

Lettres de Byblos
Letters from Byblos

No. 6

BEATRICE SCHLEE

**Perceptions of Culture and Democracy
in Metropolitan Kinshasa,
Democratic Republic of Congo**

A survey study

Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme
International Centre for Human Sciences

Byblos 2004

Lettres de Byblos / Letters from Byblos

A series of occasional papers
published by

UNESCO Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme
International Centre for Human Sciences

(Arabic)

The opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the author and should not be construed as representing those of the International Centre for Human Sciences.

All rights reserved. Printed in Lebanon. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

C International Centre for Human Sciences, 2004

Published in 2004 in Lebanon by the International Centre for Human Sciences, B.P. 225 Byblos (Jbeil), Liban.

ISBN xxxyx

Contents

Social and cultural markers: Analysis of a survey sample	5
Psycho-social attitudes	20
Economy and society	25
Religion and identity	33
Democracy and conviviality	42
Parties and politics	61
Outlook	74

The first draft of the paper was presented and discussed in Kinshasa in a workshop of the Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP), 21 June 2003. The Congo democracy study on which the paper is based was funded by UNESCO Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme, Byblos, Lebanon.

The author worked as a consultant for the Byblos Centre in November and December 2002 and did research on the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo with emphasis on civil society institutions and NGO working in the field of civic and electoral education.

The findings of the survey were complemented by in-depth fieldwork in the Eastern Provinces of the Congo, the Kivus and Province Orientale during two months in 2003. The author conducted interviews with a wide range of members of civil society (human rights, women, development groups), the political élite, the media, lawyers and representatives of the reduced economic sector.

The usual disclaimers apply; the author is responsible for views expressed in the paper which should not be attributed to the persons and organizations acknowledged above.

Perceptions of Culture and Democracy in Metropolitan Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo

A survey study

BEATRICE SCHLEE

Social and cultural markers: Analysis of a survey sample.

Attitudes and opinions are determined by a number of factors. Besides biological characteristics, these include socio-economic variables such as education and income. It is widely assumed that in multi-ethnic societies such as the Congo factors such as mother tongue, religion and ethnicity decisively influence social and political attitudes. This survey therefore makes use of both socio-economic and cultural variables and investigates their effective analytical strengths.

Owing to the unstable political situation in Congo in early 2002, the survey was limited to Kinshasa, the capital.¹ Kinshasa, a city of about 6,000,000 inhabitants at the time of the survey, is a microcosm of the country's ethnic diversity and hence of its social, economic and political problems.²

¹ The questionnaire used for this survey has been developed by Theodor Hanf in co-operation with Salim Nasr and Lawrence Schlemmer (© Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, Freiburg im Breisgau). The survey was conducted in April, towards the end of the - unsuccessful, as it turned out - Sun City peace negotiations. Residents of 52 districts were asked to complete the questionnaire. The 24 communes of Kinshasa are broken down into 318 residential districts, though many have only a small population. All interviewees had to be at least 18 years of age.

² In summer 2002, some estimates put the population of Kinshasa at 9,000,000.

Social and economic variance

Of the 1000 respondents, 52% are men and 48% women. Only people of 18 years and older and entitled to vote were interviewed.

The breakdown by age is as follows (all figures in percent):³

18-24 years of age	37
25-34 years of age	24
35-49 years of age	22
over 50 years of age	17

As is common in African societies, the younger the age group, the larger it is; a good 60% of all respondents are younger than 35.

The survey breaks down educational levels as follows:

No formal education	2
Catechumens / able to read	3
Primary-school graduates	11
Trade-school graduates	5
Primary-school graduates with further training	10
Secondary-school graduates	49
Polytechnic graduates ⁴	15
University graduates and post-graduate students ⁵	5

For a developing country, the level of education is comparatively high: half of all respondents have completed at least secondary school, more than 70% have some form of higher education, and four fifths have received some post-primary training or schooling. Accordingly, the number of people with no formal schooling, or who have

³ Unless otherwise stated, this applies to all tables. In the following, the term "middle-aged" is synonymous with the "35-49 age group".

⁴ This also includes primary and secondary-school teachers.

⁵ As this group includes doctoral and other post-graduate students, it will hereinafter be referred to as "university graduates".

only learned to read in catechism class, is extremely low: just five percent of the population.

Educational breakdown by *gender* does affect the level of education achieved, but not to the extent that might be expected. While women are more strongly represented among the less-educated than well-educated groups, it should be pointed out that there is little difference between the proportion of women and men in secondary school. Distinctions first appear at the polytechnics, where two thirds of the graduates are male. Men are also overrepresented, if not quite so heavily, at the universities.

The level of education correlates inversely with *age*. Respondents over the age of 50 with some school education are overrepresented among primary-school and underrepresented among secondary-school graduates. The latter is also true of 35-49-year-olds, a disproportionate number of whom, on the other hand, have attended a polytechnic. The age profile of university graduates was a surprise: a full third are 50 or older, and less than one percent is in the youngest age group.

In other words, we are dealing with a society in which members of the oldest generation either have very little education or are highly qualified. Younger people have attended secondary school, but most cannot afford or have been prevented by the war from getting a polytechnic or university education.

By occupation, the breakdown is as follows:

Unemployed	31
Students / schoolchildren	18
Shopkeepers / small traders	16
Office workers ⁶	9
Government officials ⁷	5
Casual labourers	5
Artisans	4
Skilled and unskilled workers ⁸	4
Teachers ⁹	3
Farmers ¹⁰	3

⁶ This group includes white-collar workers in the private sector, both managers (3%) and ordinary employees.

⁷ Two percent of the government officials hold managerial positions.

⁸ Tradesmen and artisans include mechanics, electricians and stonemasons.

⁹ This includes both primary- and secondary-school teachers. The latter account for just one percent.

¹⁰ This includes only those who work full-time in agriculture, not those who grow vegetables or keep cattle as a side-line, activities also widespread in the capital.

The replies to the question about occupation are revealing. The largest single group by occupation is the unemployed, who accounts for almost one third of all respondents. Students and schoolchildren make up a little less than one fifth; thus, almost half of the sample is not gainfully employed. The largest group among the economically active population is shopkeepers and small traders with 16%. They are as numerous as office workers and government officials together. Artisans and skilled and unskilled workers each account for less than five percent of the workforce, even less than casual labourers. Smaller groups include teachers and farmers, which make up three percent each.

The occupational breakdown by *gender* confirms the above impression. Although men are solidly overrepresented in nearly all occupations - most notably among casual labourers (90%) - women are found in all, including the classic male, occupations. And they predominate in business: three quarters of all shopkeepers and small traders are female. Many families owe their survival to women's roadside fruit stalls.

A characteristic of the metropolis, the relatively high proportion of economically active women is exacerbated by the economic emergency, which has disrupted the traditional division of labour. Yet, unemployment is still far more widespread among women than men: a good 60% of all unemployed are female.

Although unemployment affects all *age groups*, 25-34-year-olds have greatest difficulty finding a job: almost 30% of them are unemployed. Middle-aged people have better chances of being employed. Older people also predominate among shopkeepers and small traders. Hardly anybody in the younger generation works in agriculture, where the majority are over 50.

The correlation between *education* and occupation yields no surprises. Government officials, office workers and teachers are overrepresented among those with tertiary education. Although almost half of all traders and skilled and unskilled workers have attended secondary school, few of them have gone further. Artisans are an exception in that only a good third of them are secondary-school graduates. Primary-school graduates are overrepresented in these occupations: almost one fifth of all skilled and unskilled workers have primary schooling and another fifth have completed some further training. The latter also applies to traders and artisans, of whom one quarter have attended trade schools. Farmers are also represented among primary-school graduates, those with no formal schooling and catechumens. By contrast, government officials and office workers are overrepresented among secondary-school graduates, and about one fifth of all government officials are polytechnic or university graduates. A good three tenths of office workers have a polytechnic diploma, and 15% have been to university. Teachers are underrepresented among secondary-school graduates; almost half of them are polytechnic and one tenth university graduates.

The breakdown by income is as follows:

New Congolese francs per month¹¹

1-15 000	22
15 500-25 000	20
25 600-30 000	20
30 500-48 000	20
50 000 +	18

Just under half of the respondents also have income in kind (cattle, farming produce). This can be taken as an indicator of pauperization, in which non-monetary income is essential for survival.

Education plays a role in income in kind. Almost two thirds of catechumens and 60% of respondents with post-primary training and those without formal schooling receive some income in this form. Secondary-school graduates, on the other hand, are underrepresented; only a good two fifths said they received non-monetary income.

The relationship between income and *age* is another new development. Astonishingly, the youngest are the largest age group in the second highest income bracket. It appears that better education and the ability to adapt to the changing situation is paying off. By contrast, the poorest group contains a disproportionately large number of middle-aged respondents: almost 30% of them are in this situation. For the most part, income in kind is a characteristic of the oldest generation.

A glance at the *job situation* reveals that a good three tenths of artisans and skilled and unskilled workers are in the lowest income group, a disproportionately high figure. Office workers on the other hand are the only group with above-average representation among high earners (about one quarter). A surprising result was that for government officials: one good tenth are in the lowest income group, which is above average. And in the upper income groups they are well below average.

The level of education is a strong determinant of income. It is a predominant factor in determining income: those with the least education must be satisfied with the lowest income. This is particularly true of almost half of the respondents without any formal schooling as well as 30% of catechumens and primary-school graduates. Moreover, a quarter of the artisans and the primary-school graduates with further training also earn only a modest income. University education pays off only for those on the threshold of

¹¹ To be able to draw conclusions about income groups, we created quintiles, which explains the even distribution of the population. All data on income are in new Congolese francs. At the time of the study, USD 1 was equal to 340 new Congolese francs. The income groups are described as follows in the text: Group 1: people living in poverty, Group 2: people living in modest circumstances, Group 3: people with a median income, Group 4: people with a good income, Group 5: highest earners.

the highest income group: whereas former students are heavily underrepresented among people with a good income, 40% of university graduates and almost a quarter of former polytechnic students are among the highest earners.

An analysis of the monthly income and accommodation gives an inkling of people's living conditions:

Large house ¹²	44
Small house ¹³	49
Makeshift or emergency accommodation	7

Most makeshift accommodation lies in the poor districts on the edge of the city, far from the city centre. Owing to their explosive growth, their importance rises from year to year. The larger the houses, by contrast, are clustered in the centre of the city. Almost four fifths of respondents live in the outer districts of the city more than ten km from the city centre. Only a good fifth can afford a dwelling in the generally more expensive residential areas close to the city centre.

As expected, the size and comfort of people's houses reflect their *occupations*: in makeshift accommodation office workers and traders are underrepresented and farmers, artisans and unemployed overrepresented. A disproportionate number of students and schoolchildren (60%) live in large houses, which is indicative of their parents' financial situation.

Accommodation correlates directly with the level of education: whereas respondents with no formal schooling and primary-school graduates are overrepresented among inhabitants of makeshift or emergency accommodation, a disproportionately large number of secondary-school, polytechnic and university graduates live in small houses.

Accommodation varies by *income*. While more than three quarters of the highest income group live in large houses, the two lowest income groups are heavily overrepresented in makeshift and emergency housing.

A disproportionately large number of people in makeshift accommodation have *non-monetary sources of income*, as do inhabitants of large houses.

¹² A large house does not automatically mean greater comfort and more luxury. First, many houses have suffered from lack of maintenance and/or looting on the one hand and a succession of owners on the other. Moreover, owing to the war, many owners have, voluntarily or involuntarily, abandoned their houses, with the result that many formerly luxurious dwellings are now inhabited, mainly illegally, by several poor families or refugees. Yet, one may assume that many homes are still inhabited by long-time owners or by wealthy tenants or members the new elite.

¹³ Small houses usually have one or two rooms, in addition to a kitchen and bathroom.

Cultural variance

There are four indicators of cultural variance: religion, mother tongue, ethnic affiliation and regional origins of the respondent's ethnic group in one of the four provinces relevant for the survey.¹⁴ Let us first look at religious affiliation.

Religion

Churches of the Reawakening ¹⁵	32
Catholic ¹⁶	29
Adventists, Pentecostals	16
Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist	5
Kimbanguists	4
Other	13
None	2

Religious affiliation was a surprise: the largest group is not Catholics, but adherents of Churches of the Reawakening, with the support of almost a third of the sample, followed closely by Catholics with almost 30%. Equally surprising is the loss of support for Kimbanguists. Owing to internal dissent, this movement on which hopes of political and social reform were once pinned is now the choice of less than five percent of respondents. Adventists and Pentecostals hold the middle ground with 16%; they appear to have lost some of their adherents to Churches of the Reawakening. Only two percent of respondents say they belong to no church, itself an indication of the strength of religion in Congolese society.

¹⁴ The provinces selected are the four mentioned most often by respondents: Bas-Congo, Bandundu, East Kasai and Equateur; the rest of the provinces are grouped under the heading "other provinces".

¹⁵ For some time Churches of the Reawakening have experienced extraordinary growth throughout the country. In the capital these churches are notable for their number, diversity and the fluctuating popularity of their often self-proclaimed preachers, which makes it difficult to tell the different groupings and currents apart. Hence, we group them together under the neutral term Churches of the Reawakening.

¹⁶ Fifty-one percent of the total population is Catholic (Africa South of the Sahara 2003, London: Europa Publications 2002, 280).

Language groups

The breakdown of the four official languages, Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo and Chiluba, is as follows:¹⁷

Kikongo-speakers	41
Lingala-speakers	22
Chiluba-speakers	13
Swahili-speakers	7
Other	18

From the table, it is clear that one language group predominates: Kikongo.¹⁸ Lingala and Chiluba together account for a good third. Swahili-speakers are the smallest group in the survey, a reflection of the fact that their heartland lies 2000 km east of the capital.¹⁹

Stratification and cultural differences

Religion

There are clear religious preferences by gender. The most obvious is the attraction charismatic revivalist churches - Adventists, Pentecostals and Churches of the Reawakening - have for women. Men tend to join the Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Kimbanguists. Almost all of those without any religious affiliation were men.

An outstanding feature of breakdown by age is the resonance (40%) Churches of the Reawakening find among the 18-34-year-olds. By contrast, Catholics are overrep-

¹⁷ Lingala, an artificial language spread principally by the military, is used throughout the country. Swahili is the lingua franca in the east; Kikongo is spoken in the provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu and Chiluba is the language of the Luba ethnic group in Kasai.

¹⁸ According to a 1986 survey, there are 1,000,000 Kikongo (also called Kongo) speakers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (www.ethnologue.com, Ethnological Report for Democratic Republic of Congo, Languages of Democratic Republic of Congo). The total population is estimated at approx. 60 million.

¹⁹ According to a 1993 estimate, Lingala was the first language of 300,000 people and the second language of 7,000,000 people. Swahili is the sole language of 313,200 inhabitants (1982), but the second language of 9,100,000 (1991). According to the 1991 figures, Chiluba is spoken by 6,300,000 Congolese. See www.ethnologue.com. Although these numbers should be treated with caution, they do give some indication of migration to Kinshasa by language group. As the west of the country has been pacified, while fighting continues in the east, the number of Swahili refugees in the capital may well have risen.

resented among respondents over 50, as are Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists and Kimbanguists. The few respondents who have no religious affiliation tend to be middle-aged; their representation is weakest among the over-50s.

Correlating *occupational groups* with religion reveals that adherents of Churches of the Reawakening include a disproportionate number of unemployed. Farmers, by contrast, tend to favour more traditional churches such as the Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists as well as the Kimbanguists. The few who stated they belonged to no church are office workers, teachers, artisans or casual labourers. Unemployed, students and schoolchildren, on the other hand, are far more religious.

Correlating *level of education* with religious affiliation confirms the finding that secondary-school graduates are overrepresented among supporters of Churches of the Reawakening. A good third of them identify themselves as adherents of this new charismatic tendency. Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists have little appeal for this group. Among catechumens there is strong support for the more traditional churches. Kimbanguists also appeal to this group, as well as to many primary-school graduates. A disproportionate number of primary-school graduates with further training find their religious home with the Adventists and Pentecostals. The majority of those who have broken with religion are well educated, in particular polytechnic graduates.

Income group is also a significant indicator of religious preference. The upper income strata are overrepresented among Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists. Kimbanguists have particular problems proselytizing in this income group; on the other hand, they have been far more successful among the upper middle class and people living in modest circumstances.

By *language group*, Swahili-speakers are disproportionately represented among the Catholics. By contrast, Adventists and Pentecostals appeal more than Catholics to an above-average proportion of Chiluba-speakers, of whom 20% favour these religious teachings.

Language groups

A breakdown of language groups by *age* reveals that Lingala- and Chiluba-speakers are disproportionately represented in the lowest age groups, where they account for two fifths of respondents. Among the former this trend is also apparent in the age group up to 35. Swahili-speakers, on the other hand, are overrepresented among middle-aged people.

As far as *education* is concerned, Swahili-speakers, the smallest linguistic group, have the highest. Among both university and polytechnic graduates, their strength is well above average at a good ten and just under 30%, respectively, but not represented among primary-school and trade-school graduates at all. Lingala- and Chiluba-speakers are particularly well represented among secondary-school graduates, a reflection of this age group's strong representation in society.

By *occupation* there are no significant distinctions in the representation of the various language groups, apart from the overrepresentation of Swahili-speakers among office workers; they also account for eight percent of government officials.

By *accommodation*, it is noticeable that almost three fifths of the Swahili-speakers and almost half of the Chiluba-speakers live in large houses, and thus close to the city centre.

By *income*, about a quarter of the Swahili-speakers (26%) and almost a quarter of the Chiluba-speakers (23%) are high earners. Overrepresentation of the latter also holds for the upper middle class, a group in which Swahili-speakers are underrepresented.

Unsurprisingly, only two fifths of both of these language groups supplement their income with goods in kind, well below the average.

Regional origins

Another cultural characteristic is the provincial roots of the respondents. This also affords an insight into the distribution of ethnic groups in the four regions relevant to our survey.

Bas-Congo ²⁰	40
Bandundu ²¹	24
East Kasai ²²	16
Equateur ²³	9
Other provinces	12

According to this breakdown, almost two thirds of the respondents come from the provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu, and thus from the immediate surroundings of Kinshasa. Somewhat less than 20% come from East Kasai, east of the capital, and

²⁰ The following ethnic groups were recorded as living in Bas-Congo province (in descending order): Kongo, Ntandu, Nyanga, Ndibu, Yombe, Besingombe, Mbata, Mbaza, Lemfu, Mbeku, Woya, Lari and Nsanga.

²¹ The following ethnic groups were recorded as living in Bandundu province: Mbala, Ngole, Yanzi, Yaka, Nzombo, Sakata, Suku, Pende, Ngole, Ngombo, Dinga, Kuzu, Banunu, Lonzo, Lobo, Muhunangani, Basengele, Pelende, Bamputu, Muzula, Pini and Kwesse.

²² The following ethnic groups were recorded as living in East Kasai province: Luba, Tetela and Bamputu.

²³ The following ethnic groups were recorded as living in Equateur province: Mongo, Ngala, Mbuza, Ngombe, Ngbadi, Ekonda, Libinza, Yakoma, Ngwaka, Mungando, Bobangi and Mukula.

just under ten percent come from more distant provinces, such from Equateur in the far north of the country.

Linking the regional origins of the ethnic groups to the provinces of the individual *language groups* gives the following picture.

Not surprisingly, three quarters of Kikongo-speakers come from nearby Bas-Congo and a little less than one quarter from Bandundu. Similarly, 90% of the Chiluba-speakers come from East Kasai. Three fifths of the Lingala-speakers come from Equateur, the home province of Joseph Mobutu. At the same time, a good third of the Lingala-speakers have their roots in Bas-Congo and a little less than one quarter in Bandundu. Thanks to the strong presence of the military throughout the country, Lingala as a mother tongue is very widespread. Swahili-speakers come mostly from provinces in the east of the country and are not overrepresented in any of the provinces mentioned. In view of the high correlation between mother tongue and regional origins, we shall focus on discrepancies.

There are two differences by *gender*. Most of those moving from Equateur and East Kasai to the city are women, either in hopes of better employment or of escaping from the war. The low proportion of men should be seen against the backdrop of conscription either for the military or one of the rebel militias. By contrast, there are more men than women from Bandundu, including many labour migrants who have left their families in their home villages. A look at *accommodation* confirms this: two fifths of the people in makeshift housing come from Bandundu.

By *education*, an above-average number of people from East Kasai attend secondary schools and polytechnics, which is in line with the high proportion of Chiluba-speaking secondary-school graduates.

As far as the *labour situation* is concerned, it appears that unemployment is particularly high among people from Equateur: two fifths of the migrants from the north have not found any work; they are underrepresented even among casual labourers. The figures confirm yet again the high percentage of Kinshasa students and school-children (25%) from East Kasai.

By *income group*, a good quarter of migrants from Bandundu live in modest circumstances. By contrast, about 30% of the migrants from Equateur belong to the upper middle class. And a good quarter of respondents from East Kasai are among the highest earners, a finding already noticed in our analysis of the Chiluba language group.

As confirmation of this picture, migrants from East Kasai are underrepresented among those with additional income in kind, a fact that also applies to migrants from Bandundu. By contrast, the number of people from Bas-Congo in this position is disproportionately large: a good half of them can draw on non-monetary sources of income.

Ethnic groups

Ethnic group has been introduced as a supplementary variable to the language groups. Only those ethnic groups with a proportion of over ten percent will be taken into account. This applies only to the Kongo, who make up somewhat less than one fifth (17%), and the Luba, who account for a good tenth (13%). The remaining 70% are divided among the other ethnic groups; this ethnic diversity in the microcosm Kinshasa mirrors the macrocosm Congo.

The correlation between *ethnic group* and mother tongue shows that a good four fifths of the Kongo name Kikongo as their first language and nine tenths of the Chiluba-speakers belong to the Luba ethnic group. Owing to this high correlation, we will point out peculiarities of these two ethnic groups only if this variable diverges markedly from the variable language. A good 80% of Lingala-speakers and Swahili-speakers belong to other ethnic groups than those presented here.

By *education*, it is obvious that the Luba are better schooled than the Kongo: a good fifth of the Luba are polytechnic and a good half secondary-school graduates.

By *income*, the Luba are underrepresented in all the lower income strata and overrepresented in the higher strata. Yet, the Luba and the Kongo each account for only one quarter of the highest earners. This reflects in the possession of goods in kind: in this respect, the Luba are substantially underrepresented by comparison with the Kongo, a good half of whom have access to non-monetary sources of income.

As for *accommodation*, a good half of the Kongo live in large houses. The Luba, too, are among the financially better off: only two percent live in makeshift or emergency housing.

Looking at *religious affiliation*, it is clear that a little less than 40% of the Kimbanguists are Kongo, while a good fifth of the Luba are Adventists and Pentecostals. The Kongo have made little contribution to the rise of Churches of the Reawakening: only 14% of this ethnic group are adherents of the new churches.

Communication of political information

How do you keep yourself informed about what's happening in politics?

<i>Radio</i>	72
<i>Television</i>	65
<i>The market place</i>	33
<i>Somebody in my family reads the paper</i>	29
<i>I read a newspaper (which?)</i>	23
<i>The Internet</i>	5

Radio and television are the most important information media.²⁴ Word of mouth, whether in the market place or through family members, is an important source of information for about three tenths of respondents. Only one fifth read a newspaper, mainly owing to the high cost of print media and the chaotic political situation. Illegal, usually two-page, reprints of newspapers are a low quality substitutes for those who cannot afford the originals. Only a small minority use the Internet as a medium of information.

More men than women listen to political news on the *radio*. Among them, middle-aged people are overrepresented. Radio use is lowest among the oldest generation, of whom less than two thirds use it. By contrast, an above-average proportion of people with income in kind, and thus probably in the lowest income group, listen to the radio. The popularity of radio correlates directly with the level of education: 90% of university graduates and almost as many polytechnic graduates listen to political news. Other educational groups, with the exception of secondary-school students, are underrepresented. In particular, 60% of those without any formal schooling do not listen to news-casts. This also holds for about half of all catechumens and trade-school graduates and two fifths of primary-school graduates. On the other hand, every teacher, nine tenths of government officials and almost as many office workers tune in to political radio programmes. This is also true of an above-average proportion of casual labourers, skilled and unskilled workers, pupils and students. By contrast, almost half the farmers, about 40% of shopkeepers and the unemployed - among them numerous women - say they never listen to political news. By province, respondents from East Kasai and Bandundu are overrepresented and members of ethnic groups from Equateur underrepresented.

²⁴ Because respondents could give more than one answer, it is possible to comment only on the strength of individual media; not on the exclusivity of use.

In the case of *television*, too, the proportion of men who watch is markedly higher than that of women. Age influences television habits: only a good half of the oldest age group get their information from television. The higher the level of education, the more often respondents watch political programmes. A good 80% of university and polytechnic graduates keep themselves informed in this way, which is true of only about half of primary-school graduates and those without any formal schooling. By occupation, about four fifths of office workers, students, pupils and government officials and 70% of casual labourers and teachers watch television. Farmers, shopkeepers, artisans and the unemployed spend less time than average watching television. Income is also crucial: the higher people's monthly income, the greater the probability that they will watch the news. This is true of a good 80% of the highest income group, but of only a good half of those living in impoverished circumstances. Place of residence is also significant: a disproportionately large number of inner-city residents watch television. Furthermore, people who live in big houses watch more television than people in makeshift or emergency housing, of whom, however, a good half keep themselves informed through this medium. By language group, Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers are overrepresented and respondents who claim Kikongo as their mother tongue are underrepresented.

One third of the respondents get their information while shopping *at the market*. For the first time, women are overrepresented. Less surprisingly, the market is a source of breaking news for a disproportionately large number of shopkeepers, traders and farmers. Use of the market for information declines rapidly as the level of education rises: only six percent of university graduates, but a quarter of polytechnic graduates, using shopping excursions to pick up political information. Catechumens are greatly overrepresented at a good 60%, as are people without any formal education, of whom just less than get their information in this way. Primary-school graduates are also overrepresented. Furthermore, half of the respondents in makeshift and emergency accommodation and the unemployed pick up most of their information at the market. Office workers and casual labourers as well as Lingala-speakers are underrepresented.

Almost 30% are kept abreast of political events by *family members* who read a newspaper. Here, too, the proportion of women is greater than men. Once again, people with a low level of education are overrepresented. More than half of all catechumens and a good 40% of trade-school graduates also get their information this way. Exceptions are graduates of post-primary training courses, who are underrepresented, and polytechnic graduates, who are overrepresented.

The majority of *newspaper readers* - one fifth of the respondents - are men. Only a good ten percent of women pick up a newspaper. More than half of the people living in large houses read a newspaper, whereas people in makeshift or emergency accommodation are underrepresented. Half of all teachers, two fifths of office workers and a good third of government officials and casual labourers keep themselves abreast of events through the press; pupils and students are also overrepresented. Shopkeepers have the lowest readership - a good ten percent - owing to the large number of women

traders. As one would expect, newspaper readership correlates directly with the level of education: whereas 60% of university graduates inform themselves through newspapers, only a negligible number of primary-school graduates and people without any formal education do, perhaps a result of inadequate schooling or insufficient reading practice. Newspaper readership correlates almost directly with income: one third of respondents in the highest income group get their information from the press, among other sources, whereas the proportion of people with modest incomes is below average.

Only five percent of the respondents get political information via the *Internet*. As to be expected, Internet use correlates directly with education: almost 30% of university graduates and a little less than ten percent of polytechnic graduates use the Internet to keep abreast of politics. Occupation is also a crucial factor: most Internet users are teachers, of whom a good fifth have online access. Office workers and civil servants are also overrepresented. Regular Internet access is also a function of income and place of residence: the highest earners most frequently plug into global newscasts, and almost three quarters of the Internet users live in large houses. Internet users are overrepresented among Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers.

Psycho-social attitudes

Variables that measure subjective disposition, such as fear of the future and trust in others also need to be considered. Disappointment with previous regimes gives the latter particular relevance in respect of both possible withdrawal into the family circle and the possible mobilisation by future politicians.

I feel uncertain and fearful about the future.

Despite the difficult situation in the Congo, a little less than half of all respondents (47%) agree with this statement. Variables such as age, education and income do not affect attitudes significantly. However, people in difficult living conditions are more fearful of the future, which is the case among almost two thirds of those living in emergency and makeshift accommodation. By language group, Lingala-speakers are least fearful; three fifths take a more positive view of the future than indicated in the statement. To a lesser degree this is also true of Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers.

Even before the war, Congolese had learned that survival often depends on self-organisation. Which social groups do they trust?

1. People of the same religion	80
2. Family	76
3. Clergy	72
4. People in similar living conditions	70
5. Friends	66
6. Congolese	62
7. The same ethnic group	59
8. Neighbours	57
9. People living in the same part of town	57

Surprisingly, the haven of greatest trust is not the family but the religious community. On the one hand, this can be explained by the pre-eminent role played by the churches as actors in times of weak central government, both as providers of social services and as places of refuge. On the other hand, the attenuating effects of life in Kinshasa on family ties should not be underestimated, especially as many people are forced to live apart from their families. Another notable result is the fact that respondents feel closer to "all Congolese" than to members of their own ethnic group, which contradicts the view of a society riven by ethnic conflicts. However, it should be re-

membered that in 2002 the state was on the verge of disintegration, which would have strengthened pro-unity trends. Once again, here too the results will reflect the peculiarities of life in the capital.

What variables influence people to place their trust in *members of the same religious community*? Education correlates inversely with trust in members of the same religious community. Whereas an above-average number of catechumens and people without formal schooling trust their coreligionists, just two thirds of university graduates do. Accommodation also plays a role: people in makeshift or emergency accommodation are more likely to trust their coreligionists than respondents living in large houses. Trust is inversely correlated with income, as the replies of the wealthiest respondents reveal. But in general this group has comparatively weak ties with religious groups. By religious group, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists cultivate particularly close ties within their own communities. This also applies to a lesser extent to adherents of Churches of the Reawakening. Mistrust is greatest among Catholics, of whom more than a quarter take a sceptical view of their coreligionists. Regional origins are most noticeable among people from Bandundu, who are disproportionately close to members of their respective religious groups. By contrast, only a good two thirds of Swahili-speakers trust their coreligionists.

A good three quarters of respondents trust *family members* - which thus ranks second on the scale of trust. Here, too, the level of trust correlates inversely with education. Similarly, the closer to the city centre people are, the weaker their family ties. The results confirm the adage that the family that prays together stays together; trust in family members by people that belong to no community is comparatively weak. Within religious communities, nine tenths of Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists exhibit particularly close family ties, followed by Catholics.

Clergymen are trusted by almost three quarters of respondents (72%), which is not surprising in view of people's religiosity. Trust in ministers of religion is greater among women than men, a reflection of the formers' strongly religious background, which can be traced right back to catechism instruction. The significance of this can be seen in the results for catechumens, of whom 90% trust their pastors, while polytechnic graduates bring up the rear with less than three fifths. Age also plays a role: the highest age group is generally trusting of clergy, whereas a good third of the 25-34-year-olds have a more distant relationship. By religious group, four fifths of the members of Churches of the Reawakening have a close relationship with their respective pastors, which is indicative of the character of these new churches. Catholics are sceptical not only of their coreligionists, as seen above, but also exhibit the least trust of all religious communities in their priests. By language group, a third of Chiluba- and Lingala-speakers have reservations about clergymen. Once again, as with their coreligionists, respondents from Bandundu express the greatest trust in their ministers. At the other extreme, almost two fifths of the respondents from East Kasai and Equateur mistrust their pastors. This may reflect their position as recent arrivals.

The profile of trust in people in *similar living conditions* (70%) confirms yet again that trust in one's fellow human beings is consistently substantially higher among respondents with a low level of education. Trust also declines as living conditions improve. Other variables such as mother tongue, religion, occupation, etc. do not affect this behaviour.

Trust in *friends* ranks fifth, expressed by two thirds of all respondents. By gender, men are far more inclined (74%) to trust friends than women are. By age, the oldest generation expresses a closer relationship to friends than the people between 25 and 34 do. As before, respondents who do not belong to any Church are noticeably less likely to trust their friends. Once again, trust in friends is highest among Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists at almost 80% and not much weaker among Catholics and Kimbanguists. Occupation, too, influences the level of trust: teachers, government officials and office workers trust their friends far more than traders, farmers, students and schoolchildren do; despite their youth, almost two fifths have not established relationships of trust with any friends. This lack of trust among the youngest generation is possibly connected to their socialisation in a world in which institutions and people have seldom been reliable. These young people have lived through not only several changes of regime, but also economic decline.

The next variable, *trust in fellow citizens*, is generally taken as an indicator of patriotism. In the case of Congo, after years of de facto tripartite existence, it is also indicative of the potential for permanently integrating the Congolese into one polity. Taking into account the multi-ethnic diversity of the population and earlier attempts at secession, a positive response of more than 60% on this point is high. Once again, level of trust correlates inversely with education, ranging from almost nine tenths of those with no formal schooling to less than half of university graduates. For this variable, women are far more sceptical than men. By occupation, trust is greatest among tradesmen, of whom 90% trust their fellow citizens, as to a lesser extent do unskilled and skilled workers and government officials. The level of trust is lowest among office workers, of whom just under half mistrust other Congolese on account of negative experiences, followed by pupils, students and shopkeepers with 45%. Confirming above results, Congolese from Bandundu are most open to trusting friends; of the respondents from East Kasai, 44% of them replied that they had no close ties with their fellow citizens. This result may be seen in the context of earlier secessionist attempts - i.e. of the region's mineral wealth, violent expulsions and the significant role played by Tshisekedi, the leader of the Socialist Party, and should serve as a warning for future political developments.

The variable trust in *persons from the same ethnic group* enjoys great significance in view of the multi-ethnic composition of the Congo and the question of whether the peace process will strengthen or polarise the different groups. All in all, almost 60% of the respondents feel close ties to members of their ethnic group. Here, too, age influences the level of trust: in contrast to a little less than three quarters of the oldest respondents, almost half of the 25-34-year-olds prefer to keep their distance even with

people from the same ethnic group. Other known factors seen above also determine the trust relationship. Trust declines steadily from 90% of the uneducated strata to less than half of all university graduates. By occupation, the results are very mixed both among those that trust and those that prefer to avoid close contact with members of their ethnic group. As seen above for trust in friends, teachers are the most trusting: a good four fifths trust people of the same ethnic group. Values for farmers, unskilled and skilled workers and artisans are also above average. Trust in the own ethnic group is lowest among casual labourers, office workers, students and pupils.

Almost three fifths of the population trust their *neighbours*. The influence of the variables living conditions, residential district, income, education and age on the level of trust is the same as noted above: older, poorer people with little formal schooling living in the outer districts are obviously more trusting of their neighbours than are inner-city residents and large-house dwellers. By occupation, artisans, unskilled and skilled workers and farmers trust their neighbours. As noted elsewhere, mistrust is above average among Swahili-speakers and Chiluba-speakers, of whom more than half are cautious in their dealings with their neighbours. This finding is confirmed by the views of people from East Kasai in general and the Luba in particular, which may be associated with living far from home. By contrast, respondents from Bandundu and those from Equateur feel closer to their neighbours.

Just as many respondents (57%) as trust their neighbours also believe in solidarity and trust *within the same part of town*. Again, inhabitants of the outer districts with little formal education trust people in their immediate surroundings more than do well-educated inhabitants of the city centre. But unlike the findings above, in this instance, it is not the oldest age group, but the 35-49-year-olds who express the greatest trust in their fellow residents. By regional origins the opposite trends are apparent between people from Bandundu and Equateur on the one hand and respondents from East Kasai on the other.

Generally speaking, there is a direct correlation between a low level of education, poor living conditions, greater age and residence in the outer districts on the one hand and a high level of trust in one's fellow human beings on the other.

After ten years of civil war and 30 years of dictatorship, do the Congolese assess their influence on developments?

There is little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country.

Notwithstanding the chaos of war, the population of the capital is anything but utterly disheartened; almost two thirds of respondents assume that they, too, can help to improve the current situation. The level of self-confidence rises with the level of education. It is highest among polytechnic graduates, of whom two thirds express such confidence. On the other hand, a good half of all catechumens are sceptical about their

potential influence. There are similar differences by income: fewer low earners have confidence in their own abilities than do people in economically secure situations. Financial uncertainty obviously colours the opinions of people from Bas-Congo and Equateur, who are less confident that their involvement can help to change the current situation. People from East Kasai are more optimistic.

When you start changing things, they usually get worse.

Before you start something, you should know whether it will work or not.

A good 40% of respondents are of the opinion that change is usually for the worse. Compared to other studies, the results by age are astonishing: the most positive attitudes are found not among the youngest, but among the oldest age group. A good two thirds of respondents over 50 are open to change. Among of people living close to the city centre, almost 70% express notably less reticence in this respect. Furthermore, just under two thirds of the Lingala- and the Swahili-speakers are also optimistic, compared to less than half of the Chiluba-speakers.

In our survey, 87% of respondents wanted to know more about the possible outcome before undertaking something. Their number is disproportionately high among artisans. The most flexible groups are skilled and unskilled workers, farmers - a group conventionally thought to exhibit the opposite behaviour - and casual labourers, who have obviously made a virtue of necessity. The same holds for residents of the outer districts, who are far less risk-averse than residents of the city centre.

Economy and society

Scrutinising the economic and social conditions of the population of Kinshasa affords a close insight into people's everyday lives. This approach reveals people's thoughts about their current situation and their assessments of their chances in the future.

In your opinion, which one of the following is most important for success in life?

The break-down is as follows:

<i>Education</i>	68
<i>Hard work</i>	66
<i>Religious beliefs</i>	63
<i>Connections</i>	47
<i>Experience</i>	46
<i>Team work</i>	43
<i>Luck</i>	37
<i>Upbringing</i>	27
<i>Inheritance</i>	15
<i>Craftiness</i>	15

Education ranks highest, indicative of the strong tradition of education in the Congo. Similarly, religious beliefs play an important role, because the majority do not separate them from personal success. On the other hand, a little less than half believe that contacts are decisive, which contradicts the common wisdom that contacts are necessary to get anything done in Congo.

Not only teachers, pupils and students rank *education* at the most important factor of success, a disproportionate number of artisans do too. Surprisingly, besides farmers, unskilled and skilled workers, an above-average proportion of office workers also feel that education is not crucial for success in life. Emphasis on education correlates inversely with age; less than two fifths of the oldest age group believe education is a precondition for success. This opinion is shared by Chiluba-speakers and Kikongo-speakers, in contrast to other language groups, which see educational ability as the key to success.

Hard work is held to be important by two thirds of the respondents, independent of cultural and economic differences. This view is particularly widespread among people living in the city centre.

A good three fifths of respondents accept that *belief* is essential to success. This view is shared by an above-average proportion of women, who, as seen above, are extremely religious. Similarly, 80% of people living in makeshift or emergency accommodation fatalistically believe that success is linked to religion. It would be wrong to hold that this view is restricted to the poorer part of the population. Respondents living close to the city centre, who do not depend on non-monetary income and are generally viewed as well-off also think belief is crucial to success. Education, or the lack of it, also plays a role: an above-average number of people with little formal schooling regard religion as decisive for personal success, whereas the proportion of university graduates is below average. By religious community, Kimbanguists and adherents of Churches of the Re-awakening share this conviction, unlike Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists on the one hand and Catholics on the other, who evince far less enthusiasm. By language group, almost half of the Lingala-speakers are not convinced of a connection between religion and success; Chiluba-speakers, too, are disproportionately sceptical.

Almost half the respondents think *connections* are crucial to advancement. This is particular true of casual labourers, who obviously have a lot of experience in this field. A good half of pupils also share this view. Young people in particular are convinced that connections are the key to success, a view questioned by the great majority of the 35-49 age group. Nor do shopkeepers and farmers believe much in connections. Whereas more than half of the adherents of Churches of the Reawakening put their confidence in connections, support among Adventists and Pentecostals and those without any religion is much weaker. By language group, a majority of Swahili-speakers see connections as a means to success; there is less support among Lingala-speakers.

Experience is held to be important by 46% of the sample, above all teachers (80%), but also casual labourers and government officials. The same is true of those with income in kind. Most artisans, shopkeepers and farmers do not place much store by experience. Once again, Lingala-speakers are the most sceptical.

Team work is held to be important for success by 43% of the respondents. It enjoys greater support among men than women as well as among 35-49-year-olds and just under half of the highest income group. The well-educated attach greater importance to team work than do less educated respondents. By age, the oldest age group is more sceptical than younger generations about the value of team work.

All in all, somewhat less than two fifths believe there is a link between *luck* and success. Support is strongest among respondents with little formal schooling, a view shared by only a good tenth of university graduates. Lingala- and Swahili-speakers are

least likely to trust to luck: a little short of three quarters of them do not see any link between luck and success in life.

A good quarter of the respondents believe that *upbringing* is important for their own success in life. This view is shared by both inner-city residents and to a lesser degree by people living in makeshift housing. Once again, Lingala-speakers are the most sceptical.

Only 15% of the respondents believe *inheritance* can contribute to success. People without any formal schooling are more likely than others to see such a link. The proportion of Lingala- and Swahili-speakers who share this view is below average.

Three tenths of the inhabitants of makeshift or emergency accommodation are of the opinion that *craftiness* helps people get ahead. Other proponents of this view include 20% of high-earners.

What kind of job would you prefer?

A factory or office job with a regular salary

or

your own business where you can make a lot or lose a lot?

More than half of the respondents (56%) prefer a secure job with a regular salary, a result that almost certainly reflects the unsettled years following the overthrow of the Mobutu regime. Nonetheless, a considerable portion of the population is risk-tolerant; we shall focus in particular on the social profile of this group. More than half of the residents of makeshift or emergency accommodation, whose everyday life is shaped by risk anyway and who therefore have little to lose, would prefer their own business. By education, the results are more ambivalent. Both the highly and the least educated can picture a livelihood on an uncertain basis: two thirds of university graduates and about three fifths of those without formal schooling and catechumens would prefer to be independent.

If I could, I would find another kind of work.

The results are sobering. A good four fifths of the respondents agree with this statement. A disproportionately large number of people in the lowest income group - with the exception of trade-school graduates, of whom three tenths had no complaints about their job - would rather be doing something else. Almost a third of university and a quarter of polytechnic graduates are also not interested in changing. The unemployed and casual labourers are, understandably, the most dissatisfied: of the latter almost 90% want other work. Among those satisfied with their current employment al-

most two fifths of government officials. An above-average proportion of artisans, skilled and unskilled workers, farmers and traders are satisfied with job situation.

No matter how much effort I put into it, I will not get the education and jobs I deserve.

Only a good third of the sample (35%) agreed with this statement of resignation - another sign of the fundamental optimism of the Congolese. Trade school graduates are the most pessimistic, of whom a good half know what they are talking about. Catechumens are also overrepresented. The others refuse to lose hope. This is true of the less educated and polytechnic graduates. Even nine tenths of those without any formal schooling believe that they can better their position by their own efforts. By language, the Lingala- and Swahili-speakers show the least concern.

With regard to your financial situation, are you better off, about the same or worse off today than two years ago?

Only six percent of respondents feel that their position has improved in the past two years. An overwhelming majority of two thirds say that their earnings have fallen in recent years, and 28% state that their situation has not changed.

By occupation, most respondents see little difference in their situation. A particularly large proportion - approx. two fifths - of farmers, government officials and teachers feel this way, as do about one third of polytechnic graduates and respondents with post-primary-school training. Furthermore, one third of those on modest incomes and those in the upper middle class did not notice any difference, either. Worse off are a good 70% of the unemployed and almost as many casual workers and artisans. The financial situation of catechumens and primary-school graduates has also worsened in recent years; almost four fifths of the latter have had to further trim their standard of living. Alarmingly, just less than three quarters of the poorest reported that their financial situation had deteriorated markedly.

Who are the few lucky ones who are better off than two years ago? Only office workers have improved their situation (14%). Education also plays a - modest - role in this respect, as witnessed by the improved financial situation of one fifth of university graduates and one tenth of trade-school graduates. Perhaps unexpectedly, respondents without any formal schooling were also able to do better, as 14% of the replies reveal.

Young men and women from an ethnic group like mine have a reasonable chance of achieving their goals in life.

This view is shared by 71% of respondents. Religious affiliation is the only variable that influences opinions significantly: whereas three quarters of the adherents of Churches of the Reawakening agree with the statement, an above average number of Kimbanguists, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists and those not affiliated with any religious group feel that the outlook for the next generation is rather bleak.

I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living as we have.

Sixty-three percent of all respondents share this concern, independent of cultural and socio-economic differences. By age, the only exception is the youngest age group, of which two fifths face the future with optimism. Similarly, almost half of those living close to the city centre are more optimistic than others about the future of their children.

Poor people have only themselves to blame for their situation.

This view is held by 29% of respondents, regardless of economic and socio-cultural distinctions. An above-average number of respondents in large houses and people over 50 could not agree with apportioning blame in this way.

Each of us belongs to several different groups at the same time. Here is a list of groups people can belong to. Please tell us which group you identify with most strongly.

The break-down of identification with different social groups is as follows:

<i>My church or religious community</i>	47
<i>Congolese</i>	19
<i>Intellectuals</i>	15
<i>Middle class</i>	6
<i>Ethnic group</i>	5
<i>People in the neighbourhood</i>	5
<i>Farmers</i>	1
<i>The poor/the little people</i>	1

Identification with *church or religious community* (47%) is most pronounced among women and older people, while the youngest group is underrepresented. Similarly, it

can be assumed that less educated people have a closer relationship with their religious community than well-educated people, of whom only a good third identify with the church. By occupation, traders and shopkeepers predominate, which must be seen in the context of the high proportion of women in this group. By contrast, artisans and casual labourers are heavily underrepresented. By religious community, the Catholics once again have the weakest relationship with their religious community. On the other hand, Kimbanguists and adherents of Churches of the Reawakening are overrepresented.

Identification with the *Congolese* (19%) ranks second. Artisans, of whom almost two fifths identify first and foremost with their countrymen, are overrepresented. At one third, the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers is also above-average. By contrast, teachers and farmers are underrepresented. By religious community, one quarter of the Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists see themselves primarily as citizens, which applies to a far lesser degree for the Kimbanguists.

As to be expected, the identification with *intellectuals* (15% on average) correlates directly with education, led by teachers, pupils and students, i.e. university and poly-technic graduates. People over the age of 50 and inhabitants of makeshift accommodation are hardly represented at all. Women are also less likely to call themselves intellectuals. By religious affiliation, Catholics and adherents of Churches of the Reawakening are overrepresented: three tenths categorise themselves as intellectuals.

The only occupational groups overrepresented among those identifying themselves as *middle class* (six percent) are skilled and unskilled workers and artisans. Among the religious communities, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists identify most strongly with the middle class.

Almost a fifth of catechumens and a tenth of trade-school graduates identify with their respective *ethnic group* (5%). The proportion of farmers and government officials is also above-average. By religious community, Kimbanguists identify most closely with ethnicity.

An equal proportion of respondents identify with *people in the neighbourhood* (five percent) as identified ethnic group. The significant result is that those who belong to no church identify to an above-average degree with their neighbours.

Apart from farmers themselves, casual labourers are the only group to identify disproportionately with *farmers* (one percent); for many of them farming is a obviously secondary occupation.

About ten percent of people without any formal education identify with *the poor and the little people* (one percent).

When I see what rich people have I feel that I should have the same.

Three quarters of the respondents agree with this statement. Approval is above average among people without any religious affiliation, adherents of Churches of the Reawakening, and the younger age groups. But who are the people who claim not to be envious of the rich? The most notable group is people without any formal schooling, of whom half maintain that they do not compare themselves with the rich. The same holds for a good third of catechumens and primary-school graduates. Somewhat less than half of the oldest age group are also not envious. Place of residence plays a role inasmuch as a good third of those living close to the city centre pay little attention to the more prosperous inhabitants, perhaps because they belong to them. By religious affiliation, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists are also well above average. An above-average number of people from Equateur, who generally tend to be people of modest means, also say that they experience no envy.

Here are two descriptions of social differences in this country. Which do you agree with?

A small minority hold most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of poor people
or

A majority of people are in the middle, with few people who are rich or poor.

A small majority of the respondents (51%) favour the first answer. Almost 80% of artisans, two thirds of teachers, a good half of traders, pupils and students also have a picture of wide social inequalities. This perception runs through all educational categories: three quarters of catechumens and three fifths of university and trade-school graduates see Congolese society as one with extreme inequality. People who have no religious affiliation, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists and Kimbanguists are also overrepresented. The great majority of the Kongo and Luba ethnic groups also believe that a small minority live at the expense of the poor.

By contrast, an above-average proportion of farmers, casual labourers and office workers perceive Congolese society as basically middle-class (49%).

The most important differences are between rich and poor, regardless of ethnic group.

Seventy-one percent of the respondents, regardless of cultural and socio-economic differences, agree with the perception of a society with gross inequalities. The only groups that take a noticeably different view are the Lingala- and Swahili-speakers, of whom a good third disagree with this statement.

In the last two years, has the gap between rich and poor

- widened

- narrowed

- remained the same?

Just under half of the respondents believe that social distinctions have widened. A little less than a third think that the gap between rich and poor have narrowed. A good fifth think that there has been no change in the past two years. Here, too, public opinion is uniform, regardless of socio-cultural factors. Among those who think social differences have increased, older people and people living in large houses are overrepresented.

Practical training is more important than a school education.

A secondary-school leaving certificate is more important than any practical training,

A little less than three tenths of respondents agree with the first statement. Approval is strongest among the catechumens, of whom almost half favour practical training. This view is shared by all less-educated strata. As to be expected, support for practical training is above average among skilled and unskilled workers, casual labourers and trades and shopkeepers. The proportion of government officials who share this view, a little under 40%, is surprisingly high. Not surprisingly, teachers, pupils and students are the strongest supporters of formal schooling. By ethnic group, a good third of people from Bas-Congo - and just less than 40% of the Kongo - think practical training is more important. By contrast, the ethnic groups from East Kasai and members of the Luba are underrepresented.

If only secondary school is considered, the results are more complex. Only a good half of the respondents think a school-leaving certificate is more important than practical training, whereas in response to the first question more than 70% favoured more formal schooling. Secondary schooling has the strong support of pupils and students, three fifths of the youngest age group and 65% of the casual labourers. This last figure draws attention to the high level of education of this group. By contrast, 60% of farmers and an above-average number of artisans and skilled and unskilled workers think practical training is more important. Surprisingly, teachers are also in the ranks of supporters. A good half are of the opinion that practical training is more useful than a secondary-school leaving certificate - obviously a reaction to the high level of unemployment among secondary-school graduates.

Religion and identity

As we have seen, Congolese society is very religious. Faith takes pride of place - and not only as a determinant of success in life. How deep is this faith, to what extent is it part of daily life, and how does it affect coexistence?

Whatever people say, there are hidden forces of good and evil that may help or harm me.

One respondent in two, regardless of religious affiliation, age, level of education or income, believes in the existence of hidden forces. However, this belief varies by language: a disproportionately large number of Swahili-speakers and a disproportionately small number of Lingala-speakers believe in forces of good and evil. This belief is also more widespread than average among the Luba.

I believe in some form of existence after death.

I am convinced that my own religion is the only true religion.

Three quarters of the respondents can imagine some form of existence after death. This conviction is shared by all age groups, levels of education and income strata.

The same applies to respondents' convictions that their religion is the only true one. This attitude, a potential source of religiously motivated conflict, is shared by half of the respondents, once again irrespective of cultural and socio-economic characteristics. The only deviation is above-average acceptance among inner-city residents.

It doesn't matter what a person's religion is; the important thing is that people are responsible and good.

More than 80% of respondents take this view, which attests to a high level of tolerance among the Congolese. Openness towards other religious communities correlates with the quality of residential accommodation and proximity to the city centre. The correlation with level of education is also more or less linear. Catechumens at almost 60% are less tolerant than better educated respondents. People without any formal schooling, however, constitute an exception to this linearity; for them the most important consideration is whether others are good people. Support is well above average among Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists, a group whose replies to other questions have

revealed them to be very religious and identity-conscious. By linguistic group, Swahili-speakers are least and Chiluba-speakers most likely to let religious affiliation influence their opinions about others.

I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.

Somewhat less than one fifth agree with this statement, irrespective of cultural affiliations and socio-economic differences. Once again, inner-city residents prove to be a notably religious group: only one in ten can imagine being happy without religion.

How often do you pray?

<i>Regularly</i>	73
<i>Often</i>	18
<i>Sometimes</i>	7
<i>Never</i>	2

Nine tenths pray regularly or often - further evidence of a society that is religious through and through. Almost ten percent of the respondents say that they pray only sometimes or never. Women pray most regularly; include those who pray often, and prayer is part of the everyday life of almost every woman. An above-average proportion of pupils and students pray regularly. By occupation, office workers pray least. Although farmers, skilled and unskilled workers and tradesmen do not pray regularly, an above-average number pray often. By religious community, adherents of Churches of the Reawakening are overrepresented and Kimbanguists underrepresented among those for whom prayer is an important part of life.

Do you practise religious rituals (attend church services, light candles, fast)?

<i>Regularly</i>	76
<i>Sometimes</i>	15
<i>Hardly ever</i>	7
<i>Never</i>	2

Adventists and Pentecostals are the most regular churchgoers, followed by adherents of Churches of the Reawakening. Catholics, by contrast, are underrepresented. As

might be expected, women are the most fervent practitioners, as are people without any formal schooling, of whom just about all attend the weekly rituals of their respective religious communities. Among the more educated population, as figures for polytechnic graduates show, such behaviour is less common. By occupation, the number of regularly practising artisans, casual labourers, skilled and unskilled workers and government officials and office workers is below average. Government officials and farmers are overrepresented among those that sometimes go to church.

I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion.

Four fifths of the respondents agree with this statement, irrespective of income group or social indicators. Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists try least hard: just three quarters answered in the affirmative. Once again, inner-city residents prove to be a particularly god-fearing group.

I feel very close to all members of my religion, regardless of their education, income or political views.

Almost four fifths of the respondents across all cultural and socio-economic divides agree with the statement. Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists are underrepresented: they are most interested in meeting people from all religions. The same applies to people with regional ties to Equateur or East Kasai, for whom religious affiliation is not the be all and end all.

I feel very close to all members of my ethnic group, regardless of their education, income or political views.

Sixty-one percent agree with this statement - far fewer than the comparable question about religious affiliation -, which is indicative of comparatively weak solidarity with members of the same ethnic group. People without any formal schooling are almost unanimous on this point, a view shared by only two fifths of university graduates and teachers. The proportion of farmers and unemployed is also above average, a significant finding because they constitute almost one third of the sample. Group solidarity is also comparatively low among people living on the outskirts of the city, of whom less than two fifths agree with the statement. By contrast, skilled, unskilled and office workers are underrepresented: only one in two attaches great importance to ethnic affiliation. Values for Swahili- and Lingala-speakers are below average: only half express unconditional solidarity with members of the same ethnic group.

I would not mind if a child of mine marries somebody from a different religion, provided they love each other.

I would be quite happy if a daughter of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they love each other.

A good four fifths of the respondents subscribe to the first view, further testimony to the high level of tolerance among the inhabitants of Kinshasa. Cultural and socio-economic factors do not affect views on *marriages between people of different religions*, except for the variable religious affiliation. Catholics are most tolerant: almost 90% of them declare themselves satisfied with the described situation. At the other extreme are Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists, whose underrepresentation categorises them as the religious community least open to outsiders. Only a good 70% of the Kongo agree, which is also below average, and indicative of strong group solidarity. Inner-city residents are overrepresented: they have no difficulties with mixed marriages.

The general response to the second statement on the acceptability of mixed marriage between people from different ethnicities is even more positive than the first: almost nine tenths of the respondents agree. This is yet further evidence that religion is more important than ethnic identification. Agreement correlates directly with proximity to the city centre and level of education. Whereas virtually no university graduate disapproves, only a little less than 70% of catechumens are in favour. However, the direct correlation does not hold for people without any formal education, who once again demonstrate their general openness. By language, agreement is lowest among the Chiluba, who are accordingly underrepresented. People from Equateur have the fewest difficulties with this proposition.

In your opinion, which of the following characteristics/attributes describes your ethnic group?

You belong to a specific ethnic group. What do other ethnic groups think of your group?

	Self-perception	Perception of others' views
<i>Respected</i>	88	73
<i>Better</i>	86	65
<i>Modest</i>	81	72
<i>As good as the others</i>	78	66
<i>Envied</i>	60	54
<i>Feared by the others</i>	55	53
<i>Less developed</i>	29	40
<i>Arrogant</i>	27	37
<i>Weak</i>	21	30

The low ranking of the last three attributes - *less developed*, *arrogant* and *weak* - points to low future conflict potential between the ethnic groups. On the other hand, a good half of the respondents believe that they are *feared by others*, which should not be underestimated. The values for *envied* and *better than others* (almost 90%) are even higher. An analysis of the data will determine whether it is possible to draw up a clear profile of perceptions of group inferiority and superiority.

Just under 90% of all respondents, regardless of socio-economic factors, share the impression that their ethnic group is *respected*. Age, however, is significant: while middle-aged members assume that they are viewed with respect, the youngest generation is less certain. Another factor that plays a role is language group or regional origins. The self-perception of people from Equateur is below average, and slightly less than three fifths believe that they are respected by others. The proportion of Lingala-speakers, most of whom come from Equateur, is also below average.

Overall, 86% of the respondents regard their own ethnic group as *better* than others. On the other hand, only a little less than two thirds believe that members of other ethnic groups share this view.

Inner-city residents and people dependent on income in kind are less likely to regard themselves as the better ethnic group.

As for others' perceptions, values for people from Bas-Congo are above average. The self-confidence of this group may be related to geography and their numerical superiority in Kinshasa. People from East Kasai have problems on this score: only a good half believe that others see them as the better ethnic group, a view held by not many more respondents from Bandundu, many of whom may well have moved to the capital as migrant labourers.

An analysis of others' perceptions produces the following picture: financial security strengthens people's belief that others view them as the better ethnic group, as the example of the highest earners illustrates. Education also influences people's views of others' perceptions, although there is no direct correlation. People with a lower level of education are more likely to believe that others see them as the better group. Respondents with post-primary-school training, however, are an exception; they are underrepresented. By language, Swahili-speakers are most convinced that others regard them as the better group. The proportion of Chiluba- and Lingala-speakers is well below average, which is in line with other trends.

These regional trends of others' perceptions hold for other characteristics: a good seven tenths of respondents believe that their ethnic group is held to be *modest*. This conviction is particularly pronounced among Kikongo-speakers, i.e. people from Bas-Congo and Bandundu, and Swahili-speakers. There is a gulf between these groups and Chiluba-speakers, of whom less than 40% believe others view them as modest. A good half of the respondents from Equateur, too, believe that others do not perceive them as modest. Similarly, People living close to the city centre and those not dependent on income in kind to survive are also underrepresented.

In the view of almost four fifths of the respondents, their own ethnic group is *as good as others*. Older people tend to perceive their own ethnic group as the equal of any other. Inner-city residents also express great self-confidence. The level of education also affects self-perception: whereas almost all catechumens view their own ethnic group as equal to any other, this is true of just under seven tenths of university graduates. High earners are also sceptical; agreement among them runs a good ten percent below average. By language group, agreement is strongest among Chiluba-speakers with almost 90%. Lingala-speakers, by contrast, are underrepresented. There were no significant differences between groups concerning others' perceptions (66%).

Three fifths of all respondents think that others *envy* them on account of their ethnic affiliation, a view held regardless of socio-cultural or economic markers.

Opinions are influenced by the presence of income in kind. In times of financial bottlenecks and high inflation, income in kind arouses envy in others. Over and above this, somewhat less than two thirds of the respondents from East Kasai and Bas-Congo as well as 60% from Equateur also assume that others are envious of them, a view shared by a below-average proportion of respondents from Bandundu.

Fifty-five percent of respondents believe that they are *feared* by others. Inner-city inhabitants are underrepresented. Apart from this, the only significant factor is regional origins: over 60% of people from East Kasai and Equateur believe that they are feared by others, something that less than half the respondents from Bandundu can imagine.

As for perceptions of what others think (53%), the belief that they spread fear is again most pronounced among Congolese from Equateur and East Kasai.

Compared to the average of 29%, a disproportionate number of Kikongo-speakers (33%) perceive themselves as *less developed*. By contrast, only 12% of Chiluba-speakers share this view, not even half of the average figure. At only one fifth, Swahili-speakers are also substantially underrepresented. Less than three fifths perceive their ethnic group as *less developed*. Women and inner-city residents are underrepresented, as are the good tenth of Chiluba-speakers and one fifth of Swahili-speakers who agree. By regional origins, only the proportion of respondents from Bandundu, of whom a good third perceive their ethnic group as less developed, are overrepresented.

The belief that others see the respondents' group as less developed is more widespread; two fifths think this possible. Few of the generally well-off inner-city residents share this view. Religious affiliation is significant: the proportion of Kimbanguists is above average, and that of all others except adherents of Churches of the Reawakening below average. The fear of being though less developed is particularly widespread among almost half of all Kikongo-speakers and people from Bandundu, a view shared by less than one fifth of Chiluba- and just one quarter of Swahili-speakers.

Twenty-seven percent of all respondents term their own ethnic group *arrogant*. This view is shared by a good half of Chiluba-speakers and one third of Lingala-speakers.

This is also reflected in the language groups' regions of origin; indeed, among people from Equateur, where mainly Lingala is spoken, the proportion is even higher at almost half. This is a consequence of the Mobutu era, when the dictator from Equateur gave numerous privileges and advantages to members of this northern ethnic group, which considerably strengthened their self-confidence. Arrogance is lowest among the modest Kikongo-speakers. This is reflected in the low values for people from Bandundu and Bas-Congo, two provinces where Kikongo is spoken.

A little less than two fifths believe that they are perceived as arrogant by others. People living in large houses are more often confronted with this prejudice than people in other accommodation. In addition, proportionately fewer men than women believe that others regard them as arrogant. By language group, a little less than three quarters of the Chiluba-speakers believe this to be the case. As might be expected, Kikongo-speakers are well below average. This finding is also reflected in regional origins. A good half of people from Equateur not only regard themselves as arrogant, but assume that this is how others perceive them as well.

An average of 21% of respondents regard their own ethnic group as *weak*. Almost 40% of artisans and people with post-primary-school training believe this. By contrast, polytechnic and university graduates are noticeably underrepresented. Inner-city residents are less likely to view their ethnic group as weak. In keeping with the results for the language groups, an above-average proportion of Kikongo-speakers view their own ethnic group as weak, something virtually no Chiluba-speaker does. The proportion of Swahili-speakers is also below average. These results are in line with those by regional origin. One notable finding is that only somewhat more than one tenth of respondents from Equateur believe that others perceive their group as weak.

The picture of others' perceptions of ethnic-group weakness is similar, although higher at 30%. Those without any or only a little formal schooling are more likely to believe that their ethnic group is perceived as weak by outsiders. By contrast, this belief is shared by only a good tenth of university graduates. These values clearly demonstrate the close connection between individual ability and self-confidence and projected perceptions of the own group by others.

There is a clear recurrent pattern in the above findings: Chiluba-speakers and people from East Kasai and Equateur have a great deal of self-esteem (high values for the attributes "as good as others" and "arrogant"), but are afraid of not being recognised, or even being feared, by others. By contrast, Kikongo-speakers from Bas-Congo and Bandundu have above-average values for the attributes "modest" and "weak", and for being perceived by others as less developed.

Religion is more important than politics.

Almost four fifths of respondents (79%) agree with this statement, which is not surprising in the light of earlier results. Agreement is particularly high among people in make-shift and emergency accommodation, of whom only one tenth feel that politics is more important than religion. Once again, inner-city residents attach great value to religion. This is also true of farmers. By contrast, about just seven tenths of office workers, artisans and skilled and unskilled workers agree, which is below average. Almost 40% of teachers give politics precedence over religion. This indicates that support for religion correlates inversely with the level of education. Whereas people without formal schooling favour religion without exception, the proportion falls steadily to a good three fifths of university graduates. By income, the statement draws least agreement among people with medium and high incomes, of whom about one quarter attach greater value to politics. Other factors such as religion, gender and age do not sway attitudes in this respect, but ethnic affiliation does: the Kongo are overrepresented, and with almost 90% people from Equateur position themselves as the most religious group.

Which of the differences between the Congolese do you consider to be most important:

the differences between rich and poor

or

the differences between Christians and Muslims

or

the differences between different ethnic groups

or

the differences between different regions?

More than half the respondents (56%) feel that the differences between rich and poor are the most serious. For one fifth the religious factor takes precedence, and only 12% each regard differences in ethnicity or regional origins as the most important distinctions among the Congolese.

Cultural and socio-economic factors hardly influence this picture. As might be expected, people in the lowest income group attach greatest significance to differences between rich and poor, a view shared by only half of the highest earners. Responses vary significantly by mother tongue. Differences between rich and poor find least support among Swahili-speakers, only two fifths agree. On the other hand, a good quarter of Swahili-speakers see the cleavage between Christians and Muslims as the major difference. Swahili-speakers are also overrepresented among those who regard differences between the individual ethnic groups as most important. By contrast, one fifth of the Lingala-speakers give priority to the regional factor, a view shared by a below-average proportion of Chiluba-speakers.

Democracy and conviviality

The first exclusively political set of questions provides insights into people's hopes of coexistence, their expectations of the political elites and the level of political organisation of the inhabitants of Kinshasa.

Now that political parties are legal again in Congo:

life is better for people like me

or

life is more difficult for people like me?

Only 14% agreed with the first option, viz. that life has improved since the ban on political parties was lifted. The deterioration in the situation of the broad majority affects all strata in the population, regardless of linguistic and religious affiliations. Life has become more difficult for inner-city residents in particular.

Which organisations, societies, political parties or clubs do you belong to?

The level of organisation is low: two thirds of the respondents say they belong to neither a political party nor a religious or cultural association. Party membership at 11% is not much higher than that of religious or cultural societies at nine percent each.²⁵

Women are underrepresented in *political parties*. By occupation, farmers are the most strongly organised with 25%, followed by casual labourers and office workers each with about one fifth. Only five percent of artisans are party members, the lowest level of political activism of all occupations. Party membership rises with the level of education: almost one fifth of university graduates are active in political parties. By contrast, not one of the respondents without any formal schooling admitted to being politically organised. Catechumens and graduates of post-primary training courses are noticeably underrepresented. By language group, Chiluba-speakers are most organised: a good fifth of them belong to political parties. This high level of organisation can probably be attributed to Etienne Tshisekedi, Chiluba-speaking chairman of the social-democratic UDPS, who has focused recruitment drives on his home region of East

²⁵ Five percent of respondents belong to other types of societies than those mentioned. This is particularly true of teachers (14%) and government officials (ten percent).

Kasai.²⁶ In *cultural organisations*, skilled and unskilled workers have the strongest representation, with almost one fifth of respondents, followed by civil servants and casual labourers. Teachers and shopkeepers are underrepresented. However, the latter are active to an above-average degree in *religious societies*, which can be ascribed to the high proportion of women traders. Not surprisingly, catechumens are also overrepresented. Yet, the proportion of primary-school graduates with further training is even higher: almost one fifth are organised. Skilled and unskilled workers have the lowest level of representation. Catechumens and people without any formal schooling take no part at all in *cultural societies*.

The low level of involvement in political parties must be put in context. At the time of the survey, the ban on political parties was still in force. Other factors include the war, frustration with the economic mismanagement and self-enrichment of the previous ruling elites, and, with few exceptions, the lack of profile of most political parties founded in the first phase of liberalisation under the Mobutu regime in the early 1990s.

At the present time, political leaders cannot do much to improve people's living conditions.

Almost half the respondents agree with this statement. This division into two groups with opposite opinions runs through all age and educational groups and religious and ethnic affiliations.

In the case of violent ethnic conflict, everybody suffers in the long run.

Almost two thirds of the respondents subscribe to this view. There are significant differences by place of residence: a good 70% of inner-city residents agree with the statement.

*I fear that peace and cooperation between the groups may have become impossible
or*

*In spite of all that has happened, I believe that peace and cooperation between the
different groups is still possible.*

Hope in peaceful coexistence is stronger: notwithstanding the violence of recent years, 84% of respondents believe that it is still possible to share a future together. On the

²⁶ For more information on the UDPS, see the chapter on "Parties and Politics".

one hand, this high level of agreement is astonishing, but on the other hand it does reflect perceptions in the country. Many Congolese are shocked by conditions in their country and feel that external aggression is responsible for the lack of peaceful coexistence in recent years.

People with a low level of education are overrepresented among the sceptics: a good third of catechumens and almost a quarter of people without any formal schooling do not believe in the possibility of peace. In contrast, about 90% of university and polytechnic graduates are convinced that peaceful coexistence between the different ethnic groups is possible. Almost all primary-school graduates are confident in this respect, evidence that one cannot simply assume that a belief in the possibility of a peaceful future is the preserve of people with a high level of education. Similarly, an above-average people who depend on income in kind to survive accept the probability of coexistence between different groups. On the other hand, Kimbanguists, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists and people with no religious affiliation are less hopeful about the prospects of lasting peace.

Of particular interest in the context of this survey are the attitudes of the Congolese to political systems and the accountability of governments. The respondents were given a choice of different political options, from one-party states to a government of national unity, which is eminently relevant to the future of the country, before as well as after elections. After decades of dictatorship and war, the political focus has now shifted to the people's views of the political elites and the significance of the ethnic factor.

It doesn't matter what people say, I don't believe you can get rid of fraud in elections.

This question is significant in the light of planned elections in 2005. Sixty percent of all respondents agree with this view, irrespective of socio-economic variables. The results were influenced only by cultural distinctions. The most pessimistic are those with no religious affiliation: almost 90% of them are convinced that electoral fraud is inevitable. By ethnic group, roughly two thirds of the Luba and the Kongo are sceptical about clean elections. By religious affiliation, the proportion of Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists who agree is well below average.

To what extent do political leaders enjoy unconditional support in a country in which corruption, large-scale plundering of resources and kleptocracy are part way of everyday life?

Even if my political leader does something I don't agree with, I will still vote for him in elections.

Eight-four percent of respondents do not agree with this statement. This finding makes it clear that support for political leaders is anything but unconditional. This attitude runs through all levels of education. Rejection is strongest among those without any formal schooling: not one agreed with the statement. This also holds for virtually all university, almost 90% of polytechnic graduates and a majority of people with post-primary-school training. One exception is trade-school graduates, of whom three tenths would remain loyal even if their leader did something they disapproved of. By language group, Lingala- and Swahili-speakers would no longer vote for the leader in question. This is also true for an above-average number of people from Equateur, Mobutu's home province, and from Bandundu. One quarter of Chiluba-speakers, on the other hand, do not share this view. This finding is interesting inasmuch as many Luba are supporters of the UDPS, whose leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, a member of this ethnic group, has frequently changed his policies in recent years.

Questioned about their basic attitudes to democratic principles such as pluralism, the division of powers,, freedom of the media and government control, interviewees responded as follows:

There should be only one political party, with a single plan for the country's future

or

There should be more than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future.

Second option: 64

Some people say that Congo needs a new political order that is acceptable to all the major parties, even if this takes more time to achieve.

or

Others say that the decision on a new political order in Congo should be left to the party that wins the most votes in the elections.

Second option: 51

Judges should follow directives from the government

or

Judges should be truly independent and apply the law without listening to the government.

Second option: 80

The government should control the newspapers, radio and television to prevent discord

or

The government should allow newspapers, radio and television the freedom of expression to criticise the government as they like.

Second option: 77

The government should be controlled by elected members of parliament

or

The government should be free to act without being hampered by members of parliament?

First option: 82

The statement that the government should be controlled by elected members of parliament draws the greatest support: more than four fifths of the respondents agree. Almost as many favour the division of powers between the executive and the judiciary and freedom of the media. A multiparty system wins the approval of almost two thirds of all respondents. Opinion is divided on whether the party with the most votes or all parties should design the country's future political system. Marginally more than half favour the first option.

More men than women approve of a *multiparty system*. In particular 35-49-year-olds express above-average support for a political process involves several parties, whereas support among the youngest age group is below average. Unlike the older generations, the youth did not experience the lifting of the prohibition on political parties in the early 1990s. Rather, young people appear to have had enough of changing heads of state and the chaotic political situation that led to war, and would even prefer a one-party state as during the Mobutu regime. Better-educated people tend to vote for a multiparty system. Support is strongest among polytechnic graduates, of whom four fifths approve. Trade-school graduates are also overrepresented. By ethnic group, three quarters of the Luba, probably including many adherents of the IDPS, support a multiparty system. On the other hand, more than half of all respondents without any formal schooling and approx. two fifths of primary-school graduates with or without further training would like just one party to decide the future of the country.

Respondents are split on who the main actors should be that decide on the future political system; a small majority favours the *party with the most votes*. A little less than 60% of the people from Equateur, Mobutu's home province, vote for this option, as do many members of the Kongo ethnic group. By contrast, a majority of interviewees from Bandundu would prefer to include all parties.

Four fifths of the respondents want an *independent judiciary*. This view is overrepresented among the better educated, including 94% of university graduates and 87% of polytechnic graduates. One quarter of primary-school and trade-school graduates take the opposite view. Almost nine tenths of people housed in makeshift and emergency accommodation also want an independent judiciary. Just as many Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers are also favour this choice. By contrast, a disproportionately large number of Lingala-speakers and people from Bandundu would prefer judges who obey government orders.

A good three quarters of respondents support the *freedom of the press*. With the approval of a little under nine tenths, polytechnic graduates lead the list of those in favour of democratic rights, followed in second place by catechumens. Opposition is notable among trade-school graduates, of whom a good two fifths disapprove of press freedom. Almost as many people with post-primary-school training and almost a third of primary-school graduates also favour media controlled to contain potential conflict. An inner-city dwelling and a good income also increase willingness to make concessions to democracy. The figures by language group confirm the findings for an independent judiciary: Swahili-and Chiluba-speakers are the most democratic groups, with support of almost 90% and a good 80%, respectively. By contrast, three tenths of people from Bandundu and almost as many from Equateur would like the government to control the media.

A good 80% of respondents would like *parliamentary controls on the government*. Exceptionally, support for checks and balances is strongest among primary-school graduates with further training (92%); then come polytechnic followed by university graduates. Roughly one quarter of both primary-school graduates and catechumens would like to give the government all the freedom it needs. Inner-city residents disproportionately favour controls on the government. By language group, proponents of this view are overrepresented among Swahili-speakers, whereas one quarter of the Kongo would not like the government's scope for action to be restricted by parliamentary deputies. By religious community, Adventists and Pentecostals stand out as champions of controls on government, in contrast to roughly one quarter of all Catholics and people without any religious affiliation.

After these general statements on democratic values and their influence in political systems, the next set of questions deals with the preferred form of government. This is approached in two steps, first by looking at general preferences and then at the best solution for Congo.

1. There are many countries like ours - that is, countries with different ethnic groups. These countries have different forms of government and different opinions about the best way to govern such a country. Think of the situation in Congo. We will give you some of these opinions. Please tell us whether you find each acceptable or not.

2. Which of the above options do you feel is the best solution for the Congo?
(Choose only one)

	Acceptable	Best solution for Congo
<i>The country is partitioned, and each ethnic group has its own state.</i>	13	8
<i>The largest group governs, and the other groups accept its decisions.</i>	18	3
<i>One group governs, and people who don't like this either keep quiet or get out.</i>	9	1
<i>A single party open to everyone governs without opposition.</i>	27	14
<i>Everybody votes for the party of their choice, and the parties form a national government in which each group has a share of power.</i>	75	53
<i>People vote for the party they like; the winning party governs and the other parties go into opposition.</i>	56	21

Asked for the best solution in a multiethnic state, three quarters of the respondents would like a government of national unity to be formed after elections. More than half can also imagine the party with the most votes governing and the losers going into the opposition. Almost 30% favour a single-party system, and a little less than one fifth think the best solution is government by the largest group. Only a good ten percent favour partition, so that each ethnic group would have its own state. Less than ten percent would like one group to form the government and those who disapprove to either keep quiet or leave the country.

A comparison between these answers and the responses to the question of which would be the best form of government for the Congo (second column), the preferences, with one exception, are the same as those that respondents think are desirable for comparable countries. Partition moves up from the second last to the third last place. However, more than half of all respondents would like a government that embraces all important groups. A good fifth would accept a system with majority government and opposition. Systems of government that allow for domination by one group are rejected outright, attracting less than five percent of the votes.

Partition of the state

Only a good ten percent feel that partition is generally acceptable. Support is concentrated among the less-educated: a good third of catechumens and almost 30% of trade-school graduates approve of partition. One fifth of the Kongo ethnic group can also imagine a partitioned country.

Asked specifically about the *Congo*, only eight percent think that partition is the best solution. By education, acceptance is once again greatest among catechumens, of whom almost one quarter are in favour, followed by trade-school graduates. This option is not very attractive for primary-school graduates with further training, and support is below average. By religious community, a good fifth of Kimbanguists and almost one sixth of Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists favour partition. Agreement is also above average among people with no religious affiliation. Swahili-speakers reject the notion of a partitioned Congo almost unanimously, whereas support among the Kongo is above average.

Almost one fifth are in favour of letting the largest group decide alone, regardless of socio-economic and cultural distinctions.

As an option for the *Congo*, this solution is the least favoured but one, drawing the support of three percent of respondents. The only group significantly overrepresented is people that belong to no religious community.

Absolute dominance of one group over the others

Not even one tenth of the respondents want a system of government that gives the opposition only the option of exile, whether actual or internal. Who are the few that find this type of government acceptable? As might be expected, trade-school graduates and catechumens are overrepresented. By contrast, the concept is rejected utterly by university and polytechnic graduates and those with no formal schooling. This confirms what we have seen above, namely that there is only an imperfect correlation between the level of education and support for democratic values. By occupation, roughly one quarter of artisans and farmers and a disproportionate number of office workers find an authoritarian system of government without any rights for the opposition acceptable. On the other hand, not a single teacher is in favour of one group dominating all others. The proportion of civil servants that reject this proposal is also above average. With regard to the *Congo*, virtually no one favours the absolute domination of one group. Socio-economic and cultural factors did not play a significant role.

One-party state

A good quarter of the respondents approve of a one-party state such as practised under Mobutu. People with a low level of education are overrepresented, lead by catechumens at 45% and people with post-primary-school training. A good third of the

respondents without any formal schooling and those with primary-school education also favour this system. Opposition to the reintroduction of a one-party system is far above average among polytechnic graduates. Primary-school graduates are the strongest supporters of a return to a one-party system in the *Congo* (14%); among those who have gone on to further training support rises to a good quarter. The proportion of polytechnic and university graduates is well below average. One fifth of the Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists are in favour of a one-party state, as are almost one quarter of the respondents from Equateur, Mobutu's one-time base. By contrast, members of the Luba ethnic group, to which Etienne Tshisekedi, chairman of the UDPS, belongs, are underrepresented.

A government of national unity

With the support of three quarters of the respondents, a government of national unity is the most popular option. The decision cuts across all strata and religious groups. The one notable result is that people from less well-off in households with income in kind are more likely than average to vote for consensus solutions. By province, people from Equateur are least willing to accept compromise (63%), possibly due to the enduring influence of Mobutism.

A government of national unity for the *Congo*, which was partly realized in summer 2003, though without elections or the inclusion of all groups, is favoured by both the most and the least educated: two thirds of respondents without any formal schooling and a good 60% of university graduates regard a government that includes all political parties as the best solution. Supporters of this form of government are also overrepresented among primary-school and trade-school graduates, although it fails to find a majority among primary-school graduates with further training. Furthermore, only a good third of respondents without any religious affiliation and less than two fifths of Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists agree. Support among Adventists and Pentecostals is below average. By language group, Lingala-speakers are underrepresented. Moreover, only two fifths of the Kongo favour this solution. And, as seen above, only a good third of people from Equateur - well below average - agree.

Majority government

A good half (56%) of all respondents think a system of openly competing political parties in which the majority party forms the government and the smaller parties form the opposition is the best form of government. Once again, there is no obvious correlation between agreement and level of education. Two thirds of both university graduates and catechumens favour majority government. Polytechnic and trade school graduates are also overrepresented. Below-average support for majority government is expressed by people with a low level of education: those with no formal schooling and primary-school graduates with and without further training. However, the majority government option appeals to almost four fifths of government officials and two thirds of

teachers. The proportion of skilled and unskilled workers is also above average. On the other hand, this system finds little support among farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and traders. People in makeshift accommodation are also underrepresented.

As a solution for the *Congo*, by contrast, majority government gains the approval of only a good fifth of respondents. Support for this option is strongest among polytechnic graduates, a good quarter of whom like this solution. Support for a majority government is lowest among people with no formal schooling (five percent) and primary-school graduates (a good ten percent). Inner-city residents are overrepresented at a good three tenths. This is also the case with people without any religious affiliation and with Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists. By religious community, its attraction is weakest among Kimbanguists. By language group, the strongest proponents are Lingala- and Swahili-speakers: almost 30% of each group is in favour. Despite the close relationship with the Mobutu clan, almost one third of people from Equateur support a majority democracy.

Which countries and social, economic and political systems do respondents who have only been disappointed by their governments see as models?

In your mind, which country comes closest to being an ideal country, a country that other countries should attempt to be like?

South Africa	18
USA	16
France	15
Canada	7
Belgium	5
Switzerland	5
Congo-Brazzaville	4
An African country	13
An European country	7
An Asian country	4
None	5
Other	1

The most popular choice is South Africa, favoured by almost one fifth of the respondents. Moreover, by continent, Africa is the option of choice. Congo-Brazzaville is an exception; few regard its state as worth emulating. The West, the listed European countries and North America draw the support of one quarter each. The home country

of the former colonial rulers holds little attraction, except for respondents over the age of 50, of whom an above-average proportion see in Belgium a model country. At the same time, none of the countries appeal to a little less than half of this generation. Support for Belgium is inversely proportional to education: in particular people with little education see Belgium as a model country, whereas not one university graduate chooses the country. Attitudes towards the United States and Canada show exactly the opposite pattern. They are underrepresented among the choices of people with a low level of education, but are the favourite models of polytechnic graduates. The attraction of South Africa runs through all educational groups, from those without any formal schooling, through artisans, to university graduates. Views about France are similar: while a below-average number of catechumens see it as a model, the values for people without any formal schooling and for polytechnic graduates are above-average. People without any formal education and catechumens do not see prosperous western countries like Canada and Switzerland as models. Similarly, an above-average proportion of them express no preference for any of the listed countries, or prefer other countries. By contrast, a good ten percent of university graduates vote for Switzerland. Support for Europe in general is also below average. Among graduates of post-primary training courses "an African country" draws above-average support. By education, the choice of country is similar: South Africa is overrepresented and the USA underrepresented in the choices of people living in impoverished circumstances. Support for the latter is already stronger in the next income group. Support for "an African country" is lowest among the highest earners. This result may be related to the low preference for South Africa among inner-city residents.

Choices also vary by religious affiliation. Support for South Africa is above-average among Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists, and receives the lowest values from those without any religious affiliation and Kimbanguists. On the other hand, the latter are particularly enamoured of the USA. This is also true of one fifth of adherents of Churches of the Reawakening. The reason for this lies in the close ties between these churches with churches in the USA. In the summer months, the capital teems with preachers from North and South America. A disproportionately large number of Kimbanguists vote for the former colonial power. France has below-average appeal for Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists. Adventists and Pentecostals in particular tend to favour an African country, whereas people with no religious affiliation vote disproportionately for a European or Asian state, or countries not mentioned in the list.

Mother tongue and ethnic affiliation also colour people's choices. A disproportionate number of Chiluba-speakers see Canada as an ideal country. Moreover, support for South Africa is above-average among the Luba ethnic group. The Kongo are particularly attracted to African countries. Swahili-speakers and people from Bandundu, on the other hand, vote to an above-average degree for France.

If the current peace efforts fail, do you think that people in your circle of friends your or co-workers would approve of the following political activities?

The break-down of responses is as follows:

	<i>yes</i>
<i>Boycott of businesses owned by political opponents</i>	23
<i>Strikes of one, two or three days</i>	27
<i>Strikes of two weeks or more</i>	20
<i>Peaceful rallies and demonstrations</i>	54
<i>Attacks on the property of political opponents</i>	21
<i>Physical violence against political opponents</i>	22
<i>Indiscriminate violence</i>	5
<i>Armed violence against political opponents</i>	12
<i>Only peaceful means</i>	72

Only peaceful means

Three quarters of respondents approve exclusively of peaceful means of protest in the event that the peace negotiations collapse, an extraordinarily high proportion. A good half could picture peaceful rallies and demonstrations. Almost 30% think short strikes of up to three days are acceptable. And about one fifth believe that friends and colleagues would be ready to go on strike for two or more weeks. Boycotts of businesses owned by or attacks on the property or person of are also approved by the fairly small proportion of one fifth. Only a small minority think an outbreak of violence is the likely reaction to a break down of peace negotiations, and only a good ten percent think that political opponents would be the target of violence.

A boycott of businesses owned by political opponents finds the approval of a little less than a quarter of all respondents. Age is a significant factor: more young than old people expect that people will resort to this measure. By education, a good 40% of catechumens and three tenths of trade school graduates think boycotts likely. The vast majority of university graduates, respondents without any formal schooling and graduates of post-primary training programmes exclude this action.

Once again, an above-average proportion of young people have few problems with strikes lasting one to three days, whereas the proportion of the over-50 generation holding this view is below average.

The social profile of those open to strikes of two or more weeks is similar. The youngest generation would approve, but already the 24-35-year-olds doubt that their friends and colleagues would give preference to this instrument. By education, the

sharpest reactions come from the most and least educated: they and to a slightly lesser extent post-primary graduates with further training are extremely sceptical about calling for a lengthy strike. On the other hand, a disproportionate number of catechumens and primary-school graduates think there is a very real possibility of friends and colleagues resorting to such action. On this point, there are also differences by language group. Chiluba-speakers have the fewest reservations: three tenths believe that numerous acquaintances would support such a strike, a view that very few Swahili-speakers share.

Only a good half of all respondents are in favour of political *rallies and peaceful demonstrations*. Strongest support is expressed by the catechumens, and university and polytechnic graduates are also overrepresented. Almost three quarters of people without any formal schooling and just below 60% of trade-school graduates no longer believe in peaceful actions; they have probably been disappointed too often. This is also the case with more than half of those living in small houses, makeshift accommodation of the inner city. By contrast, people in large houses are overrepresented among those who believe that friends and colleagues will resort to peaceful demonstrations. Seventy percent of Swahili- and three fifths of Lingala-speakers also believe in peaceful means. Kikongo-speakers, on the other hand, are split down the middle.

A good fifth think that *violence against political opponents*, whether against their *person* or their *property* is a probability. Least likely to participate are friends and colleagues of people over 50. By education, catechumens stand out: two fifths can imagine people resorting to such measures. In both cases people without any formal schooling and trade-school graduates are also overrepresented. By contrast, only ten percent of primary-school graduates with further training expect that people close to them would use violence against the person or property of political opponents. Inner-city residents think that violence against persons is improbable. For the first time there are also significant differences by religion. Two fifths of those with no religious affiliation believe that those in their circle could use violence. Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists have difficulty imagining this; like Adventists and Pentecostals, they are underrepresented. By regional origins, an above-average number from Equateur do not expect any violent action, something a good 30% of respondents from Bandundu certainly can.

Just five percent of the entire sample think that a direct reaction in the form of *indiscriminate violence* is a real possibility. Agreement is most common among graduates of trade schools and people without any formal schooling (14%). Primary-school graduates are also overrepresented. At the other extreme, not one university graduate can imagine people in their immediate environment participating in indiscriminate violence. For the first time, income also plays a role, albeit a small one: people in the lowest income group are slightly overrepresented among those who believe that people in their circle could resort to violence. By language group, not a single Swahili-speaker can imagine people taking such measures, which is also true of almost all Kongo, whereas one tenth of people from Bandundu do not want to exclude the possibility.

A good third of catechumens and approx. one fifth of trade-school graduates, people without any formal schooling and primary-school graduates can imagine people using *armed violence against political opponents*. The number of university graduates who can imagine people in their circle resorting to such actions is below average.

Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle.

Almost half of the respondents (46%) agree with this statement. Opinions are influenced by age and religion. People over the age of 35 are overrepresented among people who reject violence on principle. As seen above, the youngest age group is most prepared to accept violence: three fifths of the respondents under the age of 25 could not agree with the above statement. People with no religious affiliation as well as Adventists and Pentecostals cannot justify the use of violence under any circumstances. In keeping with previous findings (see violence against political opponents), almost 70% of the Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists found they could not renounce all forms of violence on principle. This also applies to a good 60% of the adherents of Churches of the Reawakening and one in two Kimbanguists.

Given that Congo is going through a period of upheaval and radical change that offers opportunities of a new beginning, both economically and politically, respondents were asked for their views on crucial administrative and economic decisions.

*Here are a range of opinions about different ways of governing a country.
Which alternatives do you agree with?*

A government that allows elected regional and local councils to regulate their own affairs First option: 52

or

A centralised government that regulates the affairs of the whole country?

Factories and businesses are owned by private people who work hard for the good of the whole country First option: 54

or

Factories and businesses are run by the government elected by the people?

A government that attempts to ensure that the differences in income and education are as small as possible, even if it means higher taxes for everybody

First option: 56

or

A government that allows talented people and people who work hard to earn more than others?

As can be seen, the population is more or less evenly divided on all three points, even if respondents attach more importance to reducing social inequalities than to economic liberalisation and comprehensive decentralisation.

Slightly more than half of the respondents are in favour of a *decentralised form of government*. The only significant differences are by income: an above-average proportion of persons with modest financial means favour a federal system. More than half of people living in impoverished circumstances prefer centralised government.

Opinions also differ about the desirable economic system. University graduates (85%) in particular favour *private business*; support among polytechnic graduates is also above average. A state-controlled economy is favoured by a disproportionately large number of catechumens and primary-school graduates. The only other significant factor is language: disproportionately many Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers approve of privately owned companies, whereas a good half of Lingala-speakers prefer a state-controlled economy.

Opinions are clearest on *social equality*, regardless of all socio-economic and cultural differences, well over half of the respondents favour an *egalitarian system*. The only significant influence in this respect is place of residence: a disproportionately large number of inner-city residents want a government that will promote general equality.

How important is the president's ethnic affiliation?

The president should come from the largest ethnic group

or

It doesn't matter which ethnic group the president is from, provided he is competent?

Once again, the results show that ethnicity is not everything: regardless of socio-economic and cultural factors, a good 90% of respondents think the future president's competence is more important than membership of the largest ethnic group.

Should voting be compulsory

or

Should people be free to choose whether to vote or not?

Fifty-six percent of respondents are in favour of voluntary voting. Inner-city residents are overrepresented, as are the Kongo. A good half of Lingala-speakers favour compulsory voting.

Which do you prefer:

A government in which the largest party chooses all the cabinet ministers and is thus able to realise that party's political programme

or

A government in which all the major parties name cabinet ministers and which thus has make compromises?

As seen in comparative choices, a clear majority support a government embracing all political parties in which the ministers represent different political opinions. A good three quarters of the respondents across all social strata, religious affiliations and ethnic groups favour this solution, which forces parties to reach consensus.

How should government officials be chosen?

The responses break down as follows:

	Government service	Army	Office workers	Ministers
<i>By qualifications (regardless of ethnic affiliation)</i>	79	78	81	77
<i>People of my own ethnic group</i>	2	2	2	2
<i>By ethnic quotas based on population (more jobs for large groups and fewer jobs for small groups)</i>	20	20	17	22

The results are very similar: roughly four fifths would like applicants to be chosen on the basis of qualifications and one fifth favour the introduction of a quota system based on ethnic proportionality. The third variant, preferential treatment for the respondent's own group, finds little support. Factors causing discrepancies in opinions include education, language and religious and ethnic affiliation.

How should people be chosen for jobs in government service?

An overwhelming four fifths of respondents favour appointing the most qualified government officials. Not surprisingly, support is strongest (90%) among those with the best education. By contrast, a good third of trade-school graduates and almost 30% of people with post-primary-school training would like a quota system. Inner-city residents are overrepresented among those supporting qualifications. By language group and ethnic affiliation there is a majority for qualifications - further evidence for the relativity of ethnicity. In particular Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers are overrepresented among those in favour of qualified applicants. Explanations for this attitude include the respondents' minority status in Kinshasa and their good school education. Among proponents of qualifications only Kikongo-speakers are underrepresented, which may be related to the groups comparatively low level of education. The same holds for the Kongo ethnic group, of which comparatively few - only two thirds - rate individual qualifications over primordial factors such as ethnicity. Nonetheless, they do not seek preferential treatment for their own group; most of them would like a proportional solution. By contrast, Kimbanguists as well as Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists with somewhat underrepresented among supporters of the first option, selection on the basis of qualifications. A good third of the latter are in favour of quotas. People without any religious affiliation are underrepresented among those in favour of quotas; on the other hand they are the largest group in favour preferential treatment for the own ethnic group.

How should people be recruited for the army?

Similarly, the vast majority of respondents believe that candidates for the army, too, should be chosen on the basis of qualifications. By education, it is again clear that people with a low level of education are underrepresented among those in favour of qualifications, but overrepresented among those in favour of introducing proportional quotas. This is also true of catechumens, of whom only three fifths support the appointment of the most qualified candidates. Primary-school graduates with further training are also underrepresented. These two groups, in conjunction with people with no formal schooling and trade-school graduates are overrepresented among those in favour of a quota system. Catechumens, like government officials, provide the highest

number of those interested in preferential treatment for their own ethnic group, this time with as much as one tenth of respondents. Inner-city residents again reveal their preference for selection on the basis of qualification. By language group, support among Chiluba-speakers is again a disproportionately high figure of just under 90%. About one third of the Kongo are in favour of quotas, a vote similar to that for the selection of government officials. Accordingly, they are underrepresented when it comes to selection on the basis of qualification.

How should the private sector recruit employees?

In private sector recruitment of employees it is noticeable that qualifications enjoy an even higher rating of over 80% at the expense of quotas. As before, well-educated people favour the first option, led again by nine tenths of university and polytechnic graduates. Among the champions of quotas are primary-school graduates with or without further training. Remarkably, none of the university graduates are interested in ethnic-group quotas proportional to population. The preferences of inner-city residents are unchanged. By language group, Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers are the strongest proponents of qualifications. People from Equateur are underrepresented; however, they are slightly overrepresented when it comes to choosing people on the basis of ethnic quotas. Almost 30% of the Kongo, by contrast, are in favour of introducing quotas.

How should cabinet ministers be chosen?

In the selection of cabinet ministers, the qualification criterion gets the lowest level of support with a figure of only a good three quarters. On the other hand, quotas have their highest value of a good fifth. The break down by level of education more or less follows the established pattern. However, seven percent of catechumens would like their own ethnic group to get preferential treatment in the appointment of ministers. A good 30% of respondents without any formal schooling, followed by catechumens and primary-school graduates with further training, favour quotas. The choice of ministers is influenced not by the language group, but solely by ethnic affiliation: one third of the Kongo approve of the quota solution. Once again, a disproportionate number of Luba approve of selection on the basis of qualifications.

The major groups in our country are more or less of equal strength. Therefore it is necessary to seek compromise and reach an understanding.

A good four fifths of the respondents agree with this statement. Supporters of compromise are overrepresented in the oldest generation. Similarly, a disproportionate number of respondents without any formal school and primary-school graduates are in favour of compromise. Remarkably, three tenths of university graduates do not share this view. This also holds for almost one quarter of inner-city residents. Three tenths of Lingala-speakers are also sceptical about finding a consensus.

Whether we like it or not: when different language, religious and ethnic groups live in the same country, they must either dominate or be dominated.

Almost half of all respondents agree with this statement. However it is sharply contradicted by almost 70% of the inhabitants of makeshift or emergency accommodation, who do not believe that domination by any one group is inevitable. A good half of people who belong to no religious community as well as the adherents of Churches of the Reawakening do not believe that coexistence is possible without great differences in power. Almost 70% of Kimbanguists, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists see the coexistence between different groups less bleakly. An above-average proportion of Kikongo-speakers and members of the Kongo ethnic group (59%) believe that dominance of one group is inevitable. Half of the Luba also assume clear power relationships. However, on this point two thirds of the Lingala-speakers are of another opinion.

Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept other people as they are and respect each other's mutual rights.

Almost four fifths of the respondents (78%) agree with this statement, regardless of socio-economic and cultural differences.

Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting.

Just somewhat more than 60% of respondents agree with this statement. The only factor influencing responses is ethnicity: a disproportionately large number of the Kongo feel that ethnic diversity enriches a society.

Parties and politics

In this chapter we focus on respondents' political preferences in respect of both political elites and parties. This discussion takes place against the backdrop of the current transition arrangements, which foresee elections in 2005 or 2006 at the latest.

Which leader do you admire most?

Joseph Kabila	31
Etienne Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba	20
Antoine Gizenga	9
Jean-Pierre Bemba	3
Joseph Nkoy Olenga	2
None	25
Other politicians	9
Don't know	2

The preferences are clear: Joseph Kabila tops the list with a good 30%; one fifth of respondents favour Etienne Tshisekedi; and Antoine Gizenga takes third place with a little less than ten percent. A high 25% of all respondents did not admire any of the leaders mentioned. This represents an opening for new politicians, and thus rapid change in the political arena.

From which population groups are supporters of the individual politicians drawn?²⁷

*Joseph Kabila*²⁸ (31%), the current president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, draws disproportionately high support from women (55%) and many young people: a good two fifths of his supporters are younger than 25. His appeal is lowest among the oldest generation: only a good ten percent would vote for him. People's accommodation is also indicative of political preferences: a good third of Kabila's supporters live in emergency and makeshift accommodation. By education, his support is strongest

²⁷ The following expositions focus on the first four politicians in the list. Joseph Nkoy Olenga was advisor and official representative of Tshisekedi's during his premiership 1992-1993. As leader of FONUS (Forces Nouvelles pour l'Union et la Solidarité), a radical opposition movement, he was also the representative of unarmed civil society at the peace negotiations.

²⁸ Kabila is leader of the Parti pour le reconciliation et le développement (PPRD), which he founded in March 2002.

among people with post-primary education (a good two fifths). Support among university graduates at almost a quarter and among trade-school graduates and people with any formal schooling is below average. A disproportionately large number of Kimbanguists, adherents of Churches of the Reawakening, and Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists would vote for the president. He has little support among people with no religious affiliations community and Catholics (a good fifth of his potential voters). By language group, the proportion of Lingala- and Kikongo-speakers who favour Kabila is above average. Support for him is well below average among Chiluba-speakers. He draws a little less than half of his support from people from Bas-Congo, but has great difficulty finding supporters in East Kasai (eight percent). Kabila's father, Laurent Désirée Kabila, came from Bas-Congo, which explains the strong regional preferences of southern Congolese.

*Etienne Tshisekedi*²⁹ (20%) is most admired by graduates of trade schools (a good third of his supporters). But he also has a following among university and polytechnic graduates. Few people without formal education have any time for him (five percent), a preference shared by people in makeshift or emergency accommodation (15%). On the other hand, he is appreciated in particular by inner-city residents. He can also count on the support of almost three tenths of those without religious affiliations. His support among Adventists and Pentecostals is below average. By language group, the results are clear: 60% of his supporters are Chiluba-speakers. His support among the Luba is also above average (almost 60%), and naturally among people from East Kasai (a good half), Tshisekedi's home region. These last results highlight the importance of the ethnic factor in recruiting a political following. Tshisekedi's support among all other language groups is below average.

*Antoine Gizenga*³⁰ draws strong support from primary and trade-school graduates (almost one fifth), but almost none from university graduates. He also finds little support among inner-city residents and the highest income group. A good half of his supporters are Kikongo-speakers. On the other hand, not one Swahili-speaking respondent and very few Chiluba-speakers prefer him. About three fifths of his supporters come from Bandundu, Gizenga's home region.

It is noticeable that men make up three quarters of the followers of *Jean-Pierre Bemba* (three percent), the former leader of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), a rebel organisation that controlled the north of the country for years.³¹ Over and above this, a good 60% of his support is younger than 25. People from Equateur, Bemba's home region, are overrepresented among his supporters (a good ten per-

²⁹ Etienne Tshisekedi is chairman of the Union pour le démocratie et le progress social (UDPS), which he founded in 1982.

³⁰ Antoine Gizenga was prime minister and president of the rebel regime in Stanleyville in 1960-61.

³¹ The MLC was founded in 1998 and received support from Uganda for a number of years, until, even before fighting ceased, Bemba gradually started to move closer to Kabila's governing faction.

cent). Geographic and family connections with Mobutu - his father was a cabinet minister under Mobutu - ensure him a reservoir of sympathy in the north of the country and among Mobutists.

Looking at the preferences of those who admire *none* or *other politicians*, or are *undecided*, middle-aged people and those over 50 in particular like none of the listed politicians, whereas the youngest are least likely to vote this way. People in emergency and makeshift housing are also slightly overrepresented among the undecided. Among those that admire none of these or other politicians, Swahili-speakers are heavily over- and Chiluba-speakers heavily underrepresented. By region, a disproportionately high percentage of respondents from Equateur favour none of the mentioned politicians, whereas people from East Kasai, who have a standard bearer in Tshisekedi, are underrepresented in this category. By ethnic group, an above-average number of Kongo admire none of the politicians mentioned.

There is a slight shift in preferences when respondents are asked to name their second favourite politician:

Which leader is your second choice?

Etienne Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba	13
Joseph Kabila	12
Jean-Pierre Bemba	7
Antoine Gizenga	7
Nkoy Olenga	6
Léon Kenge Wa Dondo	1
None	38
Other politicians	14
Don't know	3

Among second choices of respondents, Tshisekedi is a little more popular than Kabila. The former rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba shares third place with Antoine Gizenga. Kenge Wa Dondo, several times prime minister under Mobutu, brings up the rear with just one percent of the votes.³² It should be pointed out that a good half of all respondents admire either none of or other politicians than those listed above. This is also indicative of the low regard in which respondents hold the political elite.

How do first and second choices compare in the popularity stakes?

³² Kenge Wa Dondo was prime minister in 1982-1986; 1988-1990 and 1994-1997.

Our analysis shows that there was an exchange of votes between Kabila and Tshisekedi, notwithstanding the political differences between the two leaders. Tshisekedi won first place as second choice by taking about one quarter of the votes that had gone to Kabila in the first vote. The same holds for the president, who won the same number of votes of Tshisekedi supporters. The net increase in Tshisekedi's support comes from people who had voted for Bemba and Olenga in the first round: a little less than 40% voted for the chairman of the UDPS as their second choice.

People have few reservations about Bemba, who turned his MLC rebel organization into a political party in summer 2003. One third of Kenge Wa Dondo's supporters named Bemba as their second choice, as did almost one fifth of Kabila's supporters.

This latter figure is also one part of another straight exchange of votes: 40% of Bemba's supporters gave Kabila their second vote. This reflects the closing of the gap between the two political camps, which crucially facilitated the peace negotiations in the run-up to a transitional government.

Which politician would you not like to see in the government?

Etienne Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba	27
Joseph Kabila	5
Jean-Pierre Bemba	8
Antoine Gizenga ³³	3
Nkoy Olenga	1
Léon Kenge Wa Dondo	5
None	27
Other politicians	20
Don't know	4

An analysis of the results shows that Kabila supporters have serious reservations about *Tshisekedi* - almost half do not want him in the government. In addition, about two fifths of the supporters of Bemba, Gizenga and Olenga disapprove of the chairman of the UDPS, as do those who support politicians not mentioned here.

Kabila is disapproved of by only one fifth of Bemba's supports and 15% of Tshisekedi's.

³³ Concerning Antoine Gizenga (three percent), the results show that a disproportionately large number of Kimbanguists and a slightly above-average number of Chiluba-speakers dislike him.

Two thirds of the supporters of Kenge Wa Dondo and about ten percent each of the followers of Tshisekedi and Kabila were not prepared to accept rebel leader *Bemba*.

The vote against Tshisekedi is even more clear-cut among *second-preference* votes. The disapproval rating of the chairman of the UDPS rose by about 20%, by far the worst result. One major cause is Tshisekedi's zigzag politics. Once the embodiment of the opposition's hopes, during the war he formed an alliance with RCD-GOMA (Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie), a Rwanda-supported rebel movement, for which many have not forgiven him. Otherwise the break-down of antipathies between supporters of the individual politicians was more or less unchanged.³⁴

The social profile of those who do not want to see specific politicians in the government is as follows:³⁵

Rejection of *Tshisekedi* (27%) is highest among the youngest age group and lowest among the oldest. In particular, graduates of post-primary training courses disapprove of giving him a role in government, whereas those with little education, above all catechumens, remain faithful to him. By religious group, rejection is greatest among the Adventists, Pentecostals and Kimbanguists. Among the language groups, a disproportionately large number of Lingala-speakers object to him in government. Respondents from Equateur and Bandundu object to him strongly, whereas just eight percent of those from East Kasai do.

University graduates are slightly overrepresented among those opposed to *Kabila* (five percent), whereas he enjoys the unanimous support of people without any formal education. This also holds for Kimbanguists. He is strongly rejected by those who belong to no religion. Resentment against the president is above average among Chiluba-speakers and people from East Kasai. In view of their clear endorsement of Tshisekedi, this finding is not a surprise.

At one fifth, opposition to *Bemba* (eight percent) is greatest among trade-school graduates, most of whom support Tshisekedi or Gizenga. Support among university graduates and catechumens is below average. He attracts the least opposition in Equateur, which is not surprising in view of his origins.

Who is *undecided*, or voted *none* or rejected *other politicians* (and together account for a good half of the votes)? Women are overrepresented among those who wanted *none* of the politicians mentioned, as are people over 34. The 25-34 age group is overrepresented and the oldest generation underrepresented among those who reject *other* politicians than those listed. People living makeshift housing and people with a very low level of education are heavily overrepresented among those who *don't know* whom they do not want in government. By contrast, they are noticeably underrepresented among those who voted against *other* politicians. Similarly, half of those without any formal schooling liked *none* of the listed politicians, as to a lesser extent did

³⁴ One exception is Kabila's rejection by one fifth of Kenge Wa Dondo's supporters.

³⁵ Politicians who received less than five percent of the votes are not considered.

people with the next highest level of education and people from Equateur. University and polytechnic graduates in particular objected to *other* politicians, as did about 30% of Chiluba-speakers.

The next step is to analyse the popularity of political parties.

Elections will soon take place in Congo. Which party are you most likely to vote for?

PPRD	23
UDPS	19
PALU36	10
None	13
Don't know	26
Other parties	8

The PPRD, Kabila's recently founded party, received just less than one quarter of the votes, just ahead of the UDS, Tshisekedi's much older party. A comparison with support for the respective party leaders in the first table of this chapter reveals that the PPRD is not as popular as the president, whereas the UDPS enjoys as much support as Tshisekedi, its chairman. The same holds for the PALU, which has been led by Gizenga for years. Once again, it should be pointed out that only a good half of all respondents voted for one of the parties mentioned, while a good quarter did not know who to vote for.

Let us take a closer look at the results. The discrepancy between support for the leader and support for the party is greatest in the case of the PPRD: only a good 60% of those who approve of Kabila would vote for the ruling party. The party would even lose some votes to the UDPS. The PPRD would attract small blocs of votes, always less than ten percent, from a variety of sources: first, from supporters of Bemba, Olenga Nkoy and Tshisekedi and, second, half the votes of those who like none of the politicians listed. This provides clear evidence of the incumbent's bonus. The PALU is a picture of unity: 85% of the respondents who support Gizenga would also vote for his party. Tshisekedi's followers are almost as loyal: 84% of those who admire him would vote for the UDPS. Moreover, the party would also draw one third of the votes of Kenge Wa Dondo's supporters; another third of the latter's support cannot decide for which party to vote.

What is the social profile of those who would vote for one of the mentioned parties as first or second choice?

³⁶ Antoine Gizenga is general secretary of the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU).

Support for the *PPRD* (23%) is slightly above average among women. The party draws its strongest support from 18-24-year-olds, of whom almost three tenths would vote for the ruling party. Support among the oldest respondents in the oldest age group is much lower (ten percent). By income, the party is underrepresented among the lower middle classes. It draws above-average support from inner-city residents and people in makeshift or emergency housing. Its popularity among skilled and unskilled workers is well above average, but below average among teachers and casual labourers (both ten percent) and only slightly less so among office workers. Its supporters are overrepresented only among graduates of post-primary training courses (a good three tenths) and underrepresented among people with no or little formal schooling (nine percent) as well as university graduates (15%). The results by language group are surprising: the proportion of Swahili-speaking supporters is well above average: a good third would vote for Kabila's party. This attitude can be explained by Kabila's role in reuniting the country. Support is also above average among Kikongo-speakers, which is hardly surprisingly given Kabila's regional roots. By contrast, not quite eight percent of Chiluba-speakers would vote for the *PPRD*.

The profile of those that would vote first for the *UDPS* (19%) is similar in some points to that of Tshisekedi supporters. The proportion of inner-city residents is slightly above average, whereas the support among inhabitants of makeshift accommodation is well below average at a somewhat more than ten percent. It is slightly overrepresented among middle-income respondents. By occupation, it is most popular among casual labourers, of whom three tenths would vote for the party. But among government officials and office workers it has little support. It is markedly underrepresented among people with a low level of education, but like Tshisekedi, enjoys above-average support among trade-school graduates. Three fifths of the Chiluba-speakers and a good half of the respondents from East Kasai support the party. The *UDPS* is underrepresented by all other linguistic groups.

There is also some evidence that the *PALU* (ten percent) is a party of the middle class and little people: it gets the vote of almost one fifth of people living in makeshift or emergency accommodation. By contrast, its support is underrepresented among inner-city residents and the highest earners and slightly overrepresented among the lower income groups. By occupation, the *PALU* draws its strongest support from farmers, of whom one quarter would vote for the party in elections. But support among shopkeepers and the unemployed is patently underrepresented. On the other hand, almost one fifth of skilled and unskilled workers and casual labourers and nearly as many artisans would give their vote to the party. It also has above-average appeal for office workers. The *PALU*'s support correlates inversely with education: the party attracts greatest support among primary-school graduates (almost one fifth), but would get not a single vote from university graduates. Graduates of post-primary training courses and people with no formal schooling are also slightly overrepresented. It finds little support among Chiluba- and Swahili-speakers, and that of Lingala speakers is also below average. On the other hand, it enjoys strong appeal in Bandundu, Gizenga's home region, where almost three tenths would vote for *PALU*.

An analysis of the *undecided* (26%) shows - unsurprisingly - that the majority are women. While 18-24-year-olds know very well whom they support, already three tenths of those older than 34 are uncertain about whom to vote for. A good third of undecided voters live in makeshift accommodation. Shopkeepers (among whom there are many women), teachers, farmers, unemployed and office workers are also over-represented. A good half of all catechumens, a good third of people without any formal schooling and a disproportionate number of primary-school graduates - with and without further training - are also unsure about which party to vote for at the next elections. This also holds for about one third of Lingala- and Swahili-speakers and members of the Kongo ethnic group. By contrast, Chiluba-speakers are distinctly underrepresented.

Among those that would vote for *none* (13%) of the parties, people accommodated in makeshift housing and inner-city residents are noticeably underrepresented. By contrast, a good quarter of government officials would not vote for any of the parties listed. People without any formal schooling (one quarter) and university graduates and people with post-primary-school training (one fifth each) are overrepresented. On the other hand, the proportion of Swahili-speakers is below average.

If you could vote for two parties, what would be your second choice?

Just less than three quarters of the respondents are either undecided (38%), like none of the parties mentioned (23%) or prefer a party not listed (13%). Of the remainder, 11% chose the UDPS, which represents a sharp shift away from the PPRD. The ruling party is the second choice of only seven percent, ranking third behind the PALU in third place with eight percent of the respondents.

The good result for the UDPS is explained by the support it would receive from three tenths of PALU voters on the one hand and one quarter of those who were undecided at the first vote. A good 20% of the PPRD supporters also preferred the UDPS as their second choice. Although the PPRD is second choice for almost one quarter of PALU followers, this is not enough to boost its voting support.

Second preferences affirm the correlation between parties and politicians seen in the first votes: the agreement between politicians and parties generally persists.³⁷

The social profile of the people who would give their second vote to the PPRD differs in some details from that of the first-preference voters. The slight preference among women voters disappears; on the other hand the party receives an above-

³⁷ Kenge Wa Dondo's followers remain an exception: one fifth would vote for the PALU, as would four percent of Bemba's followers. This is balanced by a drop to three percent in the latter's support for the PPRD. But the ruling party makes up for this with nine percent of Gizenga's supporters.

average number of votes from people in makeshift or emergency accommodation. Support among office workers rises to almost one fifth, noticeably higher than among the first votes. By contrast, not one teacher and hardly any university graduates come out in support of the ruling party. But once again it is overrepresented among trade-school graduates.

The *UDPS* draws the second votes of farmers; it is also marginally overrepresented among casual labourers. Unlike the first vote, support among university graduates could not be worse: not one would give the party his second vote. On the other hand, a disproportionate number of trade-school graduates would vote for the *UDPS* again.

The social profile of the *PALU*'s second voters is basically the same as that of its first voters. Discrepancies arise from the increase in support from women, of whom a good two fifths would vote for the party. In contrast to the first votes, the *PALU* would be underrepresented among office workers. But a disproportion number of casual labourers and slightly more farmers would vote for it. By education, the party's weakest support, in contrast to the first votes, is among respondents with no formal schooling: not one would vote for the party. Among university graduates it receives just two per cent.

Among those who would vote for *other* parties, people over 50 and those in makeshift housing are underrepresented. The proportion of office workers is slightly above average. Catechumens in particular as well as primary- and trade-school graduates are underrepresented. This is balanced by about a fifth of all university and polytechnic graduates.

*Think of the people in your neighbourhood or part of town.
Which party would most of them vote for?*

UDPS	17
PALU	14
PPRD	11
Don't know	50
None	5
Other parties	4

Once again, the *UDPS* leads with somewhat less than one fifth, and the ruling *PPRD* is in third place with a good tenth. Half the respondents do not know how their neighbours would vote, probably owing to a lack of experience with a party political system under the dictatorship and the disruption caused by the war. The party system is still in the process of establishing itself and does not yet have fixed structures and strong constituencies of core voters. As the survey was conducted before the forma-

tion of the transitional government, it does not include all the political parties now in existence, such as the MLC and the RCD among others.

Supporters of all parties generally assume that people in their personal circle would vote for the party the respondent favours. Agreement is strongest among PALU supporters: two thirds are of the opinion that their neighbours would vote for the same party. This is also true of almost half of the UDPS voters. Uncertainty is greatest among PPRD adherents: not only do almost 40% have no idea of how people in their neighbourhood vote, but only a good third think that people in their part of town would vote for Kabila's party. The attitudes of supporters of the ruling party must be seen against the background of the recent founding of the PPRD; it is still too early for a recognizable identity and fixed party ties to have developed, especially as its chairman, Joseph Kabila is politically still a relative neophyte - even if he has managed to become a key figure in a very short time. Four fifths of respondents who *do not know* how they are going to vote do not know how others in their area are going to vote, either. Most of those (60%) that would not vote for any of the parties mentioned cannot image what their neighbours' preferences would be.

Opinions in response to a question about neighbours' *second votes* are similar: approx. one quarter of the UDPS and PALU supporters assume that people in their vicinity would also give their second vote to the respondent's choice of party. By contrast, only a good ten percent of PPRD second voters share this conviction. On the other hand, almost one fifth of the UDPS and the PALU voters are convinced that in their neighbourhoods the PPRD will get the second vote. UDPS and PALU voters believe that in their neighbourhood about 30% of the votes would go to the other party.

The social profile of respondents that voted for a specific party has the following characteristics:

Unsurprisingly, a good third of Chiluba-speakers think it possible that their immediate neighbourhood will vote *UDPS*. By contrast, this view is underrepresented among people from Bandundu and the Kongo ethnic group.

Not even five percent of inner-city residents and very few Swahili- and Chiluba-speakers think their neighbourhood will vote for the PALU. On the other hand, people from Bandundu, the home region of party chairman Antoine Gizenga, are overrepresented: a good three fifths optimistically believe that the party will receive neighbours' votes, something very few people from East Kasai and Equateur can imagine. The proportion of Kongo and Luba is also below average.

Almost half of the 18-24-year-olds believe it probable that the immediate neighbourhood will vote PPRD, a proportion slightly above average. The oldest generation expresses least sympathy with this view. On the other hand, a disproportionate number of inner-city residents believe that people will vote for the ruling party, a view doubted above all by people from East Kasai.

People from Equateur in particular believe that most people will vote for *other* parties than those mentioned.³⁸ A disproportionate number of women as well as people in the highest age group claim that they do not know (50%) whom people will vote for. This is also true of people in the upper two income groups, whereas people in impoverished circumstances and members of the middle classes are underrepresented. Three fifths of Lingala-speakers and a good half of Swahili-speakers claim not to know how their neighbourhood votes. On this point, Chiluba-speakers are underrepresented. By region, people from Bas-Congo and Equateur are overrepresented and people from East Kasai and in particular from Bandundu are underrepresented.

Which party would you not like to see in government?

UDPS	21
MPR39	21
RCD-Goma ⁴⁰	6
PALU	3
Don't know	30
None	10
Other parties	9

The UDPS does not fare as badly as its chairman, but it heads the list, this time together with the Mobutists. By contrast, just five percent do not want to see RCS-Goma in the government, although the former rebel movement controlled, and in part still controls, the east of the country with support from Rwanda. This result highlights the regional and perhaps also emotional distance of Kinshasa's inhabitants from the events in the faraway eastern provinces. In an election in the east at the time of the survey RCD-Goma would have lost by a landslide.

The poor result for Tshisekedi's party can be explained by the negative votes of the good two fifths of respondents who support the PALU or the PPRD. Similarly, almost 40% of those who prefer other parties than those mentioned here also voted against the UDPS. Just fewer than 40% of the UDPS's supporters object to any role in government for the MPR. Almost one quarter of the PALU supporters, too, reject the Mobutists. Almost ten percent of the supporters of the president's party are against

³⁸ Socio-economic and cultural variables did not significantly effect responses to the statement that neighbours would vote for *none* of the parties.

³⁹ The Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) may be seen as the party of supporters of Mobutu, the former dictator.

⁴⁰ The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD-Goma) is a Rwanda-supported faction of the RCD, which split in Goma in 1999.

RCD-Goma's participation; at the time of the survey, Kabila was involved in difficult peace negotiations with the unpopular rebel movement.

An analysis of *second votes* reveals similar trends. Once again, with almost three tenths, UDPS supporters demonstrate that they are the leading opponents of the MPR. Similarly, PALU followers are against UDPS participation in government. Unlike previous results, almost 30% of those who would not vote for any party also disapprove of a government role for the UDPS. Almost one quarter of the PPRD supporters would cast their second ballot to vote against the Mobutist party. By the same token, more people who give the UDPS their second vote are against the RCD-Goma participating in government, which is indicative of the internal split in the party over its relationship to RCS-Goma.

A study of the ostensible preferences of voters in respondents' *neighbourhoods* in combination with the question of which party one does not want to see in government provides the following picture: those that believe that the PPRD will win the greatest number of votes take the strongest line against government participation on the part of RCD-Goma (13%), whereas UDPS voters express the strongest objections to the MPR. A quarter of the PALU supporters and a fifth of all first-voters who do not know which party to vote against also disapprove of the latter. Once again, opposition to the UDPS is particularly pronounced in the PPRD (42%), but also in the PALU.

Combining these results with those for politicians the respondents do not want to see in the government, a good half of those who do not want to see Kenge Wa Dondo, a former prime minister under Mobutu, in the government are also opposed to the Mobutists, as are a quarter of those who do not want either Kabila or Bemba to hold government posts. The same also holds for a fifth of those opposed to Gizenga's participation. One tenth of Bemba's opponents are also against the participation of RCD-Goma, the rebel movement that was still competing with Bemba's MLC at the time of the survey. An equal number do not want the UDPS to have any government responsibility, either. Tshisekedi's party is also disapproved of by ten percent of those who do not want Kabila in the government. One fifth of those who do not want to give Olenga any government responsibility also object to a government role for the RCD-Goma and the PALU. Not surprisingly, almost two thirds of Tshisekedi's opponents do not want to include the UDPS in any cabinet. Almost 40% of those who object to government participation by *other* than the politicians mentioned also wish to exclude the MPR, and almost one fifth the RCD-Goma, from the government.

An analysis of the social profile of those who do not want specific parties in the government breaks down as follows. Large parts of the social profile of those who vote against the UDPS (21%) corresponds with that of Tshisekedi's opponents. Once again, the number of 25-34-year-olds is above average, whereas the oldest age group is again underrepresented. Unskilled and skilled workers are the strongest opponents of the UDPS; half of them do not want to see the UDPS in the government, which is also true of three tenths of government officials. Casual labourers are also slightly overrepresented, whereas the proportion of farmers is below average. In particular, graduates

of post-primary training courses are against government participation. By contrast, the proportion of catechumens and other people with a level of education is well below average. On the other hand, people from Bandundu and Equateur are overrepresented.

Opposition to the *MPR* (21%) at three tenths is greatest among casual labourers, farmers and artisans as well as one quarter of office workers. At the other extreme, only one tenth of skilled and unskilled workers and 16% of government officials are opposed. By education, a good three tenths of polytechnic and trade-school graduates do not want to see the party in government. People without any formal schooling (five percent) and post-primary training graduates and university graduates, each with ten percent. Chiluba-speakers in particular are opposed to the party, whereas the proportion of Swahili-speakers is below average. Less surprisingly, the same applies to 14% of the people from Equateur and slightly more from Bandundu.

Opposition to government participation by the *RCD-Goma* rebel movement is expressed above all by one fifth of all teachers and a good tenth of government officials. By education, polytechnic graduates are slightly overrepresented among those opposed to giving the RCD-Goma any government responsibilities, about which primary-school graduates can only shake their heads. By language, Swahili-speakers, who, coming from the eastern provinces, have the most immediate experience of the RCD-Goma, are overrepresented. The former rebel movement attracts least opposition from people from Equateur.

In the break-down of opposition to the PALU (three percent) there were no significant distinctions by socio-economic or cultural markers.⁴¹

Similarly, the vote for *other* parties (nine percent) that should not be given government responsibility also revealed virtually no significant deviations by socio-economic or cultural variables.⁴²

Women, shopkeepers (of whom many are women), older people and unemployed are underrepresented. All other occupational groups with the exception of office workers and artisans are underrepresented. This is particularly true of skilled and unskilled workers and casual labourers. By contrast, almost three fifths of catechumens and almost two fifths of primary-school graduates do not know whom they do not want to see in the government; this is least true of polytechnic graduates. Almost two fifths of respondents from Equateur are also undecided.

⁴¹ The catechumens, among whom opposition to government participation is above average, are an exception.

⁴² This applies with reservations to Chiluba-speakers, who are overrepresented, and trade-school graduates and government officials, who are underrepresented.

Outlook

The experiences of economic decline, dictatorship, war and looting of resources raise the question of how the Congolese population views their future.

Think about life in the Democratic Republic of Congo for people like yourself.

How do you feel about life now and how do you think you will feel in ten years' time?

The replies break down as follows:

	At present	In 10 years' time
<i>Very satisfied with life as it is in the Congo</i>	2	25
<i>Basically satisfied with life as it is</i>	6	15
<i>Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied - so-so</i>	17	27
<i>Dissatisfied with life as it is</i>	12	5
<i>Angry and impatient with the current situation in the Congo</i>	64	28

As can be seen, very few, just two percent, are very satisfied with their situation. However, in ten years' time one quarter of the respondents hope that their life will have taken a substantial turn for the better. Not many more, a good five percent, are basically happy with life as it is. But the number who expect to feel this way in ten years' time almost trebles to 15%. Somewhat less than ten percent of respondents are very satisfied or satisfied, compared to a good three quarters who feel dissatisfied or angry and impatient when they consider their present situation. But even half of this latter group expects their life to improve in the coming ten years.

Between the two extremes lie a little less than one fifth of the respondents, people who feel neither particularly happy nor unhappy with their situation. Here, too, the view of the future is more optimistic: almost one third believe that they will feel this way in ten years' time.

Three quarters of those who are very satisfied today believe that they will feel the same way in ten years' time. Slightly fewer than 30% of those who are angry and impatient today assume that they will be neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and one fifth have hopes of being very happy. Almost 40% of those who are dissatisfied with life as it is now hope to be very satisfied in ten years' time. Only one fifth believe that life will

be so-so, not particularly good, but not particularly bad either. On the other hand, one third of those who are angry and impatient expect to feel the same way in ten years' time.

Socio-economic and cultural factors have only a minor influence on these opinions. Place of residence plays a limited role on the assessment of respondents' assessments of their future prospects. Inner-city residents are slightly more likely than average to believe that they will be neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in ten years' time. And only one fifth think it probable that they will still feel anger and impatience in ten years' time when they think of Congo. The type of income is also significant in one respect: the proportion of people not dependent on income in kind among those that assume that they will be satisfied in ten years' time is slightly above average.

Looking at ethnic and regional affiliations, the proportion of Kongo who regard themselves as very satisfied is slightly below average. Only two fifths of the Luba believe that they will be very satisfied in ten years' time.

Again at just under 20%, respondents in Bandundu constitute the highest proportion of those who feel *dissatisfied* with their present situation. In this case, the ethnic groups in East Kasai recorded the lowest proportion, just less than ten percent. Among respondents who feel *anger and impatience* with the current situation, those in Equateur are slightly overrepresented, whereas only a good half of the respondents in Bandundu agree. As for the situation in ten years' time, people from Bandundu are underrepresented and, with a good third, people from Equateur are overrepresented.