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Theories of Peace

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Introduction

“Theories of peace” are usually triangular: the concept of peace is defined in the first corner, the "causes of peace", i.e. the constitutive and causal factors upon which the making and keeping of peace depend, analysed in the second, and the praxeology of peace, i.e., determination of the options and strategies of action to influence and appropriately configure these factors, developed in the third.

This article focuses for the most part on the first two aspects, the concept and the causes of peace; only in the final section does it touch on some aspects of praxeology. For there can be no question but that praxeology, important though it be, is derived from the first two concerns, the concept and the causes of peace. One first needs to establish one's objective and its contexts, before one can decide on how to influence these contexts so as to achieve one's objective. Hence, from the theoretical perspective, the concept and causes of peace have precedence.

The point of departure for the following considerations is Lothar Brock's (1990) "state-of-the-art review". Earlier works on the theory of peace will be explicitly mentioned only if they are particularly useful or in some other way indispensable for the arguments presented in this article. Otherwise we shall refer only to the literature on this subject that has appeared since Brock's article.

This article is more than a review of the literature. By undertaking this review or recent work, the author also has the ambition to further the debate about the concept and causes of peace. Hence, the author hopes in this paper to develop new proposals that will advance the subject and its argumentation.
What is "Peace"?

Why is the concept of peace so controversial?

An impartial observer may well be surprised by the persistence and passion that accompanies the debate about concepts in peace studies (for an excellent overview, see Meyers 1994). Indeed, he may even ask how it is that, after so many years, those with a scientific interest in peace still do not know - or at least cannot agree - on what they are actually talking about. Of course, such question is naive. Peace is a complex phenomenon, a fact stressed by just about every statement on the subject: after all is said and done, it is simply not a simple matter. The definition determines what can be recognized as causes of peace and, thus, what can be identified and proposed as compelling options for action. Even if the scientific purpose of definition is initially concerned with description and analysis, the concept of peace is necessarily and legitimately always normative in the utmost degree, as it forms the foundation of praxeology. It never was or is the object of peace studies to adopt a neutral stance on its subject. On the contrary: peace studies are explicitly expected to seek ways to promote peace. Thus, it would be facile to see the concept debate as a purely, and in the end superfluous, nominalistic dispute.

Schwerdtfeger's (2001, 9) complaint that science no longer gives enough thought to the basic concept of peace is hardly support by the facts. Since Lothar Brock's state-of-the-art review in 1990, Joeng (2000), Zielinski (1995), Galtung (1998a, b), Henkel (1999) and Schwerdtfeger himself (2001) - by no means an exhaustive list - have published comprehensive analyses of concepts and conceptions. And then there is Senghaas's theory of peace as a product of civilization (Senghaas 1995a, b; 1997b), the debate about this approach (Buchler et al. 1995; Vogt 1995a, b), "Den Frieden denken" (Thinking Peace), the anthology edited by Senghaas (1995a), and the fest-schriften for Czempiel (Krell//Müller 1994) and Senghaas (Menzel 2000), which, for the most past, are devoted to the problem of peace. Moreover, the debate on "democratic peace" now plays a more important role than any other discussion in the scientific debate on international relations (see inter alia Geis 2001; Onea/l/Russett 2001; Hasenclever 2002; Müller 2002). Thus, there is hardly a lack of conceptual or theoretic reflection - if anything, there is a surfeit.

In the past three decades there has been little movement between the fronts in the concept-of-peace debate: whether the concept should be wider or narrower, how far should its functional and geographic reach extend and how should it be positioned in the multilayered problem of peace. The definition of peace as the absence of violence was first broken when Johan Galtung extended the concept violence to include structural violence, the logical corollary of which is "positive" peace (Galtung 1972), which included the absence of both direct and structural violence.

The positioning and articulation of both positions has continued in the 1990s. By introducing the pair of concepts cultural violence/cultural peace (1998a, b), Galtung further expanded the concept. Feminist theory contributed the idea of peace between the
sexes, a logical extension as patriarchal violence largely come under the concept of "structural violence" (Batscheider 1993). By analogy with the construct of "ecological security", "positive peace" has been widened to include "ecological peace" as harmony between society and nature. Wolfgang Vogt has brought all these elements together in a highly complex taxonomy. Finally, as culmination, the concept of "holistic peace", which also includes elements of individual spirituality, has laid claim to overall interdisciplinary responsibility in peace studies (Wagner 1994; similarly, Galtung 1998b; Smoker/Groff 1996; Jeong 2000; Boulding 2000).

Other voices have warned against this process, fearing that the removal of all limits to the concept of peace will devalue its relevance in scientific description and analysis. Lothar Brock (1990, 1995a, b) und Christopher Daase (1991, 1993 in connection with the closely related "extended concept of security") have spoken out particularly forcefully on this point. They argue first of all from the consideration of practical research. Unless concepts can describe distinctions, they are useless in scientific debate. An all-embracing concept cannot: as it cannot distinguish anything, it describes everything.

Opponents of this view argue that excluding structural, social and cultural dimensions from the concept of peace is in itself an ideological act. For (as Galtung has argued since 1972), it distracts attention from the corresponding reprehensible social relationships, which are thus ignored, whereas the normative qualification of concept of peace legitimizes the unjust status quo. However, this conclusion is not compelling; indeed, in most instances it is a typical non sequitur. It would be accurate only if the concept of peace as the absence of direct violence were completely isolated from the social, political, economic and cultural context in which it is used. However, this is not the case if peace - as a state of freedom from direct violence - is used in the context of its causes.

Peace and justice:
A case for separate concepts

Let us consider Brock's argument (1990) using the example of justice, which is most frequently included as a component of the peace concept (my argumentation follows Ladwig 1996 in part). Any definition that treats justice as the second defining component of the peace concept, i.e., in addition to the absence of direct violence, raises two insurmountable problems. First, non-violence and justice may contradict each other; violence may be used to establish justice, as has often enough been the case. A concept whose defining components are or can be mutually incoherent is unsuitable for description. Combining within a single concept what are tough dilemmas in social practice - the choice between highly valued, but in the particular context contradictory and incompatible, components - transforms the concept into little more than conceptual incoherence. Second, there are very different concepts of justice, all of them legitimate: procedural justice, distributive justice, justice as equality of opportunity, and the medi eval concept of justice as the appropriate position in a divinely ordained order, etc. (Münkler 1997). The first objection is that deep conflicts between concepts of justice
employed by political collectives to identify themselves can themselves become causes of violence. Over and above this, however, the pluralism resident in the different concepts of justice renders the extended concept of peace unusable. Any attempt to use it engenders a debate that goes well beyond the study of peace, and requires a communicative understanding in the moral discourse or a political compromise if it is not to degenerate into a controversy that ripples out into a never-ending debate.

Galtung (1972) took this problem to extremes with his concept of structural violence, for which he has been repeatedly criticized. By defining structural violence as the difference between potential and actual realization, structural violence is necessarily always present and peace impossible. For, given the scarcity of resources and time, any conceivable distribution will always result in such a difference. No individual person will actually be able to achieve his or her hypothetical potential. As, however, the use of resources and time will always be determined by general institutional conditions, they will always be held responsible for structural violence. Accordingly, structural violence becomes the standard description of social reality, and peace its antithesis. This may be a useful critical tool, but does not enhance the clarity and definition of the concepts used, which is indispensable for scientific purposes.

Besides, the concepts of "structural" and "cultural" violence contain a considerable element of moral hazard. For permanent bodily injury, mutilation and killing of human beings are equated with states that are in principle reversible and revocable. A dead person cannot come back to life and a mutilated person cannot grow new limbs. By contrast, a person in a structural relationship of domination and exploitation or whose identity is repressed always has at least the hypothetical possibility of liberation. To equate reversible and irreversible, as Galtung does in his concepts of violence, ignores this world of difference: dead is dead, torture is torture. The observer has considerable leeway in interpreting the degree of structural deprivation or cultural gleichschaltung. The fact that the treatment of different things as equals lends itself eminently to the justification of counterviolence, as Dencik (1972) demonstrated in his notorious article 30 years ago, makes it all the more unbearable.

This gleichschaltung is morally questionable for another reason. Every individual is free to decide that "life is not the most precious good", but no one else is entitled to make this decision for any other person. However, linking reversible and irreversible damage in one and the same concept transfers precisely this decision from the authority of the person concerned to the subjective discretion of the peace researcher. Yet, it is precisely the much quoted ethics of practitioners of this scientific discipline that should render this creeping presumption of authority taboo.

Moreover, in everyday language we spontaneously use peace and justice as separate concepts. We have no problem with the conjunction of "peace and justice" or the instrumental relationship of "peace through justice", or regarding them as meaningful linguistic constructions. But this is possible only if the two concepts are in fact used to designate different facts and circumstances.

Recognition of this fact is not tantamount to ignoring the standard of justice in peace theory by any means. It is taken into account by separating the concept of peace from
its causes. By implication, it is plausible that a state of affairs that social or political
groups feel is extremely unjust faces the constant threat of violence, because it is fairly
probable that these groups will consider the possibility of using violence to change this
state and exploit any opportunities to take the appropriate action. To this extent, there is
a probabilistic causal connection between justice and peace, which is of greatest in-
terest for peace theory (see below), but which does not need to encumber the definition
of the peace concept.

Just as inaccurate is the claim that the separation of concepts is an expression of, or
at least encourages, uncritical attitudes. There is no reason why the statement that a
society is peaceful but unjust should be regarded as uncritical. It contains a critical
judgment (unjust) and a positive judgment (peaceful) and insofar is a far more differen-
tiated, and thus a more precise description, than that this society is not peaceful, which
leaves any listener uncertain about what constitutes the lack of peace.

Moreover, by combining peace with its conditions and causes, the theory becomes
virtually unmanageable. When the constitutive condition and what is constituted – cause
and effect – are treated identically, the theory becomes nothing more than typology or
taxonomy. One needs only to view the unmanageable taxonomic wastelands of Vogt
(1994/95b, 1995) or Galtung (1998b) to grasp the disadvantages of a conceptual pro-
cedure of this nature. Contrary to what Schwerdtfeger supposed, a theory’s complexity
increases when its concepts are freed of ballast (Schwerdtfeger 200134/35). Thus, we
have taken the decision to distinguish clearly between the two.

Peace as a concept of social relations

The next sensible restriction is to treat peace as a concept of relations. While it is true
that psychological, inner peace has a venerable tradition, especially in philosophy and
theology, from the point of view of science, which is primarily interested in the rela-
tionships in society and between societies and states, the effect of extending the con-
cept of peace to include personality and its disparate parts would be metaphorical and
imprecise.

Hence, I wish to propose here that we use the concept of peace exclusively for
mutual relations between collectives capable of intentional actions. Intentionality as
defined by John Searle (Searle 1997) is the ability to relate to something consciously.
The relationship is mutual insofar as all partners in this relationship of “peace” are ca-
pable of intentionality.

This eliminates the relationship between man and nature from our use of this con-
cept. Nature cannot behave intentionally towards human collectives. Expressions like
“nature’s revenge”, etc. are metaphors, not useful scientific concepts. Indeed, upon
closer analysis, every attempt to included the ecological dimension in the concept of
peace (Vogt 1994/95b; Bächer 1994/95; Galtung 1998b; Boulding 2000) leads to a
grotesque aporia at some point. Where does one draw the line? Is peace conceivable
only in a vegetarian sense - lacto-ovo or vegan? How is one to treat the taming of wild
animals, such as cats and dogs, or the selective breeding of new species by manipu-
lating mating. Is not landscaping, a violent intervention in nature, already unpeaceful? What about clearing land for farming? Is pest-control (whether using ecological means or toxic chemicals) compatible with peace? Or the extermination of disease-carrying agents, such as the tsetse fly? Or any attempt to control pathogenic micro-organisms?

The ecological concept of peace culminates in the desire to exclude "anthropocentrism" as a way of thinking that endangers peace (Galtung 1998a, Boulding 2000, 1). The protagonists of this desire fail to notice how anthropocentric their own standpoint is. For, it would never occur to any other species to adopt a neutral position, as it were, in the ecological balance. Instead, their innate instincts are programmed to ensure the species' survival and growth. Nothing could be more anthropomorphic that to want to remove one's own species from the centre of behaviour, to neutralize it, so to speak. Critical peace researchers might have learnt from constructivists that a theory-free view of reality (including nature) is not possible.

It is part of behaviour appropriate to the human species that it intervenes to cultivate its environment. Wisdom advises man to do so in an ecologically compatible manner so as not to endanger his survival. However, in the final instance, the binding rational justification for environmentally compatible behaviour is man's interests in the survival of his own species, not some esoteric ecological peace postulate.

This does not mean that the relationship between man and nature be ignored in peace theory or that critical judgment must be abandoned. Where there is an imbalance in the relationship between man and nature, there is a growing probability that the relationships between the social and political relationship will also suffer. Environmentally motivated migration can increase ethnic tensions and render distribution conflicts insoluble. The growing scarcity of natural resources - water, arable land - may also trigger conflicts over resources (Müller 1993). To this extent, our remarks above about justice and peace also apply to man's relationship with the environment and peace.

Rejection of an "ecological concept of peace" does not in any way prevent people from talking about environmental destruction, environmental impairment, the dying out of species, etc., and thus from articulating reasonable criticism. This is, however, first and foremost a task of the environmental sciences, which, like peace studies, is an interdisciplinary field (Daase 1992; Müller 1980, Müller 1992, Levy 1995).

In the end, we are talking about relations between collectives, not individuals. Hence, one should avoid the temptation to classify every outbreak of individual violence as a disturbance of the peace. People who run amok, wife-beaters, murderers, etc., express in their own ways individual or social pathologies, but these are not covered by the definition of the peace concept proposed here. Acts of criminal violence are also just that: criminal acts, nothing less, but nothing more.

As a relationship, peace can bilateral or multilateral. It can designate a particular relationship between two parties within a larger system of interactions as well as the state of this system of interactions itself (Elgestrom/Jerneck 2000, 279). Sweden and Norway are at peace, peace also describes the state of the Scandinavian system of states and the Western European and transatlantic relations, in which the Scandinavian system is embedded. Yet, within this system, there is war between the Spanish state.
and the ETA and between the adversaries in the conflict in Northern Ireland. In other words: unless the social and political collectives whose relation the peace concept describes are precisely named, use of the concept is vague.

There is no plausible reason why peace should be restricted to world peace (Schwerdtfeger 2001, 204). Here, too, everyday language may serve as a useful pointer: if peace meant only world peace, why do we distinguish between the terms? Of course, there are global interdependencies, and these are on the rise. However, this does not mean that the absence of peaceful relations in e.g. Sierra Leone should call into question or adversely affect peace in Scandinavia. Similarly, it is perfectly reasonable to observe that the member states of the European Union are at peace (and to study the causes) while at the same time allowing that certain, specific regions, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque region and Corsica, constitute exceptions to this peace, and indeed that in a number of countries there is conflict between immigrants and organized groups of right-wing radicals.

This usage has the advantage of allowing one to consider internal and external peace simultaneously, as in Galtung's theory of peace, but without the latter's fuzziness and moral hazards. Applying the concept of peace exclusively to international relations not only ignores the origins of the modern peace debate as a response to civil and religious wars, but also overlooks the fact that the overwhelming majority of wars since 1945 have not been international, but taken place within individual states. Thus, it is advisable that a concept that covers both fields without ambiguity be adopted as a matter of urgency.

A peace concept that demands that the respective actors be named also has the advantage of greater precision and enhanced possibilities of differentiation. Hence, at this point peace is defined as the absence of direct violence between specific social and political collectives.

Peace and the dimension of time

There are legitimate objections to peace purely as a status description. They boil down to the demand that the peace process take into account the dimension of time (as in e.g. the concept of structural violence and positive peace, and is one of the strengths of this approach). A status description that treats the second before the German attack on Radio Gleiwitz on 9 September 1939 as "peace", and the next second as "war" is obviously unsatisfactory.

Czempiel has drawn the widely accepted consequence and defined peace as a model process of declining violence and increasing justice (Czempiel 1972). This explicitly includes the dimension of time in the definition and solves the problem of the "last second of peace". This definition also has the advantage of making it easier to deal with problems of peace, because the existing reality is not criticized from the point of view of any arbitrary construction of utopia, but judged against the yardstick of a certifiable movement towards such an ideal. I have discussed the problem of justice above. The question now is whether defining peace as a process will bring us any further.
Unfortunately, the objection mentioned above against "peace as a state" can be turned around and used against "peace as a process": peace as a process can be measured as the difference between the dimensions of violence and injustice between two arbitrarily selected points in time $t_1$ and $t_2$. If the values for both dimensions are negative, there is peace. If the difference is positive, the relation is not peaceful.

This can lead to descriptions just as grotesque as the "peaceful second" before the outbreak of war in 1939. After the period of mass murder, Cambodia under Pol Pot exhibited decreasing violence and — a consequence of the policy of social levelling — increasing justice (at least according to a concept of justice defined in terms of equality). Contemporary Sweden, on the other hand, would appear to be moving in the opposite direction on account of the marginal increase in xenophobia and the dismantling of some aspect of the social state. Because of this trend, Swedish society would be classified as non-peaceful or lacking in peace. Under a concept of peace defined exclusively as a process, Cambodia in the post-"killing-fields" period would be more peaceful than a Sweden trying to adjust to the forces of globalization. This result is contra-intuitive, and surely also unintentional; but it is the logical consequence of a concept of peace that ignores status-oriented scaling and instead restricts comparison to process trends.

At this point, the results of our analysis are unsatisfactory: if applied consistently, both status-oriented and trend-based concepts of peace can in certain — real-life — circumstances produce grotesque results. It appears that to square the circle another choice of concept is needed, one that combines both state and process.

**Peace as a prerequisite for successful interaction in the real world**

One starting point is to reverse Hobbes' perspective. Since Thomas Hobbes, discussion about the peace has tended to view peace as the result of a special effort, of an exceptional situation or of new institutions that control and isolate the ubiquitous causes of social and international violence, causes which may even be part of human nature. This view treats war as the normal state, which -if we are fortunate - wise actions and structures can overcome.

Michael Henkel (1999) has taken St. Augustine's concept of peace and, borrowing from Buchheim (Buchheim 1982; 1991; 1993), developed another momentous and fertile perspective. Henkel does not view peace as a laboriously constructed state of emergency defended against the omnipresent causes of war, but as the normal state of successful interaction between individuals, social collectives and political units. Peace is so firmly anchored in each of these worlds that it is never consciously experienced as exceptional or problematic. This only occurs when a disturbance that gives rise to violent actions that call for countermeasures.

Unfortunately, Henkel's work is also weighed down with the ballast of political ontology: a fairly esoteric language and, more damagingly, the habitual hypostatizing of political units (in the final analysis the state) as the incarnation both of politics and the achievement of peace. This blinds him to the social aspect of international relations in
particular. The fact that classical writers and the author of the English School (in particular Bull 1997, Watson 1992) and more recent constructivist approaches (Wendt 1999; Reus-Smit 1997) have studied and demonstrated that mutual recognition is the unavoidable "exterior" of national sovereignty and the prerequisite for states' contribution to external peace makes his omission even less excusable. This is all the more regrettable and surprising because Henkel, like Wendt, refers crucially to writings of George H. Mead.

Nevertheless, the perspective of peace as successful and undisturbed interaction in the real world is a new approach to the difficult problem of combining in a single concept peace as a process and peace as a state. Grounding peace in the real world, i.e., in the unquestioned body of everyday knowledge, or "knowledge of the existing order" to use Henkel's term, emphasizes the durability necessary for peace: peace always assumes a certain measure of stability; "a second of peace" makes no sense. Accordingly, qualifications of peace such as "stable", "sustainable" and "lasting" are utterly superfluous; they are simply tautological (e.g. Kacowicz et al. 2000).

Durability must be present both in practice and in the minds of the actors involved (Kacowicz/Bar-Siman-Tov 2000, 17/18). Their practice as observed at the moment peace is "measured" may not indicate any signs of violence. Nor may their discourse at the moment peace is "measured" indicate any expectation (or intention or speculation) that violence could be employed between them in the future. In this usage, peace is, to the greatest extent possible, returned to the sovereignty of the actors by the peace researcher as referee, who is free to rule on the presence of violence and, hence, the absence of peace on the basis of his discretion, taste, preferred concept of justice, or indignation about unpopular cultural aspects (Fogarty 2000, 40/41). If they not do exercise physical violence and such violence is not within their horizon of expectations – as determined by examining their discourse – then the peace researcher must determine that there is peace.

Of course, this concept, too, may prove deceptive. Discourse may deliberately, slyly conceal true intentions and expectations. This cannot be excluded, although, happily, the involvement of third parties in the practice and the discourse limits the scope for subjectivity. Reference to investigations into possible future disruptions of the peace (injustice, patriarchalism, special interests, environmental destruction; see below) can provide valuable indications of cracks in the application of this peace concept. As such, this concept of peace appears in any case to be more manageable and less susceptible to ideology than the main competing concepts.

Hence, on the basis of the above considerations, the most sensible concept of peace appears to be the one that both is suitable for describing a given state and, by building on the actors' expectations, offers a manageable future within its horizon:

"Peace is a state between specific social and political collectives characterized by the absence of direct violence and in which the possible use of violence by one against another in the discourse between the collectives has no place."

This definition makes use of the reflection observed in more recent constructivism on the importance and empirical record of discourse as a manifestation of ideational
structures in politics. In particular, it builds on Ole Waever’s theory of securitization. Waever states that problems of security only demand action when actors say they do. Whether the securitizing speech act reflects reality or not is irrelevant. The important point is that through the speech act - which is performed by the speaker and accepted by an audience - the actors introduce a particular practice ("extraordinary measures" according to Waever) that deviates from the normality of a non-securitized situation (Waever 1989, Waever 1995; Buzan/Waever/de Wilde 1997).

Applied to our problem, peace is logically an interactive relationship, in which the parties have banned strife - the potential or actual use of violence - from their everyday practice, including particularly the practice of discourse. The transition between peace and the absence of peace occurs when representatives of a political or social group (for instance, national governments, opposition parties, non-governmental organizations, ethnic or religious groups, etc.) articulate the possibility of using violence. There is a high probability that this articulation will precede the actual use of violence. Thus, we have established here, with a fair degree of reliability, the desired time horizon in the concept of peace.

One can raise the objection that this peace concept would also describe a society - or international system - pacified under Gramsci’s hegemony concept. That is true, and it is precisely here that we see the advantage of distinguishing between the concepts of peace and justice. Gramsci’s view of hegemony assumes a stratified, hierarchical society. The lower strata and their leaders are placated by adequate concessions and, through an ideology of identification compatible with this distributive pattern, integrated into the system so that the thought of violent change does not occur to them. The class-conscious counterelite also abandons violence and endeavours to establish a counterhegemonial discourse. This society is not just, but the level of just distribution conceded is enough to ensure that violence is not necessary for domination and not considered as a means of achieving change (Gill 1993, Cox 1993): it may not have established perfect justice, but it has established peace.

Causes of Peace

Borrowing from Zielinski (1995), we term the conditions for creating and keeping peace "causes of peace". Although they have received far less attention in research and discussion that their counterparts, the causes of war, a number of models do attempt to provide information on the conditions for peace. These include a recent study by Czempiel (1997), which enumerates the factors identified in earlier and contemporary peace studies as causes of peace. In the 1990s, the major theories of international relations - realism (equilibrium of power, hegemony), institutionalism (regime) and constructivism (remove the security dilemma) - mentioned some causes of peace. More comprehensive approaches focused in particular on the liberal theory of "democratic peace" and the identification of a "peace culture", to which constructivism, feminism and
classic critical peace theory all contributed. The most complete attempt at a theory is based on the concepts of civilizing/civilization, accompanied by a lively and critical discussion.

After looking more closely at the concept of the "causes of peace", we shall briefly touch on recent developments in the major theories of international relations. Then we shall examine "democratic peace" and "peace as a product of civilization or culture" in greater detail.

Methodological and conceptual considerations in identifying "causes of peace"

If peace is understood as the normal state of successful interaction between social collectives, any approach towards the complex question of the "causes of peace" is necessarily differentiated. They can no longer be defined as the absence or neutralization of the causes of war. Rather, the focus shifts to distinguishing between different types of causes of peace, which may very well overlap in reality.

The first type of causes of peace answers the question of the constitutive conditions necessary to enable non-violent interaction between social collectives to succeed in such a way that no party thinks of using violence to achieve its interests; peaceful co-existence is the unquestioned constant of the world they share. They may be called "everyday causes of peace".

The second type of causes of peace refers to the conditions that directly counteract the appearance of causes of violence. This may be the late state after peace has been disturbed and the actors wish to prevent a repetition. Putting these causes of peace into social and political practice presumes awareness of the possibility that peace can be lost. A prerequisite for this type is the identification of those factors that are dangerous to peace and should be confronted. They may be called "preventive causes of peace".

Finally, the third type follows successful disturbances. It is used between actors whose interaction is characterized by strife, or perhaps even severe violence. The instruments aim to overcome the use or consideration of the use of violence and initiating a peace process. Here we may speak of "transformative causes of peace".

Causes of peace may belong to more than one type. Hence, it also makes sense to adopt a functional perspective of peace and speak of everyday, preventive and transformative functions of one and the same cause of peace.

This raises the question of the nature of the crucial disturbances of peaceful interaction that preventive and transformative causes of peace should affect (cf. Porter 1995). The general answer is that distribution conflicts in the wide sense underlie all violent aggravation of conflicts between social and political groups, including states (Gurr 1993, 2000). Distribution may refer to

- material goods and the opportunities of acquiring them,
- territory as a particularly politicizable form of material good,
- opportunities to participate in procedures to distribute goods and values, and
opportunities to realize identity values (cultural autonomy, religion, ethnicity). Violence threatens when the distribution of these goods and values reaches a degree of asymmetry that at least one party finds unbearable and cannot see any practicable way of remedying. It can also threaten in the case of incompatible claims on the same scarce goods and the claimants cannot agree on a method of distribution that will enable them to adjust their claims to the level of scarcity and which all of them regard as equally fair. This is the reason for the reference to “justice” in connection with peace; of course, competition between incompatible views of justice may also be a cause of violence.

Behind this distribution problem are three deep social and political structures that can exacerbate these problems or hinder their remediation. The first is a use of nature that reduces the available natural resources (and territory), thereby directly or indirectly (through migrant flows triggered by environmental destruction) creates or aggravates distribution problems. The second is an economic behaviour that continually exacerbates social disparities and aggravates conflicts over what is regarded as just and fair. The third is patriarchal structures, that by themselves do not necessarily disturb the peace (except in societies in which severe, direct violence by men against women is institutionalized [cf. Batscheider 1993; Schmölzer 1996, Chap. 9]), but reproduce cultural factors that favour violence and/or hinder the development of causes of peace.

Another significant, albeit secondary, factor is the social and political mistrust that actors acquire through experience of partners’ (and potential enemies’) character, intentions and plans. This "security dilemma" (Buzan 1991; Jervis 1978; Wendt 1999) leads actors to constantly think in categories of possible violent action – both between and within states (Posen 1993; Roe 1999) - that one may suffer and against which one must therefore arm oneself. The consequence is embedded structures of non-peace or, more broadly, "organized lack of peace" (Senghaas 1969).

Hence, preventive and transformative causes of peace need to influence the distribution problem in its various dimensions in ways that make the problem less urgent for the actors themselves or become visible and feasible remedies. Second, they must contribute to correcting the deep structures that aggravate distribution conflicts. Third, they must help to reduce the security dilemma that obstructs new structures and processes that promote peace.

The contribution of the major theories of international relations in the 1990s

Neorealism

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As is well known, realists tend to take a sceptical view on the problem of peace. Yet, realism has identified structures of international relations that are better suited to preventing violent clashes. These are

- the equilibrium of power (though there is disagreement about whether bilateral or multilateral structures are more likely to achieve this), and
- hegemonic systems, in which the strongest power can act as peacemaker to keep possible troublemakers in check or, in the worse case, make them see sense.

It is clear that neither of these structures fits the peace concept as we have defined it. In the equilibrium of power, peace is compelled by the mutual threat of violence, and in hegemonic systems by the ever-present threat that the hegemon will use violence against weaker members. Not only is violence not banned from the actors' behavioural disposition, it is ubiquitous.

In the 1990s, neorealist theoreticians made some interesting attempts to apply the theory to the growing body of bilateral cooperation, a field that raises considerable problems for the theory of realism. One is the development of Jervis's (1978) offensive-defensive theory (summarized in Lynn-Jones 2000), according to which peace is certain and cooperation probable if defensive military technology is stronger than offensive, because this significantly reduces the security dilemma, as even in cases of surprise attacks, the attacked party still has some hope of successfully defending itself. The attraction of offensive wars tends towards nil, as does the fear thereof. Taken to its logical conclusion, this could lead to the paradox situation in which the possibility of war vanishes from actors' horizons because they are optimally prepared for it.

But before we reach that stage, we need to expose the Achilles heel of the offensive-defensive theory: the notorious uncertainty about the real balance of power between offensive and defensive. The prevailing opinion in World War I was that the offensive held the upper hand; the slaughter in trench warfare and barbed-wire entanglements demonstrated the contrary. In World War II, at least the western Allies at least were convinced that defensive was stronger; the German blitzkrieg taught them otherwise. Detailed studies of these two examples prove that the respective interpretation of the offensive-defensive relationship was shaped by the actors' perceptions, and these, in turn, by cultural factors (for World War I: Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1990; for World War II: Posen 1985, Kier 1999). At this point, realism has left its traditional, firmly materialist ground and, without admitting it, turned to constructivism.

The second more recent "realistic peace theory" does not regard the security dilemma as systemic, but as a consequence of the set of actors. The presence of "predatory states", i.e., offensively expansionist governments, in the set creates a huge security problem for all defensively minded actors. If, on the other hand, the set of actors does not include a predatory state, nothing stands in the way of peaceful and cooperative relations (Schweller 1994, 1996). This approach abandons realism's systemic orientation - its distinguishing characteristic - in favour of differentiation by category of actor. Whether a state is a predator or a defender of the status quo depends, however,
on each state's internal orientation and the extent to which it is rooted in state and society, and thus, in the final instance, on culture. Once again, realistic peace theory points strongly in the direction of constructivism.

The third approach, finally, postulates, by comparison with "pure" neorealism, actors with very different interests. As the high risk of war is against the interests of each, and each knows that this holds for all of them, this reduces the security dilemma and numerous incentives for cooperation emerge. The problem is that compared to Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001), the assumptions about the "risk of survival" in the international system have been considerably toned down. The assumption that all actors are fundamentally defensive excludes the existence of predator states and of opportunists that exploit the cooperative attitudes of their partners to increase their power so as to improve their own position and, hence, their chances of survival. To exclude the absence of both types of actor presupposes a degree of mutual trust that cannot be based purely on calculation but on experience gained in previous interaction. Once again, this brings us to a cultural element (interaction in this case), which refers us again to constructivism.

All in all, the concept of peace as defined here remains alien to realism. All the attempts made in the 1990s to overcome its theoretical sterility - those that are of interest to peace theory - break with the structures of realism's characteristic axioms and turn to what are, in the final instance constructivist elements.

Institutionalism: The contribution of regimes to peace

In the 1990s, institutionalism turned regime theory into a useful approach for the analysis of problems of peace. Credit for this is due in particular to Volker Rittberger and the Tubingen School, which has consistently viewed regime analysis from the standpoint of conflict processing, thereby forging a link to peace studies (Rittberger 1993b). Their analyses show that regimes may well serve as suitable building blocks of a peaceful order in general as transformative and preventive factors (Zürn 1997, Müller 1995) - not every regime, of course, and not in all circumstances.

Regimes with grossly unequal distributions are less suited to peace, which, in the light of our discussion above, should not surprise. International regulations that exacerbate rather than moderate distribution conflicts increase rather than reduce the potential to disturb peace. Experience has also shown that grossly unfair regimes are less robust in the fact of external challenges (Zürn 1987, Hasenclever et al. 1997; Hasenclever et al. 2000). Regimes with asymmetrical distributive achievements that introduce equalization mechanisms that fail live up to their promise also tend to exacerbate rather than process conflict. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is in danger of being tied up in this way because of the policies of the nuclear powers, in particular the USA (Müller 2000).

Regimes that promote the distribution of the goods at issue in a fair and hence peace-enhancing way internally, i.e., among their members, but generate externalities towards non-members that worsen the latter's situation, constitute a special case. Whereas regimes of this kind act as preventive and transformative factors for their
members, or become everyday causes by making such cooperation part of everyday life, they aggravate relations between members and outsiders. The G-8 could develop in this direction.

Finally, as a qualifying remark, the preventive and transformative effects of regimes can obviously only take effect in certain circumstances. An example of how the orientations of specific actors can limit the instrumental effect of regimes is the inability to institutionalize economic and military confidence building measures between the Arab states and Israel since the Madrid Conference of 1991. In the Middle East as well as in South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia economic considerations and cold security interests speak strongly in favour of regime-based cooperation. The fact that this has not materialized or (in Southeast Asia) only at a glacial pace probably indicates once again impediments imposed by the actors' orientations, which are not necessarily open to an "objectivist" assessment of the particular situation and interests. Once again we have unexpectedly entered the realm of constructivism.

Constructivism
Constructivism's crucial contribution to peace theory has been to shatter the mystique of the security dilemma: it is not a naturally necessary structural element of interaction systems of independent (sovereign) actors, but a construct based on the actors' value systems, orientations and interaction patterns. Alexander Wendt (1999) has described three ideal types of interaction cultures. In the Hobbesian culture, the security dilemma is virulent; peace as defined by us is impossible. In the Locke type, it is in states' mutual interest to cooperate; non-violent relations are the rule, but not, in the final instance, guaranteed, because in rare cases opportunistic calculations of advantage could induce one actor to resort to violence - although with far lower chances of success than in the Hobbesian world on account of the "social character of mutuality" in "international society". Finally, the Kantian culture of interaction foresees a solidarity-backed international community based on common values whose communal character excludes the thought of reciprocal use of violence. It is thus the adequate interaction culture for a peaceful order.

Interaction structures have been studied in the shape of "security communities" (Adler/ Barnett 1998a; Vöyrynen 2000). This concept, originally developed by Karl Deutsch and co-workers (Deutsch et al. 1957), is of particular interest to constructivists insofar as it is based on interaction and communication flows and value agreement, all fundamental building blocks of constructivist theory.

As in alliances, members of security communities treat their partners' interest in survival as their own. Contrary to alliances, ties are far closer and stable over time, lending mutual recognition a credibility that is able to survive disappointment. Where the security of each individual member becomes the raison d'être of all the others, and this reciprocity is firmly rooted in the everyday political cultures or each, there is no longer any room for thought about fighting one another.

The security community emerges over time. Initially, its institutions are appropriate for transformative and later preventive causes of peace, which effect the "peace
learning process" among the community members. The "security community" may also be termed a peace community: its interaction demonstrates cooperation and solidarity and is rooted in constant practice to such a degree that its members cease to consider the idea of reciprocal violence. Its institutions become "everyday causes of peace" (Adler/Barnett 1998b).

As an example of this evolution, let us look at the Western European Union. It was initially founded as an organization against Germany, the "enemy state". After the latter became a member, the Union acquired another character: it became a "communal security project" of the western European countries and later retained this role as a separate institution alongside the more important EC (subsequently EU), until it was finally incorporated in the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The integration of Germany (and to a lesser degree Italy) signalled trust on the part of the other members, a risky investment in the peace project, as it were. The guarantee for this step was an "arms control agency" - an institution more or less ignored in public and academe - with the nominal duty of monitoring the declared strengths of the armed forces of the member states and observance of certain restrictions (Germany's renunciation of ABC weapons, wide-range rockets and aircraft carriers) (Jacob 1989; Western European Union 1988).

This classical confidence-building measure is a routine part of conflict processing between potential wartime enemies. In the WEU it fulfilled transformative functions: to create confidence among the parties that this time German would keep its promises of arms restraint. Later, with the consolidation of as the cooperation in the WEU, and more so in the EC, it served as a preventive instrument for the extremely unlikely case that the by now highly esteemed partner could yet relapse into bad habits. The agency was finally disbanded in 1987. It had fulfilled its task. In the meantime all partners found that hostilities between them inconceivable; hence, a military confidence-building measure no longer had any place in the everyday culture of the Union.

It is still disputed to what extent democracy and homogeneity form an indispensable basis for the constitutional system and system of values of a security community that evolves into a peace community. Adler and Barnett have searched diligently for such communities outside of the transatlantic institutions. They have found two examples - or at least incipient signs thereof - in ASEAN and the Gulf Council. The cultures, value systems and political and social orders of the states and societies in ASEAN are noticeably more diverse than those of the communities in the transatlantic region. In these circumstances, it is remarkable that the non-Atlantic structure that developed is obviously the one that comes relatively closest to the ideal type of the security community. The same holds for the Gulf Council, an organization of the monarchies in and around the Persian Gulf. Despite the members' cultural and - for the moment - relative political and social homogeneity, there are considerable differences between Saudi Wahabism and the far more liberal versions of monarchy and Islam practised in Bahrain and Oman or even Kuwait. That said, none of them are democracies. Despite this, they have taken a step towards fulfilling the ideal of the security community.

However, neither the Gulf Council nor ASEAN have realized the ideal type to such a wide-ranging extent as the European Union or NATO. Is this only a question of a late
start, i.e., of catching up? Or will diversity and the absence of democracy prove to be an impediment to further peace-promoting integration? The current state of research does not enable us to answer this conclusively.

**Democracy and peace**

On the other hand, debates about international relations most concerned with problems of peace support the thesis that security communities between non-democratic states can never get approach the ideal type as closely democracies can. Czempiel’s (1972, 1981) revival of the Kantian argument was initially went unnoticed in the English-speaking world owing to an ignorance of foreign languages and lack of interest in non-American writings. But two programmatic articles by Michael Doyle in the mid-1980s kindled the discussion.

There are two versions of the theory. The first (monadic) strand holds that democracies are fundamentally more peaceful than other forms of state organization. The second (dyadic) strand holds that this peaceful nature is compelling only in relation to other democracies. However, both strands use the same assumptions about the specific democratic causes of peace. Both take the basic view that democratic institutions – elections, freedom of organization, freedom of opinion, freedom of the press and the corresponding transparency, and public debate - transform the will of the people into political decisions.

First, the will of the people is utilitarian. Given the level of material well-being in industrialised states, the costs and sacrifices of modern warfare are out of all proportion to the possible gains. Self-interest speaks against an aggressive foreign policy. Second, people’s value systems rate human dignity, human rights, life and freedom from bodily harm very highly. War violates all these values. Third, people communicate peaceful forms of conflict resolution practised in democracies to the outside world; they would like international relations to be guided by the same instruments.

The dyadic version of the theory - which, it should not be forgotten - is based on the same assumptions about the motives that induce people to vote in favour of peace. However, it adds an interactionist element: as actors on the international stage, democracies recognize each other as equals. Democracies assume that democratic partners have the same peaceful natures as themselves. The security dilemma does not arise, and a virtuous circle emerges of reinforced positive expectations about the behaviour of partner democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995).

Following Kant and Doyle, Oneal and Russett (2000) have linked the peace effect of democracies with two other phenomena that, if not direct causes of peace, are at least supportive: international organization and interdependence.

Democracies are more open to the outside world and hence less hesitant and more willing to enter into commitments in international organizations. With their opportunities of peaceful conflict resolution, their information flows and their contribution to optimizing interests, these organizations reinforce the peaceful effects engendered by democracy.
Indeed, it can be argued that it is precisely this close association in international organizations that enables democracy to unfold its full potential as a cause of peace (Hasenclever 2002).

The same holds for interdependence, particularly in the economic field. Admittedly, it is hotly disputed whether trade relations as such promote peace. The evidence is contradictory and in any case not strong enough for independent proof; for credibility the argument resorts to specific basic conditions or draws on other variables. Trade relations are particularly strong between states (democracies; allies) whose relations anyway tend to be marked by less belligerence and more cooperation than those of the "average dyad" between states (Barbieri/Schneider 1999; Levy 2002, 356-358). Here, too, it can be argued that the peaceful stimuli of interdemocratic relations and institutions serve to neutralize the ambivalent effect of economic relations, if not channelled them in the direction of peace (Weede 1996, 155ff.; Weede 2000, 395 ff.; Oneal/Russett 1999).

The institutions of the democratic polity - the necessary and sufficient everyday causes of peace, both for peace between the collectives that exist in democracy and the web of relations and organizations between democracies (and in the monadic version: also between democracies and non-democracies) - are highlighted by the liberal theory of democratic peace as the everyday, and in the latter case also the transformative and thereafter preventive, causes of peace between states. Thus, at first glance it offers a complete theory of peace.

The empirical evidence presents a curious, and still controversial, picture. In the opinion of the majority, a peace that corresponds to the liberal hypotheses is possible only between democracies, whereas democracies are just as likely to act as warmongers towards non-democracies as non-democracies among themselves. A minority opinion also regards this finding as statistically insignificant or contestable, as democracies also wage war against one another (Layne 1994, Elman 1997). Another position that clings to the monadic theory regards the statistical findings as - weak - confirmation (Rummel 1979, 1995, Oneal/Russett 2001) or argues that although the theory is correct, the democratization of the real existing democracies has not progressed far enough to really produce the predicted effects (Czempiel 1996).

What is certainly unsatisfactory is the crude statement that the monadic theory has been disproved and the dyadic confirmed. As the dyadic theory is based on the same premises as the monadic, but has an interactionist "superstructure", it should not stand either if the foundations of the monadic theory are untenable. For, if the assumptions about the peacefulness of democracies as such are wrong, the people and government of a democratic country cannot be aware of this property in themselves or project it on to sister democracies. The "lubricant" that ensures that the interaction between democracies remains peaceful is missing.

One pointer to a possible solution to this conundrum is the fact that the causal mechanisms in both versions of the theory are by no means so unequivocally set in the direction of peace as the theories initially purport. Rather, opposite consequences can be deduced from the preceding conditions. In addition to the much discussed
peace-promoting effect, as "antinomies" they also contain the permanent contingent possibility of non-peaceful effects. There are five classes of such antinomies (Müller 2002):

**Inclusion/Exclusion:** In both versions, democratic peace is the consequence of deliberate efforts on the part of democracies to reassure themselves. Only a democracy that is conscious of its assumed advantages will actively pursue the peaceful foreign policy predicted in the monadic version or undertake the identification processes of the dyadic version. In each case, non-democracies are labelled as different and - in the end - inferior and dangerous. The dyadic version of the theory reflects this process (Risse-Kappen 1995). It does not contradict its central hypothesis, according to which democracies bring about peace only among themselves. This process has more serious consequences for the monadic version, as it runs counter to the peaceful effects of democracy as a common effort, which constitutes the core of this version of the theory.

**Conflict-exacerbating consequences of competitive structures,** as they are structured both in the democratic system itself and in the economic relations among democracies and between democracies and non-democracies. The processes promoted by competition are, however, double-edged. Competition can awaken interest in the cooperative processing of general regulations or lead to the peaceful transformation of conflicts; moreover, competition itself can be seen as a peaceful substitute for violent conflicts. It can, however, also cause or strengthen cleavages between interests and thus inclusion/exclusion dynamics. Furthermore, agents of interests bent on violence may see in competitive relations a target for their mobilization strategies.

**The ambivalence of utilitarian cost/benefit calculations:** It is not absolutely definite that people's preference to avoid the sacrifices and costs of war requires their governments to pursue peaceful foreign policies in all circumstances. The same motive can also be mobilized to demand more effective weapons and strategies for quick victories. This turns the original motivation of avoiding war and promoting peace on its head. The development of such military options - as currently promised by the proponents of the "revolution in military affairs" (Schöning 2001; Schöning/Müller 2001) - lowers not only the utilitarian, threshold against war, but even normative one, because the same weapons and strategies appear to make it possible to largely avoid harming the adversary (but cf. Wisotzki 2002).

**The democracy-weakening trend of transferring decision-making powers.** The democratization of decisions on war and peace, preferably by widening the decision-making powers of international organizations, i.e., in the final analysis, of national executives, undermines the institutionalist foundation of democratic peace. It does away with both the transparency of decisions on war and peace and the participation of the people, two of the most important conditions on which the liberal theory predicates the peacefulness of the democratic polity. Paradoxically, the willingness of democracies to take their place in international organizations, particularly in conjunction with other democracies - itself an effect and cause of peacefulness -, results in the removal of the most important mechanism for promoting peace. To demonstrate their ability to function as dependable allies and to avoid jeopardizing the existence of valuable alli-
ances between democracies, parliaments are forced into the role of rubber-stamping institutions (Wolf 2000).

Models of democratizing global politics may offer a solution for at least the last-mentioned problem. This may take the form of changes in institutional structure - giving international organizations legislative powers - or transferring decision-making powers to institutions of civil society (Schmidt 1995; Zürn 1998, 2000; Wolf 2000; Rittberger 2000; Lutz-Bachman/Bohman 2002). But this still does not deal with the crucial problem of peacefully resolving the relationship between democracies and non-democracies. To wait for the latter to become democratic, or to postulate or predict it, is of little use during the (extremely uncertain) transition period. To treat both as equals in respect of the desired democratic decision-making structures is a refusal to admit that there is a problem that needs to be dealt with. To this extent, these are designs of hope for a cosmopolitan future that does not yet exist, not useful approaches to contemporary theory and praxeology of peace.

Civilization, Culture, Peace

Thus, the institutionalized approach of "democratic peace" provides only half an answer. For the moment, this brings us back to the question of the mentality of those whose will democratic institutions are intended to express in order to produce the desired effect of promoting peace. The growing importance of culture in social science research has encouraged a number of authors, with the strong support of the UNESCO "Culture of Peace" programme, to analyse the role culture or civilization plays in bringing about peace.

Holistic concepts

One group of these works (Boulding 2000, Jeong 2000, Smoker/Groff 1996, Vogt 1995, 1994/95b, Galtung 1998b) has embraced the holistic concept of peace. They view the dominating western civilization/culture is at best deficient (Smoker), or, worse, tends towards self-destruction (Vogt), or, worst, the cause of all evil and deserving of destruction (Galtung). Although each of the civilizational alternatives designed in response includes political, economic, social, ecological, gender-oriented and psychological components, they still differ from one another.

Boulding expresses sympathy for simple matriarchal subsistence societies that live at one with nature, have very few social distinctions and possess diverse non-violent rituals and methods to channel aggression and find non-violent solutions to conflict. In the final instance, she views these structures as a basic paradigm for a peaceful world. The fact that the average life expectancy in these societies is about half that in more modern societies is not mentioned. Boulding does not ask or answer the critical question of "problems of scale" that inevitably crop up if one applies the model to larger societies, let alone a world with six billion inhabitants. Essentially, she presents a romantic
"back-to-nature" approach, which does not bring us any further in either theory or praxeology.

Jeong, Boulling, Smoker and Groff and Galtung have designed a civilization model in which nature, one's own self, family, society, state and international relations are intended to exercise equal influence. Galtung's and Smoker and Groff's models have borrowed from nature properties they believe are system-supporting (specifically symbiosis) and would like to shape social and political interactions in accordance with this model. Both models - Smoker's more than Galtung's - contain a strong spiritual component. Smoker and Groff expressly call for the reintroduction of religious - in this case mystical - components into secularized western thought. One is left with the distinct impression that there is not really any place in this peaceful civilization for atheists and rationalists; the Enlightenment, the basis, despite all its roundabout ways, still the foundation of the peacefulness achieved in Europe, falls by the wayside. Like Smoker and Groff, Galtung also recommends adopting spiritual elements, in particular from Taoism and Hinduism. It is noticeable that in his comments on western civilization Galtung always emphasized its negative aspects in real life, while his interpretation of eastern culture stresses its idealized spiritual substratum: Indian culture is Gandhi, not the caste system or suttee (1998b, v.a. Teil VI).

These approaches raise two fundamental problems. On the one hand, it is notoriously difficult to apply natural structures to social structures directly. In the meantime, even natural science has discovered the phenomenon of "emergent properties" (Calvin 1986): when simple systems join to form complex systems, the properties of the systems are "greater than the sum of the parts". Hence, emergent properties can neither be predicted with any reliability nor constructed from the bottom up. At every system level, the attributes, structures and processes are of their own order, and cannot be replaced by or utilize the instruments of those of other levels without causing harm.1

The second problem is the contradiction between the authors' demonstrative emphasis on plurality, openness and tolerance and their tightly wrapped "civilization package". There is little room for adaptive evolution to changing problem situations; the prescription resembles the precise remedies of late medieval repentance preachers. Like them, the authors - Galtung more than Smoker and Groff - employ the technique of denunciation. Without more ado, Galtung declares neoclassical economic theories are part of "cultural violence". Those who choose, unlike him, not to speak of structural and

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1 This important point is often overlooked, an unavoidable symptom of peace researchers' ambitious claims to overall interdisciplinary responsibility, which in the case of Galtung in particular is taken to irritating extremes. For instance, Galtung (1986b) turns the significance of "entropy", a concept borrowed from thermodynamics and information theory, on its head by using it as a term for states of order in diversity. Entropy is in fact a measure of disorder and uniformity. His remarks on aggressiveness in male sexuality (1998b, 85.) are based on two encyclopaedia articles and personal information obtained from a physician. In his curt dismissal of "democratic peace" (1998b, 97ff.) he cites two articles by Kende written in the 1970s. The wealth of literature published in this field in the past two decades gets a mention only in a book by Russett.
cultural violence, but of exploitation and discrimination, are ideologists in the service of cultural violence (Galtung 1998b 360, 350; by comparison, see Krysmanski 1993, 158, who can certainly not be labelled uncritical). The fight against old foe images merges seamlessly with the creation of new foe images. Ole Waever has correctly described the all-embracing prescriptions of "positive concepts of peace" as "potentially totalitarian" (Waever 1996, 55). All in all, the absoluteness of the distinction between the existing state and the countercivilization presented as the only alternative is rather demotivating and offers little hope.

Wolfgang Vogt's programme for a civil society (Vogt 1994/95; Vogt 1995; Vogt [ed.] 1999; Vogt/Jung 1997) comes closer to political and social reality. Its only disadvantage is the desire for a holistic concept of peace that includes "everything good". But Vogt does name the cracks in current global developments that cast doubt on the installed peace, the everyday "successful interaction" in and between western societies, and could let the pacification of other regions recede into an ever more distant future. As postulates for processing preventive and transformative causes of peace, the points in his programme, e.g. for social, technological and ecological "civilizing", are definitely worth considering, even though the concept may not be useful here.

The "hexagon of civilization"

Dieter Senghaas has designed a "hexagon of civilization" that offers a considerably more focused approach to a civilization theory of peace. The hexagon is a comprehensive theoretical induction, a historical genesis of the conditions behind the striking development of peaceful relations within and among western countries since World War II. He identifies these conditions with six properties that developed in the course of the western civilization. The peace effect derives from the coincidence of these properties: (1) state monopoly on the use of force; (2) subordination of this monopoly to the rule of law; (3) opportunities for an educated, attentive, politicized and mobilized population to participate in democracy; (4) an adequate degree of social justice, such as has been institutionalized in the post-war welfare states; (5) increasingly longer chains of action that link individuals with one another and with the whole, and, hence, serve as emotion control; and (6) a non-violent culture of conflict that offers conflict processing that goes beyond self-help.

Senghaas establishes four postulates intended as functional equivalents of these six system factors at the international level: (1) protection against violence; (2) protection of liberty; (3) protection against want; and (4) protection against chauvinism (Senghaas 1995b).

Although Senghaas has ceaselessly emphasized that the six hexagonal factors can be effective only synergetically and not in isolation, critics have continued to harp on individual factors (cf. Zellentin 1994/5; Vogt 1995; König 1995; Wellmann 1996). The state's monopoly on the use of force and emotion control have drawn particular ire. Criticism of the state's monopoly on the use of force focuses on its converse, viz. that the state will abuse its power. Senghaas has never disputed this, but has rightly pointed
out that this abuse of the state's monopoly of the use of force does not occur in combination with the rule of law and democratic participation. Nor have critics given an answer to how else, i.e., besides the state's monopoly on the use of force, the undisputed potential for social violence that exists in society can be controlled and pacified.

Emotion control has been criticized to the effect that it also renders possible the cold-blooded execution of the orders for mass murder issued under the Nazi dictatorship, and as a result of the long chains of events, empathy with the victims of violence cannot serve as a deterrent against violent actions. Senghaas has also countered this criticism with the argument that emotion control may not be judged in isolation from the other elements of the hexagon - e.g. a civil culture of conflict. Incidentally, critics see emotion control only in terms of repression and suppression. Yet, sublimation and strong egos are also subjected to emotion control, which, in these instances, is regarded as a prerequisite for a happy and creative emotional life. Here, too, the criticism begs the question of how critics imagine a prosperous and non-violent social existence in the absence of emotion control.

The accusation that he uncritically glorifies western civilization and defends an imperialism of civilization also misses the point. It ignores the inductive method: Senghaas is right to seek the roots of the relatively civil coexistence in and between western states. He correctly points out that the many countries that have moved beyond the stage of subsistence economy and, in the uncompleted process of modernization, are now struggling with the problems of building a state with increasingly mobilized populations demanding participation must come up with equivalent achievements. Nowhere does he write that western institutions must be literally copied one-on-one; but where western models are not or cannot be adopted, functional equivalents will have to be found.

Despite the wave of criticism, Senghaas's Model presents a strong challenge in the domain of theory. But it also has its weaknesses:

- The first reservation concerns the adequacy of the "six points" of the hexagon. Senghaas treats the growing interdependencies of modern societies and emotion control as one. Are these not actually two different, albeit closely related, elements of civilization? The interdependencies integrate previously segmented parallel spaces and to this extent constitute conditions of existence for large modern societies. Emotion control, on the other hand, is a psychological structure at the level of the individual.

- The next step is to ask whether the existence of an active and committed civil society does not constitute an indispensable part of non-violent civilization. Civil society is different from individual and collective participation through universal franchise. In response to the risk of societal segmentation, civil society offers the opportunity of different roles, multiple identities and participation in various capacities beyond universal franchise.

- Third, the element of trust - mutually among citizens and between them and the institutions - could also be included as a basic element of non-violent civilization.
Trust is not identical with either conflict culture or emotion control. Moreover, it represents a very vulnerable and reversible aspect of the complete canvas of civilization (Fogarty 2000, 30ff.). To this extent, neglecting trust could encourage unjustified assumptions of stability.

- Finally, there is the question of what degree of economic concentration is acceptable before the entire political and social construction finds itself in difficulties. Surprisingly, the hexagon is silent about economic structure and the relationship between the economy and the state, even though the much-acclaimed level of non-violence has evolved under conditions of state supervised free-market competition and a generally acceptable balance of power between the social partners.

Hence, on closer examination the hexagon of civilization could conceivably be expanded to a decagon.

Another criticism of Senghaas's model is its silence on current and future (ecological, economic, technological, socio-political and gender) challenges. This criticism is justified, but misunderstands Senghaas's intention: he was interested in an analysis of the historical conditions for non-violent social and international relations on the basis of a relatively narrowly defined concept of peace. In contrast to the ambitious designs for overall competence common in peace studies, Senghaas leaves the development of models in the fields of economics, the environment, technology and gender studies to the appropriate experts. These models can be compared with the "hexagon" and, if necessary, amended and expanded. The "hexagon" does not claim to have the answer for everything.

The strongest criticism concerns the gap between Senghaas's definition of domestic causes of peace and his relatively vague postulates on the question of international peace; whereby the peace within the western community is the least of his problems. He has studied the intra-European conditions particularly closely, and his conclusions in this field are largely in agreement with the work of other authors on security communities (Senghaas 1990; 1992).

The situation concerning the relationship between democratic and non- or partially democratic states is different. In this field, theory and praxeology are relatively vague. The four postulates of protection mentioned above fluctuate depending on whether they refer to states (protection against violence), individuals (protection against violence, protection of liberty, protection against want) or groups (protection against chauvinism). Similarly, it is not clear which institutions are responsible for these different kinds of protection and how to balance the need to minimize interstate security dilemmas with the obvious need for substantial intervention in state sovereignty that inevitably arises in the play off between references to individuals and references to groups (cf. the considerations in Zürn 2000).

This highlights a gap in the civilization theory of peace that is not satisfactorily covered by either the holistic or the hexagonal approach: How does one deal with the het-
erogeneity of the world? The "holistic" theoreticians - despite supposed multiculturalism and tolerance of diversity - refer to a package for a utopian, uniform civilization, and leave us helpless about what to do in the meantime. The hexagon refers to the conditions for peace and the trend towards a "civilization despite ourselves" (Senghaas 1998), but does not inform us about either the theoretical possibility of or the prerequisites for peaceful relations between the world of the "hexagon of civilization" and other existing real worlds.

This is all the more serious since Huntington's (however modified) thesis (Huntington 1996) of the impossibility of peaceful relations in a culturally heterogeneous world. It is all the more serious because the world is made up of democracies and non-democracies with very different cultural traditions that, even if we accept for argument's sake an evolutionary teleology towards a universalized western model, will remain heterogeneous for at least another two generations. Even in the age of the alleged "revolution in military affairs", the destructive potential of modern weaponry demands that we do everything in our power to avoid war and to use peaceful relations to widen the scope for development of all societies (see Czempiel 1999). This calls for causes of peace that are compatible with heterogeneity, especially as the present leadership of the USA, the only superpower, is plainly bent on using their military might to promote a unilateral hegemony with imperialist traits, which implies a higher rather than lower level of violence in international relations.

In this connection, the continued extension of international law to more and more fields (Delbrück 1996), albeit familiar, is nonetheless still a convincing cause of peace (in all three functions). The procedural aspects of international law are of particular significance. Protection against violence between states can be optimized only if procedural provisions can be relied upon to limit the expectation of military intervention to exceptional, extreme cases. In this respect, the growing tendency towards self-authorization on the part of the western world, fuelled by US unilateralism, has smashed a lot of china in the past decade. The reintroduction of and unconditional respect for binding procedures to regulate the use of military force beyond self-defence is a fundamental prerequisite for eliminating the ubiquitous use of force between the states of the "hexagon of civilization" and those outside (Brock 2000). All findings and experience show that, in addition to international law, other international institutions, i.e., regimes and international organizations, in particular the United Nations Organization, remain indispensable (Rittberger/Mogler/Zangl 1997; Rittberger 1996; Alger 1999).

Concerning the relationship between different cultures and civilizations, the question is whether, in addition to Senghaas's postulated four protections, there is need for a fifth: "change with dignity". The undeniable anti-western undercurrent in many parts of the third and fourth worlds - not only in Islamic countries - is a reaction to what is perceived as "cultural aggression". Western influence brings many desirable achievements - cultural products such as freedom and human rights as well as values of material well-being -, but also symptoms of decline present in the process of western civilization and, above all, a ubiquitous sense of outside determination. In this connection,
respect for the uniqueness of the other cultures and corresponding measures of empowerment and support are crucial transformative causes of peace in the relationship between the West and the "rest".

This presumes that it is possible to develop some form of platform for the interaction between the cultures or civilizations, an undertaking that often goes by the name of "intercultural dialogue". This dialogue has three facets:

- first, the simple exchange of information about the respective other facets so as to overcome ignorance about that which constitutes the otherness of other cultures;
- second, the identification of the common ground that transcends individual cultures. Nothing could be more important for the world than a basic stock of shared values that serves as a common point of reference for all participants in the intercultural dialogue and also a reference point in the discourse between states. Senghaas's proof of reciprocal commonalities in the wider narrative between civilizations (Senghaas 1998) or the "global ethos" project point (Küng 1993; Küng/Kuschel 2001) in this direction;
- third, an understanding of unbridgeable differences. Respect for differences and the acceptance that future development is open to all sides would be a significant factor for détente in both intercultural and international relations.

Conclusions

A narrow concept of peace that is restricted to the absence of physical and verbal violence between collectives offers practical advantages for research and is normatively justifiable. Defining peace as successful everyday interaction between specific partners opens up a new perspective that contrasts with the Hobbesian paradigm and draws attention to the durable elements of peaceful relations. The weakness of a snapshot status description can be balanced by including the discursive dimension - taking into account verbal acts that articulate the possibility of violent action. Justice is excluded from the concept, but not the theory, of peace: a measure of justice that leads actors to regard violent action as inappropriate and unnecessary is a significant cause of peace as defined here.

The distinction between everyday, preventive and transformative causes of peace or between everyday, preventive and transformative functions of the same cause of peace allows us to structure peace theory more precisely. Interestingly, a considerable part of the discussion on international relations in the past decade - key words: democratic peace and security community - and in peace studies - key words: civilization / civilizing / peace culture - has been concerned with everyday causes of peace. But in the end, this has failed to answer the decisive question of how to frame the relationship between those regions in which currently everyday causes of peace already determine the structure of relations and the rest of the world, given that the condition of cultural
and structural heterogeneity will hold for the foreseeable future. Preventive and transformative instruments need to play a much larger role here, as they did in the East-West conflict. What is already clear, however, is that the dimensions of culture and distribution policy will be considerably more important than they were in the “Cold War”.

The holistic approaches fail because of their ambition and, not least, an element of dilettantism that is inevitable given the attempt of individual academics to systemically integrate and present the entire body of interdisciplinary knowledge. However, these approaches do articulate one important, indeed crucial question. How can current everyday causes of peace be secured or reformed against the onrush of harmful processes - whether caused by distribution policy, the destruction of nature or structural domination (including patriarchal relationships) - welling up out of their own deep structures, and how can preventive and transformative instruments be adjusted to deal with these risks? As the unsatisfying status of the holistic approaches demonstrates, these are questions to which neither peace studies nor international relations has satisfactory answers. Nonetheless, holistic academics are urged to enter into a systematic and lasting discourse in which they can compare their insights with those of other specialists committed to the intellectual challenges of analysing these risks and finding potentially serviceable, practicable answers to them.

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