protest do people like you use or reject? We are not asking for your personal opinion, but that of people you know, the people in your district or who you work with."

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

- Only peaceful means 88
- Peaceful protests and demonstrations 78
- Strikes lasting one, two or three days 57
- Strikes lasting two weeks or more 40
- Damaging the property of political opponents 22
- Boycotting shops owned by political opponents 13
- Use of weapons against political opponents 8
- Physical violence against political opponents 7
- Violence - it does not matter against whom 5
The overwhelming majority of respondents are of the opinion that people in their environment would use peaceful means for political action. However, 22% accept the possibility of damage to property, 8% the use of weapons and 7% the use of violence against political opponents and 5% the use of random violence.

An above-average proportion of respondents in Mongo and N’djamena and in particular among the Hadjarai prefer "only peaceful means" and "peaceful protests". In both cases, women are slightly below average.

 Strikes lasting just a few days are particularly popular in N'djamena (74%), among the Barguirmi and Tandjile, but also among the Kanem-Borno (68%), Sara (68%) and Mayo-Kebbi (68%) and among women. Support is above average among teachers (82%) and civil servants (71%). Strikes are least popular among respondents in Mongo (45%) and Muslims (49%). Strikes lasting a couple of weeks draw support from the same groups, notably from the respondents in Sarh (55%), with least support among Muslims (32%).

 Damage to property drew above-average support among the inhabitants of Mongo (48%) and Sarh (26%), among the Hadjarai (40%), housewives (37%) and farmers (33%). Agreement declines with the level of education\(^{181}\) and the level of income.\(^{182}\)

 Support for the boycott of political opponents' shops is above average among respondents in Sarh (19%) and women (17%). The other social variables are statistically insignificant.

 The willingness to use weapons against political opponents is above average among respondents in Sarh (17%), the Sara and Tandjile ethnic groups (14% each) and Catholics (16%). Approval is lowest among the inhabitants of Abeche (2%) and Muslims (4%).

 The break down for physical violence against political opponents is similar. Every single teacher among the respondents disapproves.

 Random violence, regardless of the target, is rejected absolutely by the Goran, Kanem-Borno, Fitri-Batha, Peul and Mayo-Kebbi ethnic groups and by those with the highest education. Once again, the inhabitants of Sarh (16%), the Sara and Tandjile and Catholics (11% each) are more ready than others to resort to violence. This holds for only 1% of respondents in N'djamena and Abeche. From the above it is clear that among the Sara there is a - considerable - minority of radical, frustrated people ready to resort to violence.

 The following complex of questions investigates attitudes towards the practice of democracy in multiethnic states. The respondents were asked to say whether they

\(^{181}\) Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 21 - 25 - 25 - 26 - 11 - 4.

\(^{182}\) Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 30 - 23 - 20 - 16 - 9.
agreed with different forms of government or not. They were expected to respond to each statement and afterwards choose one as the best solution for Chad.  

“There are many countries like ours, i.e. with different ethnic groups. These countries have different forms of government, and opinions differ greatly about the best way to govern such countries. Below we show you some of these opinions. Think of the situation in Chad and please tell us whether you find each of these statements acceptable or not.”

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Best solution for Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“People vote for the party they like, and the parties form a national government in which each party has a share of power.”</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The party that wins the most votes governs and the other parties form the opposition.”</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The largest group governs and the others accept its decisions.”</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A single party open to everyone governs without opposition.”</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The country is partitioned and each group gets its own state.”</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“One group dominates the others, and those that don’t like it must either keep quiet or get out of the country.”</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preferences for acceptability and the best solution for Chad correspond. The only exception is the option for partition, which is regarded as the third-best solution for Chad, although it is fourth by acceptability. By social variable the assessments of acceptability of each statement and of whether it is the best solution for Chad also correspond; hence, we shall restrict the detailed analysis to the results for the "best solution".

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183 Hence the lower percentages for the "best solution for Chad".

184 For comparison, the results for this question in the Congo survey: government of national unity 53%; majority government 21%; single party system 14%; partition 8%; largest group dominates 3%; one group dominates 1%.
Almost half of the respondents prefer a government of national unity, i.e. a system of consociational democracy in which people vote for their party of choice, yet all parties govern - a political system that allows all groups in a multiethnic state to play a part in political decision-making. This solution enjoys above-average support among the inhabitants of Abeche (51%), the Mayo-Kebbi (55%), Ouaddai (54%), Kanem-Borno (53%) and Arabs (50%), among secondary school graduates (57%), civil servants (66%) and teachers (68%). Muslim support for this option is slightly above average (48%).

Just below one fifth of the respondents prefer a system of majority democracy. The inhabitants of Mongo are overrepresented (28%), as are the Hadjarai and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups (the Fitri-Batha, Peul and Goran), former Koran school pupils and casual labourers.

The results for this question do not correspond with those of other surveys: as a rule higher education goes hand in hand with more democratic attitudes, as discernible in the option of consociational democracy. Approval of a multiparty system declines with rising education and income. To summarise: 63% of the respondents regard one of the two forms of democratic government as the best solution for Chad.

On the other hand, 15% of the respondents approve of partition. Support is above average among the inhabitants of Sarh (28%) and N’djamena (23%), and hence among the Sara (31%) and Tandjile (25%), among university graduates (19%), white-collar workers (27%), casual labourers (22%) and micro-traders (21%) and the two groups of Christians (31% each). Only 2% of the respondents in Abeche agreed, which is well below average. In other words, southerners and Christians are more likely to regard partition as a future option for the country.

A good tenth voted for domination by the largest group. This option enjoys above-average support among respondents in Mongo (17%), the Fitri-Batha (19%), Peul (18%), Barguirmi (17%) and Hadjarai (16%), among respondents with no formal schooling (17%), housewives and casual labourers (16% each) and farmers and

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186 On the general question an above-average proportion of the inhabitants of Mongo, and hence of the Hadjarai, voted for this option. All other social variables are statistically irrelevant.

187 An above-average proportion of the inhabitants of Mongo, of the Hadjarai and former Koran school pupils also find this solution generally acceptable.

188 Secondary school and university graduates and members of the upper income groups are overrepresented.

189 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 11 - 29 - 13 - 23 - 14 - 18.

190 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 22 - 17 - 24 - 18 - 16.
artisans (15% each). Approval falls as the level of education\textsuperscript{191} and income\textsuperscript{192} rises. Support for this solution is lowest among Catholics (5%).

One tenth of the respondents would prefer a single party open to all; support is above average among the inhabitants of Abeche (14%), the Goran and Barguirmi ethnic groups (17% each), Arabs (16%), primary school graduates (13%) and casual labourers (19%).

With the support of only 1%, domination by one group and the departure of dissidents is not an option for Chadians - although 15% think it is an acceptable form of government. Support is above average among the inhabitants of Mongo (28%) and below average among the inhabitants of Abeche (9%). Approval correlates inversely with level of education and income; it is slightly above average among Muslims.

To summarise: In terms of the most significant items on democracy, from free elections to power-sharing, the survey respondents exhibit pronounced democratic attitudes, as reflected in the democracy scale. The majority favour peaceful means of political protest. Almost two thirds opt for a democratic form of government, either consociational democracy or majority democracy. At the same time, a good quarter think that electoral fraud in the country's interest is justified.

Perceptions of differences and coexistence

As we have seen, Chad is a country of different ethnic groups, cultures, languages and religions. The following questions have been constructed to determine what respondents view as the crucial lines of conflict, how they deal with the country's diversity, whether they think their conflicts can be regulated, and whether they are willing to continue to live together in one country.

"Which of the following do you think are the biggest differences among people in Chad?"

The answers in descending order of frequency are as follows:

- \textit{Differences between farmers and pastoralists}\hspace{1cm}34
- \textit{Differences between Christians and Muslims}\hspace{1cm}25
- \textit{Differences between rich and poor}\hspace{1cm}21
- \textit{Differences between ethnic groups}\hspace{1cm}10
- \textit{Differences between N'djamena and the rest of the country}\hspace{1cm}10

\textsuperscript{191} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 17 - 10 -13 - 12 - 7 - 0.
\textsuperscript{192} Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 17 - 12 - 6 - 9 - 6.
More than one third of the respondents feel the difference between farmers and pastoralists is the most crucial difference in Chad, one quarter that between Christians and Muslims, a good fifth that between rich and poor and one tenth each those between ethnic groups and between N'djamena and the rest of the country.

The conflict between farmers and pastoralists is perceived differently in each of the four cities in our survey: in Sarh (60%) the proportion that regards it as crucial is nearly twice the average, the proportion in Abeche and Mongo is average, and that in N'djamena (18%) is below average. There is a tradition of conflict between nomads and settled populations throughout the Sahel, not only in Chad. Superficially, it is a conflict over water and grazing. But it goes deeper than that. It is a conflict between two different ways of life, between different perceptions of authority and - depending on the region - between Christianity and Islam. The nomads in Chad are Muslim; for centuries they have followed the same routes based on the needs of their animals, the growth cycles of nature and the times settled communities sow and harvest their crops. Most of them have family in N'djamena or Abeche. Different ethnic groups follow different routes, depending on whether they have camels, cattle, sheep or goats. All groups move north during the rainy season and south during the dry season. The lower the rainfall, the earlier and farther south the nomads will wander. As a result - and compounded by the civil war -, the fragile equilibrium between settled communities and nomads has started to break down. In recent years, the rains have been particularly poor. In southern Chad this conflict is overlaid by another phenomenon. In this region the pastoralists moving through the countryside are not nomads, but paid cowherds. As a rule, the cattle belong to wealthy Muslim merchants or high-ranking politicians who have invested their capital in livestock. Unlike nomads, cowherds are not interested in the sustainable use of resources, but in profit. The cowherds and cattle-owners view the traditional nomads as competition. The farmers in the south dread the cowherds, as they have no recourse when their fields are destroyed; the cattle-owners have powerful political connections.

Against this background, the differences by city are not surprising. N'djamena has the fewest number of completely rural inhabitants or members of nomadic families. Hence, the proportion of respondents for whom the difference between farmers and pastoralists is relevant is fairly low. Mongo and Abeche have a long tradition of co-existing with nomads. To obviate conflict so-called corridors were established for the nomads in the nineteenth century, a practice that still continues today. By contrast, in the densely populated south, contact between nomads, farmers and paid cowherds is a relatively recent occurrence, and violent clashes between the different groups are not infrequent. Thus, the proportion that regards this conflict as crucial is highest here.

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Such respondents are overrepresented among the Sara (48%) and the predominantly Muslim - Barguirmi (43%) and among Christians. Support for this view is above average in the oldest age group (45%)\(^\text{194}\) and below average among secondary school (25%) and university graduates (19%).

Respondents in N'djamena (31%) and Mongo (29%) view the difference between Christians and Muslims as important, but respondents in Abeche and Sarh (20% each) less so. N'djamena has large Christian and Muslim communities, Sarh is largely Christian with a Muslim minority, and Abeche and Mongo are mainly Muslim. Yet in Mongo, the city with the fewest Christians, differences between Christians and Muslims are held to be particularly significant. Agreement is above average among ethnic groups that are underrepresented in the sample: Kanem-Borno, Fitri-Batha, Tandjile and Mayo-Kebbi. Religious differences appear to decline in significance with age.\(^\text{195}\) They are held to be important by an above-average number of university graduates (33%) and by somewhat below-average proportions of people with no formal schooling (17%)\(^\text{196}\) and Catholics (21%). Differences between rich and poor are overrepresented among those who are affected by them. Support is above-average in N'djamena (28%) and below average in Sarh (14%). Arabs and the Ouaddai also think it is the biggest difference. Twenty-nine percent of the second highest income group share this opinion, but only 15% of "other Christians". With 24%, Muslims are slightly above average.

Differences between ethnic groups draw above-average agreement in Mongo (15%) and, thus, among the Goran (17%), Kanem-Borno and Hadjarai (16% each), respondents with no formal schooling (17%) as well as university graduates (16%) and the highest income group; agreement is slightly above average among Muslims (13%). Catholics with 5% and Sara with 4% are below average.

The importance attached to the cleavages between N'djamena and the rest of the country is above average in Abeche (14%) and below average in Sarh (4%). This result probably reflects the competition for political influence between two important cities. This statement also finds above-average agreement among the Mayo-Kebbi (18%) and Ouaddai (14%), secondary school graduates (15%) and people in the highest income group.

Real or imagined discrimination or preferential treatment in awarding jobs in the private sector, the public sector or the army can also precipitate conflict in multiethnic states. Respondents were asked to choose which criteria should be used in awarding jobs.

\(^{194}\) Agreement rises from the youngest to the oldest age group: 29 - 35 - 37 - 45.

\(^{195}\) Agreement rises from the youngest to the oldest age group: 28 - 25 - 23 - 15.

\(^{196}\) This refers to the oldest age group, which is less educated.
How should the private sector choose employees (if own business: how do you ...)?

How should civil servants be chosen?

How should the army appoint officers?

The break-down of the responses is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Civil servants</th>
<th>Army officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By qualifications, regardless of ethnicity</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People I know and trust</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my family</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas for each population group</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from my region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualifications are by far the most popular criterion for filling positions in all three occupational fields. Personal and kinship relations or group quotas are far less important. Nine percent of respondents approve of ethnic quotas for army appointments. This may reflect the current discussion about a national army. The low approval for ethnicity and the huge approval for qualifications are surprising in a multiethnic state; it is possible that ethnic differences are less divisive for the indigenous population than outside observers think they are. This would explain why the role of ethnic affiliation appears to be less important than religious affiliation.

In respect of private sector jobs, respondents in Sarh (81%) and N’djamena (78%) attach above-average value to qualifications and the inhabitants of Mongo the least (49%). Women do not think qualifications are as important as men do (64% and 75%, respectively). Agreement correlates directly with household income.\(^{198}\) As to be expected, respondents with a high level of education, teachers (94%), white-collar workers (81%) and civil servants (77%) attach above-average importance to qualifications. Qualifications are more important for "other Christians" (81%) and Catholics (76%) than for Muslims (63%).

\(^{197}\) In the Chadian context, it is not unusual to ask about region rather than ethnic affiliation.

\(^{198}\) Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 57 - 68 - 75 - 79 - 83.

\(^{199}\) Agreement among secondary school graduates is 84% and among university graduates 90%.
Respondents in Mongo (18%), the Hadjarai (18%) and Barguirmi (17%) and casual labourers (22%) are most likely to appoint people they know or trust and "other Christians" least likely (7%).

Respondents in Mongo are also more likely to employ kin (18%), as are the Goran (23%), Fitri-Batha (19%) and Hadjarai (16%), women (12%) - as opposed to men (7%) - , former Koran school pupils (15%), farmers (15%) and Muslims (12%). Of the following groups, less than 6% favour employing kin: respondents in N'djamena, Sara, secondary school and university graduates, teachers, civil servants, white-collar workers and "other Christians".200

Support for ethnic quotas is also above average in Mongo (13%), among the Hadjarai (15%), women (10%; men: 5%), people with no formal education (12%) and farmers (18%). Here, too, agreement correlates inversely with household income.201

Ethnic affiliation drew very little support - just 1% - as a criterion for job appointments; it is above average among the Fitri-Batha (5%) and Goran (4%) and people in the highest household income group (4%).

The picture for the appointment of civil servants is similar: qualification is disproportionately favoured as the criterion of choice in N'djamena (84%), by men (83%) and by secondary school (88%) and university graduates (96%). Respondents in Mongo are more likely to appoint kin (11%) and people they know (9%), as are people in the lowest income group (11% each). Women (9%), the oldest age group (10%), people with no formal education (13%) and the lowest income group (10%) also tend to favour quotas - in other words, people who are already disadvantaged and often aware of it. Ethnic affiliation plays a role only for the Goran (6%). Ethnicity, occupation and religious affiliation are statistically irrelevant for this question.

The results for choosing army officers do not differ widely from those for white-collar workers and civil servants: people favouring qualifications are overrepresented in N'djamena (78%) and Sarh (77%), among the Barguirmi (87%), Peul (82%) and Tandjile (78%), men (77%), the 25-34 age group, secondary school (83%) and university graduates (88%) and "other Christians" (78%). Approval is below average among respondents in Mongo (57%), the Hadjarai (58%), the youngest age group (66%) and Muslims (67%). Once again, friends and acquaintances play a large role in Mongo (18%) and, thus, among the Hadjarai (16%), among women (12%), the uneducated (14%) and Muslims (13%).

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200 Approval correlates inversely with income. Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 14 - 10 - 9 - 9 - 3.

201 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 10 - 10 - 5 - 3 - 1.
Support for quotas for army officers was above average among the Hadjarai (12%), women (12%), people over the age of 50 (13%), primary school graduates (13%) and respondents in the lowest income group (12%).

Respondents in Mongo (10%) and the Goran (19%) are more likely to give preference to family members in appointing army officers and "other Christians" least likely (4%).

Ethnic affiliation plays a strikingly large role in this respect for the Goran (12%). It is possible that members of the ruling ethnic group feel more secure with officers that come from their own ethnic group - a persistent rumour in Chad claims that Déby has a private army made up exclusively of Zaghawa.

The break-down of responses on criteria for choosing cabinet ministers is as follows:

**How should cabinet ministers be chosen?**

- By qualifications, regardless of ethnicity: 81
- People from my region: 10
- Quotas for each population group: 9

More than four fifths of the respondents feel that even for the choice of cabinet ministers qualifications are more important than ethnicity or ethnic quotas. Each of the last two criteria has the approval of just one tenth of the respondents.

Agreement with qualifications, regardless of ethnicity, is above average among respondents in Abeche (88%), among the Peul (90%), Kanem-Borno and Tandjile (89% each), Ouaddai (88%) and Arabs (86%) and men (85%; as opposed to women: 76%); support among secondary school and university graduates, white-collar workers, casual labourers, teachers and civil servants is 90% and higher, and also above average among people in the middle and two highest income groups. Respondents in Mongo (69%), Goran (72%) and Hadjarai (68%), people with no formal schooling (75%), micro-traders (76%) and farmers (69%) and respondents in the lowest income group attach less than average importance to qualifications. For them ethnic affiliation is relatively important: respondents in Mongo (22%), Hadjarai (21%) and Goran (17%), women (13%), people without any formal education and former Koran school pupils (13% each), farmers (16%) and the lowest income group (15%).

Quotas enjoy above-average support among the Barguirmi (17%), employed workers (18%) and farmers (15%). Approval of quotas is lowest among secondary school and

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202 Agreement from the lowest to the highest income group: 74 - 79 - 86 - 87 - 86.
university graduates and the unemployed and retired. Religious affiliation is statistically insignificant for this question.

In short: approval for employing qualified people is strongest among well-educated better-off, southern men. Muslims and women exhibit a modest tendency in favour of quotas and ethnic affiliation.

What do Chadians think about the opportunities, problems and possibilities of co-existence between the different groups in Chad? To give us some idea, respondents were asked to choose one of the following pair of statements.

"Think about the problems and serious conflicts in our society.  
I fear that peace and cooperation between the different groups may have become impossible.  
or:  
In spite of everything that has happened, peace and cooperation between the different groups can still be achieved."

A good four fifths think peace and cooperation between the different groups is possible; not even one fifth take the opposite view. In the light of the many years of civil war, southern domination of the north and the Habré and Déby dictatorships, this is a remarkably sanguine assessment. The respondents in Mongo are most confident (92%) and those in N'Djamena (26%) least. The civil war was fiercest in the capital, and this is where the different ethnic groups and cultures most often clash. The most optimistic respondents are found among the Goran, Kanem-Borno (92% each) and Hadjarai (90%), and among farmers (93%), artisans (89%) and traders (88%). With 88%, Muslims are slightly above average. The Mayo-Kebbi (29%) and Sara (21%), casual labourers (35%), white-collar workers (29%) and teachers (26%), Catholics (24%) and "other Christians" (21%) are considerably more sceptical.203

Muslims and predominantly Muslim ethnic groups tend to be more positive about the possibility of peace than Christians and the ethnic groups in the south. Is this an expression of the confidence of those in power and the caution of those who have lost it?

What do respondents think about the need for peace and cooperation?

"In the event of a violent conflict between the different groups everybody would lose in the long run."

Gender, age, education and household income were statistically insignificant for this statement.
"Violence and killing can never be justified even if people are fighting for a good cause."

Just less than 70% of the respondents believe that in the event of violent conflict between the groups they will all lose in the long run. More than half the respondents think that violence and killing is never justified. Looked at the other way, almost half the respondents are prepared to justify violence.

Respondents who believe that conflict would hurt everybody are overrepresented in Sarh (81%) and Abeche (77%) and among the Mayo-Kebbi (80%), Barguirmi (78%), Fitri-Batha (76%) and Ouaddai (74%). Respondents with the lowest household income are least convinced of this (61%); very likely they have nothing more to lose. Only 66% of the Muslims believe that everybody would lose in a violent conflict; among "other Christians" the figure rises to 77%. Obviously, more Muslims find it easier than Christians to imagine violent conflict in Chad.204

Respondents in Sarh (63%), among the Sara (60%), Fitri-Batha (57%), Catholics (61%) and "other Christians" (57%) are least likely to think violence and killing is justified. All other social variables are statistically irrelevant.

It is probable that the Sara are speaking from experience. They have already lost a violent conflict and would not have the military means to win a new one - only the fear of becoming victims again.

As in the responses to the previous question, Muslims appear to be more accepting of violence than Christians.

Does the rejection of violence also mean that respondents are ready to make compromises to preserve peace and thereby reduce conflict potential?

"Give the strength of the different groups in our society, it is necessary to search for compromise and come to some agreement."

Seventy-eight percent of all respondents agree with this statement. Agreement is highest in Mongo (88%) and Sarh (86%) and lowest in N'djamena (58%). People in favour of compromise are overrepresented among the Hadjarai (85%), farmers (89%), traders (88%)205 and the lowest income group (84%). Agreement correlates inversely

204 Gender, age, education and occupation are statistically insignificant for this statement.
205 Teachers (53%), white-collar workers (60%) and civil servants (68%) express least support for the statement.
with education. There are no significant differences between Christians and Muslims on this statement. The poor obviously are more afraid of war and conflict. Consequently, they are more open to compromise than the better educated, who, as a rule, do not lose as much in crisis situations.

In addition to the regulation of conflict and conflict potential, the perception of ethnic and cultural diversity has a role to play in coexistence.

"Whether we like it or not: when different language or religious groups live together in the same country, they must either dominate or be dominated."

"A country with groups with different traditions is wealthier and more interesting for it."

"A good friend is a good friend, whether he is called Moussa or Antoine."

"Very different groups can live together in the same country, accept one another and respect one another's rights."

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents are convinced that in multiethnic states one group will dominate. Respondents in Abeche (70%) and Sarh (71%) are particularly convinced of this, as are the second lowest and highest income categories (64% each). Otherwise there are no significant differences by social variable.

Eighty-six percent of the respondents are convinced that a country is wealthier for its ethnic and religious diversity - an opinion overrepresented in Abeche (90%) and underrepresented in Sarh (81%). Other social variables are statistically insignificant.

Eighty-eight percent of respondents believe that a good friend is a good friend, regardless of religious affiliation. Agreement is above average in Abeche (93%) and below in Mongo (80%). Men agree somewhat more frequently than women; artisans (95%) and civil servants and teachers (94% each) are also overrepresented. Agreement correlates directly with education and household income. There are no significant differences by ethnicity, age or religious affiliation.

Almost nine in ten respondents are of the opinion that different groups in a country can live together in mutual respect. Agreement is particularly strong among respondents

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206 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 84 - 85 - 82 - 80 - 66 - 57.

207 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 81 - 89 - 83 - 89 - 93 - 94.

208 Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of household income: 83 - 88 - 90 - 91 - 99.
in Abeche (92%), teachers (94%) and casual labourers (92%). Agreement declines with age\textsuperscript{209} and rises marginally with the level of education.\textsuperscript{210}

Despite civil war and dictators from different regions, it is clear that the majority of the respondents are convinced that coexistence in mutual respect is still possible.

To summarise: Half of the respondents take social differences (farmer and pastoralist; rich and poor) to be the most important cleavages in Chad and one quarter religious differences. A good eight in ten respondents think peace and cooperation are possible despite the conflicts in Chadian society. Seven in ten are convinced that everybody would lose in a violent conflict, and as many as eight in ten regard compromise as desirable.

While just short of three fifths are convinced that one group will always dominate, almost nine in ten respondents believe that coexistence between different groups enriches the country and just as many approve of tolerance towards members of other ethnic groups and religious communities.

Life in the future

Respondents' assessments of whether they are happy with life or not is coloured by the current political and economic situation in Chad. To assess optimism about the future, respondents were also asked to say how they thought they would feel in ten years' time.

"Thinking about life in Chad, how do you feel?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very happy with life as it is</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy, but not very happy</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither happy nor unhappy, in the middle</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhappy with life as it is</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry and impatient with the situation in Chad</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{209} Agreement from the youngest to the oldest age group: 90 - 88 - 88 - 82.

\textsuperscript{210} Agreement from the lowest to the highest level of education: 87 - 87 - 86 - 90 - 93 - 90.
"Try to picture you life in ten years' time. How do you think you will feel then?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very happy with life as it is then</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy, but not very happy</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither happy nor unhappy, in the middle</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhappy with life as it is then</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry and impatient with the situation in Chad as it is then</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourteen percent of the respondents are very happy with their life at present, but more than twice as many think they will be happy in ten years' time. About a fifth are happy now and expect to be happy in ten years' time. Whereas 25% feel neither happy nor unhappy now, only 18% think they will feel this way in ten years' time. The largest drop is among the unhappy: from 32% now to 17% in ten years' time. The percentage of angry and impatient respondents does not change much over time. Combining the categories, only 17% of the "unhappy" and "angry and impatient" expect that their situation in life will improve in the next ten years.

Very happy respondents are overrepresented among the inhabitants of Mongo and Abeche and, thus, the predominantly Muslim Goran (34%), Kanem-Borno (24%), Ouaddai and Peul (18% each), former Koran school pupils (24%) and Muslims (19%). Women are happier than men. These groups also expect to be very happy in ten years' time;211 the youngest age group and the unemployed hope for the same.

A disproportionately large percentage of the inhabitants of N'Djamena (36%), of the Kanem-Borno (37%), Tandjile (36%), Peul (36%), Arabs (33%) and Mayo-Kebbi (33%), secondary school graduates (32%) and people in the second highest income group (34%) feel neither happy nor unhappy.

Angriest and least patient are the inhabitants of Sarh (24%), the Sara (22%) and Mayo-Kebbi (20%), men (16%), university graduates (29%), people in the highest income group (20%) and "other Christians". Precisely these groups expect to still be angry and impatient in ten years' time.

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211 Whereas today only 6% of teachers are very happy, 18% expect to be in ten years' time.
Today | In ten years' time
---|---
Very happy | Very happy | Happy | Neither happy nor unhappy | Unhappy | Angry and impatient
Very happy | 81 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 2
Happy | 42 | 35 | 12 | 8 | 4
Neither happy nor unhappy | 32 | 24 | 31 | 8 | 4
Unhappy | 18 | 14 | 21 | 35 | 12
Angry and impatient | 21 | 16 | 10 | 13 | 40
Average | 35 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 11

The people who are most optimistic about the future are those who are very happy today: 81% of them think that they will also be very happy in ten years' time. Of the happy respondents, 41% expect to be very happy and 35% happy in ten years' time. Of those that are unhappy, 35% expect to remain unhappy and 12% to become angry and impatient. Of those that are angry today, 40% expect to be so in ten years' time. Thus, it appears that a positive assessment of the present enhances expectations of the future.

Unhappy and angry respondents are overrepresented among the Sara and "other Christians". As seen above, these groups also contain elements that are more fundamentalist and more willing to condone violence than the rest of the population. Are they a potential source of social unrest in the future?

To summarise: In general, the respondents in our survey of Chad reveal deeply democratic convictions and political maturity. They accept the rules of democracy. People recognise the country's pluralistic nature, but do not necessarily feel that it is divisive.

Potential sources of conflict in the future are the radical Muslim minority in Mongo and the radical "other Christian" minority in Sarh.
Conclusion

Chad has not had a happy history: torn by pre-colonial conflicts, stitched together by a colonial power - which then proceeded to evaluate north and south differently and treat them accordingly -, democratic government that barely outlived independence, forced nation-building by the south, which plunged the country into years of civil war, and, finally, violent unification under forces from the north.

The real power elite limit their pronouncements to official statements and otherwise keep their views to themselves. Opposition politicians have fewer reservations. Their criticism of current rule is focused mainly on authoritarian practices and the government's monopoly of power. However, the credibility of these critics is tarnished by their previous participation in the same northern-dominated governments and the undertone of disappointment and bitterness in their presentations. A civil society is gradually emerging, but so far has had little effect on political events.

The attitudes and opinions of the Chadian population reveal numerous social cleavages. Yet, these cleavages are not nearly as deep and clear-cut as one might expect after years of civil war. People still have much in common. There is, for instance, broad consensus on the desirability of democracy. The subjects are better democrats than their rulers.

Political scientists may debate the classification of Chad's political system. Is it an "elected democracy" as defined by Freedom House? It is true that the president and parliament are elected. But there are good reasons to doubt whether these elections properly observed democratic principles. Is it a liberal authoritarian system? In view of the restrictions on the freedom of expression and the press, this categorisation, too, is not really convincing. Perhaps it is more appropriate to speak of an authoritarian system in democratic clothing.212

The attitudes of the population give cause for hope. They express an aversion to armed conflict, a remarkable degree of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance - and the pronounced wish for better governance, government accountability and free and fair elections. As is frequently observed in states with inter-communal conflict, the population is often more disposed to an open society, coexistence and democratic competition than the power elites, whose primary concern is to secure power and privileges for their respective group.

In Chad the majority of the people are democrats. For the time being, though, they will have to accept that they are democrats waiting for democracy.

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